A.A.O. v. A.M.O. , 2022 Ohio 2767 ( 2022 )


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  • [Cite as A.A.O. v. A.M.O., 
    2022-Ohio-2767
    .]
    COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
    EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
    COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA
    A.A.O.,                                             :
    Plaintiff-Appellant,                :
    Nos. 110338 and 110349
    v.                                  :
    A.M.O.,                                             :
    Defendant-Appellee. :
    _______________________________________
    JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION
    JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED
    IN PART, AND REMANDED
    RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: August 11, 2022
    ________________________________________
    Civil Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas
    Domestic Relations Division
    Case No. DR-20-380221
    ________________________________________
    Appearances:
    Stafford Law Co., L.P.A., Joseph G. Stafford, and Nicole A.
    Cruz, for appellant.
    TM Wilson Law Group, LLC, and Thomas M. Wilson, for
    appellee.
    EMANUELLA D. GROVES, J.:
    Plaintiff-appellant A.A.O. (“Wife”) appeals from the trial court’s
    judgment entry of divorce. For the reasons that follow, we affirm in part, reverse in
    part, and remand for the limited purpose of recalculating the child support order.
    Factual and Procedural History
    Wife and A.M.O. (“Husband”) were married on July 28, 2002, and
    the couple had four children during the marriage (L.O. d.o.b. May 25, 2004, E.O.
    d.o.b. August 24, 2007, Al.O. d.o.b. June 23, 2008, and An.O. d.o.b. June 3, 2010).
    On January 31, 2020, Wife filed a complaint for divorce.1             On
    February 11, 2020, Wife filed an emergency motion for an order requiring Husband
    to purchase a replacement vehicle for Wife. On February 14, 2020, Husband filed
    his answer and counterclaim for divorce. On February 20, 2020, Husband filed a
    reply brief to Wife’s emergency motion. On February 24, 2020, the court appointed
    a guardian ad litem (“GAL”) for the minor children.
    Trial took place on August 4, 5, 6, and 10, 2020. The court heard
    testimony from Wife, Husband, the GAL, and numerous witnesses including the
    valuation expert Stephen Barnes.
    On September 11, 2020, the parties submitted written closing
    arguments.
    1 This was the third time the parties had filed for divorce. The first complaint for
    divorce was filed by Wife and was voluntarily dismissed. The second complaint was filed
    by Husband and was set for trial but was ultimately dismissed without prejudice by
    agreement of the parties.
    With respect to division of property, the property at issue includes a
    Shell gas station business (“Petro to Go”); the marital home in Strongsville, Ohio; a
    rental property in Cleveland, Ohio; the Midnight Smoke Shop (“Midnight Smoke
    Shop”); Wife’s jewelry; and Konni’s, a grocery store business, and the debts at issue
    are the mortgage for the marital home, credit card debt, and other debt of the
    parties.
    Petro to Go is a gas station owned by Husband and located in Rocky
    River. The parties do not dispute that Husband owns Petro to Go. Valuation expert
    Stephen Barnes (“Barnes”) testified that Husband borrowed funds from his brother
    to purchase the gas station and rented the land on which the gas station is located
    from his brother. At the time of the trial, Husband had been in default of the rent
    payments for two years. Barnes testified that based on two different valuation
    approaches, the Income approach and the Market approach, Petro to Go was valued
    at $172,148, and the court accepted this valuation.
    The parties purchased the marital home in April 2006, using a
    $75,000 down payment. Husband testified that the down payment came from his
    premarital savings account. Wife testified that the down payment came from
    Husband’s parents. The home was refinanced, initially to avert balloon payments
    and rate increases, and later to absorb credit card debt and to purchase a vehicle
    for Wife. The trial court found that as of November 2018, the outstanding principal
    due for the home was $170,453.82, and the value of the home pursuant to the
    County Financial Office was $280,400. With respect to the value of the marital
    home, the trial court made the following findings:
    [Wife] testified that she has always wanted to update the home. She
    has used [Husband’s] absence to initiate repairs. For example, she took
    a hammer to a wall in the kitchen. She ultimately hired someone to
    take out the entire wall. Currently, there is a temporary board on the
    floor between the flooring in what was two different rooms. In
    addition, she over fertilized the grass, causing most of it to die. She
    therefore requested new landscaping and sod to be planted. She has a
    plan to replace all the flooring in the home at an estimated cost of
    $25,000, to paint, and to move some walls and create a room for her
    son over the garage, while expanding her room into his old room. She
    testified that if the work she has started, the painting and the
    landscaping would be completed, the house would be worth $300,000,
    but if she did all her updates it would be worth $350,000. [Wife] said
    the estimates for the repairs and remodeling beyond the numbers she
    recalled were in her bedroom.
    Some of the funds that she has used for the updates started or
    completed came from support she received during the first year of this
    case when she was “on strike” and refused to shop for food or cook for
    the children. [Husband] called in orders for food for the children and
    [Wife] during this time in addition to his direct and indirect support of
    the family. Other times [Husband] has paid some of the expenses she
    has incurred unilaterally.
    (Emphasis sic.)
    The parties own a rental property on West 104th Street in Cleveland.
    Husband purchased the property outright for $29,000; there is no mortgage on the
    property. The trial court determined that the value of the property was $29,000.
    Midnight Smoke Shop is a store located in Cleveland that sells vaping
    equipment. Wife insisted throughout the proceedings in this case that Husband
    was a true owner of this business. Evidence presented at trial with respect to this
    alleged asset included Husband’s tax returns, the business’s operating agreement,
    an affidavit from one of the owners, and testimony from Husband and one of the
    owners. This evidence showed that Husband assisted the owners in starting the
    business and has worked at the business as a W-2 employee since its inception in
    2017. The valuation expert testified at trial that the operating agreement for the
    business reflects that the limited liability company was formed with three members.
    Husband was not listed as an owner in the operating agreement, but the agreement
    did provide an option for him to buy shares of the business for an unspecified
    amount. Based on the evidence presented at trial, the trial court declined to
    consider Wife’s arguments that this business arrangement was somehow indicative
    of fraud and ultimately declined to consider Midnight Smoke Shop in its division of
    property.
    Wife was given gold jewelry when she married Husband. Wife, her
    uncle, and her three sisters testified about this jewelry. The trial court found that
    Wife’s undisputed testimony was that the gold jewelry would be worth about
    $100,000 today. The trial court also made the following findings:
    All the above witnesses testified to all or part of the following story and
    no one disputes it. At [Wife’s] sister Haneen’s wedding in 2015,
    [Husband’s] mother, Shama, asked [Wife] to give her all the jewelry she
    was wearing. [Wife] took it off and gave it to Shama. [Wife] testified
    that [Husband] told her that the gold is with Basem, [Husband’s]
    brother. [Husband] testified that he is not 100% sure that Basem has
    the gold, but it is likely. [Wife] testified that she was told that Basem
    wanted the gold because they owed so much money to him for the Shell
    station. Some of the above witnesses testified that Basem’s wife was
    holding the jewelry after Shama took it.
    [Husband] purchased the Shell station from his brother Basem who is
    also his landlord. [Husband] testified to being in arrears on the rent.
    There is a letter from Basem’s attorney regarding the arrears * * * and
    a pledge agreement for him for the Petro to Go shares * * *. These
    occurred after the jewelry was taken from [Wife.]. Basem is living in
    Palestine with his family and has been there, according to his affidavit,
    since July 2019. The Court notes that [Wife] wants her value for the
    Shell station, but that she also wants her jewelry. If the jewelry was
    given for debt repayment or collateral for debt for the Shell station,
    then [Wife] cannot have both half the value of the Shell station and her
    jewelry. If not, and the jewelry was taken from [Wife] by Shama and
    given to Basem’s wife for some other reason, it still is not a matter for
    this Court since [Wife] gave it over willingly. In addition, Basem was
    joined as a party. However, no one has testified that Basem took the
    jewelry or had the jewelry at the wedding; there is no clear testimony
    only hearsay and conjecture that he is holding the jewelry. Therefore,
    he should be dismissed as a party to this action and the Court declines
    to award to either party this jewelry that was given away in 2015.
    Konni’s is a grocery store located in East Cleveland that was
    previously owned and operated by Husband’s parents. Husband worked at the
    store from childhood through his marriage. In 2018, the business was sold. While
    Husband assisted the buyers with the transition of the business, he has not worked
    there since, and Husband has no interest in the business. The court found that
    Konni’s was not a consideration in this matter because the property was no longer
    owned by Husband’s family.
    With respect to the parties’ liabilities, in addition to the mortgage
    and other debts mentioned above, the court found that immediately prior to trial,
    Husband had purchased Wife a 2020 Kia Telluride for $48,000; the Mercedes that
    Wife had previously used was traded in, leaving a debt of $45,000. Husband also
    testified that he had traded in his 2008 Honda Odyssey with over 250,000 miles
    for a 2008 Dodge Caravan for $500 down and a loan of $7,000.
    Additionally, Wife testified regarding her credit card debt, totaling
    over $21,500 across 14 accounts. Husband testified regarding his credit card debt,
    totaling $57,477. The trial court noted that several of the accounts listed by
    Husband seemed to overlap with Wife’s, and factoring in the overlap, the court
    ultimately found that the total debt of both parties was $75,210. Husband testified
    that he used his tax refund to pay down some of the debt. Wife testified that she
    expects Husband to continue to pay her debts. With respect to this debt, the trial
    court found:
    One of the issues in the marriage was the spending of the parties.
    [Husband] attended college and worked at his parents’ store at the
    beginning of the marriage; then, he purchased the Shell station where
    he worked while still working for his parents’ store; and, in late 2017
    and 2018 he worked at the smoke shop in addition to the Shell station
    and his parents’ store. Since the store was sold, he has only worked at
    the Shell station and the smoke shop. [Husband] pointed out that he
    can’t continue to work 16 to 18 hours per day and that doing so has
    spoiled his relationship with his children. Despite his long workdays
    his earnings were never enough to pay for the lifestyle that [Wife] lived
    as apparent above.
    On February 4, 2021, the court issued a judgment entry of divorce,
    and on February 26, 2021, the court issued a nunc pro tunc judgment entry for
    divorce with findings of fact and conclusions of law.
    The court found that because Husband’s testimony and exhibits were
    credible in establishing that the $75,000 down payment for the marital home came
    from funds from his mother, $75,000 of equity in the marital home should be
    credited to Husband as separate property. The court further awarded Husband’s
    interest in the marital home to Wife. The court ordered Husband to execute a deed
    in favor of Wife within 45 days of its order and further ordered Wife to refinance
    the home within 24 months of its order. The court ordered that until Wife
    refinanced or sold the home, Husband would pay the monthly mortgage and
    homeowner’s insurance as a credit against his spousal support order.
    The court awarded Wife’s interest in the rental property to Husband.
    The court also awarded Husband full interest in Petro to Go, without any claim by
    Wife. Further, the court ordered that Wife was awarded the Kia Telluride and
    Husband was awarded the Dodge Caravan, with the provision that for as long as
    Husband was obligated on the lien for the Kia, he would hold the title and continue
    to provide automobile insurance. The court ordered that after 48 months, Husband
    would no longer be responsible for the monthly payments and Wife would either
    refinance or sell the vehicle to relieve Husband of that obligation. The court found
    that each party would be responsible for the debt in their respective names. The
    court further found that the difference between the parties’ property division of
    approximately $32,445 could be partially alleviated by the past due taxes for the
    marital home and Husband’s support arrearage being passed to Wife.
    With respect to spousal support, the court considered the factors
    enumerated    in   R.C.   3105.18(C)(1)(a)   through    (n).    Considering    R.C.
    3105.18(C)(1)(a), the income of the parties, the court found:
    [Wife] has no income. During these proceedings the Court and the GAL
    encouraged her to pursue assistance through Cuyahoga Community
    College Women in Transition program. The parties were engaged
    when [Wife] was 16 and married when she was 17 before her senior year
    in high school. She [has] a high school diploma or the equivalent
    pursuant to the Request for Admissions that are deemed admitted due
    to [Wife’s] failure to respond. The parties have been married since
    July 28, 2002, for 18 years. [Wife] never worked outside the home.
    [Husband] has worked outside the home since he could push a broom
    at his parents’ grocery store. By the time of the parties’ marriage,
    [Husband] was attending college and working for the family grocery
    store. He continued to work there until that business was sold. Once
    he purchased the Shell station, he worked at both the Shell station and
    the grocery store. Once Midnight Smoke Shop was initiated, he worked
    there too. [Husband] testified to 16 to 18-hour days. All agree that
    [Husband] spent a good deal of time away from home. He
    acknowledges now that he sacrificed time with his children to provide
    for them financially and to pay the bills that [Wife] incurred.
    Using Husband’s tax returns, rental income, and business documents, the court
    found that Husband’s 2018 income was $108,598.
    The court ultimately found:
    [I]t is appropriate and reasonable for Husband to pay spousal support
    to Wife in the amount of $3500 per month, for a term of 48 months,
    commencing on January 1, 2021, subject to either parties’ death or
    Wife’s remarriage. The Court, however, finds that [Husband] is
    obligated on the mortgage for the marital home and the monthly debt
    for [Wife’s] Kia Telluride and [Wife] has no means to pay either
    obligation beyond her spousal support. In addition, it is in Husband’s
    best interest to continue to maintain insurance for both the marital
    home and the automobile so long as he is obligated on the debt for those
    items. Therefore, [Husband] should pay the monthly mortgage
    payment of $950 per month and the Kia Telluride monthly payment of
    $700 directly to the lien holders plus the homeowner’s and automobile
    insurance ($136.42 per month per [Wife’s] exhibit 67) directly to the
    provider and subtract that sum of $1736 from the $3500 per month.
    The approximately $11,680 that [Wife] owes [Husband] for the
    property division should be deducted at a rate of $200 per month for
    48 months. Although it is less than $11,680 over 48 months, it
    accounts for the increase in past due real estate taxes likely to have
    occurred since the evidence presented for 2019 real estate taxes. In
    addition, [Wife’s] child support obligation should be deducted from her
    monthly spousal support obligation. The order for support is subject
    to the Court’s continuing jurisdiction for adjustment should the
    mortgage payment be increased or decreased, should the homeowner’s
    insurance be cancelled, or the marital residence be refinanced in
    [Wife’s] name or be sold.
    With respect to the allocation of parental rights and responsibilities,
    the court found that while neither party filed a motion for shared parenting, the
    GAL requested an order awarding shared parenting. Ultimately, after considering
    the factors enumerated in R.C. 3109.04(F)(1), the court found that it was in the best
    interests of the children to allocate the parental rights and responsibilities for the
    care of the children primarily to Husband. The court further found that it was in
    the children’s best interests that Wife have parenting time from 9 a.m. to 4 p.m.
    Monday through Friday while the children attended school virtually; once the
    children resumed attending school in person, Wife would have custody of the
    children Wednesdays from 4 p.m. to the start of school on Thursdays, or 4 p.m. on
    Thursdays when school was not in session. In addition, Wife would have custody
    of the children on alternating weekends. The court also ordered Wife to commence
    individual therapy “which should include managing her outbursts and education
    on appropriate boundaries for parenting.”
    With respect to child support and cash medical support obligations,
    the court found that Wife was the child support obligor and Husband was the child
    support obligee. The court found that Wife was “voluntarily unemployed” and that
    there was no impediment to her “earning at least minimum wage for some hours
    per week.” Therefore, the court imputed income to Wife in the amount of $12,000
    per year, “which is less than a full-time minimum wage earner can earn but
    considers her need for some training.” The court ultimately found that Wife had an
    annual child support obligation of $11,052.35 and an annual cash medical support
    obligation of $688.15, or a monthly obligation of $978.38 for child support and cash
    medical support.
    Finally, the court denied Wife’s request for attorney fees. The court
    found specifically that
    [Wife] repeatedly criticized the Court for failing to assist her. The
    record reflects the opposite. The valuations occurred upon the order
    and appointment by the Court and with funds provided by [Husband].
    The final attorney for [Wife] was hired with funds the Court ordered
    [Husband] to provide. [Wife] refuses to take any responsibility for her
    expenditures, including the attorney fees. This matter could have been
    resolved but for the refusal of the parties, but [Wife] in particular, to
    stipulate to the financial realities and of [Wife] to refuse to resolve the
    parenting issues except upon her terms, which included [Husband]
    being excluded from the children’s life except when she allows his
    visits.
    Based on this, the court found that while Wife’s requested attorney fees were
    reasonable, they were not Husband’s responsibility and found that each party was
    responsible for their own attorney fees.
    Wife appeals, presenting six assignments of error for our review:
    I. The trial court erred as a matter of law and abused its discretion in
    its determination of separate property.
    II. The trial court erred as a matter of law and abused its discretion by
    issuing a division of property that is not reasonable or equitable.
    III. The trial court erred as a matter of law and abused its discretion in
    its allocation of parental rights and responsibilities for the parties’ four
    minor children.
    IV. The trial court erred as a matter of law and abused its discretion in
    its calculation of child support.
    V. The trial court erred as a matter of law and abused its discretion as
    to the term and amount of spousal support.
    VI. The trial court erred as a matter of law and abused its discretion by
    denying the appellant’s request for attorney fees.
    Legal Analysis
    I. Standard of Review
    “‘The Ohio Supreme Court has long recognized that a trial court must
    have discretion to do what is equitable upon the facts and circumstances of each
    divorce case.’” O’Neal v. O’Neal, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 110114, 
    2022-Ohio-372
    ,
    ¶ 19, quoting Feldman v. Feldman, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 92015, 2009-Ohio-
    4202, ¶ 11, citing Booth v. Booth, 
    44 Ohio St.3d 142
    , 144, 
    541 N.E.2d 1028
     (1989).
    The term abuse of discretion connotes more than an error of law or
    judgment; it implies that the court’s attitude is unreasonable, arbitrary, or
    unconscionable. Blakemore v. Blakemore, 
    5 Ohio St.3d 217
    , 
    450 N.E.2d 1140
    (1983).
    II. Division of Property
    Because Wife’s first and second assignments of error are related, we
    will address them together. In Wife’s first assignment of error, she argues that the
    trial court erred as a matter of law and abused its discretion in its determination of
    separate property. Specifically, Wife argues that the trial court erred when it found
    that $75,000 of equity in the marital residence was Husband’s separate property
    and when it failed to find that Wife’s gold jewelry was her separate property. In
    Wife’s second assignment of error, she argues that the trial court erred and abused
    its discretion by issuing a division of property that is not reasonable or equitable.
    Specifically, she argues that it was improper and unequitable to award Husband
    income properties and a separate property interest in the marital property, as well
    as to allocate $50,659 of alleged credit card debt to Wife.
    R.C. 3105.171(B) provides that
    [i]n divorce proceedings, the trial court shall * * * determine what
    constitutes marital property and what constitutes separate property. In
    either case, upon making such a determination, the court shall divide
    the marital and separate property equitably between the spouses, in
    accordance with this section.
    R.C. 3105.171(A)(6)(a)(ii) defines “separate property” as “any real or personal
    property or interest in real or personal property that was acquired by one spouse
    prior to the date of the marriage.” “Separate property” also includes “any gift of any
    real or personal property or of an interest in real or personal property that is made
    after the date of the marriage and that is proven by clear and convincing evidence to
    have been given to only one spouse.” R.C. 3105.171(A)(6)(vii).
    A trial court’s characterization of property as marital or separate
    property is a mixed question of law and fact and will not be reversed unless it is
    against the manifest weight of the evidence. Saks v. Riga, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No.
    101091, 
    2014-Ohio-4930
    , ¶ 35, citing Williams v. Williams, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No.
    95346, 
    2011-Ohio-939
    , ¶ 8. “‘We will not reverse a judgment as against the
    manifest weight of the evidence if it is supported by some competent, credible
    evidence.”’ Dayal v. Lakshmipathy, 
    2020-Ohio-5441
    , 
    163 N.E.3d 683
    , ¶ 26 (6th
    Dist.), quoting Sullinger v. Sullinger, 6th Dist. Lucas No. L-18-1079, 2019-Ohio-
    1489, ¶ 41. Further, the weight of the evidence and the credibility of the evidence
    are primarily for the trier of fact — here, the trial court — to determine. Pruitt v.
    Pruitt, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 84335, 
    2005-Ohio-4424
    , ¶ 6, citing State v. DeHass,
    
    10 Ohio St.2d 230
    , 
    227 N.E.2d 212
     (1967).
    A. The Down Payment
    The trial court found that Husband was able to trace at least
    $57,140.78 of the $75,000 down payment from a premarital account of $89,000
    that Husband’s mother helped him start as a child. The court further found that
    Husband’s testimony and exhibits related to this property were credible and that
    “despite the denial of this issue in her closing argument, the Wife testified that the
    down payment for the house came from his parents from money that they had saved
    for him since he was a child.”
    Wife argues that this was insufficient for the trial court to conclude
    that the entire down payment was Husband’s separate property because Husband
    was unable to establish the entire $75,000 came from his premarital account or
    adequately trace the down payment from any such premarital account. Our review
    of the record further confirms that in addition to the Husband’s evidence described
    above that the trial court deemed credible, Wife herself testified that the down
    payment for the marital home came from Husband’s parents.
    Therefore, the trial court’s determination that the $75,000 down
    payment was Husband’s separate property was clearly supported by competent and
    credible evidence.
    B. The Gold Jewelry
    Wife also argues that the trial court erred in failing to find that Wife’s
    gold jewelry was her separate property and likewise failing to allocate the value of
    that property to Wife.
    The trial court made multiple references to the gold jewelry in its
    judgment entry. In its discussion of separate property, the trial court explicitly
    found that
    [t]he Wife has no separate property beyond some jewelry that was
    given to her by her family at the time of her marriage. To the extent
    that this jewelry exists and is in her possession, it should be retained by
    her.
    In its discussion of the valuation of Petro to Go, the trial court found that Wife and
    numerous relatives testified as to the gold jewelry, its undisputed value of
    $100,000, and the incident in which Wife gave the jewelry to Husband’s mother
    Shama, ostensibly in connection with Husband’s debt to his brother Basem related
    to Petro to Go. The trial court went on to find that
    [Wife] wants her value for the Shell station, but she also wants her
    jewelry. If the jewelry was given for debt repayment or collateral for
    debt for the Shell station, then [Wife] cannot have both half the value
    of the Shell station and her jewelry. If not, and the jewelry was taken
    from [Wife] by Shama and given to Basem’s wife for some other reason,
    it still is not a matter for this Court since [Wife] gave it over willingly.
    In addition, Basem was joined as a party. However, no one has testified
    that Basem took the jewelry or had the jewelry at the wedding; there is
    no clear testimony only hearsay and conjecture that he is holding the
    jewelry. Therefore, he should be dismissed as a party to this action and
    the Court declines to award either party this jewelry that was given
    away in 2015.
    Wife argues that evidence presented at trial shows that the gold was
    in Basem’s possession as rent payment and, therefore she sufficiently traced her
    separate property to Petro to Go. Husband testified that he believed Basem had the
    gold because Husband owed him money. While Wife asserts now that Shama took
    the gold, the record contains conflicting testimony, including from Wife herself, as
    to whether or not Wife voluntarily gave Shama the gold. Further, we note that while
    the trial court described the jewelry as having an undisputed value of $100,000,
    this amount came from Wife’s testimony, and the record reveals that the jewelry
    was never formally appraised.     Even assuming that Wife did not voluntarily
    relinquish the jewelry and that the jewelry was given to Basem as rent payment for
    Petro to Go, the record contains no information as to the details of this payment.
    The record lacks both a valuation of the jewelry based on anything beyond Wife’s
    testimony and any documentation showing that the jewelry was used as a payment
    that would create an interest in Petro to Go. In the absence of such evidence, Wife
    failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that any gold jewelry no longer
    in her possession constitutes separate property. Therefore, the trial court did not
    err in holding that any gold jewelry currently possessed by Wife constitutes her
    separate property and that any gold jewelry given away in 2015 is not separate
    property that could be awarded to either party. Therefore, Wife’s first assignment
    of error is overruled.
    C. Division of Property
    In her second assignment of error, Wife argues that the trial court
    erred and abused its discretion when it issued a division of property that was not
    reasonable or equitable. Wife specifically argues that it was unreasonable and
    unequitable for the trial court to award Husband the rental property on West 104th
    Street, to order Wife to refinance the marital home within two years, and to allocate
    over $50,000 of credit card debt to Wife.
    We reiterate that we review a trial court’s division of property under
    an abuse of discretion standard. Strauss v. Strauss, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 95377,
    
    2011-Ohio-3831
    , ¶ 35, citing Holcomb v. Holcomb, 
    44 Ohio St.3d 128
    , 131, 
    541 N.E.2d 597
     (1989). We review a trial court’s property division “‘as a whole, in
    determining whether it has achieved an equitable and fair division of marital
    assets.”’ Victor v. Kaplan, 
    2020-Ohio-3116
    , 
    155 N.E.3d 110
    , ¶ 26 (8th Dist.),
    quoting Tyler v. Tyler, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 93124, 
    2010-Ohio-1428
    , ¶ 24, citing
    Briganti v. Briganti, 
    9 Ohio St.3d 220
    , 222, 
    459 N.E.2d 896
     (1984).               R.C.
    3105.171(C)(1) mandates an equal division of marital property, or “‘if an equal
    division is inequitable, the court must divide the marital property equitably.”’ 
    Id.,
    quoting Neville v. Neville, 
    99 Ohio St.3d 275
    , 
    2003-Ohio-3624
    , 
    791 N.E.2d 434
    , ¶ 5.
    In determining what constitutes an equitable division, the trial court must consider
    the factors outlined in R.C. 3105.171(F), including the duration of the marriage, the
    assets and liabilities of the spouses, the economic desirability of retaining intact an
    asset, and any other factor that the court expressly finds to be relevant and
    equitable. 
    Id.
    The record reflects that the trial court considered the R.C.
    3105.171(F) factors in determining its division of marital property. The trial court
    considered that the parties refinanced the marital home numerous times for the
    purpose of paying down consumer debts incurred by Wife. The trial court also
    considered that Wife initiated numerous projects at the marital home which,
    though perhaps well-intentioned, remained unfinished at the time of the trial. The
    trial court also considered that in addition to the support payments Husband made
    to Wife throughout the divorce proceedings, Wife would frequently visit Petro to
    Go and take approximately $1,000 per week in cash from Husband’s business.
    Wife argues that the assets awarded to Husband — Petro to Go and
    the rental property — are income-producing, whereas the Wife was awarded an
    asset — the marital home — that is encumbered by a mortgage and outstanding
    property taxes. While this is correct, this argument fails to account for additional
    complexities. Specifically, the trial court acknowledged that Petro to Go carried a
    looming financial burden of replacing its gas storage tanks at a cost of nearly
    $300,000, owed nearly $50,000 in outstanding sales tax, and Husband had been
    behind in his rent payments for the business for at least two years. Additionally,
    the court recognized Wife’s financial position by ordering Husband to continue to
    pay the mortgage and insurance for four years.
    With respect to the credit card debt, the record, including Wife’s own
    testimony, reflects that the majority of the debt was incurred by Wife. We are
    mindful that for the duration of the parties’ 18-year marriage, Wife was responsible
    for purchasing food and clothing for the children. We are also mindful, however,
    that Husband paid the mortgage and bills and regularly provided Wife with cash.
    This credit card debt, then, which included consumer debt from numerous retail
    credit cards, including credit cards for women’s clothing, was presumably not
    incurred to exclusively provide for the basic necessities of the children. Wife
    testified that she provided a lavish lifestyle for her children. Further, the trial court
    acknowledged Wife’s spending by finding that Wife “has refused to accept the limits
    of [Husband’s] ability to pay” and has “made no adjustment in her lifestyle, in fact,
    she has incurred significant new expenses to the home due to her ‘remodeling’ some
    of which the Court doubts have added value to that premises and to her ‘fertilizing’
    which clearly reduced the value of the home.”
    Having reviewed the record, and viewing the division of property as
    a whole, we cannot conclude that the trial court’s division of property was
    unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable. Therefore, Wife’s second assignment
    of error is overruled.
    III. Parental Rights and Responsibilities
    In her third assignment of error, Wife argues that the trial court
    erred and abused its discretion in its allocation of parental rights and
    responsibilities of the parties’ four children. Specifically, Wife asserts that the trial
    court’s designation of Husband as the residential parent and legal custodian of the
    children and corresponding grant to Wife of limited parenting time as
    unreasonable, improper, and not in the children’s best interest. Wife argues that
    evidence presented at trial showed that she was an amazing mother and was almost
    entirely responsible for caring for the children for the duration of the marriage. She
    further argues that evidence showed that Husband was minimally involved with the
    children.
    This court has held:
    When reviewing a ruling pertaining to the allocation of parental rights, the
    trial court is to be afforded great deference. Miller v. Miller, 
    37 Ohio St.3d 71
    ,
    
    523 N.E.2d 846
     (1988). “The discretion which a trial court enjoys in custody
    matters should be accorded the utmost respect, given the nature of the
    proceeding and the impact the court’s determination will have on the lives of
    the parties concerned. The knowledge a trial court gains through observing
    the witnesses and the parties in a custody proceeding cannot be conveyed to
    a reviewing court by a printed record. In this regard, the reviewing court in
    such proceedings should be guided by the presumption that the trial court’s
    findings were indeed correct.” Id. at 74 (internal citations omitted).
    Strauss v. Strauss, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 95377, 
    2011-Ohio-3831
    , ¶ 8. Therefore,
    we must uphold the trial court’s allocation of parental rights and responsibilities
    absent an abuse of discretion. 
    Id.
    The trial court in this case was deeply familiar with the parties in this
    case, having presided over all three iterations of this divorce case over the course of
    over three years. Pursuant to R.C. 3109.04(B)(1), the trial court was required to
    consider the best interest of the children when allocating parental rights and
    responsibilities. O’Malley v. O’Malley, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 98708, 2013-Ohio-
    5238, ¶ 68. In making a best interest determination, the court must consider the
    factors enumerated in R.C. 3109.04(F)(1).
    Pursuant to its consideration of the factors laid out in R.C.
    3109.04(F)(1), the court found that Wife interfered with the children’s relationship
    with Husband by making outrageous and hate-filled statements about and to
    Husband. The court also found that “although the children are soldiers in this case
    for their Mother, the Court cannot in good conscience endorse her as the best
    parent or her ongoing parenting as in their best interests.” The court made findings
    related to Wife’s mental health, stating:
    As to [Wife’s] mental health, it could be in question if one assumes that
    inappropriate violence and an arrest record could be an outgrowth of
    mental health issues. Prior to this case, [Wife] was arrested in 2016 for
    domestic violence against [Husband.] She said she used her false nails
    to scratch him and took his car to flee. The charge was reduced to
    disorderly conduct. The previous year she was arrested for driving
    under the influence, which she described as a mistake.
    The court also noted additional examples of volatile behavior. Wife testified that
    she repeatedly took a hammer and violently smashed wall-mounted televisions in
    the marital home because she did not know how to get them off of the wall. The
    record also reflects numerous incidents in which Wife went to Petro to Go and had
    violent outbursts and bullied the gas station’s employees. Wife testified that she
    had numerous self-described “breakdowns” throughout this case.
    With respect to which parent would be more likely to honor and
    facilitate court-approved parenting time rights, the court found that Wife failed to
    facilitate or honor parenting time throughout the proceedings and was
    unsupportive of Husband’s time with the children. Further, the court noted that
    the GAL recommended shared parenting largely so that Husband would remain a
    part of the children’s lives, but found:
    After consideration of the factors for allocation of parenting and for
    shared parenting, and based on the foregoing reasons, the Court cannot
    support the GAL’s plan for the exercise of shared parenting. The choice
    here is between the Mother and the Father. Although [Wife] has been
    a caretaker of the children, [Wife’s] selfish behavior, including “going
    on strike” and failing to take the children for their regular doctor
    appointments, and the negative impact on the children with her hate
    speech, selfishness, and violence, all of which they have been privy to,
    results in the Court being unable to sustain her caretaking [role] or
    designate her as the primary caretaker. [Wife] has used the children to
    extort [Husband] for her own purposes. [Wife’s] vitriol about this case
    and [Husband] has blinded her to her children’s needs, even the basic
    ones such as routine checkups. It would be in the children’s best
    interests that [Wife] attend anger management courses, individual
    therapy, and parenting courses. The court has little hope or
    expectation that [Wife] would follow any orders herein after the divorce
    any more than she did before the divorce. Therefore, eliminating her
    contact with the children would be futile, but limiting it is necessary.
    Wife argues that evidence presented at trial showed that she was an
    amazing mother and was almost entirely responsible for caring for the children for
    the duration of the marriage. She further argues that evidence showed that
    Husband was minimally involved with the children. Indeed, it appears from our
    review of the record that one of the fundamental issues in the parties’ marriage is
    that Husband worked extremely long hours to provide for his family, perhaps at the
    expense of spending time with his children. However, in light of the foregoing
    findings made by the trial court and our review of the record, we cannot conclude
    that the parties’ division of familiar responsibilities prior to the divorce proceedings
    compels a different allocation of parental rights and responsibilities in this case.
    Because the trial court’s allocation of parental rights and responsibilities was not
    unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable, we find no abuse of discretion.
    Therefore, Wife’s third assignment of error is overruled.
    IV. Child Support
    In Wife’s fourth assignment of error, she argues that the trial court
    erred and abused its discretion in its calculation of child support. Wife specifically
    challenges the trial court’s finding that she was voluntarily unemployed and its
    decision to “impute income” to her. Wife argues that this finding ignored the
    realities of the COVID-19 pandemic. Finally, Wife argues that the trial court erred
    in its calculation of her gross income by using an inaccurate figure for spousal
    support.
    R.C. 3119.02 governs the calculation of child support and provides
    that a parent’s child support obligation shall be calculated “in accordance with the
    basic child support schedule, the applicable worksheet, and the other provisions of
    Sections 3119.02 to 3119.24 of the Revised Code.” S.E.J. v. C.S.J., 8th Dist.
    Cuyahoga No. 107576, 
    2019-Ohio-3274
    , ¶ 18, citing R.C. 3119.02 and In re K.R.B.,
    
    2017-Ohio-7071
    , 
    95 N.E.3d 799
    , ¶ 13 (8th Dist.). R.C. 3119.01(C)(11)(a) authorizes
    a court to impute income to a parent whom the court finds is voluntarily
    unemployed or underemployed.         If a trial court determines that a parent is
    voluntarily unemployed or voluntarily underemployed, the trial court computes
    that parent’s income by adding that parent’s potential income to any gross income
    he or she may have. Miller v. Dendinger, 3d Dist. Seneca No. 13-20-13, 2021-Ohio-
    546, ¶ 47, citing R.C. 3119.01(C) and 3119.01(C)(17). The question of whether a
    parent is voluntarily unemployed is a question of fact for the trial court, and a trial
    court’s determination on that issue will not be disturbed unless the trial court is
    found to have abused its discretion. 
    Id.
    Here, the trial court found that Wife had a high school diploma, no
    physical or mental disabilities that would hinder her ability to work, lived in a
    metropolitan area, was skilled in childcare having been a stay-at-home parent for
    approximately 16 years, and could initiate a training program so that she could be
    gainfully employed. The trial court found that while minimum wage work would
    garner an income of approximately $17,000 for 50 weeks of the year, potential
    income of $12,000 should be imputed to Wife to account for her need for training.
    Based on the foregoing, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding Wife
    voluntarily unemployed and imputing income to her in the amount of $12,000.
    R.C. 3119.01(C)(12) defines “gross income” in relevant part as “the
    total of all earned and unearned income from all sources during a calendar year”
    including “spousal support actually received.” Here, Husband was ordered to pay
    $3500 per month in spousal support, less $17362 for the mortgage and insurance
    of the marital home, for a total of $1764 per month or $21,168 per year. Here, the
    2  The parties have not questioned this calculation, but it appears to be a
    typographical error. The sum of the mortgage ($950), car payment ($700), and insurance
    ($136) totals to $1786.
    trial court calculated Wife’s gross income on its child support computation
    worksheet by totaling her imputed income of $12,000 and “other/potential
    income” of $48,000. Even if the other income omitted the deduction of Wife’s child
    support obligation from Husband’s spousal support obligation, the spousal support
    would amount to $42,000 annually. Because it appears the trial court erred in its
    calculation of child support based on this error in the worksheet, we reverse the
    child support order and remand for the limited purpose of allowing the trial court
    to recalculate based on the spousal support order imposed and discussed below.3
    V. Spousal Support
    In her fifth assignment of error, Wife argues that the trial court erred
    as a matter of law and abused its discretion as to the term and amount of spousal
    support.
    The trial court has broad discretion in determining whether an
    award of spousal support is proper based on the facts and circumstances of each
    case. Smith v. Smith, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga Nos. 110214, 110245 and 110274, 2022-
    Ohio-299, ¶ 33, citing Wojanowski v. Wojanowski, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 99751,
    
    2014-Ohio-697
    , ¶ 43, citing Kunkle v. Kunkle, 
    51 Ohio St.3d 64
    , 67, 
    554 N.E.2d 83
    3 We note that while Husband presented an argument in response to Wife’s
    argument that the trial court abused its discretion in finding her voluntarily unemployed
    and imputing income to her, Husband’s brief did not present an argument in response to
    or otherwise reference Wife’s argument that the trial court miscalculated her child
    support obligation based on an incorrect figure on the child support computation
    worksheet.
    (1990). Therefore, we will not disturb the trial court’s spousal support order absent
    an abuse of discretion.
    Trial courts must consider the factors set forth in R.C. 3105.18(C)(1)
    when determining whether spousal support is appropriate and reasonable. 
    Id.
    citing Kaletta v. Kaletta, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 98821, 
    2013-Ohio-1667
    , ¶ 22.
    These factors include the relative earning abilities of the parties, the physical,
    mental, and emotional conditions of the parties, the duration of the marriage, the
    standard of living established during the marriage, the relative education of the
    parties, and the relative assets and debts of the parties, and any other factor the
    court expressly finds to be relevant and equitable. Id.; R.C. 3105.81(C)(1).
    Wife argues that the trial court erred in ordering spousal support for
    a term of 48 months because this is an insufficient period of time for her to obtain
    the education, training, and skills necessary to become gainfully employed and it is
    generally insufficient in light of the lengthy term of the parties’ marriage. Wife
    further argues that the court erred in ordering that spousal support shall terminate
    upon her remarriage. Finally, Wife argues that the trial court improperly attempted
    to justify the spousal support order by crediting Husband for his payment of
    temporary support when, at the time of trial, his temporary support arrearages
    amounted to over $3,000.
    Here, the trial court addressed the R.C. 3105.81(C)(1) factors and
    commented on each factor that was relevant to the parties with a thoughtful and
    lengthy analysis. Specifically, the court considered Husband’s greater earning
    ability and the fact that Wife has never worked outside the home. The court also
    considered that given the children’s ages, and the fact that the oldest child helped
    with childcare, it would not be inappropriate for Wife to seek job training or
    ultimately employment. The court also noted that while Wife had not indicated any
    interest in obtaining education, training, or a job, it was not inappropriate to expect
    her to do so.
    Additionally, we are unpersuaded by Wife’s assertion that four years
    is an insufficient length of time for her to find gainful employment. Trial courts are
    vested with broad discretion to consider such issues; “[s]imply because the court
    was empowered to impose an indefinite award of spousal support, it does not follow
    that the failure to do so is an abuse of discretion.” Lojek v. Lojek, 4th Dist.
    Washington No. 10CA8, 
    2010-Ohio-5156
    , ¶ 64.
    Finally, with respect to Wife’s arguments about Husband’s
    temporary support arrearages, the record is clear that the court considered all
    aspects of the parties’ financial situations, including the contentious history of
    temporary support. Nothing in the record indicates that the trial court’s spousal
    support order was unreasonable or otherwise amounted to an abuse of discretion.
    Therefore, Wife’s fifth assignment of error is overruled.
    VI. Attorney Fees
    In her sixth and final assignment of error, Wife argues that the trial
    court erred as a matter of law and abused its discretion by denying her request for
    attorney fees. There are no “automatic attorney fees” in domestic relations cases,
    and when determining whether to award attorney fees in divorce cases, “‘the court
    must start with a presumption that attorney fees are the responsibility of the party
    who retains the attorney.’” Victor v. Kaplan, 
    2020-Ohio-3116
    , 
    155 N.E.3d 110
    , ¶ 127
    (8th Dist.), quoting Rossi v. Rossi, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga Nos. 100133 and 100144,
    
    2014-Ohio-1832
    , ¶ 62, and Walpole v. Walpole, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 99231,
    
    2013-Ohio-3529
    , ¶ 33. Pursuant to R.C. 3105.73(A), a domestic relations court
    “may award all or part of reasonable attorney’s fees to either party if the court finds
    the award equitable.” Further, “in determining whether an award of fees is
    equitable, the court may consider ‘the parties’ marital assets and income, any award
    of temporary spousal support, the conduct of the parties, and any other relevant
    factors the court deems appropriate.’” Saks v. Riga, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 101091,
    
    2014-Ohio-4930
    , ¶ 89, citing R.C. 3105.73(A) and Walpole v. Walpole, 8th Dist.
    Cuyahoga No. 99231, 
    2013-Ohio-3529
    , ¶ 33. “‘An award of attorney fees under R.C.
    3105.73 lies within the sound discretion of the trial court and will not be reversed
    absent an abuse of that discretion.”’ 
    Id.,
     quoting Rand v. Rand, 
    18 Ohio St.3d 356
    ,
    359, 
    481 N.E.2d 609
     (1985).
    Here, the trial court found that while Wife’s attorney fees were
    reasonable, they were “not compensable to her.” The court noted that Wife
    repeatedly criticized the court and refused to take responsibility for any of her
    expenditures, including her attorney fees, and as such, each party would be
    responsible for their own attorney fees. Ultimately, the court found it appropriate
    for each party to pay for their respective attorney fees, finding that after the division
    of marital property and determinations of spousal and child support, neither party
    would have a superior financial ability.
    In light of the foregoing, we cannot conclude that the trial court
    abused its discretion in denying Wife’s request for attorney fees. Therefore, Wife’s
    sixth assignment of error is overruled.
    Judgment affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for the
    limited purpose of recalculating the child support order in accordance with this
    opinion.
    It is ordered that appellee and appellant share the costs herein taxed.
    The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
    It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the
    Cuyahoga County Common Pleas Court, Domestic Relations Division, to carry this
    judgment into execution.
    A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27
    of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
    _______________
    EMANUELLA D. GROVES, JUDGE
    MICHELLE J. SHEEHAN, P.J., and
    MARY EILEEN KILBANE, J., CONCUR