State v. Trent , 2021 Ohio 3698 ( 2021 )

[Cite as State v. Trent, 2021-Ohio-3698.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
CLARK COUNTY
STATE OF OHIO :
:
Plaintiff-Appellee : Appellate Case No. 2020-CA-61
:
v. : Trial Court Case No. 2018-CR-228
:
RODNEY TRENT : (Criminal Appeal from
: Common Pleas Court)
Defendant-Appellant :
:
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OPINION
Rendered on the 15th day of October, 2021.
...........
IAN A. RICHARDSON, Atty. Reg. No. 0100124, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, Clark
County Prosecutor’s Office, 50 East Columbia Street, Suite 449, Springfield, Ohio 45502
Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellee
HILARY J. LERMAN, Atty. Reg. No. 0029975, 249 Wyoming Street, Dayton, Ohio 45409
Attorney for Defendant-Appellant
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WELBAUM, J.
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{¶ 1} Defendant-appellant, Rodney Trent, appeals from his convictions in the Clark
County Court of Common Pleas after he pled no contest to one count of trafficking in
cocaine and one count of tampering with evidence. In support of his appeal, Trent
contends that the trial court erred by sentencing him to a prison term as opposed to
community control sanctions. Specifically, Trent claims that the trial court’s analysis of
the seriousness and recidivism factors in R.C. 2929.12 and the sentencing guidelines in
R.C. 2929.13 was against the manifest weight of the evidence. For the reasons outlined
below, the judgment of the trial court will be affirmed.
Facts and Course of Proceedings
{¶ 2} On April 9, 2018, a Clark County grand jury returned an indictment charging
Trent with one count of failure to comply with the order or signal of a police officer in
violation of R.C. 2921.331(B), a felony of the third degree; one count of trafficking in
cocaine in violation of R.C. 2925.03(A)(2), a felony of the fourth degree; one count of
possession of cocaine in violation of R.C. 2925.11(A), a felony of the fourth degree; and
one count of tampering with evidence in violation of R.C. 2921.12(A)(1), a felony of the
third degree. The indictment also included a forfeiture specification for $2,462.16 in cash
that was seized from Trent’s person.
{¶ 3} The aforementioned charges arose after Trent fled from police in his vehicle
after a traffic stop was initiated due to Trent’s driving under suspension. Responding
police officers pursued Trent’s vehicle and then took Trent into custody following a foot
chase. During the pursuit, Trent reached into his pocket and disposed of a bag
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containing white powder, which was later established to be 6.49 grams of cocaine. After
Trent was taken into custody, a pat-down search of his person yielded a digital scale
covered with a trace amount of cocaine, a bag of marijuana, and $2,462.16 in cash. Two
cell phones with pictures of Trent stored on them were also recovered at the scene of the
pursuit.
{¶ 4} On January 8, 2019, Trent entered into a plea agreement with the State and
pled no contest to one count of trafficking in cocaine and one count of tampering with
evidence. In exchange for Trent’s no contest pleas, the State dismissed the counts for
failure to comply with the order or signal of a police officer and possession of cocaine.
Trent also agreed to forfeit the $2,462.16 in cash that was seized from his person. The
trial court accepted Trent’s no contest pleas and found him guilty of trafficking in cocaine
and tampering with evidence. The trial court then ordered a presentence investigation
and scheduled Trent’s sentencing hearing for January 30, 2019. Because Trent failed
to appear at the sentencing hearing, the trial court issued a capias for his arrest.
{¶ 5} On September 9, 2020, Trent was arrested and thereafter sentenced on
October 13, 2020. Prior to imposing a sentence, the trial court noted at the sentencing
hearing that it had considered the purposes and principles of felony sentencing in R.C.
2929.11, the seriousness and recidivism factors in R.C. 2929.12, and the sentencing
guidelines set forth in R.C. 2929.13. After discussing the relevant factors under R.C.
2929.12, and after noting that R.C. 2929.13 did not mandate community control
sanctions, the trial court sentenced Trent to 18 months in prison for trafficking in cocaine
and to 36 months in prison for tampering with evidence. The trial court then ordered
those sentences to be served concurrently for an aggregate term of 36 months in prison.
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{¶ 6} Trent now appeals from his convictions, raising a single assignment of error
for review.
Assignment of Error
{¶ 7} Under his sole assignment of error, Trent contends that the trial court erred
by sentencing him to a prison term as opposed to community control sanctions.
Specifically, Trent claims that the trial court’s analysis of the seriousness and recidivism
factors in R.C. 2929.12 and the sentencing guidelines in R.C. 2929.13 was against the
manifest weight of the evidence. Trent’s argument fails for the following reasons.
{¶ 8} When reviewing felony sentences, appellate courts must apply the standard
of review set forth in R.C. 2953.08(G)(2). State v. Marcum, 146 Ohio St.3d 516, 2016-
Ohio-1002, 59 N.E.3d 1231, ¶ 7. Under that statute, an appellate court may increase,
reduce, or modify a sentence, or it may vacate the sentence and remand for resentencing,
only if it clearly and convincingly finds either: (1) the record does not support the
sentencing court’s findings under certain enumerated statutes, including R.C. 2929.13(B);
or (2) the sentence is otherwise contrary to law. Id. at ¶ 9, citing R.C. 2953.08(G)(2).
{¶ 9} In this case, the trial court made a finding under R.C. 2929.13(B) that it was
not required to impose community control sanctions because Trent was being sentenced
for a charge that was greater than a felony of the fourth or fifth degree. The trial court’s
finding was based on R.C. 2929.13(B)(1)(a)(ii), which provides that:
[I]f an offender is convicted of or pleads guilty to a felony of the fourth
or fifth degree that is not an offense of violence or that is a qualifying assault
offense, the court shall sentence the offender to a community control
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sanction or combination of community control sanctions if all of the following
apply: * * * (ii) The most serious charge against the offender at the time of
sentencing is a felony of the fourth or fifth degree. * * *
{¶ 10} Upon review, we find that the trial court’s finding was not clearly and
convincingly unsupported by the record, as Trent was being sentenced for fourth-degree
felony trafficking in cocaine and third-degree felony tampering with evidence. As a
result, the trial court was simply required to comply with R.C. 2929.11 and R.C. 2929.12
when deciding whether to impose a prison term, as R.C. 2929.13(B)(2) provides that:
If division (B)(1) of this section does not apply, * * * in determining
whether to impose a prison term as a sanction for a felony of the fourth or
fifth degree, the sentencing court shall comply with the purposes and
principles of sentencing under section 2929.11 of the Revised Code and
with section 2929.12 of the Revised Code.
{¶ 11} Because the trial court’s finding under R.C. 2929.13(B) was not
unsupported by the record, and because none of the other statutes enumerated under
R.C. 2953.08(G)(2) were applicable to this case, this court may modify or vacate Trent’s
sentence only if it clearly and convincingly finds that Trent’s sentence is otherwise
contrary to law. “ ‘[C]ontrary to law’ means that a sentencing decision manifestly ignores
an issue or factor which a statute requires a court to consider.” (Citation omitted.) State
v. Lofton, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 19852, 2004-Ohio-169, ¶ 11. For example, “[a]
sentence is contrary to law when it does not fall within the statutory range for the offense
or if the trial court fails to consider the purposes and principles of felony sentencing set
forth in R.C. 2929.11 and the sentencing factors set forth in R.C. 2929.12.” (Citation
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omitted.) State v. Brown, 2017-Ohio-8416, 99 N.E.3d 1135, ¶ 74 (2d Dist.).
{¶ 12} “The trial court [however] has full discretion to impose any sentence within
the authorized statutory range, and the court is not required to make any findings or give
its reasons for imposing maximum or more than minimum sentences.” (Citation omitted.)
State v. King, 2013-Ohio-2021, 992 N.E.2d 491, ¶ 45 (2d Dist.). Therefore, “when
making a felony sentencing decision, a trial court must consider the R.C. 2929.11
purposes of felony sentencing and the R.C. 2929.12 felony sentencing factors, but there
is no requirement for the trial court to make any on-the-record findings regarding R.C.
2929.11 and R.C. 2929.12.” State v. Benedict, 2d Dist. Greene No. 2020-CA-25, 2021-
Ohio-966, ¶ 8.
{¶ 13} In this case, Trent is challenging the trial court’s analysis under R.C.
2929.12 on grounds that it was against the manifest weight of the evidence. Such an
argument essentially claims that the record does not support Trent’s sentence under R.C.
2929.12. The Supreme Court of Ohio, however, recently explained that R.C.
2953.08(G)(2)(b) “does not provide a basis for an appellate court to modify or vacate a
sentence based on its view that the sentence is not supported by the record under R.C.
2929.11 and 2929.12.” State v. Jones, 163 Ohio St.3d 242, 2020-Ohio-6729, 169
N.E.3d 649, ¶ 39. Therefore, “[w]hen reviewing felony sentences that are imposed solely
after considering the factors in R.C. 2929.11 and R.C. 2929.12, we do not analyze
whether those sentences are unsupported by the record.” State v. McDaniel, 2d Dist.
Darke No. 2020-CA-3, 2021-Ohio-1519, ¶ 11, citing State v. Dorsey, 2d Dist. Montgomery
No. 28747, 2021-Ohio-76, ¶ 18; Jones at ¶ 26-29. Instead, “[w]e simply must determine
whether those sentences are contrary to law.” Dorsey at ¶ 18.
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{¶ 14} Here, the record establishes that Trent’s aggregate 36-month prison
sentence was not contrary to law. The trial court expressly stated at the sentencing
hearing that it had considered the purposes and principles of felony sentencing under
R.C. 2929.11 and the seriousness and recidivism factors under R.C. 2929.12. See
Sentencing Trans. (Oct. 13, 2020), p. 13 and 15-16. Although not required, the trial court
also analyzed the relevant factors under R.C. 2929.12 on the record. While analyzing
those factors, the trial court noted that Trent risked physical harm to persons and property
while he was fleeing from officers. The trial court also noted that Trent had several adult
felony and misdemeanor convictions dating back to 1995 for domestic violence,
aggravated trafficking in drugs, possession of criminal tools, having weapons under
disability, possession of drugs, driving under suspension, possession of cocaine,
operating a vehicle while under the influence, driving without a license, and obstructing
official business. The trial court also found that Trent had not responded favorably to
previously imposed sanctions, lacked genuine remorse for his conduct, and scored high
on the Ohio Risk Assessment Survey. Finally, the trial court considered the fact that
Trent had failed to appear for his January 30, 2019 sentencing hearing.
{¶ 15} As previously noted, and in accordance with the Supreme Court of Ohio’s
decision in Jones, we need not determine whether these findings were unsupported by
the record. It is enough that the record demonstrates that the trial court considered R.C.
2929.11 and R.C. 2929.12 prior to imposing its sentence. Therefore, because the record
demonstrates that the trial court complied with its obligations under those statutes, and
because Trent’s individual prison terms were within the authorized statutory range, see
R.C. 2929.14(A)(3)(b) and (A)(4), Trent’s aggregate 36-month prison sentence was not
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contrary to law and therefore may not be disturbed by this court.
{¶ 16} For the foregoing reasons, Trent’s sole assignment of error is overruled.
Conclusion
{¶ 17} Having overruled Trent’s assignment of error, the judgment of the trial court
is affirmed.
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DONOVAN, J. and HALL, J., concur.
Copies sent to:
Ian A. Richardson
Hilary J. Lerman
Hon. Richard J. O’Neill