State v. Madden , 2022 Ohio 2638 ( 2022 )


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  • [Cite as State v. Madden, 
    2022-Ohio-2638
    .]
    IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
    FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO
    HAMILTON COUNTY, OHIO
    STATE OF OHIO,                              :           APPEAL NO. C-210537
    TRIAL NO. B-2100164
    Plaintiff-Appellant,                :
    vs.                                       :                O P I N I O N.
    KEAJZUAN MADDEN,                            :
    Defendant-Appellee.                   :
    Criminal Appeal From: Hamilton County Court of Common Pleas
    Judgment Appealed From Is: Affirmed
    Date of Judgment Entry on Appeal: August 3, 2022
    Joseph T. Deters, Hamilton County Prosecuting Attorney, and Mary Stier, Assistant
    Prosecuting Attorney, for Plaintiff-Appellant,
    The Law Office of John D. Hill and John D. Hill, Jr., for Defendant-Appellee.
    OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
    WINKLER, Judge.
    {¶1}   Defendant-appellee Keajzuan Madden was indicted for aggravated
    burglary under R.C. 2911.11(A)(2), with two firearm specifications. The trial court
    granted his motion to suppress his statements to the police. The state has appealed
    that decision under R.C. 2945.67 and Crim.R. 12(K). We find no merit in the state’s
    assignment of error, and we affirm the trial court’s judgment.
    {¶2}   In its sole assignment of error, the state contends that the trial court
    erred in granting Madden’s motion to suppress. It argues that after invoking his right
    to counsel, Madden waived that right by initiating further communication with the
    police. This assignment of error is not well taken.
    {¶3}   Appellate review of a motion to suppress presents a mixed question of
    law and fact. We must accept the trial court’s findings of fact as true if competent,
    credible evidence supports them. But we must independently determine whether the
    facts satisfy the applicable legal standard. State v. Burnside, 
    100 Ohio St.3d 152
    ,
    
    2003-Ohio-5372
    , 
    797 N.E.2d 71
    , ¶ 8; State v. Richardson, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-
    200187, 
    2021-Ohio-2751
    , ¶ 13.
    {¶4}   A suspect who has “expressed his desire to deal with police only through
    counsel is not subject to further interrogation by the authorities until counsel has been
    made available to him, unless the accused himself initiates further communication,
    exchanges or conversation with the police.” Arizona v. Roberson, 
    486 U.S. 675
    , 677,
    
    108 S.Ct. 2093
    , 
    100 L.Ed.2d 704
     (1988), quoting Edwards v. Arizona, 
    451 U.S. 477
    ,
    484-485, 
    101 S.Ct. 1880
    , 
    68 L.Ed.2d 378
     (1981). The police may not reinitiate an
    interrogation under the guise of a generalized discussion about the investigation.
    State v. Van Hook, 
    39 Ohio St.3d 256
    , 259, 
    530 N.E.2d 883
     (1988); State v. Williams,
    1st Dist. Hamilton Nos. C-060631 and C-060668, 
    2007-Ohio-5577
    , ¶ 34. The suspect
    2
    OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
    himself must initiate dialogue with the authorities and must knowingly and voluntarily
    waive his right to counsel. Oregon v. Bradshaw, 
    462 U.S. 1039
    , 1045-1046, 
    103 S.Ct. 2830
    , 
    77 L.Ed.2d 405
     (1983); Van Hook at 259; Williams at ¶ 34.
    {¶5}   The United States Supreme Court has established this rule as a “bright-
    line test” for dealing with defendants who invoke their right to counsel. “Simply
    stated, if a defendant requests counsel, the police must stop all questioning and
    interrogation immediately.” State v. Knuckles, 
    65 Ohio St.3d 494
    , 495, 
    605 N.E.2d 54
    (1992). Interrogation is “any words or actions on the part of the police * * * that the
    police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the
    suspect.” Rhode Island v. Innis, 
    446 U.S. 291
    , 301, 
    100 S.Ct. 1682
    , 
    64 L.Ed.2d 297
    (1980).
    {¶6}   This rule involves two distinct inquiries. First, courts must determine
    whether the accused unequivocally invoked his right to counsel. Second, if the accused
    invoked his right to counsel, a court may admit the accused’s statements into evidence
    only if he initiated further discussions with the police, and knowingly and intelligently
    waived the right he had invoked. Smith v. Illinois, 
    469 U.S. 91
    , 95, 
    105 S.Ct. 490
    , 
    83 L.Ed.2d 488
     (1984); Knuckles at 496. The burden of showing that the defendant
    waived his rights remains on the prosecution. Oregon v. Bradshaw, 
    462 U.S. 1039
    ,
    1044, 
    103 S.Ct. 2830
    , 
    77 L.Ed.2d 405
     (1983).
    {¶7}   The record shows that Madden was under investigation for an incident
    in which three men knocked on the door of a residence. When the victim opened the
    door, the men rushed inside. They held her at gunpoint and demanded money.
    Eventually, the men fled from the residence with the victim’s purse, approximately
    $1,500 in cash, and a cell phone. Madden was subsequently arrested.
    3
    OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
    {¶8}   He was interviewed at the police station by two detectives.          That
    interview was recorded, and the video was admitted into evidence.
    {¶9}   Before starting the interview, the detectives read Madden his rights
    under Miranda v. Arizona, 
    384 U.S. 436
    , 
    86 S.Ct. 1602
    , 
    16 L.Ed.2d 694
     (1966), and
    had him sign a written acknowledgement of those rights. Madden explained that he
    had come to Cincinnati from Mississippi to visit his wife. When the detectives began
    asking about the incident in question, Madden claimed that he had not been involved.
    After his continued denials, the detectives stated that they were going to interview
    other suspects. They then left him alone in the interview room for approximately 55
    minutes.
    {¶10} The detectives then returned to the room and began interviewing
    Madden in a more aggressive manner. They told him that two of his alleged co-
    conspirators, his wife, and her cousin, had talked to them and had implicated Madden
    as the ringleader. One of the detectives stated, “If you want the whole thing, I’ll type
    it up and that’s what you’re going to get.” He added, “And when we go to court, I can
    say, this is who cooperated, to the judge, this is who manned up, and this is who didn’t
    man up.” Madden then asked to see a lawyer.
    {¶11} The detective then stated, “If that’s what you want to do. I mean, I
    would rather just get your side of the story.” Madden replied, “Uh huh,” and the
    detective asked, “You don’t want to tell me your side of the story.” Madden stated that
    he wanted to tell his side of the story, but with a lawyer present. The detective
    responded, “That’s fine. All right. I’ll type up the paperwork. You’re going to go to
    jail for aggravated robbery.”
    4
    OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
    {¶12} The detectives then stood up in unison and started to walk out of the
    room. Madden again said that he wanted to speak to a lawyer. The detectives told him
    that they did not have time to wait for a lawyer to come to talk to Madden. They said
    that they would charge him, and then he could have a lawyer appointed for him.
    {¶13} Madden then asked, “How many years is it for this or whatever?” One
    of the detectives told him that “it’s the same charge as murder. That’s why we wanted
    to talk to you to get your side of the story.” The other detective added, “It’s a big
    charge.” The first detective asked him if he wanted to “sit there and think about it for
    a minute and I’ll come back and see you and see if you want to talk to me.” Madden
    replied, “Yeah.”
    {¶14} The detectives left the room for a few minutes. Upon reentering, the
    first detective stated, “Do you want an attorney or do you want to talk to us?” When
    Madden did not answer right away, the detectives told him that if Madden had an
    attorney, they would call the attorney. If not, he would go to the jail, and then he would
    get an attorney. They told him if he went to jail, he would see a judge the following
    day. The first detective added that if he wanted an attorney, that was his right, and if
    he wanted to talk, they would talk to him. Madden answered, “Alright.” The officer
    asked if he should sit down, Madden answered, “Yes.” He then confessed to his
    involvement in the robbery.
    {¶15} The parties do not dispute that the detectives read Madden his Miranda
    rights. In ruling on the motion to suppress, the trial court stated, “Therefore, the sole
    issue for the Court to decide is whether the Detectives interrogated Mr. Madden after
    he invoked his right to counsel. This court determines that they did.” We agree.
    5
    OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
    {¶16} The record shows that Madden unequivocally and unambiguously
    invoked his right to counsel. See State v. Carr, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-090109,
    
    2010-Ohio-2764
    , ¶ 18-20. Nevertheless, the trial court found that the police asked
    him several times whether he wanted to talk to them, and stated that they wanted to
    talk to him, a finding supported by competent, credible evidence. Their statements
    were calculated to elicit an incriminating response by Madden. The detectives made
    numerous statements that went far beyond inquiries or statements relating to “routine
    incidents of the custodial relationship,” which do not generally “initiate” a
    conversation about the investigations. See Bradshaw, 
    462 U.S. at 1045
    , 
    103 S.Ct. 2830
    , 
    77 L.Ed.2d 405
    .
    {¶17} The state argues that after the detectives left the room the second time,
    telling him to “think about it,” Madden initiated the discussion about the investigation
    by asking what the penalty was for the offenses of which he was accused. But this
    question only occurred after he had asked for an attorney three times. The detectives
    continued to ask him to tell them his story and repeatedly told him about the severity
    of the charges. Further, it only occurred after the detectives said they did not have
    time to wait for him to talk to an attorney.
    {¶18} In contrast is Williams, 1st Dist. Hamilton Nos. C-060631 and C-
    060668, 
    2007-Ohio-5577
    , in which this court held that the defendant initiated the
    dialogue and voluntarily waived his rights. In that case, the defendant asked for a
    lawyer, and questioning ceased.         Subsequently, the detective who had been
    interviewing the defendant brought the defendant a jail uniform and did not
    interrogate the defendant. The defendant, without any prompting, stated that he
    wanted to talk to the detective. The detective told the defendant that if he wanted to
    6
    OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
    talk to him, the defendant would have to waive his rights. The defendant still indicated
    his willingness to talk. We stated that the defendant “evinced a willingness and a
    desire for generalized discussion about the investigation.”      Id. at ¶ 36, quoting
    Bradshaw at 1045-1046. In this case, Madden never indicated a willingness to discuss
    the robbery without an attorney present.
    {¶19} The bright-line test set out by the United States Supreme Court was to
    prevent “the police from wearing down and confusing the defendant to obtain a waiver
    of his rights.” Knuckles, 65 Ohio St.3d at 496, 
    605 N.E.2d 54
    , citing Smith, 
    469 U.S. at 98
    , 
    105 S.Ct. 490
    , 
    83 L.Ed.2d 488
    . The video recording shows that was exactly what
    occurred in this case. Consequently, we overrule the state’s assignment of error and
    affirm the trial court’s judgment.
    Judgment affirmed.
    MYERS, P.J. and B0CK, J., concur.
    Please note:
    The court has recorded its own entry on the date of the release of this opinion.
    7
    

Document Info

Docket Number: C-210537

Citation Numbers: 2022 Ohio 2638

Judges: Winkler

Filed Date: 8/3/2022

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 8/3/2022