State v. Milliken ( 2022 )


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  • [Cite as State v. Milliken, 
    2022-Ohio-4497
    .]
    COURT OF APPEALS
    MUSKINGUM COUNTY, OHIO
    FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
    STATE OF OHIO                                  :   JUDGES:
    :
    :   Hon. Earle E. Wise, Jr., P.J.
    Plaintiff-Appellee                      :   Hon. Patricia A. Delaney, J.
    :   Hon. Craig R. Baldwin, J.
    -vs-                                           :
    :   Case No. CT2022-0008
    :
    ERIC MILLIKEN                                  :
    :
    :
    Defendant-Appellant                     :   OPINION
    CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING:                             Appeal from the Muskingum County
    Court of Common Pleas, Case No.
    CR2021-0483
    JUDGMENT:                                            AFFIRMED
    DATE OF JUDGMENT ENTRY:                              December 13, 2022
    APPEARANCES:
    For Plaintiff-Appellee:                            For Defendant-Appellant:
    RONALD L. WELCH                                    TODD W. BARSTOW
    MUSKINGUM CO. PROSECUTOR                           261 West Johnstown Road Ste. 204
    TAYLOR P. BENNINGTON                               Columbus, OH 43230
    27 North Fifth St., P.O. Box 189
    Zanesville, OH 43701
    Muskingum County, Case No. CT2022-0008                                                     2
    Delaney, J.
    {¶1} Appellant Eric Milliken appeals from the Entry of conviction and sentence
    dated December 27, 2021, of the Muskingum County Court of Common Pleas. Appellee
    is the state of Ohio.
    FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
    {¶2}   The following facts are adduced from the record of appellant’s jury trial.
    {¶3}   Appellant was the live-in boyfriend of Mother Doe from 2014 until 2015.
    During this period, Mother’s daughter Jane Doe was 5 to 7 years old.
    {¶4} In 2021, Jane Doe disclosed to her boyfriend in a text message that
    appellant sexually assaulted her while he lived in the home. Mother had an app, Bark,
    which notified her when certain words were used in Jane’s texts. Mother thus learned of
    the allegation and asked Jane what happened. Jane said appellant touched her
    inappropriately.
    {¶5} Mother contacted child protective services of Muskingum County and
    reported sexual abuse. The agency opened an investigation and referred Mother and
    Jane to Harcum House for a forensic interview. During the forensic interview, Jane
    disclosed multiple incidents of sexual assault including touching of the genitals and oral,
    vaginal, and anal intercourse.
    {¶6} Shortly after Jane Doe’s disclosure, her cousin, Mary Roe, disclosed that
    appellant sexually assaulted her when she spent the night with Jane Doe. Mary disclosed
    that appellant entered the bedroom she was in, touched her breasts, and digitally
    penetrated her.
    Muskingum County, Case No. CT2022-0008                                                   3
    {¶7} Appellant was charged by indictment as follows: Count I, gross sexual
    imposition (G.S.I.) pursuant to R.C. 2907.05(A)(4), a felony of the third degree; Count II,
    G.S.I. pursuant to R.C.2907.05(A)(4), a felony of the third degree; Count III, rape of a
    child under the age of 10 pursuant to R.C. 2907.02(A)(1)(b), a felony of the first degree;
    Count IV, rape of a child under the age of 10 pursuant to R.C. 2907.02(A)(1)(b), a felony
    of the first degree; Count V, G.S.I. pursuant to R.C. 2907.05(A)(4), a felony of the third
    degree; and Count VI, rape pursuant to R.C. 2907.02(A)(1)(b), a felony of the first
    degree.1 Counts I through IV were against victim Jane Doe, and Counts V and VI were
    against victim Mary Roe.
    {¶8} Appellant entered pleas of not guilty and the matter proceeded to trial by
    jury. Appellant was found guilty as charged. The trial court deferred sentencing pending
    a pre-sentence investigation.
    {¶9} On December 27, 2021, the trial court found, e.g., that appellant fled the
    state to avoid prosecution, had multiple victims whose lives can never be fully restored,
    and showed absolutely no remorse. The trial court imposed an aggregate mandatory
    prison term of life without parole followed by life without parole for ten years.
    {¶10} Appellant now appeals from the trial court’s Entry of conviction and
    sentence entered December 29, 2021.
    1
    Appellee amended Count VI at the close of the evidence at trial eliminating the allegation
    that the victim was under the age of 10.
    Muskingum County, Case No. CT2022-0008                                                  4
    {¶11} Appellant raises one assignment of error:
    ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
    {¶12} “THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AND DEPRIVED APPELLANT OF DUE
    PROCESS OF LAW AS GUARANTEED BY THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT TO THE
    UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION AND ARTICLE ONE SECTION TEN OF THE OHIO
    CONSTITUTION BY FINDING HIM GUILTY OF RAPE AND GROSS SEXUAL
    IMPOSITION AS THOSE VERDICTS WERE NOT SUPPORTED BY SUFFICIENT
    EVIDENCE AND WERE ALSO AGAINST THE MANIFEST WEIGHT OF THE
    EVIDENCE.”
    ANALYSIS
    {¶13} In his sole assignment of error, appellant argues his convictions for rape
    and gross sexual imposition are against the manifest weight and sufficiency of the
    evidence. We disagree.
    {¶14} The legal concepts of sufficiency of the evidence and weight of the evidence
    are both quantitatively and qualitatively different. State v. Thompkins, 
    78 Ohio St.3d 380
    ,
    
    1997-Ohio-52
    , 
    678 N.E.2d 541
    , paragraph two of the syllabus. The standard of review
    for a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence is set forth in State v. Jenks, 
    61 Ohio St.3d 259
    , 
    574 N.E.2d 492
     (1991) at paragraph two of the syllabus, in which the Ohio
    Supreme Court held, “An appellate court’s function when reviewing the sufficiency of the
    evidence to support a criminal conviction is to examine the evidence admitted at trial to
    determine whether such evidence, if believed, would convince the average mind of the
    defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The relevant inquiry is whether, after
    Muskingum County, Case No. CT2022-0008                                                     5
    viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact
    could have found the essential elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt.”
    {¶15} In determining whether a conviction is against the manifest weight of the
    evidence, the court of appeals functions as the “thirteenth juror,” and after “reviewing the
    entire record, weighs the evidence and all reasonable inferences, considers the credibility
    of witnesses and determines whether in resolving conflicts in the evidence, the jury clearly
    lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the conviction must
    be overturned and a new trial ordered.” State v. Thompkins, supra, 78 Ohio St.3d at 387.
    Reversing a conviction as being against the manifest weight of the evidence and ordering
    a new trial should be reserved for only the “exceptional case in which the evidence weighs
    heavily against the conviction.” Id.
    {¶16} Sufficiency of the evidence is a legal question dealing with whether the state
    met its burden of production at trial. State v. Murphy, 5th Dist. Stark No. 2015CA00024,
    2015–Ohio–5108, ¶ 13, citing State v. Thompkins, 
    78 Ohio St.3d 380
    , 386, 
    678 N.E.2d 541
     (1997). “Specifically, an appellate court's function, when reviewing the sufficiency of
    the evidence to support a criminal conviction, is to examine the evidence admitted at trial
    to determine whether such evidence, if believed, would convince the average mind of the
    defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” Murphy at ¶ 15. The test for sufficiency of
    the evidence raises a question of law and does not permit the court to weigh the
    evidence. State v. Martin, 
    20 Ohio App.3d 172
    , 175, 
    485 N.E.2d 717
     (1st Dist.1983). The
    relevant inquiry is whether, after viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the
    prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime
    proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Murphy at ¶ 15, citing Thompkins at 386.
    Muskingum County, Case No. CT2022-0008                                                   6
    {¶17} Appellant was convicted upon multiple counts of G.S.I. pursuant to R.C.
    2907.05(A)(4), which states in pertinent part:
    (A) No person shall have sexual contact with another, not the
    spouse of the offender; cause another, not the spouse of the
    offender, to have sexual contact with the offender; or cause two or
    more other persons to have sexual contact when any of the following
    applies:
    * * * *.
    (4) The other person, or one of the other persons, is less than
    thirteen years of age, whether or not the offender knows the age of
    that person.
    {¶18} “Sexual contact” is defined as any touching of an erogenous zone of
    another, including without limitation the thigh, genitals, buttock, pubic region, or, if the
    person is a female, a breast, for the purpose of sexually arousing or gratifying either
    person. R.C. 2907.01(B).
    {¶19} He was also convicted of multiple counts of rape pursuant to R.C.
    2907.02(A)(1)(b), which states in pertinent part:
    A)(1) No person shall engage in sexual conduct with another
    who is not the spouse of the offender or who is the spouse of the
    offender but is living separate and apart from the offender, when any
    of the following applies:
    * * * *.
    Muskingum County, Case No. CT2022-0008                                                     7
    (b) The other person is less than thirteen years of age,
    whether or not the offender knows the age of the other person.
    {¶20} R.C. 2907.01(A) defines “sexual conduct” as “vaginal intercourse between
    a male and female; anal intercourse, fellatio, and cunnilingus between persons regardless
    of sex; and, without privilege to do so, the insertion, however slight, of any part of the
    body or any instrument, apparatus, or other object into the vaginal or anal opening of
    another. Penetration, however slight, is sufficient to complete vaginal or anal intercourse.”
    {¶21} Appellant argues his convictions are not supported by sufficient evidence
    and are against the manifest weight of the evidence because of minor inconsistencies in
    the testimony of the victims. Appellant does not challenge appellee's evidence on any
    specific element of the offense; instead, his arguments are premised upon the victims’
    credibility. We have held that the testimony of one witness, if believed by the factfinder,
    is enough to support a conviction. See, State v. Dunn, 5th Dist. Stark No. 2008– CA–00137,
    2009–Ohio–1688, ¶ 133. The weight to be given the evidence introduced at trial and the
    credibility of the witnesses are primarily for the trier of fact to determine. State
    v. Thomas, 
    70 Ohio St.2d 79
    , 
    434 N.E.2d 1356
     (1982), syllabus. It is not the function of
    an appellate court to substitute its judgment for that of the factfinder. State v. Jenks, 
    61 Ohio St.3d 259
    , 279, 
    574 N.E.2d 492
     (1991). Any inconsistencies in the witnesses'
    accounts were for the trial court to resolve. State v. Dotson, 5th Dist. Stark No.
    2016CA00199, 
    2017-Ohio-5565
    , ¶ 49. “The weight of the evidence concerns the
    inclination of the greater amount of credible evidence offered in a trial to support one side
    of the issue rather than the other.” State v. Brindley, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 01AP–926,
    2002–Ohio–2425, ¶ 16.
    Muskingum County, Case No. CT2022-0008                                                       8
    {¶22} First, appellant points to Jane Doe’s statement at the beginning of the
    forensic interview that she “did not really remember what happened.” This statement is
    unremarkable because Jane may have been hesitant at first to disclose to the forensic
    examiner. Appellant further notes that Jane said her mother was home during two of the
    assaults, but apparently didn’t notice anything was wrong and Jane didn’t reveal what
    happened. Again, we find this testimony unremarkable and not indicative of Jane’s
    credibility. Jane explained that she didn’t tell her mother right away because she didn’t
    understand the activity was wrong, and yet during another incident, she realized her
    mother was coming home during the act, got dressed, and left appellant’s bedroom. In
    appellant’s estimation, this behavior indicates Jane “had some inkling that what was
    happening was wrong.” Again, we find this “discrepancy” insignificant. As Jane testified,
    she was afraid to tell her mother because she worried that no one would believe her.
    There are innumerable reasons why a 6-year-old child may choose not to disclose sexual
    abuse, as the forensic interviewer testified, and this choice has little bearing on the child’s
    credibility.
    {¶23} Finally, appellant asserts Mary Roe was only “joining the bandwagon” of the
    family’s allegations against him, but we find no support for this assertion in the record.
    As appellee points out, Mary partially disclosed the abuse to her stepmother before she
    spoke to anyone else about it. Ultimately appellant’s characterization of the victims’ lack
    of credibility is unavailing.
    {¶24} When       assessing witness credibility,   “[t]he   choice   between credible
    witnesses and their conflicting testimony rests solely with the finder of fact and an
    appellate court may not substitute its own judgment for that of the finder of fact.” State
    Muskingum County, Case No. CT2022-0008                                                    9
    v. Awan, 
    22 Ohio St.3d 120
    , 123, 
    489 N.E.2d 277
     (1986). “Indeed, the factfinder is free
    to believe all, part, or none of the testimony of each witness appearing before it.” State v.
    Pizzulo, 11th Dist. Trumbull No. 2009–T–0105, 2010–Ohio–2048, ¶ 11. Furthermore, if
    the evidence is susceptible to more than one interpretation, a reviewing court must
    interpret it in a manner consistent with the verdict. 
    Id.
     The finder of fact may take note of
    the inconsistencies and resolve or discount them accordingly, but such inconsistencies
    do not render defendant's conviction against the manifest weight of the evidence. State
    v. Nivens, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 95APA09–1236, 
    1996 WL 284714
    , at *3 (May 28, 1996).
    {¶25} We note that appellant’s premise is belied by the evidence presented at
    trial. The jury was able to watch the victims’ interviews and hear their testimony. Appellant
    himself testified that the victims are good girls who have no reason to lie.
    {¶26} Upon our review of the entire record, we conclude appellant's rape and
    G.S.I. convictions are supported by sufficient evidence and are not against the manifest
    weight of the evidence. His sole assignment of error is overruled.
    Muskingum County, Case No. CT2022-0008                                               10
    CONCLUSION
    {¶27} Appellant’s sole assignment of error is overruled, and the judgment of the
    Muskingum County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed.
    By: Delaney, J.,
    Wise, Earle, P.J. and
    Baldwin, J., concur.
    

Document Info

Docket Number: CT2022-0008

Judges: Delaney

Filed Date: 12/13/2022

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 12/14/2022