Simmons v. Rauser & Assoc., L.P.A. , 2011 Ohio 4510 ( 2011 )


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  • [Cite as Simmons v. Rauser & Assoc., L.P.A., 
    2011-Ohio-4510
    .]
    Court of Appeals of Ohio
    EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
    COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA
    JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION
    No. 96386
    AARON SIMMONS
    PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT
    vs.
    RAUSER & ASSOCIATES LPA, ET AL.
    DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES
    JUDGMENT:
    AFFIRMED
    Civil Appeal from the
    Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas
    Case No. CV-721101
    BEFORE:           S. Gallagher, J., Boyle, P.J., and E. Gallagher, J.
    RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: September 8, 2011
    ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT
    Rosel C. Hurley, III
    Arnuma Law
    12800 Shaker Boulevard
    Suite 230
    Cleveland, Ohio 44120
    ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEES
    Jason D. Winter
    Marianne K. Barsoum Stockett
    Holly M. Wilson
    Reminger Co., LPA
    1400 Midland Building
    101 Prospect Avenue, West
    Cleveland, Ohio 44115-1093
    SEAN C. GALLAGHER, J.:
    {¶ 1} Plaintiff-appellant, Aaron Simmons, appeals the judgment of the
    Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas that granted summary judgment in
    favor of defendants-appellees Rauser & Associates LPA and Denise Bartlett.
    For the reasons stated herein, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
    {¶ 2} This is a legal malpractice action that arose from attorney Denise
    Bartlett’s representation of Simmons in connection with a Chapter 7
    bankruptcy filing, which was ultimately converted into a Chapter 13 filing.
    Bartlett is an attorney with the law firm of Rauser & Associates LPA.
    {¶ 3} Simmons instituted this action on March 12, 2010.            In his
    amended complaint, Simmons alleged that he retained Bartlett in connection
    with a Chapter 7 bankruptcy and that he advised her that he had no interest
    in a five-year Chapter 13 plan. He further alleged that Simmons advised him
    to file a Chapter 7 bankruptcy despite his income being over twice the allowed
    income, that she told him to stop paying his bills, and that she advised him to
    purchase a vehicle in order to defeat the Chapter 7 “means test” in violation of
    federal bankruptcy laws. Following the filing by the U.S. Trustee of a motion
    to dismiss for abuse, Simmons’s Chapter 7 filing was converted to a Chapter
    13 filing in June 2008.
    {¶ 4} The defendants filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that
    Simmons had failed to produce an expert report to establish that defendants
    breached the standard of care or proximately caused him damages. The trial
    court granted the motion, and this appeal followed.            Simmons’s sole
    assignment of error is as follows: “The trial court erred when it granted
    summary judgment in favor of the defendant as a result of the plaintiff failing
    to provide an expert witness report even though an expert report is not needed
    because the actions of the defendant amounted to negligence per se.”
    {¶ 5} Appellate review of summary judgment is de novo, governed by the
    standard set forth in Civ.R. 56.      Comer v. Risko, 
    106 Ohio St.3d 185
    ,
    
    2005-Ohio-4559
    , 
    833 N.E.2d 712
    , ¶ 8. Accordingly, we afford no deference to
    the trial court’s decision and independently review the record to determine
    whether summary judgment is appropriate.        Hollins v. Shaffer, 
    182 Ohio App.3d 282
    , 
    2009-Ohio-2136
    , 
    912 N.E.2d 637
    , ¶ 12.        Under Civ.R. 56(C),
    summary judgment is proper when the moving party establishes that “(1) no
    genuine issue of any material fact remains, (2) the moving party is entitled to
    judgment as a matter of law, and (3) it appears from the evidence that
    reasonable minds can come to but one conclusion, and construing the evidence
    most strongly in favor of the nonmoving party, that conclusion is adverse to
    the party against whom the motion for summary judgment is made.” State ex
    rel. Duncan v. Mentor City Council, 
    105 Ohio St.3d 372
    , 
    2005-Ohio-2163
    , 
    826 N.E.2d 832
    , ¶ 9, citing Temple v. Wean United, Inc. (1977), 
    50 Ohio St.2d 317
    ,
    327, 
    364 N.E.2d 267
    .
    {¶ 6} Simmons’s complaint alleges that defendants are liable for legal
    malpractice committed in connection with their representation of him in the
    Chapter 7 bankruptcy. “To establish a cause of action for legal malpractice
    based on negligent representation, a plaintiff must show (1) that the attorney
    owed a duty or obligation to the plaintiff, (2) that there was a breach of that
    duty or obligation and that the attorney failed to conform to the standard
    required by law, and (3) that there is a causal connection between the conduct
    complained of and the resulting damage or loss.” Vahila v. Hall (1997), 
    77 Ohio St.3d 421
    , 
    674 N.E.2d 1164
    , syllabus. The plaintiff’s failure to prove any
    one of these elements entitles the defendant-attorney to summary judgment.
    Woodrow v. Heintschel, Lucas App. No. L–10–1206, 
    2011-Ohio-1840
    , ¶ 17;
    Williams-Roseman v. Owen (Sept. 21, 2000), Franklin App. No. 99AP-871.
    {¶ 7} Here, it is undisputed that Bartlett represented Simmons in the
    bankruptcy proceeding.        Accordingly, she had a duty to “‘exercise the
    knowledge, skill, and ability ordinarily possessed and exercised by members of
    the legal profession similarly situated, and to be ordinarily and reasonably
    diligent, careful, and prudent[.]’” See Palmer v. Westmeyer (1988), 
    48 Ohio App.3d 296
    , 298, 
    549 N.E.2d 1202
    , quoting 67 Ohio Jurisprudence 3d (1986)
    16, Malpractice, Section 9.
    {¶ 8} Simmons claims that when he retained Bartlett, he informed her
    that he had no interest in a Chapter 13 plan and that he wanted a Chapter 7
    bankruptcy with an elimination of all debts. He further asserts that Bartlett
    was negligent in her representation by advising him to proceed with a Chapter
    7 filing, advising him to stop paying his bills while she proceeded with the
    elimination of his debts, and advising him to purchase a vehicle, allegedly in
    order to deceive the Chapter 7 means test.      According to the defendants,
    although Simmons’s income exceeded the amount for a Chapter 7 filing, he
    could still pass the means test calculation.1
    {¶ 9} Generally, expert testimony is required to establish the breach of
    duty, unless the breach is so obvious that it may be determined by the court as
    a matter of law, or is within the ordinary knowledge of a lay person. Bloom v.
    Dieckmann (1983), 
    11 Ohio App.3d 202
    , 
    464 N.E.2d 187
    , syllabus; see, also,
    McInnis v. Hyatt Legal Clinics (1984), 
    10 Ohio St.3d 112
    , 113, 
    461 N.E.2d 1295
    .       Initially, we recognize that the requirements for a Chapter 7
    bankruptcy and the application of the means test are not matters within the
    ordinary knowledge of the layman. Furthermore, Simmons’s allegations are
    unsupported by any evidence in the record and he has failed to demonstrate
    that the alleged advice to purchase a vehicle constituted negligence as a
    matter of law.2 Expert testimony was therefore necessary to support a cause
    of action for malpractice.           Additionally, Simmons failed to demonstrate
    whether the alleged malpractice proximately caused any actual damages.
    Without any affirmative evidence, we are simply left with an unsuccessful
    Chapter 7 bankruptcy.
    1
    
    11 U.S.C. § 707
    (b)(1) establishes the means test to determine whether a presumption of
    abuse arises in a debtor’s bankruptcy case.
    2
    The provisions to which he cites, 
    18 U.S.C. § 152
     and 157, do not clearly establish
    negligence per se.
    {¶ 10} Therefore, we find the trial court properly awarded summary
    judgment in favor of the defendants.
    {¶ 11} Judgment affirmed.
    It is ordered that appellees recover from appellant costs herein taxed.
    The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
    It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the
    common pleas court to carry this judgment into execution.
    A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to
    Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
    SEAN C. GALLAGHER, JUDGE
    MARY J. BOYLE, P.J., and
    EILEEN A. GALLAGHER, J., CONCUR
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 96386

Citation Numbers: 2011 Ohio 4510

Judges: Gallagher

Filed Date: 9/8/2011

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 3/3/2016