In re J.S. , 2023 Ohio 82 ( 2023 )


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  • [Cite as In re J.S., 
    2023-Ohio-82
    .]
    COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
    EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
    COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA
    IN RE J.S., ET AL.                           :
    :
    Minor Children                               :           Nos. 111256 and 111258
    :
    [Appeal by S.S., Mother]                     :
    JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION
    JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED
    RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: January 12, 2023
    Civil Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas
    Juvenile Division
    Case Nos. AD20904448 and AD21902244
    Appearances:
    Valore and Gordillo, LLP, and Michael Gordillo, for
    appellant.
    Michael C. O’Malley, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting
    Attorney, and Joseph C. Young, Assistant Prosecuting
    Attorney, for appellee.
    EMANUELLA D. GROVES, J.:
    Appellant-mother (“Mother”) appeals from the judgment of the
    Cuyahoga County Common Pleas Court, Juvenile Division, granting permanent
    custody of her minor children, J.S. and M.S., to appellee, the Cuyahoga County
    Division of Children and Family Services (“CCDCFS” or the “Agency”). 1 For the
    reasons that follow, we affirm the juvenile court’s judgment.
    Procedural and Factual History
    On April 29, 2020, CCDCFS filed a complaint alleging that J.S., born
    April 11, 2020, was an abused and dependent child as defined by R.C. 2151.031(D)
    and 2151.04(B). The complaint averred, in part, the following particulars:
    1. Mother has a substance use disorder related to marijuana. The child
    tested positive for marijuana at birth. This is mother’s second child
    who tested positive for marijuana.
    2. Mother lacks the necessary income to provide basic needs for the
    child.
    3. Mother has three other children who were previously adjudicated
    and are no longer in her custody due in part to mother’s substance use
    disorder, financial instability, untreated mental health issues, and lack
    of housing. Two children were committed to the legal custody of their
    paternal grandmother. The other child was committed to a step
    grandfather. See Case Nos. AD17903644, AD17907121, and
    AD17908415.
    4. Mother has prior convictions for forgery and theft, for which she
    served a period of incarceration. See Cuyahoga County Case No.: CR-
    15-600885-E.
    5. Alleged father, [D.S.], lacks the necessary income to provide basic
    needs for the child. 2
    6. Alleged father, [D.S.], has failed to establish paternity.
    7. Alleged father, John Doe, has failed to establish paternity and has
    failed to support, visit, or communicate with the child since birth.
    1   The juvenile court issued two judgment entries: one for each child.
    2 The alleged father, D.S. (“Alleged Father”), is not a party to this appeal, but will
    be referenced in the discussion to provide context.
    Along with the complaint, CCDCFS also filed a motion for
    predispositional temporary custody of J.S. to the agency. Following a hearing held
    on May 26, 2020, the juvenile court granted the motion and J.S. was placed in the
    predispositional temporary custody of CCDCFS.
    The agency developed a case plan to assist Mother in remedying the
    issues that led to J.S.’s removal. Specifically, the case plan was geared towards
    addressing Mother’s challenges with substance abuse, mental health, parenting,
    housing, and providing for the child’s basic needs.       On September 10, 2020,
    following a hearing where Mother stipulated to an amended complaint, the juvenile
    court adjudicated J.S. abused and dependent and placed the child in the Agency’s
    temporary custody.
    On March 24, 2021, while Mother’s case involving J.S. was pending,
    CCDCFS filed a separate complaint, for abuse and dependency, relating to another
    child of Mother. That child, M.S., was born prematurely, on February 17, 2021, at
    approximately 26 weeks gestation, with significant medical challenges.
    That complaint averred, in part, the following particulars:
    1. Mother has a substance abuse issue related to marijuana that
    interferes with her ability to care for the child. M.S.’s meconium tested
    positive for marijuana at birth. This is mother’s third child who tested
    positive for marijuana at birth.
    2. Mother lacks the necessary income and the ability to meet the basic
    needs of the infant.
    3. Mother has mental health diagnoses of depression and anxiety that
    interfere with her ability to care for the child.
    4. Mother has four other children who were previously adjudicated and
    are not in her custody due in part to mother’s issue with substance
    abuse and mental health. Three of the children were committed to the
    legal custody of relatives. See Case Nos. AD17903644, AD17907121,
    and AD17908415. The fourth child is in the temporary custody of
    CCDCFS and a motion for permanent custody is pending. See Case No.
    AD20904448.
    5. Alleged father, [D.S.], has not yet established paternity.
    6. [D.S.] lacks the necessary income and the ability to meet the basic
    needs of an infant.
    7. [D.S.] has another child who was adjudicated and committed to the
    temporary custody of CCDCFS. A motion for permanent custody is
    pending. See Case No. AD20904448.
    8. Alleged father, John Doe, has failed to establish paternity and has
    failed to support, visit, or communicate with the child since birth.
    CCDCFS filed a contemporaneous motion for permanent custody of
    M.S. In the affidavit filed in support of CCDCFS’s motion, caseworker Deja Arthur
    (“Arthur”) averred in pertinent part, as follows:
    1. M.S. was born premature on February 17, 2021 and is medically
    fragile due to being born premature.
    2. Mother has mental health diagnoses of depression and anxiety that
    interfere with her ability to care for the child.
    3. Mother has four other children who were previously adjudicated and
    are not in her custody due in part to mother’s issues with substance
    abuse and mental health. Three of the children were committed to the
    legal custody of relatives. See Case Nos. AD17903644, AD17907121,
    and AD17908415. The fourth child is in the temporary custody of
    CCDCFS and a motion for permanent custody is pending. See Case No.
    AD20904448.
    4. Alleged father, [D.S.], has not yet established paternity.
    5. [D.S.] is currently unemployed.
    6. [D.S.] has another child who was adjudicated and committed to the
    temporary custody of CCDCFS. A motion for permanent custody is
    pending. See Case No. AD20904448.
    7. Alleged father [D.S.], has pending charges of gross sexual imposition,
    importuning, public indecency, and endangering children. A sibling of
    M.S. was the alleged victim while on a visit with mother at the home
    she shares with [D.S.]. See Case No. CR-21-661303-A.
    8. Alleged father, John Doe, has failed to establish paternity and has
    failed to support, visit, or communicate with the child since birth.
    As was done with J.S., the juvenile court also placed M.S. in the
    predispositional temporary custody of CCDCFS.
    On the same day that the complaint for abuse and dependency
    concerning M.S. was filed, CCDCFS also filed a motion to modify temporary custody
    of J.S. to permanent custody. In support of that motion, CCDCFS asserted that the
    conditions listed in R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(a) existed and that one or more of the factors
    listed in R.C. 2151.414(E) applied to the parents at issue. Additionally, CCDCFS
    asserted that after considering all relevant factors, including those listed at R.C.
    2151.414(D)(1)(a)-(e), the evidence to be presented would establish clearly and
    convincingly that an award of permanent custody was in J.S.’s best interest.
    In the affidavit filed in support of CCDCFS’s motion, caseworker Halli
    Martin (“Martin”) averred in pertinent part, as follows:
    1. I was assigned the case on or about March 5, 2021.
    2. The child was committed to the emergency custody of CCDCFS
    pursuant to an order journalized on May 5, 2020.
    3. The child was adjudicated dependent, pursuant to an order
    journalized on September 10, 2020.
    4. The child was committed to the temporary custody of CCDCFS
    pursuant to an order journalized on September 10, 2020.
    5. A case plan was filed with Juvenile Court and approved which
    required that mother was to complete a psychological assessment and
    follow all recommendations, engage in substance abuse services,
    complete parenting classes, obtain and maintain stable housing and
    provide for the basic needs of the child.
    6. Mother is not compliant with case plan services.
    7. Mother has three other children who were previously adjudicated
    and are no longer in her custody due in part to mother’s substance use
    disorder, financial instability, untreated mental health issues, and lack
    of housing. Two children were committed to the legal custody of their
    paternal grandmother. The other child was committed to the legal
    custody of a step grandmother.            See case nos. AD17903644,
    AD17907121, and AD17908415.
    8. A case plan was filed with Juvenile Court and approved which
    required that alleged father, [D.S.] was to engage in substance abuse
    services, complete parenting classes, obtain and maintain stable
    housing and provide for the basic needs of the child.
    9. Alleged father, [D.S.] has not established paternity and is not
    compliant with case plan services.
    10. Alleged father, John Doe, has failed to establish paternity and has
    failed to support, visit, or communicate with the child since birth.
    On January 3, 2022, the scheduled date for the dispositional hearing
    concerning J.S., both Mother and Father stipulated to the Agency’s amended
    complaint for abuse and dependency concerning M.S. Among the stipulations were
    that “Mother has mental health diagnoses of depression and anxiety that interfere
    with her ability to care for the child.” Both also stipulated that “[a]lleged father,
    [D.S.] has pending charges of gross sexual imposition, importuning, public
    indecency, and endangering children. A sibling of M.S. was the alleged victim while
    on a visit with mother at the home she shares with [D.S.].” See Case No. CR-
    21661303-A.
    Following the stipulations, the juvenile court adjudicated M.S. a
    dependent child.    Thereafter, by agreement of the parties, both matters were
    consolidated for disposition. The dispositional hearing commenced the same day.
    Dispositional Hearing
    At the hearing, CCDCFS presented the testimony of Sara Massey
    (“Massey”), a Private Practice Clinician at New Leaf Counseling, LLC. Massey
    testified that she was formerly employed as a Court Clinician with Cuyahoga County,
    and CCDCFS referred Mother for a mental-health evaluation. Massey testified that
    the Agency requested the evaluation because of their concerns about Mother’s
    cognitive functions, mental health, and trauma history. As part of the evaluation,
    Massey requested medical records from University Hospitals and the Centers for
    Family and Children (the “Centers”).         Massey also interviewed Mother and
    conducted a number of psychological tests.
    Massey noted that although the medical records indicated that the
    children tested positive for marijuana at birth, Mother was adamant that she was
    not using marijuana and insisted the test was a false-positive. During the evaluation,
    Mother admitted to ongoing depression, trouble with moodiness, and sadness.
    During the evaluation, Mother alluded to wishing that she had died during the birth
    of M.S. Mother reported a prior diagnosis of bipolar disorder, was prescribed Zoloft,
    and that she had previously engaged in mental-health services.
    Massey testified that, based on the contents of the medical records,
    she discussed the negative genetic impact on the children because of the familial
    connection with Alleged Father. Mother did not seem to appreciate that the family
    connection was a possible cause of some of the children’s medical challenges.
    Massey noted that Mother indicated that due to separation during childhood, she
    did not know that the Alleged Father was her first cousin until after they had begun
    a romantic relationship. Mother admitted that she was aware they were first cousins
    prior to the birth of their second child.
    Massey testified that Mother completed the Wechsler Abbreviated
    Scale of Intelligence Test, which looks at verbal comprehension and perceptual
    reasoning. Mother overall score was 78, which would be considered within the
    borderline range of intellectual functioning. Mother scored much lower on verbal
    comprehension, when compared to her perceptual reasoning, and acknowledged
    challenges reading and understanding written words. Massey also conducted the
    Wide Range Achievement Test to gauge Mother’s level of reading. That test revealed
    that Mother read at a seventh-grade level.
    Massey testified that she conducted the Substance Abuse Subtle
    Screening Inventory test, designed to evaluate whether Mother was likely to meet
    the criteria for substance use diagnoses. At the time Massey did not make a referral
    for substance abuse, because the medical records received indicated that Mother
    was compliant with her substance-abuse treatment.
    Massey testified that based on her evaluation, she diagnosed Mother
    with bipolar disorder and major depression. Massey recommended that Mother
    meet with a psychiatrist to evaluate whether her current medication was appropriate
    and if additional medication was needed to manage Mother’s symptoms. Massey
    also recommended that Mother participate in individual counseling to better
    understand her symptoms, so that she could be able to respond more appropriately
    to life’s stressors.
    Massey also recommended parenting classes so that Mother could
    better understand the needs of the children, specifically their medical needs, if they
    were reunited.         Given Mother’s verbal comprehension challenges, Massey
    recommended that Mother utilized a case manager or community resource, if
    reunited with the children. Massey deemed the parenting component to be very
    crucial because of the children’s severe medical condition.
    Massey testified that parenting classes were necessary because, at the
    time of the evaluation, there was an active allegation that the Alleged Father had
    engaged in inappropriate sexual conduct with one of Mother’s older children.
    Massey noted that Mother adamantly denied that this occurred and did not
    appreciate the need to provide any additional safety precautions, given the
    allegation.
    CCDCFS also presented the testimony of Arthur, an Extended Service
    Worker, whose testimony conformed to the affidavits provided in support of the
    respective motions for permanent custody. Arthur testified about the case plan
    developed to assist Mother and Alleged Father to remedy the issues that prompted
    the Agency’s involvement. Arthur noted that Mother’s case plan objectives were
    designed to address issues of mental health, substance abuse, parenting skills, stable
    housing, and employment.
    Arthur testified the Agency referred Mother to the Centers to address
    issues with substance abuse.      Arthur noted that Mother completed intensive
    outpatient treatment (“IOP”) in September 2021. As part of the referral, Mother was
    required to submit random weekly drug screens. Arthur noted that Mother did not
    submit consecutive drug screens. Instead, Mother routinely missed weeks or failed
    to comply within the requested 24-hour window. Arthur testified that Mother tested
    positive for alcohol in October 2021, submitted a drug screen in November 2021,
    which was negative, and submitted another drug screen in December 2021, but that
    result was still pending.
    Arthur testified that the Agency also referred Mother to the Centers
    for mental-health services. Arthur noted that based on correspondence from the
    Centers, Mother had only completed the mental-health assessment. There was no
    indication that Mother had availed herself of any additional mental-health services.
    Arthur testified that Mother was referred to the Ohio Guidestone
    Nurturing Parenting Program (“Guidestone”). Arthur noted that Guidestone’s
    counselor reported that Mother was not compliant. The counselor also noted that
    due to routinely missing appointments, Mother had not completed Guidestone’s
    three-month program.
    Arthur testified that the Agency referred the Alleged Father to the
    Centers for mental health and substance-abuse services. Arthur noted that the
    Alleged Father had not engaged in any case-plan services. Arthur noted that Mother
    and the Alleged Father were still in a relationship with each other, that they had
    visited the children minimally, and that the visits were primarily virtually.
    Arthur testified that because both children were born prematurely,
    there were attendant severe medical challenges. M.S.’s situation was even more
    complicated, given cardiac, pulmonary, and optical challenges.         M.S. required
    abundant physical and occupational therapies, as well as the care of an
    ophthalmologist. Arthur testified that both were in the care of very attentive and
    engaged foster parents. Arthur noted that although the foster parents have invited
    Mother to attend M.S.’s many appointments, Mother failed to attend any.
    Based on the foregoing, Arthur recommended that the juvenile court
    grant the Agency’s respective motions for permanent custody.
    The children’s guardian ad litem, Harvey E. Tessler (the “GAL”), who
    previously filed written reports, likewise recommending that permanent custody be
    granted to the agency, verbally indicated that his sentiments favoring a grant of
    permanent custody to the agency had not changed. The GAL noted that M.S.’s
    intense medical needs were hard to imagine. A review of the filed report provides
    illumination as follows:
    M.S. was a premature baby, having a massive Grade 4 bleeding on the
    brain * * * weighing less than two pounds at birth. * * * [A]s a result of
    the severe brain bleed, part of her brain is dead and * * * she has
    between 70 to 80% chance of having cerebral palsy. * * * [M.S.]
    receives regular treatment from her pediatrician, ophthalmologist,
    cardiologist, geneticist, neonatologist, pulmonologist, and neurologist.
    She is also involved in early childhood intervention/Help Me Grow and
    has in home services for physical therapy and is on the wait list for
    speech and occupational therapy. She is immuno-compromised * * *
    has conditions with her lungs, heart, and may have dwarfism.
    The GAL further noted that M.S. had been with the same foster family
    since her release from the hospital. The foster parents have had 60 hours of
    specialized training and during M.S.’s three-month hospital stay, were taught by the
    healthcare professionals how to specifically care for M.S.
    Pertinent to J.S., the GAL’s written report noted that J.S. was also
    born premature, with bleeding on the brain and with a slow heart rate. J.S. was in
    foster care, with the same foster family for more than a year and was thriving.
    On January 6, 2022, the juvenile court journalized entries
    terminating all parental rights and ordered the children placed in the permanent
    custody of CCDCFS.
    Mother now appeals and raises the following sole assignment of error
    for our review:
    Assignment of Error
    The trial court’s award of permanent custody and termination of
    appellant’s parental rights is against the manifest weight of the
    evidence.
    Law and Analysis
    In her sole assignment of error, Mother argues the juvenile court
    erred in granting permanent custody to the agency because the decision is against
    the manifest weight of the evidence.
    At the outset, we note, it is well established that a parent has a
    fundamental right to raise and care for his or her child. In re L.M., 8th Dist.
    Cuyahoga No. 106072, 
    2018-Ohio-963
    , citing In re C.F., 
    113 Ohio St.3d 73
    , 2007-
    Ohio-1104, 
    862 N.E.2d 816
    , ¶ 28; In re K.H., 
    119 Ohio St.3d 538
    , 
    2008-Ohio-4825
    ,
    
    895 N.E.2d 809
    , ¶ 40. We recognize that termination of parental rights is “the
    family law equivalent of the death penalty in a criminal case.” In re V.C., 8th Dist.
    Cuyahoga Nos. 102903, 103061, and 103367, 
    2015-Ohio-4991
    , citing In re J.B., 8th
    Dist. Cuyahoga No. 98546, 
    2013-Ohio-1704
    , ¶ 66, quoting In re Hoffman, 
    97 Ohio St.3d 92
    , 
    2002-Ohio-5368
    , 
    776 N.E.2d 485
    , ¶ 14.
    An appellate court will not reverse a juvenile court’s decision awarding
    permanent custody to an agency if the judgment is supported by clear and
    convincing evidence. In re J.M-R., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 98902, 
    2013-Ohio-1560
    ,
    ¶ 28. “Clear and convincing evidence” is that measure or degree of proof that is more
    than a “preponderance of the evidence,” but does not rise to the level of certainty
    required by the “beyond a reasonable doubt” standard in criminal cases. In re K.S.,
    8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 109928, 
    2021-Ohio-694
    , ¶ 15, citing In re M.S., 8th Dist.
    Cuyahoga Nos. 101693 and 101694, 
    2015-Ohio-1028
    , ¶ 8, citing In re Awkal, 
    95 Ohio App.3d 309
    , 315, 
    642 N.E.2d 424
     (8th Dist.1994), citing Lansdowne v. Beacon
    Journal Publishing Co., 
    32 Ohio St.3d 176
    , 180-181, 
    512 N.E.2d 979
     (1987). It
    “produces in the mind of the trier of fact a firm belief or conviction as to the facts
    sought to be established.” In re K.S. at ¶ 15, citing In re M.S. at ¶ 18.
    The termination of parental rights is governed by R.C. 2151.414. In
    re M.H., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 80620, 
    2002-Ohio-2968
    , ¶ 22. R.C. 2151.414 sets
    forth a two-part test courts must apply when deciding whether to award permanent
    custody to a public services agency.
    First Prong: R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(a)-(e)
    Under the first prong, the juvenile court must find by clear and
    convincing evidence one of the following five factors:
    (a) The child is not abandoned or orphaned, has not been in the
    temporary custody of one or more public children services agencies or
    private child placing agencies for twelve or more months of a
    consecutive twenty-two-month period, or has not been in the
    temporary custody of one or more public children services agencies or
    private child placing agencies for twelve or more months of a
    consecutive twenty-two-month period if, as described in division (D)(1)
    of section 2151.413 of the Revised Code, the child was previously in the
    temporary custody of an equivalent agency in another state, and the
    child cannot be placed with either of the child’s parents within a
    reasonable time or should not be placed with the child’s parents.
    (b) The child is abandoned.
    (c) The child is orphaned, and there are no relatives of the child who
    are able to take permanent custody.
    (d) The child has been in the temporary custody of one or more public
    children services agencies or private child placing agencies for twelve
    or more months of a consecutive twenty-two-month period, or the child
    has been in the temporary custody of one or more public children
    services agencies or private child placing agencies for twelve or more
    months of a consecutive twenty-two-month period and, as described in
    division (D)(1) of section 2151.413 of the Revised Code, the child was
    previously in the temporary custody of an equivalent agency in another
    state.
    (e) The child or another child in the custody of the parent or parents
    from whose custody the child has been removed has been adjudicated
    an abused, neglected, or dependent child on three separate occasions
    by any court in this state or another state.
    R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(a)-(e).
    Only one of the factors must be present for the first prong of the
    permanent custody analysis to be satisfied. In re S.S., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No.
    109356, 
    2020-Ohio-3039
    , ¶ 28, citing In re L.W., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 104881,
    
    2017-Ohio-657
    , ¶ 28.
    In this matter, the juvenile court found, pursuant to R.C.
    2151.414(B)(1)(a), that the children could not be placed with either parent within a
    reasonable time or should not be placed with either parent.3
    In assessing whether a child cannot be placed with either of the
    child’s parents within a reasonable time or should not be placed with the child’s
    parents under R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(a), a juvenile court must consider the factors
    outlined in R.C. 2151.414(E). In re A.V., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 101391, 2014-Ohio-
    5348, ¶ 58; In re R.M., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga Nos. 98065 and 98066, 
    2012-Ohio-4290
    ,
    ¶ 14; In re B.P., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga Nos. 107732 and 107735, 
    2019-Ohio-2919
    , ¶ 13.
    A juvenile court is only required to find that one of these factors is met
    in order to properly find that a child cannot or should not be placed with a parent.
    3   The findings set forth in this decision refers to both children, unless specifically
    noted.
    In re Ca.T., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 108969, 
    2020-Ohio-579
    , ¶ 27, citing In re V.C.,
    8th Dist. Cuyahoga Nos. 102903, 103061, and 103367, 
    2015-Ohio-4991
    , ¶ 42.
    Pursuant to R.C. 2151.414(E)(1), the juvenile court found that
    following the placement of the child outside the child’s home and
    notwithstanding reasonable case planning and diligent efforts by the
    agency to assist and remedy the problems that initially caused the child
    to be placed outside the home, [Mother and Alleged Father] have failed
    continuously and repeatedly to substantially remedy the conditions
    causing the child to be placed outside the child’s home
    Pursuant to R.C. 2151.414(E)(4), the juvenile court found that
    [Mother and Alleged Father] have demonstrated a lack of commitment
    toward the [children] by failing to regularly support, visit, or
    communicate with the [children] when able to do so, or by other actions
    showing an unwillingness to provide an adequate permanent home for
    the child.
    Pursuant to R.C. 2151.414(E)(16), regarding any other factor the
    Court finds relevant, the juvenile court found that
    Mother has four other children who are not in her custody. Alleged
    Father has another child who was adjudicated on today’s date and this
    Court placed that child in the permanent custody of CCDCFS following
    the joint dispositional hearing with this child.
    Pursuant to R.C. 2151.414(E)(16), and specifically regarding M.S., the
    juvenile court found that
    Mother and Alleged Father have failed to receive any training to care
    for the child’s extensive medical needs. Mother and Alleged Father
    have failed to attend the child’s medical appointments and they have
    only visited with the child three times since she has come into Agency
    custody * * *.
    Notably, and specifically regarding J.S., the juvenile court found that
    Mother and Alleged Father have not made significant progress on the
    case plan, as required by ORC 2151.415(D)(1) and therefore a first
    extension of temporary custody cannot be ordered and would not be in
    the best interest of the child[ren]. Additionally, time has elapsed for a
    first extension and the Court finds that the Mother and Alleged Father
    have not made substantial additional progress on the case plan, as
    required by ORC 2151.415(D)(2) and therefore a second extension
    cannot be ordered and would not be in the best interest of the
    child[ren].
    Indeed, the juvenile court’s finding above is supported by clear and
    convincing evidence.    Arthur provided exhaustive testimony that the agency
    developed a case plan designed to remedy the issues that led to their involvement
    with the children. Yet, the overwhelming evidence established that Mother failed to
    commit to the case plan’s objectives geared to addressing substance abuse, mental
    health, and parenting concerns. It is undisputed, despite Mother’s contentions to
    the contrary, that she did not consistently engage in and therefore could not benefit
    from the very services designed to achieve reunification of Mother and children.
    Additionally, although Mother completed the IOP, she did not follow
    through with aftercare. Mother compounded the situation by failing to consistently
    submit to the agency’s random drug screens. Further, Mother failed to fully embrace
    the importance of addressing her mental health. Again, although Mother completed
    the mental-health assessment, she never followed through with the recommended
    services.
    The above sampling clearly demonstrates that the children could not
    be placed with Mother within a reasonable time or should not be placed with
    Mother. As such, there is no dispute that the juvenile court’s finding pursuant to
    R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(a), is supported by the record.
    Our review of the record reveals that the juvenile court’s findings
    under the first prong are supported by competent and credible evidence. Finding
    no error with the juvenile court’s findings under the first prong, we consider the
    court’s finding under the second prong.
    Second Prong: R.C. 2151.414(D)
    The second prong also requires the juvenile court to find by clear and
    convincing evidence that granting permanent custody to the agency is in the best
    interest of the child. We review a trial court’s best-interest determination under R.C.
    2151.414(D) for an abuse of discretion. In re D.A., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 95188,
    
    2010-Ohio-5618
    , ¶ 47. In this regard, ‘“[a] trial court’s failure to base its decision
    on a consideration of the best interests of the child constitutes an abuse of
    discretion.”’ In re N.B., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 101390, 
    2015-Ohio-314
    , ¶ 60.
    R.C. 2151.414(D)(1) sets forth best-interest factors that the court must
    consider when making the best-interest determination under R.C. 2151.414(D)(1),
    including
    (a) The interaction and interrelationship of the child with the child’s
    parents, siblings, relatives, foster caregivers and out-of-home
    providers, and any other person who may significantly affect the child;
    (b) The wishes of the child * * *;
    (c) The custodial history of the child, including whether the child has
    been in the temporary custody of one or more public children services
    agencies or private child placing agencies for twelve or more months of
    a consecutive twenty-two-month period * * *;
    (d) The child’s need for a legally secure permanent placement and
    whether that type of placement can be achieved without a grant of
    permanent custody to the agency;
    (e) Whether any of the factors in divisions (E)(7) to (11) of this section
    apply in relation to the parents and child.
    The juvenile court has considerable discretion in weighing these
    factors. In re D.A. at ¶ 47. Although a trial court is required to consider each relevant
    factor under R.C. 2151.414(D)(1) in making a determination regarding permanent
    custody, “there is not one element that is given greater weight than the others
    pursuant to the statute.” In re Schaefer, 
    111 Ohio St.3d 498
    , 
    2006-Ohio-5513
    , 
    857 N.E.2d 532
    , ¶ 56. Moreover, “[R.C. 2151.414(D)(1)] requires a weighing of all the
    relevant factors * * * [and] requires the court to find the best option for the child
    * * *.” Id. at ¶ 64.
    Further, the Ohio Supreme Court, in In re A.M., 
    166 Ohio St.3d 127
    ,
    
    2020-Ohio-5102
    , 
    184 N.E.3d 1
    , held that R.C. 2151.414(D)(1) does not require a
    juvenile court to expressly discuss each of the best-interest factors in R.C.
    2151.414(D)(1)(a) through (e). Id. at ¶ 31. Consideration is all the statute requires.
    Although a reviewing court must be able to discern from the magistrate’s or juvenile
    court’s decision, and the court’s judgment entry, that the court satisfied the statutory
    requirement that it consider the enumerated factors, we may not graft onto the
    statute a requirement that the court include in its decision a written discussion of or
    express findings regarding each of the best-interest factors. Id.
    We begin our inquiry into the second prong by noting the juvenile
    court articulated that it considered the relevant factors set forth under R.C.
    2151.414(D)(1) when assessing the child’s best interests. The record before us
    indicates that the juvenile court satisfied the statutory requirements herein.
    Specifically, under subsection (a), the juvenile court found that
    [J.S.] has been residing with current caregiver since release from the
    hospital after birth. [J.S.] has a significant bond with foster mother,
    foster brother and foster mother’s mother.
    ***
    [M.S.] is bonded with caregivers and other children in the caregiver’s
    home.
    Under subsection (b), the juvenile court found that the children are
    “too young to express [their] wishes. GAL recommends permanent custody.”
    Under subsection (c), the juvenile court found that
    [J.S.] has never resided with mother or alleged father. [J.S.] came into
    Agency custody shortly after birth and has been raised by the current
    caregiver.
    ***
    [M.S.] came into Agency custody shortly after birth. Upon release from
    NICU, [M.S.] has been residing with current caregivers.
    Under subsection(d), the juvenile court found that
    [J.S.] deserves a safe and stable environment where his basic needs can
    be met, and he can thrive. This cannot be achieved with either parent
    as Alleged Father has failed to participate in any case plan services.
    Mother has participated in some services but has failed to complete
    services and/or show a benefit from services. Mother and Alleged
    Father only visited with [J.S.] approximately three times, virtually,
    during [J.S.’s] first year of life.
    ***
    [M.S.] deserves a safe and stable environment where her basic needs
    and extensive medical needs can be met. This cannot be achieved with
    either parent as they have not received any training as it relates to the
    care of [M.S.], as Alleged Father has failed to participate in any case
    plan services. Mother has participated in some but has failed to
    complete services and/or show a benefit from services. Mother and
    Alleged Father have only visited with [M.S.], virtually, three times in
    approximately 9 months.
    Under subsection (e), the juvenile court found, which we noted
    earlier, that Mother had four other children who were not in her custody. In
    addition, Alleged Father had another child who had been adjudicated dependent
    and had been placed in the permanent custody of CCDCFS.
    Undeniably,      the   trial   court’s   best-interest   determination
    encapsulated above, was supported by competent and credible evidence. Our review
    reflects that the best-interest factors that the juvenile court must consider under the
    second prong was contained in the record. As such, we conclude that the juvenile
    court’s termination of parental rights and award of permanent custody was
    supported by clear and convincing evidence. Therefore, contrary to Mother’s
    assertion, the juvenile court’s decision was not against the manifest weight of the
    evidence.
    Moreover, as recognized, all children have “‘the right, if possible, to
    parenting from either natural or adoptive parents which provides support, care,
    discipline, protection and motivation.’” In re S.B., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga Nos. 110016
    and 110017, 
    2021-Ohio-1091
    , ¶ 35, citing In re J.B. at ¶ 66, quoting In re Hitchcock,
    
    120 Ohio App.3d 88
    , 102, 
    696 N.E.2d 1090
     (8th Dist.1996). Where parental rights
    are terminated, the goal is to create “a more stable life” for dependent children and
    to “facilitate adoption to foster permanency for children.” 
    Id.,
     citing In re N.B. at
    ¶ 67, citing In re Howard, 5th Dist. Tuscarawas No. 85 A10-077, 
    1986 Ohio App. LEXIS 7860
    , 5 (Aug. 1, 1986). The record here demonstrates that the trial court
    sought to fulfill that goal.
    Accordingly, we overrule the sole assignment of error.
    Judgment affirmed.
    It is ordered that appellee recover from appellant costs herein taxed.
    The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
    It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the
    common pleas court, juvenile division, to carry this judgment into execution.
    A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27
    of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
    _________________________
    EMANUELLA D. GROVES, JUDGE
    ANITA LASTER MAYS, A.J., and
    MARY J. BOYLE, J., CONCUR