In re J.R. , 2022 Ohio 2623 ( 2022 )

[Cite as In re J.R., 2022-Ohio-2623.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
ALLEN COUNTY
IN RE:
CASE NO. 1-22-16
J.R.,
OPINION
ADJUDICATED DELINQUENT CHILD.
Appeal from Allen County Common Pleas Court
Juvenile Division
Trial Court No. 2-21 JG 37764
Judgment Affirmed
Date of Decision: August 1, 2022
APPEARANCES:
Melody Goodin for Appellant
John R. Willamowski, Jr. for Appellee
Case No. 1-22-16
ZIMMERMAN, P.J.
{¶1} Adjudicated delinquent child-appellant, J.R., appeals the March 1, 2022
judgment entry of disposition of the Allen County Court of Common Pleas, Juvenile
Division. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.
{¶2} On December 3, 2021, a complaint was filed against J.R. charging him
with Count One of felonious assault in violation of R.C. 2903.11(A)(2), a felony of
the second degree if committed by an adult, and Counts Two and Three of
improperly discharging firearm at or into habitation in violation of R.C. 2923.161,
felonies of the second degree if committed by an adult. The complaint arose from
a December 1, 2021 drug transaction between J.R. and another juvenile during
which J.R. discharged a firearm toward the other juvenile’s residence but struck two
other residences. On December 9, 2021, J.R. appeared by remote contemporaneous
video and denied the charges in the complaint.
{¶3} On January 14, 2022, J.R. withdrew his denial of the charges in the
complaint and admitted to Count Three as alleged in the complaint. In exchange
for his change of pleas, the State agreed to dismiss Counts One and Two. The trial
court accepted J.R.’s admission, dismissed Counts One and Two, and adjudicated
J.R. a delinquent child as alleged in Count Three of the complaint.
{¶4} At a dispositional hearing on February 28, 2022, the trial court
committed J.R. to the legal care and custody of the Ohio Department of Youth
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Services (“DYS”) for a minimum of one year (not to exceed J.R.’s 21st birthday).1
(Doc. No. 19).
{¶5} On March 3, 2022, J.R. filed a notice of appeal. He raises one
assignment of error for our review.
Assignment of Error
The Trial Court Abused its Discretion In Ordering That
Appellant J.R. Be Immediately Committed to the Care and
Custody of the Ohio Department of Youth Services for a
Minimum of One (1) Year And to a Maximum of the Age of 21
Years, In Violation of 2152.01 of the Ohio Revised Code.
{¶6} In his assignment of error, J.R. argues the trial court abused its
discretion by committing him to the legal care and custody of DYS for a minimum
of one year and a maximum period not to exceed J.R.’s attainment of 21 years of
age. Specifically, J.R. contends that the trial court’s order of commitment is
unsupported by the record and is an improper-punitive disposition.
Standard of Review
{¶7} We review a juvenile court’s disposition for a child adjudicated
delinquent under an abuse-of-discretion standard. In re D.S., 111 Ohio St.3d 361,
2006-Ohio-5851, ¶ 6; In re T.H., 12th Dist. Clermont No. CA2006-02-021, 2007-
Ohio-352, ¶ 10; In re D.W., 10th Dist. Franklin No. 19AP-221, 2019-Ohio-5259, ¶
1
The trial court filed its judgment entry of disposition on March 1, 2022. (Doc. No. 19).
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7. An abuse of discretion suggests that a decision is unreasonable, arbitrary, or
unconscionable. State v. Adams, 62 Ohio St.2d 151, 157-158 (1980).
Analysis
{¶8} Ohio’s juvenile courts—deriving power solely by statute—are courts of
limited jurisdiction. In re Williams, 4th Dist. Washington No. 05CA56, 2006-Ohio-
4657, ¶ 5, citing Carnes v. Kemp, 104 Ohio St.3d 629, 2004-Ohio-7107, ¶ 25 and
In re R.K., Cuyahoga No. 84948, 2004-Ohio-6918, ¶ 22. To that end, R.C. Chapter
2152 governs juvenile-delinquency matters. See In re Cross, 96 Ohio St.3d 328,
2002-Ohio-4183, ¶ 11.
{¶9} When reviewing a case that originated in the juvenile court, we must
consider the purposes underlying juvenile dispositions as set forth under R.C.
2152.01. In re H.V., 138 Ohio St.3d 408, 2014-Ohio-812, ¶ 9. Those purposes
include providing “for the care, protection, and mental and physical development of
the juvenile offender”; protecting “the public interest and safety”; holding “the
juvenile offender accountable”; restoring “the victim”; and rehabilitating “the
juvenile offender.” Id. “The statute further states that these purposes are to be
achieved ‘by a system of graduated sanctions and services.’” Id., quoting R.C.
2152.01(A).
{¶10} “The various traditional juvenile dispositions available to a trial court
are delineated in R.C. 2152.16, 2152.17, 2152.19, and 2152.20.” Id. at ¶ 32
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(O’Connor, C.J., dissenting), citing R.C. 2152.02(Z). In particular, when
determining an appropriate disposition for a juvenile who has been adjudicated
delinquent, the juvenile court may commit the juvenile to the legal care and custody
of DYS; place the juvenile in a detention facility or on house arrest; impose fines;
or impose any of the other options (or combination of options) described in R.C.
Chapter 2152. Id. at ¶ 33 (O’Connor, C.J., dissenting), citing R.C. 2152.16,
2152.19(A)(3), (4)(j), and 2152.20(A)(1). “Dispositions imposed under the
delinquency statutes are to be ‘reasonably calculated to achieve the overriding
purposes’ of R.C. 2152.01 but must also be ‘commensurate with and not demeaning
to the seriousness of the * * * conduct and its impact on the victim, and consistent
with dispositions for similar acts committed by similar delinquent children.’” State
v. Morgan, 153 Ohio St.3d 196, 2017-Ohio-7565, ¶ 47, quoting R.C. 2152.01(B).
{¶11} Importantly, “[t]he juvenile disposition statutes do not exist merely to
punish children and prevent future crime[.]” In re T.H., 2007-Ohio-352, at ¶ 13,
quoting In re Chappell, 164 Ohio App.3d 628, 2005-Ohio-6451, ¶ 49 (7th Dist.).
“Nevertheless, despite the stated purposes of providing for the care, protection, and
development of children, and to rehabilitate the offender, some circumstances
justify substantial confinement in order to fulfill the purposes of protecting public
safety and holding the offender accountable.” Id., citing In re J.B., 12th Dist. Butler
No. CA2004-09-226, 2005-Ohio-7029, ¶ 120.
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{¶12} As a second-degree felony if committed by an adult, improperly
discharging firearm at or into habitation carries the possibility of commitment to the
legal care and custody of DYS “for an indefinite term consisting of a minimum
period of one year and a maximum period not to exceed the child’s attainment of
twenty-one years of age.” R.C. 2152.16(A)(1)(d); 2923.161(C). In this case, the
trial court committed J.R. to the legal care and custody of DYS for a minimum
period of one year and a maximum period not to exceed J.R.’s attainment of 21
years of age as to his improperly-discharging-firearm-at-or-into-habitation
adjudication. Accordingly, J.R.’s disposition falls within the statutory range.
Accord In re J.S., 3d Dist. Hancock No. 5-19-22, 2020-Ohio-3413, ¶ 14.
{¶13} Nevertheless, J.R. argues that the trial court abused its discretion by
committing him to the care and custody of DYS for a minimum of one year and a
maximum period not to exceed J.R.’s attainment of 21 years of age. J.R. contends
that the trial court’s order of commitment disregards the evidence in the record that
a less restrictive disposition would be more appropriate to satisfy the purposes
underlying juvenile dispositions as set forth under R.C. 2152.01. In particular, J.R.
contends that the trial court acted arbitrarily, unreasonably, and unconscionably by
overlooking the mitigating circumstances presented in this case along with the
dispositional recommendation contained in the pre-dispositional report and, instead,
committing him to the legal care and custody of DYS.
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{¶14} When imposing a juvenile disposition, the best practice is to develop
a robust analysis of the purposes underlying juvenile dispositions at the dispositional
hearing and in the dispositional entry to satisfy the virtue of the statute.
Notwithstanding the curt analysis put forth by the trial court at the dispositional
hearing (and the lacking analysis in its dispositional entry), we are able to discern
from the record that the trial court entered its disposition after considering the
purposes of juvenile dispositions and that the trial court’s commitment of J.R. to
DYS is reasonably calculated to achieve those purposes. Accord In re J.S. at ¶ 16;
In re K.M.C., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 103449, 2016-Ohio-5322, ¶ 7. At the
dispositional hearing, the trial court heard from the probation department, crime-
victim services, the State, J.R.’s trial counsel, J.R., and J.R.’s mother and maternal
grandfather. While the probation department and J.R. advocated for a disposition
of a suspended treatment commitment conditioned on his successful compliance
with community-control sanctions, the State indicated that it would defer the matter
to the court’s discretion. Furthermore, the trial court reviewed the pre-dispositional
report and one victim-impact statement. Importantly, the trial court was aware of
the mitigating factors, including J.R.’s history with the court system, his remorse
for his conduct, his plans for his future, and his behavior report from the juvenile
detention center. See In re G.S., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 110198, 2021-Ohio-3201,
¶ 22.
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{¶15} However, it is evident from the record that the trial court heavily
weighed the purposes of protecting the public interest and safety as well as the
seriousness of J.R.’s conduct in favor of a disposition of a commitment to DYS. See
id., citing R.C. 2152.01. See also In re K.M.C. at ¶ 7 (“At the dispositional hearing,
the juvenile court noted that although the incident was K.M.C.’s first involvement
with the court system, the seriousness of the offenses * * * warranted his
commitment to ODYS.”). Specifically considering protecting the public interest
and safety, the trial court stated at the dispositional hearing that it “cannot have
individuals out on the streets, illegally, with firearms, with the intent to harm
someone or accidentally injure or kill someone else.” (Feb. 28, 2022 Tr. at 14). See
In re D.H., 6th Dist. Erie No. E-21-029, 2022-Ohio-1972, ¶ 22 (concluding that
“[t]he trial court’s consideration of appellant’s ability to continue carrying a firearm
and the potential danger to the public in determining the appropriate disposition
comports with the protection of the public safety and interest purpose of juvenile
disposition established in R.C. 2152.01(A)”). Indeed, “[p]rotection of the public
interest and safety and holding a juvenile offender accountable for his actions are
among the ‘overriding purposes’ of juvenile disposition.” In re K.M.C. at ¶ 9,
quoting R.C. 2152 .01(A).
{¶16} Moreover, we are able to glean from the record that the trial court
considered the purposes of rehabilitation and the provision of care, protection, and
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the mental and physical development of J.R. when weighing the appropriateness of
a disposition of a commitment to DYS. Compare In re D.H. at ¶ 23 (noting that the
record reflects that the trial court’s statements at the dispositional hearing “plainly
reflect” its “consideration of the remaining purposes of [a] juvenile disposition in
that it sought to provide appellant with the appropriate care, protection, mental, and
physical development as well as the most appropriate rehabilitative services as
described in R.C. 2152.01(A)”). In particular, the record reflects an exchange
between the trial court and J.R. regarding his impulsive decision to not only carry a
firearm but to discharge that firearm multiple times, striking two residences,
suggesting that the trial court weighed the foregoing purposes. Compare id.{¶17} Significantly, “when reviewing for an abuse of discretion, an appellate
court must not substitute its judgment for that of the trial court.” In re I.S.P., 4th
Dist. Washington No. 09CA37, 2010-Ohio-410, ¶ 20. Indeed, the trial court is
“better able to view the parties, to assess the victim’s and the victim’s family’s
needs, to assess the offender’s situation and to then consider and weigh all available
options.” In re B.C., 4th Dist. Lawrence No. 06CA43, 2007-Ohio-6477, ¶ 13. See
also In re J.S. at ¶ 13 (“‘Because the juvenile court “has the opportunity to see and
hear the delinquent child, to assess the consequences of the child’s delinquent
behavior, and to evaluate all the circumstances involved,” [R.C. 2152.01] authorizes
it to issue orders of disposition appropriate to each child.’”), quoting In re B.K., 2d
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Dist. Greene No. 2017-CA-32, 2018-Ohio-864, ¶ 10, quoting In re Caldwell, 76
Ohio St.3d 156, 160-161 (1996).
{¶18} Here, J.R. has not presented this court with any reason other than a
difference in opinion to reverse his order of commitment. Consequently, because
the trial court’s disposition is well within its broad discretion, there is nothing in this
record to suggest that the trial court acted unreasonably, arbitrarily, or
unconscionably. See In re G.S. at ¶ 24; In re K.M.C. at ¶ 9. See also In re B.C. at ¶
16. Therefore, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by
committing J.R. to the legal care and custody of DYS for a minimum period of one
year and a maximum period not to exceed J.R.’s attainment of 21 years of age as to
his improperly-discharging-firearm-at-or-into-habitation adjudication.
{¶19} J.R.’s assignment of error is overruled.
{¶20} Having found no error prejudicial to the appellant herein in the
particulars assigned and argued, we affirm the judgment of the juvenile court.
Judgment Affirmed
MILLER and SHAW, J.J., concur.
/jlr
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