State v. Voris , 2022 Ohio 152 ( 2022 )

[Cite as State v. Voris, 2022-Ohio-152.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
MIAMI COUNTY
STATE OF OHIO :
:
Plaintiff-Appellee : Appellate Case No. 2021-CA-2
:
v. : Trial Court Case No. 2019-CR-459
:
WILLIAM VORIS : (Criminal Appeal from
: Common Pleas Court)
Defendant-Appellant :
:
...........
OPINION
Rendered on the 21st day of January, 2022.
...........
MATTHEW C. JOSEPH, Atty. Reg. No. 0090869, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, Miami
County Prosecutor’s Office, Appellate Division, Safety Building, 201 West Main Street,
Troy, Ohio 45473
Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellee
CARLO C. MCGINNIS, Atty. Reg. No. 0019540, 55 Park Avenue, Dayton, Ohio 45419
Attorney for Defendant-Appellant
.............
DONOVAN, J.
-2-
{¶ 1} Defendant-appellant William Voris appeals from his conviction for one count
of unlawful sexual conduct with a minor, in violation of R.C. 2907.04(A)/(B)(3), a felony of
the third degree. Voris filed a timely notice of appeal on February 2, 2021.
{¶ 2} On October 9, 2019, Voris was indicted for the following offenses: Counts I
and II, rape, in violation of R.C. 2907.02(A)(1)(c), both felonies of the first degree; Count
III, unlawful sexual conduct with a minor, in violation of R.C. 2907.04(A)/(B)(3), a felony
of the third degree; and Count IV, corrupting another with drugs, in violation of R.C.
2925.02(A)(4)(c)/(C)(1)(a), a felony of the second degree. On October 24, 2019, the
State filed a superseding indictment amending Count II to rape, in violation of R.C.
2907.02(A)(1)(c), where the victim is less than 13 years of age, whether or not the
offender knows the victim’s age.
{¶ 3} On November 7, 2019, Voris, through counsel, filed a plea of not guilty by
reason of insanity (NGRI) and a suggestion of incompetency to stand trial. Voris also
filed a motion to suppress on the same day. On November 12, 2019, the trial court
ordered that Voris be evaluated by the Forensic Psychiatry Center for Western Ohio
(FPC) regarding his mental condition at the time the charged offenses. On December 5,
2019, defense counsel filed a motion to extend the hearing and a request for an NGRI
evaluation premised upon the counsel’s unavailability and Voris’s refusal to participate in
the sanity evaluation. The trial court granted defense counsel’s motion to extend and
scheduled the competency hearing for December 19, 2019.
{¶ 4} On December 19, 2019, the trial court conducted a competency hearing at
which both parties stipulated to a report from the FPC finding that Voris was competent
-3-
to stand trial. At the same hearing, the trial court ordered the FPC to conduct a second
evaluation of Voris with respect to his mental condition at the time of the offenses,
because he had failed to cooperate with the evaluator in that regard during his first
interview. On December 30, 2019, the trial court filed an entry ordering the mental
evaluation to be conducted by the FPC. On February 6, 2020, the trial court held a
hearing wherein both parties stipulated to a report submitted by the FPC on January 14,
2020, which found that Voris did not have any mental incapacity or suffer from any severe
mental disease at the time that the alleged offenses were committed. On March 6, 2020,
the trial court found Voris competent to stand trial and found that he suffered from no
mental condition at the time of the offenses.
{¶ 5} On March 20, 2020, the State filed a motion to continue the motion to
suppress hearing due to the unavailability of a witness because of the mandatory COVID-
19 quarantine in effect in Miami County. In light of the health risk posed by COVID-19
and the orders issued by the Ohio governor, the Miami County Court of Common Pleas
issued an order staying all pending matters for 45 days. On March 23, 2020, the trial
court continued the motion to suppress hearing “for a reasonable period of time.” A
hearing on Voris’s motion to suppress was eventually held on May 5, 2020, and the trial
court overruled the motion to suppress on June 11, 2020.
{¶ 6} On July 7, 2020, Voris filed several documents and motions, drafted himself,
in which he claimed that his right to speedy trial had been violated: “Letter to the Court;”
“Petition for Release;” and “Letter Addressing the Petition for Release.” On July 9, 2020,
Voris, again acting on his own behalf, filed a letter in which he argued that he had a
conflict of interest with his trial counsel and no longer wished to be represented by him.
-4-
The next day, the trial court held a status conference in order to generate a briefing
schedule to address Voris’s speedy trial argument.
{¶ 7} On July 30, 2020, Voris’s attorney filed a motion to withdraw, citing a “total
breakdown in the attorney-client relationship.” The trial court granted defense counsel’s
motion to withdraw. On August 13, 2020, the trial court appointed an attorney from the
Office of the Ohio Public Defender to represent Voris. On August 14, 2020, the State
filed a memorandum in opposition to Voris’s petition for release, arguing that there were
still 48 days to try his case once the trial court ruled on his petition. On September 1,
2020, Voris, represented by counsel, filed a reply to the State’s memorandum in
opposition; he did not dispute the State’s calculation of the days remaining to try his case,
but rather argued that he was entitled to discharge because he had been deprived of his
constitutional right to speedy trial pursuant to the Sixth Amendment of the United States
Constitution and Article I, Section 10 of the Ohio Constitution. On September 11, 2020,
the State filed a memorandum in opposition to Voris’s reply brief, arguing that “the delays
in this case were primarily caused by [Voris], either through his delay in cooperating with
the metal evaluations he requested or with his attorney.” Memorandum in Opposition, p.
5.
{¶ 8} On September 11, 2020, Voris also filed a “Motion for Determination of
Competency” and requested a hearing on his competence to stand trial. On September
17, 2020, the trial court ordered that Voris to be evaluated by the FPC for a third time.
On October 9, 2020, the trial court overruled Voris’s petition for release, finding that
neither his statutory right to speedy trial nor his constitutional right to speedy trial had
been violated. The trial court also found that, by its own calculation, the State had 20
-5-
days to bring the case to trial once the trial court determined whether Voris was competent
to stand trial. On October 26, 2020, the trial court conducted a competency hearing
wherein the parties again stipulated to a report from the FPC finding that Voris was
competent to stand trial, and on November 5, 2020, the trial court issued an order to that
effect.
{¶ 9} On November 16, 2020, the trial court scheduled Voris’ trial for December 8,
2020. In its order, the trial court explained its reasoning for setting Voris’s trial date
outside of the statutorily-required time period. On November 18, 2020, the trial court
rescheduled Voris’s trial for December 7, 2020.
{¶ 10} On November 30, 2020, a change of plea hearing was held wherein the
parties agreed that Voris would plead guilty to Count III, unlawful sexual conduct with a
minor, in exchange for dismissal of the remaining counts. However, in light of Voris’s
erratic behavior at the plea hearing, the trial court was unable to take his guilty plea, and
the case remained set for trial. On December 4, 2020, Voris filed a motion for a
competency hearing based upon his behavior at the unsuccessful plea hearing. On the
same day, the trial court held a competency hearing at which it heard Voris’s testimony
regarding his behavior at the abortive plea hearing. At the end of the hearing, the trial
court found Voris competent to stand trial.
{¶ 11} On December 7, 2020, Voris plead guilty to Count III, unlawful sexual
conduct with a minor, in exchange for dismissal of the remaining counts in accordance
with the previous plea agreement between the parties. The plea form signed by all of
the parties was filed on December 9, 2020. On January 6, 2021, the trial court sentenced
Voris to 48 months in prison, with credit for 490 days already served. The court filed the
-6-
judgment entry of conviction on January 8, 2021.
{¶ 12} Voris appeals.
{¶ 13} Voris’s first assignment of error is:
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR AND VIOLATED
APPELLANT’S RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS BY FAILING TO PROVIDE
APPELLANT A TRIAL WITHIN THE TIME PRESCRIBED BY LAW.
{¶ 14} Voris contends that his constitutional right to speedy trial was violated
pursuant to the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article I, Section
10 of the Ohio Constitution, because approximately one year had passed without his trial
being held. Voris also argues that his statutory right to speedy trial was violated pursuant
to R.C. 2945.71 through R.C. 2945.73.
I. Constitutional Right to Speedy Trial
{¶ 15} The Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution,
and Article I, Section 10 of the Ohio Constitution, guarantee all criminal defendants the
right to a speedy trial. State v. Gatewood, 2d Dist. Clark No. 2010-CA-18, 2012-Ohio-
202, ¶ 16. Ohio's speedy trial statute, R.C. 2945.71, “was [enacted] to [realize] the
constitutional protection of [this] right.” Brecksville v. Cook, 75 Ohio St.3d 53, 55, 661
N.E.2d 706 (1996); see also State v. Large, 2015-Ohio-33, 26 N.E.3d 328, ¶ 10 (2d Dist.).
{¶ 16} To determine whether a defendant's constitutional right to a speedy trial has
been violated, a court should apply the four-factor balancing test adopted by the United
States Supreme Court in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 33 L.Ed.2d 101(1972); see also State v. Louis, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 27909, 2020-Ohio-951, ¶ 32.
The factors include: (1) the length of the delay “between accusation and trial”; (2) the
-7-
reason for the delay; (3) the defendant's assertion, if any, of his right to a speedy trial;
and (4) the prejudice, if any, to the defendant. Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647,
651, 112 S.Ct. 2686, 120 L.Ed.2d 520 (1992); State v. Adams, 144 Ohio St.3d 429, 2015-
Ohio-3954, 45 N.E.3d 127, ¶ 88.
{¶ 17} A “delay becomes presumptively prejudicial as it approaches one year,” and
unless the length of the delay “is presumptively prejudicial, there is no necessity for inquiry
into the other factors.” Barker at 530; Adams at ¶ 89-90. None of the factors is controlling
because a “balancing test necessarily compels” a court to evaluate an alleged speedy
trial violation “on an ad hoc basis,” meaning that the court must consider the totality of the
circumstances. Barker at 530; State v. Perkins, 2d Dist. Clark No. 08-CA-0081, 2009-
Ohio-3033, ¶ 8.
{¶ 18} As previously stated, on November 7, 2019, Voris filed a motion to
suppress. On the same day, Voris also filed an NGRI plea and suggestion of
incompetency to stand trial. It is undisputed that the motion to suppress could not be
heard until Voris was evaluated by the FPC and a competency hearing was held. On
November 12, 2019, the trial court filed an entry ordering that Voris be evaluated by the
FPC, and in December 2019, defense counsel filed a motion to extend the hearing and a
request for an NGRI evaluation because Voris had refused to participate in the sanity
evaluation. The trial court granted the motion to extend and scheduled the competency
hearing for December 19, 2019.
{¶ 19} On December 19, 2019, the trial court conducted a competency hearing at
which both parties stipulated to a report from the FPC finding that Voris was competent
to stand trial. At the request of defense counsel, the trial court ordered the FPC to
-8-
conduct an NGRI evaluation of Voris with respect to his mental condition at the time of
the offenses, because he had failed to cooperate with the evaluator in that regard during
his first interview; Voris’s NGRI examination was conducted on January 13, 2020. In
early February 2020, the trial court held a hearing at which the parties stipulated to a
report submitted by the FPC finding that Voris did not have any mental incapacity or suffer
from any severe mental disease at the time of the offenses. Also on February 6, 2020,
defense counsel request that the case be scheduled for a pretrial on March 2, 2020.
{¶ 20} On March 20, 2020, the State filed a motion to continue the motion to
suppress hearing due to the COVID-19 pandemic and the mandatory quarantine in effect
in Miami County. On March 23, 2020, the trial court continued the motion to suppress
hearing “for a reasonable period of time,” and a hearing on the motion to suppress was
eventually held on May 5, 2020. The trial court overruled Voris’s motion to suppress on
June 11, 2020.
{¶ 21} In addition to the delays caused by the competency evaluations and the
COVID-19 pandemic, the record establishes that Voris frequently refused to cooperate
with defense counsel, claiming in several instances not to have recognized him.
Furthermore, on July 2020, Voris filed several documents that he had drafted himself in
which he claimed that his right to speedy trial had been violated and that he wanted
different counsel. Counsel also filed a motion to withdraw. Shortly thereafter, the trial
court granted counsel’s motion to withdraw, and new counsel was appointed.
{¶ 22} The record reflects several reasons for the delay that were attributable to
Voris, specifically his failure to cooperate with the NGRI evaluation in a timely fashion and
his refusal to cooperate with defense counsel. Additionally, the trial court acted
-9-
reasonably when it continued Voris’s motion to suppress hearing because of the
restrictions and quarantine arising from the COVID-19 pandemic. In short, the record
reveals that the majority of the delay between Voris’s October 9, 2019, indictment and the
adjudication of his motion was attributable to him and/or to forces outside the control of
the trial court. Accordingly, the second Barker factor weighs against finding a
constitutional speedy-trial violation.
{¶ 23} The next Barker factor is “the defendant's assertion of his right” to a speedy
trial. Barker, 407 U.S. at 530, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 33 L.Ed.2d 101. “ ‘It is well established
under our law that the right to a speedy trial conferred by the Constitution is not self-
executing. Affirmative action on the part of an accused in the nature of a demand to be
tried is necessary to invoke the protection of the Constitution.’ ” Perkins, 2d Dist. Clark
No. 08-CA-0081, 2009-Ohio-3033, ¶ 12, quoting Partsch v. Haskins, 175 Ohio St. 139,
140, 191 N.E.2d 922 (1963). “ ‘In other words, there can be no denial where there has
been no demand. The purpose of Section 10, Article I [of the Ohio Constitution] is to
provide a trial for an accused without undue delay with its attendant anxieties and the
possibility that the defense might be prejudiced by the lapse of time. However, it was
not intended as a shield to the guilty, the protection of which might be invoked by sitting
silently back and allowing the prosecution to believe that the accused is acquiescing in
the delay. It is a right which must be claimed or it will be held to have been waived.’ ” Id.Here, the record establishes that Voris vigorously asserted his right to speedy trial in
numerous filings, pro se and through counsel. Therefore, the third Barker factor weighs
in favor of finding a constitutional speedy-trial violation.
{¶ 24} With regard to the fourth Barker factor, we see no actual prejudice to Voris
-10-
as a result of the delay, which, as noted above, was largely attributable to him. In his
appellate brief, Voris argues that the over one-year delay in this case was “presumptively
prejudicial.” We note, however, that a finding of “presumptive prejudice” is merely a
triggering mechanism under the first Barker factor, which justifies an inquiry into the other
three factors. State v. Kraus, 2d Dist. Greene No. 2011-CA-35, 2013-Ohio-393, ¶ 23.
The last of those other factors involves actual prejudice. Here, the only actual prejudice
Voris suggests in his appellate brief is impairment of his defense, because he alleges that
he suffers from dementia and “his ability to remember what happened in 2018 and 2019
has diminished greatly.” Appellant’s Brief, p. 13.
{¶ 25} Upon review, we find that any prejudice to Voris was solely attributable to
him and the actions he took during these proceedings. Specifically, Voris’s own actions
undermine his claims regarding his alleged dementia: 1) he could recall facts sufficient to
allegedly prepare a document to file criminal charges against the former assistant
prosecuting attorney in this case and to file a federal indictment against her and request
protection under whistleblower laws; 2) he could recall the facts of a 1997 memorandum
drafted on his behalf and sent to several CEOs of large companies such as Microsoft and
Oracle; 3) he could describe his past communications with well-known government
employees and businessmen; and 4) he could discuss at length his own theory, which he
called the “paradigm of threes.” See Letter to the Court, July 7, 2020. Additionally,
following Voris’s forensic evaluation in January 2020, Dr. Adkins stated that Voris
displayed no memory deficits during the evaluation and demonstrated adequate short-
and long-term memory. In light of the foregoing, we find that Voris’s constitutional right
to a speedy trial was not violated.
-11-
Statutory Right to Speedy Trial
{¶ 26} We also agree with the State's assessment that no statutory violation
occurred. Ohio's speedy trial statutes constitute a rational effort to implement the
constitutional right to a speedy trial and are to be strictly enforced. State v. Pachay, 64
Ohio St.2d 218, 416 N.E.2d 589 (1980). In Ohio, R.C. 2945.71 requires the State to
bring a felony defendant to trial within 270 days of arrest. R.C. 2945.71(C). Each day
during which the accused is held in jail in lieu of bail on the pending charge is counted as
three days pursuant to the “triple-count” provision of R.C. 2945.71(E). This triple-count
provision reduces to 90 days the time for bringing to trial an accused who is incarcerated
the entire time preceding trial. State v. Dankworth, 172 Ohio App.3d 159, 2007-Ohio-
2588, 873 N.E.2d 902, ¶ 31 (2d Dist.). Pursuant to R.C. 2945.72, however, the time
within which an accused must be brought to trial is extended by a period of delay caused
by his own motions. State v. McClain, 2015-Ohio-3691, 41 N.E.3d 882, ¶ 11 (2d Dist.).
{¶ 27} We have already analyzed Voris’s speedy trial argument based upon an
alleged violation of his constitutional rights. Other than mentioning the statutes involved,
R.C. 2945.71 through R.C. 2945.73, Voris has failed to provide any additional arguments
in his appellate brief in support of his claim that his statutory rights to a speedy trial were
violated. Furthermore, both the State and the trial court addressed this issue, and the
trial court found that Voris’s statutory speedy trial rights had not been violated.
{¶ 28} As previously stated, Voris filed a pro se petition for release on July 7, 2020.
The State opposed the petition, arguing that there were still 48 days to try his case once
the trial court ruled on his competency. On September 1, 2020, Voris, represented by
counsel, filed a reply to the State’s memorandum in opposition in which he did not dispute
-12-
the State’s calculation of the days remaining to try his case; he only argued that he was
entitled to discharge because he had been deprived of his constitutional right to speedy
trial. The State responded that “the delays in this case were primarily caused by [Voris],
either through his delay in cooperating with the metal evaluations he requested or with
his attorney.”
{¶ 29} The trial court found that neither Voris’s statutory right to speedy trial nor
his constitutional right to a speedy trial had been violated. The trial court also found that,
by its calculation, the State had 20 days left to bring the case to trial once the trial court
determined whether Voris was competent to stand trial. On October 26, 2020, the trial
court conducted a competency hearing, and the parties again stipulated to a report from
the FPC finding that Voris was competent to stand trial. The trial court issued an order
to that effect on November 5, 2020.
{¶ 30} As previously stated, on November 16, 2020, the trial court scheduled
Voris’s trial for December 8, 2020, and explained its reasons for setting Voris’s trial date
outside of the statutorily-required time period. Specifically, the trial court stated that it
had discussed an appropriate trial date with both parties and found that the first available
trial date was December 8, 2020. Relying upon R.C. 2945.72(H), the trial court held that
it could sua sponte issue a reasonable continuance. The trial court based its decision to
continue Voris’s trial arguably outside of speedy trial time upon the COVID-19 pandemic
and the fact that Miami County remained in a state of emergency because of the virus.
Additionally, the trial court noted that Miami County had recently been designated a “red
county” by the Ohio governor on November 12, 2020. The trial court defined “red” as
“very high exposure and spread.” The trial court also referenced Opinion No. 2020-002
-13-
from the Ohio Attorney General, which stated that “Courts may suspend jury trials to
prevent the spread of the novel coronavirus, and they may do so consistent with state
and federal speedy-trial obligations. * * * Although tolling speedy trial time by suspending
jury trial activity is an extraordinary step, it is lawful – and responsible – to do so during a
pandemic emergency.” Voris did not further challenge the State’s or the trial court’s
calculation of statutory speedy trial time in his reply to the State’s memorandum in
opposition to his petition for release or in his appellate brief now before this Court.
Therefore, we find that Voris’s statutory rights to a speedy trial were not violated.
{¶ 31} Voris’s first assignment of error is overruled.
{¶ 32} Voris’s second assignment of error is:
THE TRIAL COURT VIOLATED APPELLANT’S RIGHT TO DUE
PROCESS AND FAILED TO EXERCISE ANY DISCRETION WHEN IT
DENIED HIS REQUEST FOR A THIRD COMPETENCY EVALUATION
AND FOUND APPELLANT COMPETENT TO STAND TRIAL.
{¶ 33} Voris argues that the trial court erred when it denied his request for a third
competency evaluation after observing his erratic behavior at an unsuccessful plea
hearing held on November 30, 2020.
{¶ 34} “Fundamental principles of due process require that a criminal defendant
who is legally incompetent shall not be subjected to trial.” State v. Berry, 72 Ohio St.3d
354, 359, 650 N.E.2d 433 (1995). If a defendant “lacks the capacity to understand the
nature and object of the proceedings against him, to consult with counsel, and to assist
in preparing his defense[,]” he may not stand trial. State v. Skatzes, 104 Ohio St.3d 195,
2004-Ohio-6391, 819 N.E.2d 215, ¶ 155.
-14-
{¶ 35} This due process right has been codified at R.C. 2945.37, which provides
in pertinent part:
(B) In a criminal action in a court of common pleas, * * * [the] defense may
raise the issue of the defendant's competence to stand trial. If the issue is
raised before the trial has commenced, the court shall hold a hearing on the
issue as provided in this section. * * *
(C) The court shall conduct the hearing required or authorized under
division (B) of this section within thirty days after the issue is raised, unless
the defendant has been referred for evaluation in which case the court shall
conduct the hearing within ten days after the filing of the report of the
evaluation * * *.
{¶ 36} R.C. 2945.371 provides that if the issue of a defendant's competence to
stand trial is raised under R.C. 2945.37, the court may order one or more, but not more
than three, evaluations of the defendant's present mental condition. Further, R.C.
2945.37(E) states that “[t]he prosecutor and defense counsel may submit evidence on
the issue of the defendant's competence to stand trial. A written report of the evaluation
of the defendant may be admitted into evidence at the hearing by stipulation, but, if either
the prosecution or defense objects to its admission, the report may be admitted under
sections 2317.36 to 2317.38 of the Revised Code or any other applicable statute or rule.”
{¶ 37} The use of the word “may” in these statutes indicates that the decision
whether to order an examination is a matter within the trial court's discretion. “Taken as
a whole, the provisions of R.C. 2945.37 and 2945.371 support the inference that when
the initial hearing on a competency motion is held, the trial court is only required to give
-15-
the defendant, or his counsel, the chance to submit evidence on the issue.” State v.
Bailey, 90 Ohio App.3d 58, 67, 627 N.E.2d 1078 (11th Dist.1992). “If this evidence raises
a genuine question as to the defendant's competency, the court can order that one or
more evaluations be performed.” Id.; State v. Carson, 2d Dist. Greene No. 2002-CA-73,
2003-Ohio-5958, ¶ 30.
{¶ 38} Thus, we review the decision of the trial court regarding competency
evaluations for an abuse of discretion. State v. Curry, 2d Dist. Greene No. 2012-CA-50,
2014-Ohio-3836, ¶ 40; State v. Cook, 2016-Ohio-2823, 64 N.E.3d 350, ¶ 63 (5th Dist.);
State v. Patton, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 08AP-800, 2009-Ohio-1382, ¶ 8. In order to find
that the trial court abused its discretion, we must find that the trial court's decision was
unreasonable, arbitrary or unconscionable. Blakemore v. Blakemore, 5 Ohio St.3d 217,
219, 450 N.E.2d 1140 (1983).
{¶ 39} In determining whether a defendant is competent to stand trial, the test is
“ ‘ “whether [the defendant] has sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a
reasonable degree of rational understanding—and whether he has a rational as well as
factual understanding of the proceedings against him.” ’ ” State v. Neyland, 139 Ohio
St.3d 353, 2014-Ohio-1914, 12 N.E.3d 1112, ¶ 32, citing State v. Berry, 72 Ohio St.3d
354, 359, 650 N.E.2d 433 (1995), quoting Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 80 S.Ct.
788, 4 L.Ed.2d 824 (1960). It is with this standard in mind that we review the evidence
in this record to determine whether Voris raised a genuine question as to his competency
to stand trial and whether the trial court abused its discretion by declining to order a third
evaluation.
{¶ 40} During the first competency hearing on December 19, 2019, the trial court
-16-
stated that an evaluation had been held, and the court had received a report dated
November 26, 2019, which found that Voris was competent to stand trial pursuant to R.C.
2945.371(G)(3). Tr. p. 2. Defense counsel replied Voris would stipulate to that report as
to competency only, and that counsel believed his client was competent. As previously
stated, the trial court then reordered an evaluation for NGRI and scheduled another
hearing once the report was received.
{¶ 41} On February 6, 2020, the trial court held a second hearing at which it
referenced a January 14, 2020, report from the FPC regarding Voris’s “condition”;
according to the court, that report also indicated that Voris was “okay to proceed with
trial.” Tr. p. 2. The trial court further stated that the report indicated that there was “no
issue and that defendant can proceed not having any mental incapacity or severe mental
disease at the time of the offense.” Tr. p. 3. Voris and defense counsel again stipulated
to the contents of the FPC report finding him to have been sane at the time of the offenses.
{¶ 42} Thereafter, at the request of Voris’s newly appointed counsel, a third
competency hearing was held on October 26, 2020. At that time, the parties again
stipulated to a FPC report, dated October 15, 2020, which found Voris competent to stand
trial. Voris then pled guilty to one count of unlawful sexual conduct with a minor in
exchange for dismissal of the other counts. However, because of Voris’s erratic behavior
at the plea hearing, the trial court was unable to take his guilty plea, and the case
remained set for trial. On December 4, 2020, Voris filed a motion for a competency
hearing based upon his behavior at the plea hearing. On the same day, the trial court
held a competency hearing at which it heard Voris’s testimony regarding his behavior at
the abortive plea hearing. At the end of the hearing, the trial court found Voris competent
-17-
to stand trial and denied his request for an additional evaluation at the FPC.
{¶ 43} In our view, the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it denied Voris’s
request for yet another mental evaluation. At the hearing held on December 4, 2020, the
trial court stated the following after hearing Voris’s testimony:
* * * [T]he court denies the motion. Based upon the information presented
to this court. We have been in court since around September of 2019.
The court has had various conversations with the defendant. As indicated,
there were two prior competencies and an evaluation for the mental health
at the time of the offenses. All three came back indicating there was no
issue. There is no type of report indicating there was prior mental health
history. On December 19, 2019, when we were in court for the
competency [hearing], the defendant stated that he had no prior mental
health history documented. He felt like there were people who thought
maybe he did need some mental health treatment, but there was no doctor,
no treatment and no medication. It wasn’t until today that we heard in that
in 1986 there was some type of diagnosis.
Additionally, we were in court on Monday [November 30, 2020],
where the defendant would be what I would describe as agitated, shaking,
irritable, not wanting to listen to the court or go through with things and then
as soon as the court changed direction and said we were not going to do
what we originally came for, the defendant instantly was calm and indicated
that he had calmed down. Today there’s been absolutely no issue. The
defendant is completely calm, polite, respectful, answers the questions
-18-
posed by the court. He indicates, maybe not directly, to the questions,
answered [sic] of the court about the difference between guilty or not guilty,
he certainly indicated through his answers he knows that – that there is a
difference between guilty, not guilty, right, wrong, done something or not
done something. Those all indicate to the court that there is an
understanding – the basic understanding of right and wrong. * * *
Tr. (December 4, 2020), p. 21-22.
{¶ 44} The transcript of the October 20, 2015 hearing shows that Voris’s responses
to questions posed by the trial court were coherent and appropriate. While Voris did note
some issues with his short-term memory, he did not claim that it affected his ability to
understand the proceedings against him or his ability to assist counsel with his defense.
Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in declining to
order a third evaluation, as Voris’s testimony did not raise a genuine question of his ability
to understand the proceedings or to aid his attorneys.
{¶ 45} Voris’s second assignment of error is overruled.
{¶ 46} Because they are interrelated, we will discuss Voris’s third and fourth
assignments of error together:
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL ERROR BY
ACCEPTING A PLEA OF GUILTY THAT WAS NOT KNOWINGLY,
INTELLIGENTLY, AND VOLUNTARILY GIVEN IN VIOLATION OF
CRIM.R. 11.
APPELLANT’S PLEA AND SENTENCE/TERMINATION ENTRY
WERE CONTRARY TO LAW IN VIOLATION OF HIS FUNDAMENTAL
-19-
RIGHTS TO EQUAL PROTECTIONS AND FUNDAMENTAL FAIRNESS
AND DUE PROCESS UNDER THE FIFTH AND FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENTS TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION; SECTIONS
10 AND 16; ARTICLE I OF THE OHIO CONSTITUTION.
{¶ 47} Voris’s appellate brief does not address his final two assignments of error
and contains no arguments supporting either assignment. Nonetheless, we have
reviewed the transcript of Voris’s plea hearing and find that the trial court substantially
complied with Crim.R. 11. Additionally, the trial court’s judgment entry of conviction filed
on January 8, 2021, in no way violated Voris’s constitutional rights to equal protection,
fundamental fairness, and due process of the law.
{¶ 48} Voris’s third and fourth assignments are overruled.
{¶ 49} The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
............
TUCKER, P.J. and EPLEY, J., concur.
Copies sent to:
Matthew C. Joseph
Carlo C. McGinnis
Hon. Stacy M. Wall