Shaker House, L.L.C. v. Daniel , 2022 Ohio 2778 ( 2022 )

[Cite as Shaker House, L.L.C. v. Daniel, 2022-Ohio-2778.]
COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA
SHAKER HOUSE LLC, :
Plaintiff-Appellant, :
No. 111183
v. :
CHRISTOPHER DANIEL, :
Defendant-Appellee. :
JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION
JUDGMENT: REVERSED AND REMANDED
RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: August 11, 2022
Civil Appeal from the Cleveland Municipal Court
Housing Court Division
Case No. 2021 CVG 008203
Appearances:
Dworken & Bernstein Co., L.P.A., Grant J. Keating, and
Patrick J. Perotti, for appellant.
Danielle Gadomski Littleton and Abigail C. Staudt, urging
affirmance for amicus curiae The Legal Aid Society of
Cleveland.
Anastasia A. Elder, urging affirmance for amicus curiae
Schubert Center for Child Studies, Case Western Reserve
University.
Ulmer & Berne LLP and Michael N. Ungar, urging
affirmance for amicus curiae United Way of Greater
Cleveland.
Ulmer & Berne LLP and Michael N. Ungar, urging
affirmance for amicus curiae Enterprise Community
Partners, and Environmental Health Watch.
Baker Hostetler and Chad W. Makuch, urging affirmance
for amicus curiae The George Gund Foundation.
Susan Jagers, urging affirmance for amicus curiae Ohio
Poverty Law Center, LLC.
Kristen Finzel Lewis, urging affirmance for amicus curiae
Southeastern Ohio Legal Services.
Heather L. Hall, urging affirmance for amicus curiae
Advocates for Basic Legal Equality, Inc.
John Schrider, urging affirmance for amicus curiae Legal
Aid Society of Southwest Ohio, LLC.
Benjamin D. Horne, urging affirmance for amicus curiae
The Legal Aid Society of Columbus.
EILEEN T. GALLAGHER, J.:
Plaintiff-appellant, Shaker House Limited Liability Company (“Shaker
House”), appeals an order of the Cleveland Municipal Court, Housing Division
(“housing court”), dismissing its complaint for forcible entry and detainer against
defendant-appellee, Christopher Daniel (“Daniel”). Shaker House claims the
following error:
The trial court erred in dismissing appellant’s eviction complaint for
failing to comply with Housing Court Local Rule 3.015.
Daniel has not filed an appellee brief. However, the Legal Aid Society
of Cleveland, Enterprise Community Partners, Environmental Health Watch,
Schubert Center for Child Studies of Case Western Reserve University, the George
Gund Foundation, United Way of Greater Cleveland, the Legal Aid Society of
Southwest Ohio, LLC, Southeastern Ohio Legal Services, Advocates for Basic Legal
Equity, Inc., and the Ohio Poverty Law Center, LLC (collectively “the Amici”) have
filed a merit brief of amici curiae in support of Daniel.
After reviewing the briefs and applicable law, we find that Loc.R. 3.015
of the Cleveland Municipal Court, Housing Division, is invalid, and we reverse the
trial court’s judgment.
I. Facts and Procedural History
Shaker House is the owner of an apartment complex known as the
“Shaker House Apartments” located on Shaker Boulevard in Cleveland, Ohio.
Daniel, who leased an apartment in the Shaker House Apartments, failed to pay rent
in accordance with parties’ written lease. Shaker House served him with a three-day
notice to vacate the premises on July 8, 2021, but Daniel did not vacate the premises.
As a result, in August 2021, Shaker House filed a complaint for forcible entry and
detainer in the housing court. It is undisputed that Shaker House complied with all
the requirements of R.C. 1923.01 et seq. for obtaining restitution of the premises and
all the local rules of the housing court, except for Loc.R. 3.015.
Loc.R. 3.015 requires that landlords establish compliance with
Cleveland Codified Ordinance (“C.C.O.”) 365.04, Cleveland’s lead-safe certification
ordinance, as a precondition to obtaining an eviction. C.C.O. 365.04(a) provides, in
relevant part:
Any residential rental unit originally constructed prior to January 1,
1978 is presumed to have lead-based paint. It is the policy of the City
to help prevent the poisoning of children by requiring that the presence
of deteriorated lead-based paint on the interior and exterior of
residential rental structures built before January 1, 1978 be identified
and correctly addressed by reducing and controlling lead-based paint
hazards which may be present, in order to prevent human exposure to
these hazards. Therefore, it is the further policy of the City to require
all residential rental units in the City constructed prior to January 1,
1978 to have lead-safe certification no later than March 1, 2023.
The ordinance also sets forth the requirements for obtaining lead-safe
certification as well as the criteria for obtaining an exemption from the requirement.
See C.C.O. 365.04(b)-(c).
Loc.R. 3.015 provides, in its entirety:
A. Complaints in eviction must include, at the time of filing,
documentary evidence from the City of Cleveland Department of
Building and Housing verifying Lead-Safe Certification of all
residential units built before January 1, 1978, unless otherwise exempt.
See Ordinance Number 747-2019, Section 365.04.
B. Documentary evidence can include a current Lead-Safe Certificate
issued by the Director of Building and Housing (“Director”), a Lead-
Safe affidavit approved by the Director, an exemption certificate letter,
or other form approved by the Director indicating exemption or
exception. A copy of the Lead-Safe affidavit approved by the Director
can be found at
http://clevelandmunicipalcourt.org/housingcourt/forms
C. Failure to include sufficient documentation, or false, inaccurate, or
expired Lead-Safe Certificates may result in sanctions, including, but
not limited to, dismissal of the compliant [sic], inability to file a future
complaint in eviction related to any residential unit without proof of
compliance with Ord. No. 747-2019, Sec. 365.04, or, where warranted,
prosecution for perjury.
Shaker House indicated in its complaint that it was “not attaching an
Affidavit of Lead Certification Status, because the Court’s local rule 3.015 requiring
evidence of the City of Cleveland Department of Building and Housing’s Lead-Safe
Certification status as precondition to obtaining an eviction is unenforceable.”
(Complaint ¶ 9.)
A magistrate held a hearing on Shaker House’s forcible entry and
detainer claim in September 2021. It is undisputed that Shaker House presented all
the necessary evidence to obtain an eviction under R.C. 1923.01 et seq. and complied
with all the local rules of the housing court, except for Loc.R. 3.015. No opposing
evidence was presented. Shaker House concluded its presentation by requesting “a
ruling on the record today, ordering restitution of the premises in this case * * *
notwithstanding Local Rule 3.015 because that rule is not permitted by law.”
The magistrate subsequently issued a decision denying Shaker
House’s claim due to its noncompliance with Loc.R. 3.015. Shaker House filed
timely objections to the magistrate’s decision. The trial court overruled the
objections and entered judgment adopting the magistrate’s decision. Shaker
House’s second claim for relief, seeking money damages, was subsequently
dismissed by the trial court. Shaker House now appeals the trial court’s judgment.
II. Law and Analysis
In its sole assignment of error, Shaker House argues the trial court
erred in dismissing its forcible entry and detainer claim due to its failure to comply
with Loc.R. 3.015. Shaker House argues that Loc.R. 3.015 is unenforceable because
it conflicts with the landlord’s substantive rights under R.C. Chapter 1923.
Forcible entry and detainer actions are governed by R.C. Chapter 1923.
“The purpose of the forcible entry and detainer statutes is to provide a summary,
extraordinary, and speedy method for the recovery of possession of real estate in the
cases especially enumerated by statute.” Cuyahoga Metro. Hous. Auth. v. Jackson,
67 Ohio St.2d 129, 131, 423 N.E.2d 177 (1981), quoting 24 Ohio Jurisprudence 2d
455, Forcible Entry and Detainer, Section 2. “‘[G]iven its summary nature, the
drafters of the Rules of Civil Procedure were careful to avoid encrusting this special
remedy with time consuming procedure tending to destroy its efficacy.’” Miele v.
Ribovich, 90 Ohio St.3d 439, 441, 739 N.E.2d 333 (2000), quoting Jackson at 131.
R.C. 1923.02(A)(9) creates a cause of action for forcible entry and
detainer “[a]gainst tenants who have breached an obligation imposed upon them by
a written rental agreement.” It is undisputed that Daniel breached the terms of the
lease by failing to pay rent. R.C. 1923.04(A) requires the landlord give the tenant
notice of the eviction action “three or more days before beginning the action, by
certified mail, return receipt requested, or by handing a written copy of the notice to
the defendant in person, or by leaving it at the defendant’s usual place of abode or
at the premises from which the defendant is sought to be evicted.” It is undisputed
that Shaker House provided Daniel the required three-day notice. As previously
stated, it is undisputed that Shaker House complied with all the requirements of R.C.
1923.01 et seq. for immediate possession.
R.C. 1923.09(A) provides that “[i]f the judge finds the complaint to be
true, the judge shall render a general judgment against the defendant, in favor of the
plaintiff, for restitution of the premises and costs of suit.” The court’s judgment does
not dispute that Shaker House met all the statutory requirements for restitution of
the premises. The trial court denied Shaker House’s claim for restitution of the
premises solely on grounds that Shaker House failed to demonstrate compliance
with Loc.R. 3.015. But Loc.R. 3.015 is not a basis for denying an eviction claim under
R.C. Chapter 1923.
Loc.R. 3.015 effectively adds an additional element to an eviction
cause of action that is not required by the eviction statutes. Courts may not add or
delete elements to statutory claims by judicial fiat. Hulsmeyer v. Hospice of S.W.
Ohio, Inc., 142 Ohio St.3d 236, 2014-Ohio-5511, 29 N.E.3d 903, ¶ 26, In re
Application of Columbus S. Power Co., 138 Ohio St.3d 448, 2014-Ohio-462, 8
N.E.3d 863, ¶ 26 (“The court must give effect to the words used, making neither
additions nor deletions from words chosen by the General Assembly.”).
The amici argue that because the housing court “has exclusive
jurisdiction” pursuant to R.C. 1901.181 to enforce housing codes, it may dismiss a
landlord’s claim for restitution of its premises as part of its enforcement powers.
The amici contend that because the housing court has exclusive jurisdiction over
housing matters, it has the power to block summary evictions brought under R.C.
1923.01 et seq.
R.C. 1901.181 provides that the housing court has exclusive
jurisdiction over “any civil action to enforce any local building, housing, air
pollution, sanitation, health, fire, zoning, or safety code, ordinance, or regulation
applicable to premises used or intended for use as a place of human habitation
* * * .” However, an eviction action is not a “civil action to enforce” any local
ordinance.
The mechanism by which the housing court may enforce C.C.O.
365.04 or any other health and safety law during an eviction is provided in R.C.
1923.15. R.C. 1923.15 provides, in relevant part:
During any proceeding involving residential premises under this
chapter, the court may order an appropriate governmental agency to
inspect the residential premises. If the agency determines and the
court finds conditions which constitute a violation of section 4781.38
or 5321.041 of the Revised Code, and if the premises have been vacated
or are to be restored to the landlord, the court may issue an order
forbidding the re-rental of the property until such conditions are
corrected.
(Emphasis added.) Despite the amici’s argument to the contrary, there is no
authority in the statute for preventing an eviction. If the property is in violation of
C.C.O. 365.04 or any other health and safety law, the remedy is to prohibit re-rental
of the property until the conditions have been corrected. Preventing an eviction
precludes correction of unsafe conditions. The unsafe condition may continue
indefinitely because the landlord cannot evict the tenant despite his nonpayment of
1 As relevant here, R.C. 5321.04(A)(1) requires that landlords “[c]omply with
requirements of all applicable building, housing, health, and safety codes that materially
affect health and safety.”
rent, and the tenant has no incentive to vacate the premises voluntarily. This result
is contrary to the expressed purpose of C.C.O. 365.04, which is designed to prevent
human exposure to the hazards of lead-based paint, not prolong it. See C.C.O.
365.04(a).
Moreover, Loc.R. 3.015 is invalid because it conflicts with a landlord’s
substantive rights under R.C. Chapter 1923. Article IV, Section 5(B) of the Ohio
Constitution provides that the Ohio Supreme Court may “prescribe rules governing
practice and procedure in all courts of the state, which rules shall not abridge,
enlarge, or modify any substantive right.” (Emphasis added.) The provision goes
on state that other “[c]ourts may adopt additional rules concerning local practice in
their respective courts which are not inconsistent with the rules promulgated by the
supreme court.” Id. (Emphasis added.) Civ.R. 83 similarly provides that “[a] court
may adopt local rules of practice which shall not be inconsistent with these rules or
with other rules promulgated by the Supreme Court[.]” (Emphasis added.) Thus,
the housing court is authorized to adopt local rules of practice provided the rules are
consistent with the rules promulgated by the Ohio Supreme Court, which “shall not
abridge, enlarge, or modify any substantive right.” Article IV, Section 5(B), Ohio
Constitution.
“[I]f a rule created pursuant to Section 5(B), Article IV conflicts with
a statute, the rule will control for procedural matters, and the statute will control for
matters of substantive law.” Proctor v. Kardassilaris, 115 Ohio St.3d 71, 2007-Ohio-
4838, 873 N.E.2d 872, ¶ 17, citing Boyer v. Boyer, 46 Ohio St.2d 83, 86, 346 N.E.2d
736 (1976). See also State ex rel. Gudzinas v. Constantino, 43 Ohio App.3d 52, 53,
539 N.E.2d 173 (11th Dist.1988) (“Although municipal judges have the power under
R.C. 1901.14(A)(3) to adopt rules governing the administration of the court, such
rules are invalid if they conflict with state statute.”).
A “substantive” law is “‘that body of law which creates, defines and
regulates the rights of the parties.’” Id., quoting Krause v. State, 31 Ohio St.2d 132,
145, 285 N.E.2d 736 (1972). C.C.O. 365.04(a) is a substantive law because it creates
a duty on the part of landlords to remediate lead paint on their properties offered
for rent. The purpose of Loc.R. 3.015 is to force compliance with C.C.O. 365.04.
Requiring proof of compliance with a local ordinance before allowing a party to
proceed with an eviction action is not a practice and procedure rule analogous to
setting a deadline for requesting a jury or setting discovery deadlines. Loc.R. 3.015
requires that “the presence of deteriorating lead-based paint on the interior and
exterior of residential rental structures * * * be identified and correct[ed].” (Amici
brief p. 23.) Such a rule is unrelated to the practices and procedures in the housing
court. Rather, it imposes the same duty on the landlord to remediate lead-based
paint as that created by C.C.O. 365.04, before allowing an eviction to proceed.
Therefore, Loc.R. 3.015 is a substantive law, not a procedural one.
Only the legislature is vested with authority to enact substantive laws.
Houdek v. ThyssenKrupp Materials N.A., Inc., 134 Ohio St.3d 491, 2012-Ohio-
5685, 983 N.E.2d 1253, ¶ 29 (“The Ohio Constitution vests the General Assembly,
not the courts, with the legislative powers of government. [The court’s] role, in
exercise of the judicial power granted to [it] by the Constitution, is to interpret and
apply the law enacted by the General Assembly, not to rewrite it.”).
In Lager v. Pittman, 140 Ohio App.3d 227, 746 N.E.2d 1199 (11th
Dist.2000), the court held that a judge’s order requiring the county public defender
to conduct indigency interviews at a specific time and place was invalid because it
conflicted with R.C. 120.05(B), which gave the public defender discretion to decide
how to fulfill its obligation to investigate the financial status of potentially indigent
defendants. By specifying the time and place for conducting the financial
investigations, the court added requirements that were not present in the statute
and, therefore, interfered with the public defender’s discretion.
In Constantino, the Eleventh District held that a municipal court’s
local rule charging a fee of $25 for depositing rent with the clerk of courts pending a
landlord-tenant dispute was invalid because it conflicted with R.C. 5321.08, a statute
that specifically limited the fee to one percent of the amount of deposited.
Constantino, 43 Ohio App.3d at 53, 539 N.E.2d 173. The municipal court’s local rule
was invalid because it conflicted with the statute by charging more than the limit
prescribed by statute.
Similarly, in In re Estate of Duffy, 148 Ohio App.3d 574, 2002-Ohio-
3844, 774 N.E.2d 344, the Eleventh District held that a local probate court rule was
invalid because it placed additional restraints on the payment of attorney fees
beyond those found in R.C. 2113.36. R.C. 2113.36 provided that reasonable attorney
fees “‘shall be allowed.’” Id. at ¶ 19, quoting R.C. 2113.36. The local probate court
rule prohibited the payment of attorney fees to an executor, who also provided legal
services to an estate, if that individual failed to obtain the court’s preapproval of a
contract for legal services. Id. at ¶ 19. The Eleventh District held that the local
probate court rule conflicted with R.C. 2113.36 because R.C. 2113.36 did not
contemplate the restriction imposed by the local rule on the payment of reasonable
attorney fees. Id. The local rule was invalid because it imposed an additional
requirement on the payment of attorney fees that was not required by the applicable
statute.
As previously stated, Loc.R. 3.015 adds an additional element to an
eviction cause of action that is not required by R.C. Chapter 1923, which governs
forcible entry and detainer actions. Loc.R. 3.015 also conflicts with R.C. 1923.15,
which is the statutorily prescribed mechanism for enforcing health and safety laws
during eviction proceedings. As previously stated, R.C. 1923.15 provides that if a
landlord violates R.C. 5321.04(A)(1), which requires that landlords “[c]omply with
the requirements of all applicable building, housing, health, and safety codes that
materially affect health and safety[,]” “the court may issue an order forbidding the
re-rental of the property until such conditions are corrected.” While R.C. 1923.15
allows a housing court to block the re-rental of property, it does not authorize the
court to prevent an eviction due to a building code violation. Therefore, Loc.R. 3.015
conflicts with R.C. 1923.15 because it imposes an additional requirement for
obtaining an eviction not included in the statute. And, as previously stated, Loc.R.
3.015 frustrates the purpose of C.C.O. 365.04, because it prolongs the tenant’s
exposure to the hazards of lead-based paint rather than preventing it since it
prevents the landlord from obtaining an eviction despite the tenant’s nonpayment
of rent.
Finally, amici argue the housing court properly dismissed Shaker
House’s forcible entry and detainer claim on the equitable grounds. The housing
court found that Shaker House was not entitled to restitution of the property
because it had “unclean hands” as a result of its noncompliance with Cleveland’s
lead-safe certification ordinance. (Judgment entry dated Jan. 5, 2022, ¶ 14.)
However, forcible entry and detainer is a statutory remedy, not an action in equity.
Dobbins v. Kalson, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 07AP-831, 2008-Ohio-395, ¶ 10.
Although the housing court may exercise equitable powers in other contexts, it may
not use equitable powers to frustrate the purpose of the statutory remedy. Id. (“The
rationale behind excluding eviction proceedings from the civil rules is that forcible
entry and detainer is a special, statutory remedy, intended to be a summary
proceeding, and its purpose would be frustrated by strict application of the civil
rules.”), citing Miele, 90 Ohio St.3d at 442, 739 N.E.2d 333 (“Given its summary
nature, the drafters of the [civil rules] were careful to avoid encrusting this special
remedy with time consuming procedure tending to destroy its efficacy.”).
“‘[W]henever a statute is in conflict with a rule of the common law, or of equity, the
statute must prevail.’” Cousins Waste Control Corp. v. Wellston, 4th Dist. Jackson
No. 94CA733, 1995 Ohio App. LEXIS 2315 (May 26, 1995), quoting Wellston v.
Morgan, 65 Ohio St. 219, 228 62 N.E. 127 (1901). Therefore, the housing court may
not use its equitable powers to thwart the purpose of the forcible entry and detainer
statutes, which is to provide a speedy method for the recovery of possession of leased
property.
Loc.R. 3.015 is invalid because it conflicts with the provisions of R.C.
Chapter 1923, which governs forcible entry and detainer actions. The record
demonstrates that Shaker House complied with all the requirements of R.C. 1923.01
et seq. for immediate possession. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court’s judgment
and remand the case to the trial court to grant Shaker House’s forcible entry and
detainer claim within 30 days of the date of this court’s judgment.
It is ordered that appellant recover from appellee costs herein taxed.
The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate be sent to the Cleveland Municipal Court,
Housing Division, to carry this judgment into execution.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27
of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
EILEEN T. GALLAGHER, JUDGE
EILEEN A. GALLAGHER, P.J., and
MICHELLE J. SHEEHAN, J., CONCUR