In re M.D. , 2022 Ohio 2672 ( 2022 )

[Cite as In re M.D., 2022-Ohio-2672.]
COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA
IN RE M.D., ET AL. :
: Nos. 110957, 110958,
Minor Children : and 110959
:
[Appeal by T.H., Mother] :
JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION
JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED
RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: August 4, 2022
Criminal Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas
Juvenile Division
Case Nos. AD-17900994, AD-19903792, and AD-20908704
Appearances:
Scott J. Friedman, for appellant.
Michael C. O’Malley, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting
Attorney, and Joseph C. Young, Assistant Prosecuting
Attorney, for appellee.
EILEEN T. GALLAGHER, J.:
Appellant, Mother, appeals three orders of the Cuyahoga County Court
of Common Pleas, Juvenile Division, granting permanent custody of her three
children, M.D., J.K., and I.S.,1 to the Cuyahoga County Division of Child and Family
Services (“CCDCFS” or “the agency”). She claims the following error:
The juvenile court erred in terminating the appellant’s parental rights,
in violation of her rights under the Fourteenth Amendment to the
United States Constitution and Article I, Section 16 of the Ohio
Constitution.
We affirm the juvenile court’s judgment.
I. Facts and Procedural History
CCDCFS filed three separate complaints; one for each child. The case
originated with the filing of a complaint for the oldest child, M.D., in January 2017.
Two additional complaints were followed in 2019 and 2020, seeking temporary
custody of J.K. and I.S. at the times of their births. The children were each
adjudicated dependent and placed in the temporary custody of CCDCFS. I.S. was
also adjudicated neglected.
CCDCFS developed a case plan for Mother with the goal of reunifying
her with her children.2 The case plan was designed to address Mother’s issues with
mental health, housing, anger management, and domestic violence. Mother
appeared to be making progress on the case plan in late 2018, and CCDCFS
implemented overnight visitation with M.D., who was the only child born at that
time. The overnight visits were stopped, however, when CCDCFS learned of ongoing
1 The parties are referred to herein by their initials or title in accordance with this
court’s established policy regarding non-disclosure of identities in juvenile cases.
2 This appeal is brought by the children’s mother. We, therefore, focus on the
evidence relevant to Mother’s rights with the respect to the children. The children’s
fathers are not parties to this appeal.
abuse and domestic violence in the home. (Aug. 24, 2021, tr. 98-99, 115-116.) The
agency later concluded that Mother failed to significantly remedy the issues that
caused the children to be placed in temporary custody, and CCDCFS moved to
modify temporary custody of the children to permanent custody.
The juvenile court held a hearing on the motions to modify temporary
custody over the course of two days; August 24, 2021, and September 13, 2021. Two
CCDCFS social workers assigned to this case testified that Mother’s mental
instability and difficulty regulating her emotions were the primary reasons the
agency sought permanent custody of the children. (Aug. 24, 2021, tr. 96, 108, 164,
167.) Mother had been hospitalized several times due to her mental condition, and
she had attempted suicide at least twice. (Aug. 24, 2021, tr. 19.) Betsy Boyle
(“Boyle”), a social worker at Marymount Hospital where Mother was admitted
following her second suicide attempt in March 2020, testified that Mother, who was
pregnant at the time, had attempted to kill herself and her unborn baby. While she
was in the hospital, Mother threatened to harm another patient and threatened to
beat up Boyle. (Aug. 24, 2o21, tr. 20.)
Mildred Tate (“Tate”), a child protection specialist with CCDCFS,
testified that in June 2021, she attended a supervised visit with Mother and her
children on behalf of the social worker assigned to the case. During the visit, Mother
became agitated when Tate made parenting suggestions. (Aug. 24, 2021, tr. 37.)
Mother started screaming profanity and making threats. Security guards came to
the scene and escorted Mother out of the building. (Aug. 24, 2021, tr. 40.) Marcus
Allen, one of the protective services officers with the Cuyahoga County Sheriff’s
Office who responded to the scene, testified that Mother was “hostile,” and
threatened to beat the officers “bloody to the ground.” (Aug. 24, 2021, tr. 52.) This
incident occurred less than three months before the permanent custody hearing.
Frontline Services is a nonprofit organization that assists individuals
with housing, mental health, and suicide prevention. Caleb Dixon (“Dixon”), a
program manager at Frontline Services, testified that he performed an assessment
of Mother’s needs and found that she had a history of 20 hospitalizations. (Aug. 24,
2021, tr. 60.) According to Dixon, Mother, who had been in foster care as a child
herself, had a history of trauma and a strong mistrust of people. She also had
difficulty regulating her emotions. (Aug. 24, 2021, tr. 61.) Dixon recommended that
Mother receive counseling and psychiatric treatment. (Aug. 24, 2021, tr. 64.)
Treveya Franklin, who worked with Mother at Frontline Services, described an
incident in which Mother became “agitated with staff” and refused to leave the
lobby. Ultimately, police were called to remove her. (Aug. 24, 2021, tr. 72.)
Pamela Roy (“Roy”), who is now a supervisor with CCDCFS, was
assigned to the case from September 2018 through February 2020. Roy testified
there were several objectives in Mother’s case plan, but the primary goal was
stabilizing her behavior because she had “explosive behaviors.” (Aug. 24, 2021,
tr. 96.) Roy explained that Mother became defensive anytime anyone offered
parenting advice. Yet, according to Roy, Mother never reached a point where
parenting instruction was not warranted. (Aug. 24, 2021, tr. 97.)
Nevertheless, Mother made improvements in 2018 to the point that she
progressed from supervised visits to unsupervised visits and eventually started
having overnight visits with M.D. in late 2018. The unsupervised visits were
stopped, however, when Roy learned that domestic violence was a problem in
Mother’s home. Mother admitted that “her home was unsafe” and reported at a
“staffing”3 that her father and uncle were entering her home and abusing her.
(Aug. 24, 2021, tr. 99.) The agency was also concerned about domestic violence
involving Mother and one of the fathers of Mother’s children. (Aug. 24, 2021, tr.
98.)
Roy referred Mother to Able Counseling for anger-management
counseling, and Mother told Roy she was engaging in the anger-management
program. However, when Roy inquired at Able Counseling regarding Mother’s
participation in the program, she was told Able Counseling “didn’t have any
programming for her.” (Aug. 24, 2021, tr. 106.) Roy testified that after one and one-
half years of services, Mother had not made enough progress to begin reunification
with her children. (Aug. 24, 2021, tr. 108.)
Michelle McCracken (“McCracken”), a social worker with CCDCFS,
took over as the case manager following Roy’s reassignment. McCracken testified
that Mother often failed to appear for supervised visits with the children. As a result,
3 According to the Cuyahoga County Division of Child and Family Services Policy
Statement, the term “staffing” refers to a team decision-making process that involves
birth or adoptive families, service providers, community members, and agency staff to
assure the best possible placement for children in temporary or permanent custody. In
re E.Z., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga Nos. 103728 and 103966, 2016-Ohio-5412, ¶ 9, fn. 1.
Mother was required to give notice that she would be present the day before a
scheduled visit. If Mother failed to give prior notice, the visit was automatically
canceled. (Aug. 24, 2021, tr. 155.)
McCracken testified that although Mother completed anger-
management classes, she continued to have fits and failed to control her emotions.
McCracken described Mother’s outburst with Tate when protective services were
required to escort her out of the building as an example of an outburst that occurred
after Mother had completed anger-management classes. Thus, McCracken
concluded that Mother had not benefitted from the classes and “hasn’t
demonstrated a change in behavior.” (Aug. 24, 2021, tr. 164.)
CCDCFS also required that Mother complete a mental-health
assessment in order to assess her mental stability. (Aug. 24, 2021, tr. 164.) Mother
told McCracken that an assessment had been done and that she would provide
McCracken with a copy, but McCracken never received it. (Aug. 24, 2021, tr. 164.)
Mother signed releases to allow CCDCFS to obtain information from
her service providers, but each time she signed a release, she often revoked it before
the agency could obtain any information.4 (Aug. 24, 2021, tr. 156.) McCracken
explained that without releases, she was not authorized to discuss Mother’s progress
with service providers and was, therefore, unable to determine if Mother was
making progress or needed additional services. McCracken explained:
4 Although Mother may have revoked releases authorizing the agency to obtain
confidential information from her service providers, the record shows that the agency
obtained information from Frontline Services, and other service providers.
[I]f I can’t talk to the provider about exactly what services mom is
getting and if I can’t get copies of the assessment to see what mom is
telling them so that I can have conversation with them and share with
them some of the things that I’ve seen and some of my concerns, then
I don’t feel that mom’s getting the proper or most adequate counseling
and mental health services if they’re only doing services based on what
mom is telling them and not anybody else.
As Miss Ray testified here, it’s kinda like mom doesn’t want anybody to
know her bad stuff, so she tells them the good stuff because from us, we
disclose it all.
(Aug. 24, 2021, tr. 166-167.) Ultimately, McCracken concluded that Mother had not
“demonstrated a behavior change enough to be able to reunify or place the children
with [her].” (Aug. 24, 2021, tr. 177.)
Carla Golubovic (“Golubovic”), the children’s guardian ad litem
(“GAL”), agreed that the children should not be reunified with Mother. At the
hearing, Golubovic explained:
[M]y concern for the three children, should they be returned to the
mother’s care and control, is her mental health stability.
I’ve been associated to this case since [M.D.] was an infant.
Initially, M.D. remained in the care of her mother and was
subsequently removed, placed into temporary custody, and then
mother had two subsequent children, that being [J.K.] and [I.S.].
Since my association to this family in total mother has had multiple
psychiatric hospitalizations.
Mother’s [sic] went from provider to provider, has not had any
consistency, has not had stability for any length of time such that I
would be comfortable with returning her three daughters to her care
and control.
Based on her own testimony here today the only person that she sees
for mental health is Cynthia Holtzman of Ohio Guidestone, and Miss
Holtzman testified that she’s a therapist at Ohio Guidestone, conducts
telehealth meetings with mother that are now bi-weekly and it’s a self-
report.
* * *
Your Honor, mother has a lot of positives. I believe she’s a very
resourceful woman and again, very committed to her children, but I’m
concerned about the status of her mental health, her ability to be
consistent in managing mental health, even having insight as to what
her mental health conditions are and maintaining stability and
consistency for her children.
We heard that some visitations that have taken place have escalated in
bringing in law enforcement.
Even on today’s date mother doesn’t appear to have much insight as to
being reflective looking back and thinking there was a better way to
handle situations, so that’s very concerning.
And I don’t believe that she has the capacity to properly parent these
children, so my recommendation is permanent custody.
(Sept. 13, 2021, tr. 351-352.)
Following the hearing, the court issued judgments in the three
separate cases granting permanent custody of the children to CCDCFS. In reaching
each of the judgments, the court observed that Mother “failed continuously and
repeatedly to substantially remedy the conditions causing the child to be placed
outside the home.” The court also noted that Mother’s “chronic mental illness,
chronic emotional illness, and chemical dependence”5 prevented Mother from
providing an appropriate home for the children. Finally, the court found that
5 As explained in our analysis of the evidence, the record supports the juvenile
court’s finding that Mother had chronic mental illness and emotional illness but does not
support the court’s finding that Mother was troubled by chemical dependency.
Mother failed to regularly visit with her children and that Mother abandoned and
neglected J.K. and I.S. Mother now appeals the trial court’s judgments.
II. Law and Analysis
In the sole assignment of error, Mother argues the trial court erred in
terminating her parental rights, in violation of her rights under the Fourteenth
Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 16 of the Ohio
Constitution.
A parent has a “fundamental liberty interest * * * in the care, custody,
and management of [his or her child].” Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753, 102
S.Ct. 1388, 71 L.Ed.2d 599 (1982). Indeed, the termination of parental rights is
regarded as “‘the family law equivalent of the death penalty in a criminal case.’” In
re J.B., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 98546, 2013-Ohio-1704, ¶ 66, quoting In re
Hoffman, 97 Ohio St.3d 92, 2002-Ohio-5368, 776 N.E.2d 485, ¶ 14. Consequently,
parents “‘must be afforded every procedural and substantive protection the law
allows.’” In re Hayes, 79 Ohio St.3d 46, 48, 679 N.E.2d 680 (1997), quoting In re
Smith, 77 Ohio App.3d 1, 16, 601 N.E.2d 45 (6th Dist.1991).
Nevertheless, a parent’s right to the care and custody of his or her child
is not absolute. In re L.G., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 110789, 2022-Ohio-529, ¶ 49.
“‘[T]he natural rights of a parent * * * are always subject to the ultimate welfare of
the child, which is the polestar or controlling principal to be observed.’” In re L.D.,
2017-Ohio-1037, 86 N.E.3d 1012, ¶ 29 (8th Dist.), quoting In re Cunningham, 59
Ohio St.2d 100, 106, 391 N.E.2d 1034 (1979).
R.C. 2151.414 provides a two-prong analysis to be applied by a juvenile
court in adjudicating a motion for permanent custody. In re S.C., 2018-Ohio-2523,
115 N.E.3d 813, ¶ 20 (8th Dist.), citing R.C. 2151.414(B). This first prong authorizes
the juvenile court to grant permanent custody of a child to the public agency if, after
a hearing, the court determines, by clear and convincing evidence, that any of the
following factors apply: (a) the child is not abandoned or orphaned, but the child
cannot be placed with either parent within a reasonable time or should not be placed
with the child’s parents; (b) the child is abandoned; (c) the child is orphaned, and
there are no relatives of the child who are able to take permanent custody; (d) the
child has been in the temporary custody of one or more public children services
agencies or private child placing agencies for 12 or more months of a consecutive 22-
month period; or (e) the child or another child in the custody of the parent or parents
from whose custody the child has been removed has been adjudicated an abused,
neglected, or dependent child on three separate occasions by any court in this state
or another state. R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(a)-(e).
In accordance with the second prong of R.C. 2151.414, when any one
of the above factors exists, the second prong of the analysis requires the juvenile
court to determine, by clear and convincing evidence, whether it is in the best
interest of the child to grant permanent custody to the agency pursuant to R.C.
2151.414(D).
“A juvenile court’s decision to grant permanent custody will not be
reversed as being against the manifest weight of the evidence ‘if the record contains
some competent, credible evidence from which the court could have found that the
essential statutory elements for permanent custody had been established by clear
and convincing evidence.’” In re G.W., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 107512, 2019-Ohio-
1533, ¶ 62, quoting In re A.P., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 104130, 2016-Ohio-5849, ¶ 16.
“‘Clear and convincing evidence’ is evidence that ‘will produce in the mind of the
trier of facts a firm belief or conviction as to the allegations sought to be
established.’” In re T.B., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 99931, 2014-Ohio-2051, ¶ 28,
quoting Cross v. Ledford, 161 Ohio St. 469, 477, 120 N.E.2d 118 (1954).
With respect to the first prong of the permanent-custody analysis, the
juvenile court made a finding in M.D.’s case, pursuant to R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(d), that
“[t]he child has been in temporary custody of the Cuyahoga County Division of Child
and Family Services * * * for twelve (12) or more months of a consecutive twenty-
two (22) months period.” Specifically, the court found in its judgment entry dated
September 30, 2021, that the child had been in custody since April 6, 2017.
The court also made a finding in each child’s case, pursuant to R.C.
2151.414(B)(1)(a), that the children could not be placed with either parent within a
reasonable time or should not be placed with either parent. R.C. 2151.414(E)
provides a list of factors the court must consider in determining whether or not
children can be placed with a parent within a reasonable time. As relevant here, the
court found, pursuant to R.C. 2151.414(E)(1), that
notwithstanding reasonable case planning and diligent efforts by the
agency to assist the parents to remedy the problems that initially
caused the child[ren] to be placed outside the home, the [parents] have
failed continuously and repeatedly to substantially remedy the
conditions causing the child[ren] to be placed outside the child[ren]s
home.
Evidence at the hearing established that Mother had ongoing mental
health and anger-management issues that affected her ability to adequately parent
the children. McCracken testified that although Mother completed anger-
management classes, she continued to have inappropriate outbursts and failed to
control her emotions. For example, Mother was escorted out of the building where
she was having a supervised visit with her children because she lost control when
Tate offered parenting advice. During the incident, Mother threatened Tate and told
the protective services officers who responded to the scene that she would beat them
“bloody to the ground.” Because the incident occurred after Mother had completed
anger-management classes, McCracken concluded that Mother did not benefit from
the instruction because her behavior remained unchanged. (Aug. 24, 2021, tr. 164.)
McCracken also testified that Mother failed to provide proof that she
completed a mental assessment and although she signed releases to allow CCDCFS
social workers to discuss her case with service providers, she often revoked the
authorizations, which prevented the agency from exchanging relevant information
that could assist in Mother’s treatment. (Aug. 24, 2021, tr. 156, 166-167.)
McCracken testified that, at time of trial, Mother had not demonstrated enough of a
behavior change to allow reunification of the children with her. (Aug. 24, 2021, tr.
167.) The GAL also testified that the children could not be placed with Mother
within a reasonable time. (Sept. 13, 2021, tr. 351-352.)
The juvenile court found, pursuant to R.C. 2151.414(E)(2), that the
children could not be placed with Mother within a reasonable time due to her
chronic mental illness. Evidence showed that Mother had 20 mental health related
hospitalizations, including at least three hospitalizations in 2018 and one
hospitalization in 2020 related to a second suicide attempt while Mother was
pregnant with I.S. (Aug. 24, 2021, 18-20, 25, 59-60, 101-102, 198-199.) Mother’s
ongoing struggle with mental health manifested in erratic and volatile behavior
during which she threatened to harm a patient in the hospital, hospital staff, agency
staff, and protective services officers. (Aug. 24, 2021, tr. 18-28, 37-47, 50-55, 72-75,
111, 149.) The GAL testified that the children could not be placed in Mother’s care
primarily because of Mother’s lack of mental stability. (Sept. 13, 2021, tr. 350.)
The juvenile court also found that the children could not be placed in
Mother’s care within a reasonable time due to ongoing neglect caused by Mother’s
“failure to regularly visit the child[ren].” Although Mother visited the children, there
were also extended periods of time without visitation. McCracken testified that
Mother had no contact with the children from March 2021 through August 2021.
(Aug. 24, 2021, tr. 153.) McCracken explained that the agency established a rule
whereby Mother was required to notify the agency the day before a scheduled visit
of her intent to appear for the visit because she often failed to show for scheduled
visits. (Aug. 24, 2021, tr. 155.) Therefore, the trial court’s finding that Mother
neglected the children by failing to regularly attend scheduled visits is supported by
the evidence, and the juvenile court properly found that the first prong of the
permanent-custody analysis was established by the evidence.
With respect to the second prong of the permanent-custody analysis,
we recognize that, given the nature of the proceeding and the impact the court’s
decision will have on the lives of the parties concerned, the juvenile court enjoys
broad discretion in determining whether an order of permanent custody is in the
child’s best interest. In re Awkal, 95 Ohio App.3d 309, 316, 642 N.E.2d 424 (8th
Dist.1994). We, therefore, review a juvenile court’s determination of a child’s best
interests under R.C. 2151.414(D) for abuse of discretion. In re D.A., 8th Dist.
Cuyahoga No. 95188, 2010-Ohio-5618, ¶ 47.
“A court abuses its discretion when a legal rule entrusts a decision to
a judge’s discretion and the judge’s exercise of that discretion is outside of the legally
permissible range of choices.” State v. Hackett, 164 Ohio St.3d 74, 2020-Ohio-
6699, 172 N.E.3d 75, ¶ 19. An abuse of discretion may be found where a trial court
“applies the wrong legal standard, misapplies the correct legal standard, or relies on
clearly erroneous findings of fact.” Thomas v. Cleveland, 176 Ohio App.3d 401,
2008-Ohio-1720, 892 N.E.2d 454, ¶ 15 (8th Dist.). When applying the abuse of
discretion standard, a reviewing court may not substitute its judgment for that of
the trial court. Vannucci v. Schneider, 2018-Ohio-1294, 110 N.E.3d 716, ¶ 22 (8th
Dist.).
In determining the best interests of a child, the juvenile court must
consider all relevant factors, including, but not limited to, the following:
(a) The interaction and interrelationship of the child with the child’s
parents, siblings, relatives, foster caregivers and out-of-home
providers, and any other person who may significantly affect the child;
(b) The wishes of the child, as expressed directly by the child or through
the child’s guardian ad litem, with due regard for the maturity of the
child;
(c) The custodial history of the child, including whether the child has
been in the temporary custody of one or more public children services
agencies or private child placing agencies for twelve or more months of
a consecutive twenty-two-month period * * *;
(d) The child’s need for a legally secure permanent placement and
whether that type of placement can be achieved without a grant of
permanent custody to the agency;
(e) Whether any of the factors in divisions (E)(7) to (11) of this section
apply in relation to the parents and child.
R.C. 2151.414(D)(1).
Although a juvenile court is required to consider each relevant factor
under R.C. 2151.414(D)(1) in making a determination regarding permanent custody,
“there is not one element that is given greater weight than the others pursuant to the
statute.” In re Schaefer, 111 Ohio St.3d 498, 2006-Ohio-5513, 857 N.E.2d 532, ¶ 56.
“R.C. 2151.414(D)(1) does not require a juvenile court to expressly discuss each of
the best-interest factors in R.C. 2151.414(D)(1)(a) through (e). Consideration is all
the statute requires.” In re A.M., 166 Ohio St.3d 127, 2020-Ohio-5102, 184 N.E.3d
1, ¶ 31. Moreover, only one factor needs to be resolved in favor of permanent custody
in order to find that permanent custody is in the child’s best interest. In re S.C., 8th
Dist. Cuyahoga No. 102350, 2015-Ohio-2410, ¶ 30.
Mother does not challenge the court’s best interest of the child
determination directly. She argues instead that she met most of the objectives
outlined in her case plan and that she substantially remedied the conditions that
required removal of the children. While it is true that Mother obtained housing and
completed several aspects of her case plan, including anger-management classes and
parenting classes, the evidence showed that the problematic behaviors remained
unchanged. (Aug. 24, 2021, tr. 164.) Moreover, the evidence supports the court’s
finding that permanent custody is in the children’s best interests.
With respect to the “relationship” factor listed in R.C. 2151.414(D)(1),
the evidence showed that Mother was not well bonded to the children. As previously
stated, Mother often missed visits with the children and went long periods of time
without any contact with them. Even when Mother attended visits, McCracken was
concerned the children were not bonding with their mother. (Aug. 24, 2021, tr. 171.)
By contrast, McCracken testified that the children, who are together in the same
foster home, have a good relationship with their foster mother. (Aug. 24, 2021, tr.
176.)
As relevant to the “children’s wishes” factor listed in
R.C. 2151.414(D)(1)(b), the GAL testified that the children were each too young to
express their wishes, and she recommended that permanent custody would be in
their best interests. (Sept. 13, 2021, tr. 352.) “‘The juvenile court properly considers
the GAL’s recommendation on the permanent-custody motion as part of the
R.C. 2151.414(D)(1)(b) analysis where the children are too young to express their
wishes.’” In re R.A., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 110541, 2021-Ohio-4126, ¶ 52, quoting
In re B/K Children, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-190681, 2020-Ohio-1095, ¶ 45.
R.C. 2151.414(D)(1)(c) involves consideration of the custodial history
of the child. At the time of trial, M.D. had been in agency custody for over four years
(all but the first few months of her life). (Aug. 24, 2021, tr. 103-104, 112-113, 131,
143.) The other two children had been in agency custody their entire lives. Indeed,
Mother acknowledged at trial that she had never had the children in her home.
(Sept. 13, 2o21, Tr. 322.) The custodial history demonstrated that the children were
in need of a permanent placement. And, as previously explained, the children could
not be reunified with Mother within a reasonable time and no alternative to
permanent custody was presented at trial. Therefore, the evidence at trial
established that permanent custody was in the children’s best interests.
We recognize that Mother made an effort to complete her case plan
and that she genuinely cares for her children. However, the evidence at trial
supports the court’s findings that the children could not be reunified with Mother
within a reasonable time and that permanent custody was in the children’s best
interests. According, the sole assignment of error is overruled.
Judgment affirmed.
It is ordered that appellee recover from appellant costs herein taxed.
The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate issue of this court directing the common
pleas court, juvenile division, to carry this judgment into execution.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27
of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
EILEEN T. GALLAGHER, JUDGE
ANITA LASTER MAYS, P.J., and
CORNELIUS J. O’SULLIVAN, JR., J., CONCUR