Harvest Land Co-Op, Inc. v. Hora , 2022 Ohio 2375 ( 2022 )


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  • [Cite as Harvest Land Co-Op, Inc. v. Hora, 
    2022-Ohio-2375
    .]
    IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
    SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
    MONTGOMERY COUNTY
    HARVEST LAND CO-OP, INC.                              :
    :
    Plaintiff-Appellee                            :      Appellate Case Nos. 26218 and 26227
    :
    v.                                                    :      Trial Court Case No. 2010-CV-2284
    :
    FRANKIE J. HORA, et al.                               :      (Civil Appeal from
    :      Common Pleas Court)
    Defendants-Appellants                         :
    :
    ...........
    OPINION
    Rendered on the 8th day of July, 2022.
    ...........
    MAURA J. HOFF, Atty. Reg. No. 0098259, 400 South Walnut Street, Suite 200, Muncie,
    Indiana 47305
    Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellee
    FRANKIE J. HORA, 15725 Eaton Pike, West Alexandria, Ohio 45381
    Defendant-Appellant, Pro Se
    .............
    TUCKER, P.J.
    -2-
    {¶ 1} Defendant-appellant Frankie J. Hora appeals from a judgment of the trial
    court finding him liable in the amount of $89,307.15 on a promissory note. He also
    appeals the trial court’s denial of his Civ.R. 60(B) motion to vacate judgment. However,
    for the reasons set forth below, we conclude this appeal has been rendered moot by a
    discharge in bankruptcy which settled all issues regarding the debt underlying this case.
    Accordingly, this appeal is dismissed.
    I.   Facts and Procedural History
    {¶ 2} The facts relevant to this matter were previously set forth by this court in
    Harvest Land Co-Op, Inc. v. Hora, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 25068, 
    2012-Ohio-5915
    (Hora I), wherein we stated:
    Plaintiff Harvest Land Co–Op, Inc. (“Harvest Land”) is an agricultural
    cooperative. 1 Defendant Frankie J. Hora is a farmer and has been a
    member of the Harvest Land cooperative since 2006. Hora purchased
    agricultural products and services from Harvest Land during that time, and
    he maintained an account with Harvest Land for that purpose. Sometime in
    2009, Hora fell into arrears in paying the account. In March of 2009, Frankie
    Hora paid Harvest Land $21,089.91 on the account. Hora and his wife, Mary
    D. Hora, also gave Harvest Land a promissory note for $100,000.00.
    On March 16, 2010, Plaintiff Harvest Land filed a complaint alleging
    1
    Following a January 2021 merger, Co-Alliance Cooperative, Inc. became the
    succeeding legal entity of Harvest Land Co-Op, Inc. For the sake of clarity, we will
    continue to refer to the plaintiff-appellee as “Harvest Land.”
    -3-
    that the Horas had defaulted on the promissory note in the amount of
    $100,000.00 made payable to Harvest Land, and that the sum of
    $100,787.26, plus interest, was due, owing, and unpaid. Harvest Land also
    alleged that the promissory note “memorialized” a delinquent debt on an
    account the Horas previously owed.
    A copy of the alleged promissory note was attached to Harvest
    Land's complaint. The note requires the Horas to pay the face amount of
    $100,000.00, plus interest at the rate of eight percent per annum, in monthly
    payments of $3,133.64, beginning May 1, 2009. The note further provides
    that interest charges at the rate of 21 percent per annum will accrue after
    the date of maturity until the amounts due and owing are paid in full, plus
    attorney's fees and costs of collection.
    After obtaining leave of court, the Horas filed an amended answer
    and counterclaim. After denying certain allegations on Harvest Land's
    complaint, the Horas admitted Harvest Land's allegation that their
    promissory note memorialized a delinquent debt and that they failed to
    make all payments due on the note, alleging that their failure was due to
    Harvest Land's wrongful conduct. The Horas also admitted that Harvest
    Land expected to be paid for agricultural products it sold to the Horas that
    were not defective. The Horas also admitted that they failed to pay for
    certain agricultural products which failed to perform as represented by
    Harvest Land, but denied that they owed $100,000.00 plus interest on the
    -4-
    note.
    The Horas' counterclaim alleged breaches of their contracts by
    Harvest Land in five separate causes of action and claims for unjust
    enrichment in two causes of action. The Horas also asked for an accounting
    of payments they made and services they provided Harvest Land.
    The matter was referred to a magistrate. Following hearings, the
    magistrate filed a decision on November 15, 2010, granting Harvest Land
    summary judgment on its claim for relief on the promissory note. The
    magistrate rejected the Horas' claim that their promissory note is
    unenforceable for lack of consideration. The magistrate held that the
    promissory note is an instrument for value, and therefore does not lack
    consideration, because it was issued by the Horas as payment of, or as
    security for, an antecedent claim against Frank Hora for the balance due on
    his account with Harvest Land. R.C. 1303.33(A)(3). The magistrate further
    found that the Horas failed to bear their burden to rebut the presumption of
    the existence of consideration for a promissory note. Accordingly, the
    magistrate granted judgment for Harvest Land in the amount of
    $106,876.15, plus per diem interest. The magistrate further held that the
    summary judgment for Harvest Land rendered moot the Horas' claims for
    unjust enrichment and breach of contract.
    The Horas filed objections to the magistrate's decision. Before those
    objections were ruled upon by the trial court, the magistrate filed a second
    -5-
    decision on January 14, 2011, granting summary judgment for Harvest Land
    on the Horas' counterclaims for breach of contract and unjust enrichment.
    No objections were filed to that decision, which on July 7, 2011 was adopted
    by the trial court as its own order.
    On August 1, 2011, the magistrate filed a third decision, awarding
    Harvest Land a judgment for $25,062.50 on its claim for attorney's fees.
    Objections to that decision were filed by both Harvest Land and the Horas.
    On February 6, 2012, the trial court overruled the objections the
    Horas filed to the summary judgment for Harvest Land in the amount of
    $106,876.15, plus interest, and the court adopted the magistrate's decision
    on that matter as the court's order. The court also overruled the objections
    the parties filed to the magistrate's decision with respect to attorneys’ fees
    for lack of a transcript.2
    On March 9, 2012, the Horas filed a notice of appeal from the trial
    court's final order of February 6, 2012. Harvest Land filed a notice of cross-
    appeal from that same final order.
    (Footnotes added.) Id. at ¶ 2-11.
    {¶ 3} On December 14, 2012, we reversed the trial court’s decision denying the
    Horas’ counterclaim for an accounting. The matter was remanded solely for further
    proceedings on the claim for an accounting. The trial court’s decision was affirmed in all
    2  Of relevance hereto, but not mentioned in Hora I, following the filing of the judgment in
    its favor, Harvest Land caused an R.C. 2329.02 certificate of judgment lien to be filed with
    the Clerk of Courts of Montgomery County, Ohio. See 2012 CJ 183311.
    -6-
    other respects. Id. at ¶ 96.
    {¶ 4} On remand, the Horas filed a motion for leave to amend their counterclaim
    to assert a claim for fraud. The motion was overruled on August 20, 2013. A trial on
    the accounting was conducted in September 2013.             On December 2, 2013, the
    magistrate entered a decision in which it reduced the amount due on the promissory note
    to $89,307.15 due to a mistake in the account charges as well as an error related to the
    interest charged on the account. The magistrate also noted that the Horas were entitled
    to a credit of $3,433.64 for payments made on the promissory note.
    {¶ 5} Hora filed objections to the magistrate’s decision. They also filed a Civ.R.
    60(B) motion for relief from the magistrate’s original 2010 decision. On April 11, 2014,
    the trial court overruled the objections to the magistrate’s decision. On April 15, 2014,
    the trial court overruled the motion for Civ.R. 60(B) relief from judgment. Thereafter, the
    previously filed certificate of judgment was amended to reflect the reduction in the
    judgment amount.
    {¶ 6} Hora filed separate, timely notices of appeal from each decision.        The
    appeals were consolidated in July 2014. In August 2014, Hora, acting pro se, filed his
    appellate brief. Harvest Land then filed its brief. Thereafter, Hora retained counsel who
    filed a motion seeking to amend Hora’s previously-filed brief. In the motion, counsel
    indicated it was necessary to properly format the brief and that the arguments required
    clarification and consolidation. The motion was granted, and an amended brief was filed
    on December 17, 2014.
    {¶ 7} In March 2015, Hora and his wife filed for bankruptcy protection. Thereafter,
    -7-
    this court filed an order staying the appeal pending the completion of the bankruptcy
    action.     The stay was lifted on September 8, 2021, following notification that the
    bankruptcy action had been resolved. On October 14, 2021, we ordered the parties to
    file supplemental briefing regarding the sole issue of whether the discharge in the
    bankruptcy case rendered this appeal moot.
    {¶ 8} On November 15, 2021, Hora filed a document entitled “Amended Brief of
    Appellant Frankie J. Hora.” At the beginning of the document, Hora set forth a one-page
    statement of his basis for claiming this appeal is not moot. However, the remaining 34
    pages of the document appear to be a restatement of the appellate brief filed by Hora in
    August 2014 prior to retaining counsel.
    {¶ 9} On February 24, 2022, this court entered an order requiring Harvest Land to
    file its supplemental brief addressing the issue of mootness. Hora filed an objection to
    that order which was subsequently overruled. In the interim, it was discovered that
    counsel for Harvest Land had passed away during the bankruptcy stay, but all post-
    bankruptcy filings had continued to be mailed to counsel. It was further discovered that
    Harvest Land had merged with another company.            Notice was provided to the new
    corporate entity. On March 10, 2022, Harvest Land, through new counsel, filed a motion
    for enlargement of time in which to file its supplemental brief. The motion was granted,
    and Harvest Land filed a supplemental brief on April 5, 2022. Hora filed a motion to strike
    the brief. The motion was overruled, but Hora was permitted to file a responsive brief,
    which he filed on April 20, 2022. This matter is now ripe for review.
    -8-
    II.     Discharge in Bankruptcy Renders Appeal Moot
    {¶ 10} Before we address the merits of the arguments raised in Hora’s appellate
    brief, we must determine whether this matter has been rendered moot by the discharge
    in the bankruptcy action.
    {¶ 11} The doctrine of mootness is founded upon the “long and well established
    [premise] that it is the duty of every judicial tribunal to decide actual controversies between
    parties legitimately affected by specific facts and to render judgments which can be
    carried into effect.” State v. Muwwakkil, 2d Dist. Clark No. 2018-CA-37, 2018-Ohio-
    4443, ¶ 6, quoting Fortner v. Thomas, 
    22 Ohio St.2d 13
    , 14, 
    257 N.E.2d 371
     (1970).
    Courts have no duty “to decide purely academic or abstract questions.” James A. Keller,
    Inc. v. Flaherty, 
    74 Ohio App.3d 788
    , 791, 
    600 N.E.2d 736
     (10th Dist.1991), citing Miner
    v. Witt, 
    82 Ohio St. 237
    , 
    92 N.E. 21
     (1910). Thus, a court “will not decide * * * cases in
    which there is no longer any actual controversy.” Heartland of Urbana, OH, L.L.C. v.
    McHugh Fuller Law Group, P.L.L.C., 
    2016-Ohio-6959
    , 
    72 N.E.3d 23
    , ¶ 36, citing In re
    A.G., 
    139 Ohio St.3d 572
    , 
    2014-Ohio-2597
    , 
    13 N.E.3d 1146
    , ¶ 37, quoting Black's Law
    Dictionary 1100 (9th Ed.2009).
    {¶ 12} Hora filed for bankruptcy protection under the auspices of Chapter 12 of the
    United States Bankruptcy Code, which “was enacted in November 26, 1986 to provide
    family farmers with regular annual income to stay in possession of the farm while
    obtaining court approval of a debt readjustment plan. Chapter 12 combines elements of
    Chapter 11 reorganizations and Chapter 13 Wage Earner Plans with a number of
    provisions unique to farm bankruptcies.” Mercer Sav. Bank v. Fullenkamp, 116 Ohio
    -9-
    App.3d 647, 649, 
    688 N.E.2d 1111
    , fn. 6 (3d Dist.1996). There is no dispute that Harvest
    Land filed a timely proof of claim in which it asserted that it held secured creditor status
    based upon the lien created by the certificate of judgment filed with the Montgomery
    County Clerk of Court. In its filings with the bankruptcy court, Harvest Land claimed it
    was owed $146,759.02. However, only $50,000, plus interest, was allowed under the
    bankruptcy plan. Ultimately, the bankruptcy trustee paid Harvest Land $59,126. An
    order of discharge was granted to the Horas and filed of record on May 13, 2021.
    Harvest Land asserts that the order of discharge specifically states that the certificate of
    judgment, recorded at 2012 CJ 183311, “shall be deemed satisfied and released of
    record.”
    {¶ 13} Hora does not dispute that the debt and certificate of judgment were
    discharged in the bankruptcy action, and he does not dispute that he no longer owes any
    monies to Harvest Land. Instead, he claims that this appeal is not moot and should be
    decided under the exceptions to the mootness doctrine.
    {¶ 14} We recognize that the mootness doctrine does have limited exceptions that,
    when present, allow review. One such exception involves issues that are “capable of
    repetition, yet evading review.” State ex rel. Plain Dealer Pub. Co. v. Barnes, 
    38 Ohio St.3d 165
    , 
    527 N.E.2d 807
     (1988), paragraph one of the syllabus.              “This exception
    applies only in exceptional circumstances in which the following two factors are both
    present: (1) the challenged action is too short in its duration to be fully litigated before its
    cessation or expiration, and (2) there is a reasonable expectation that the same
    complaining party will be subject to the same action again.” Lund v. Portsmouth Local
    -10-
    Air Agency, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 14AP-60, 
    2014-Ohio-2741
    , ¶ 8, quoting State ex rel.
    Calvary v. Upper Arlington, 
    89 Ohio St.3d 229
    , 231, 
    729 N.E.2d 1182
     (2000). “[T]here
    must be more than a theoretical possibility that the action will arise again.” 
    Id.,
     citing
    Robinson v. Indus. Comm., 10th Dist. Franklin No. 04AP-1010, 
    2005-Ohio-2290
    , ¶ 8,
    quoting James A. Keller, Inc., 
    74 Ohio App.3d 788
    , 792, 
    600 N.E.2d 736
    . “An injury is
    not deemed capable of repetition merely because someone, at sometime [sic], might
    suffer the same harm; there must be a reasonable chance that it will happen again to the
    complaining party.” Heartland of Urbana OH, L.L.C., 
    2016-Ohio-6959
    , 
    72 N.E.3d 23
    ,
    ¶ 39, quoting Village of W. Unity ex rel. Beltz v. Merillat, 6th Dist. Williams No. WM-03-
    016, 
    2004-Ohio-2682
    , ¶ 16, citing Weinstein v. Bradford, 
    423 U.S. 147
    , 149, 
    96 S.Ct. 347
    ,
    
    46 L.Ed.2d 350
     (1975).
    {¶ 15} Hora does not suggest that this type of action -- a complaint to enforce a
    promissory note -- is by its nature too short in duration to be fully litigated before its
    cessation. Indeed, notwithstanding the time on appeal and the bankruptcy stay, this
    action was pending in the trial court for over four years. Thus, we cannot conclude this
    debt collection action has been of too short a duration to fully litigate the issues raised
    therein. Also, there is no evidence, and Hora has not demonstrated, that there is any
    reasonable expectation that he will be subject to the same action again. There is no
    evidence that Hora remains a member or utilizes the services of Harvest Land.         And
    there is no evidence that Harvest Land maintains the same business practices it had
    before it merged with another company. Thus, we cannot say there is a reasonable
    chance that the same sequence of events that occurred in this case will occur again.
    -11-
    Therefore, we find no merit in Hora’s claim that the “capable of repetition yet evading
    review” exception is applicable.
    {¶ 16} In reference to other exceptions to the mootness doctrine, we note that “[an
    appellate] court may hear the appeal where there remains a debatable constitutional
    question to resolve, or where the matter appealed is one of great public or general
    interest.” State ex rel. White v. Kilbane Koch, 
    96 Ohio St.3d 395
    , 
    2002-Ohio-4848
    , 
    775 N.E.2d 508
    , ¶ 16, quoting from Franchise Developers, Inc. v. Cincinnati, 
    30 Ohio St.3d 28
    , 
    505 N.E.2d 966
     (1987). However, this record is devoid of anything to suggest either
    of these exceptions are applicable to this case.
    {¶ 17} Finally, Hora argues that the appeal is not moot because the failure to
    determine the merits of the case will result in secondary legal consequences. In support,
    he claims that Harvest Land will continue to make fraudulent charges and impose
    improper interest rates if this appeal is not decided on the merits.
    {¶ 18} We presume that Hora refers to the “collateral consequences” exception,
    which the Supreme Court of Ohio has recognized as existing in civil and criminal cases
    where “the collateral consequence is imposed as a matter of law.” Cyran v. Cyran, 
    152 Ohio St.3d 484
    , 
    2018-Ohio-24
    , 
    97 N.E.3d 487
    , ¶ 9. However, the court also stated in
    Cyran that “[s]peculation is insufficient to establish a legally cognizable interest for which
    a court can order relief using the collateral-consequences exception to the mootness
    doctrine.” Id. at ¶ 11. Likewise, this court has stated, “[a] collateral disability must be a
    substantial, individualized impairment, and a purely hypothetical statement, about what
    might occur in the future is not sufficient to give viability to an otherwise moot appeal.”
    -12-
    Cyran v. Cyran, 
    2016-Ohio-7323
    , 
    63 N.E.3d 187
    , ¶ 7-8 (2d Dist.), aff'd, 
    152 Ohio St.3d 484
    , 
    2018-Ohio-24
    , 
    97 N.E.3d 487
    , ¶ 7-8.             Hora fails to identify any collateral
    consequences which will occur by operation of law. Further, the claims that the company
    will make future fraudulent charges and/or impose improper interest charges are purely
    speculative, and thus insufficient to overcome the mootness doctrine.
    {¶ 19} Finally, although not raised in the context of collateral legal consequences,
    Hora claims he was denied a loan due to the existence of the certificate of judgment lien.
    However, he has submitted no evidence to support a finding that the lien was the basis
    for the denial of the loan. It is just as likely the loan was denied due to the bankruptcy
    filing or to a lack of sufficient collateral. In any event, we will not speculate as to the
    possibility that the certificate of judgment may result in the denial of future loan requests.
    Further, given the resolution of the bankruptcy case, Hora has the ability to petition the
    trial court for a notice of satisfaction and release regarding the certificate of judgment. In
    other words, any claim that the certificate of judgment will cause collateral consequences
    is without merit as Hora has a mechanism for voiding the lien.
    {¶ 20} We conclude that any issues of whether the trial court properly denied
    Hora’s motion for Civ.R. 60(B) relief and whether it correctly determined the issue of the
    accounting on the subject promissory note have been rendered moot because Hora’s
    debt, memorialized by the promissory note, was discharged in the federal bankruptcy
    court proceedings.     Hora has failed to dispute that discharge and has failed to
    demonstrate the applicability of any of the exceptions to the mootness doctrine.
    Therefore, we need not address the issues raised in his appellate brief.
    -13-
    III.   Conclusion
    {¶ 21} Because Hora’s claims on appeal are moot, this appeal is dismissed.
    .............
    EPLEY, J. and LEWIS, J., concur.
    Copies sent to:
    Maura J. Hoff
    Frankie J. Hora
    Hon. Dennis J. Adkins