State v. Bellomy , 2020 Ohio 6690 ( 2020 )


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  • [Cite as State v. Bellomy, 
    2020-Ohio-6690
    .]
    COURT OF APPEALS
    FAIRFIELD COUNTY, OHIO
    FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
    JUDGES:
    STATE OF OHIO                                  :       Hon. W. Scott Gwin, P.J.
    :       Hon. John W. Wise, J.
    Plaintiff-Appellee    :       Hon. Craig R. Baldwin, J.
    :
    -vs-                                           :
    :       Case No. 2020 CA 00001
    FREDERICK BELLOMY                              :
    :
    Defendant-Appellant       :       OPINION
    CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING:                           Criminal appeal from the Fairfield County
    Court of Common Pleas, Case No.
    2019CR191
    JUDGMENT:                                          Affirmed
    DATE OF JUDGMENT ENTRY:                            December 14, 2020
    APPEARANCES:
    For Plaintiff-Appellee                             For Defendant-Appellant
    KYLE WITT                                          JAMES A. ANZELMO
    Fairfield County Prosecutor                        446 Howland Drive
    239 West Main Street                               Gahanna, OH 43230
    Lancaster,, OH 43130
    [Cite as State v. Bellomy, 
    2020-Ohio-6690
    .]
    Gwin, P.J.
    {¶1}     Appellant, Frederick Bellomy [“Bellomy”], appeals from the December 2,
    2019 Judgment Entry of the Fairfield County Court of Common Pleas imposing
    consecutive sentences after a negotiated guilty plea.
    Facts and Procedural History
    {¶2}      Bellomy was indicted by the Fairfield County Grand Jury on April 10, 2019
    on one count of Rape, a felony of the first degree, in violation of R.C. 2907.02 and one
    count of Importuning, a felony of the third degree, in violation of R.C. 2907.07. A
    superseding indictment was filed on August 29, 2019 that included the original counts of
    Rape and Importuning and added an additional count of Tampering with Evidence, a
    felony of the third degree, in violation of R.C. 2921.12. The Rape count relates to a minor
    relative victim of Bellomy, C.M., and the Importuning count relates to a different minor
    relative, A.M.
    {¶3}     Bellomy entered a plea to the counts of Rape and Importuning on October
    23, 2019. The count of Tampering with Evidence was dismissed at that time. The trial
    court during the plea colloquy informed Bellomy,
    On Count One, the State is asking, from what I'm getting, 11 years.
    You and your counsel are hoping for 10. You're hoping that Count Two runs
    concurrent with Count One. The state is hoping that Count Two runs
    consecutive with Count One. Sounds like the State wants the full 36 months
    on Count Two. You're hoping for concurrent penalty, which means that
    you're hoping that the total sentence will be 10 years.
    Change of Plea hearing, October 23, 2019 at 11-12.
    Fairfield County, Case No. 2020 CA 00001                                                 3
    {¶4}   On November 20, 2019, a sentencing hearing was held. At that hearing the
    mother and stepfather of the two victims, C.M. and A.M., gave statements as to the impact
    that the Rape and Importuning offenses had on each of the children. Bellomy’s attorney
    noted that he had confessed to the crimes. Sent. T. Nov. 20, 2019 at 12-13. Counsel
    further referred to a report from Dr. Smith that indicated as a child and teenager, Bellamy
    was repeatedly molested by different perpetrators. Sent. T. Nov. 20, 2019 at 23. The
    molestation was "particularly destructive" to Bellomy, according to the psychiatrist who
    examined him. 
    Id.
     Bellomy's mother also spoke at the sentencing hearing.
    {¶5}   Having heard the arguments of the State of Ohio and Bellomy's counsel, as
    well as the statements of the victims' family members, and, having reviewed the pre-
    sentence investigation report, the trial court sentenced Bellomy to serve consecutive
    sentences of eleven years on the count of Rape and three years on the count of
    Importuning for a total sentence of fourteen years.
    Assignment of Error
    {¶6}   Bellomy raises one Assignment of Error,
    {¶7}   “I. THE TRIAL COURT UNLAWFULLY ORDERED BELLOMY TO SERVE
    CONSECUTIVE SENTENCES, IN VIOLATION OF HIS RIGHTS TO DUE PROCESS,
    GUARANTEED BY SECTION 10, ARTICLE I OF THE OHIO CONSTITUTION AND THE
    FIFTH     AND     FOURTEENTH        AMENDMENTS           TO   THE     UNITED     STATES
    CONSTITUTION.”
    Fairfield County, Case No. 2020 CA 00001                                                       4
    Law and Analysis
    {¶8}   In his first assignment of error, Bellomy argues that the Court should vacate
    the trial court's decision to impose consecutive sentences because the record does not
    support the imposition of consecutive sentences. [Appellant’s Brief at 4].
    Law and Analysis
    Standard of Appellate Review.
    {¶9}   We review felony sentences using the standard of review set forth in R.C.
    2953.08. State v. Marcum, 
    146 Ohio St.3d 516
    , 2016–Ohio–1002, 
    59 N.E.3d 1231
    , ¶ 22;
    State v. Howell, 5th Dist. Stark No. 2015CA00004, 
    2015-Ohio-4049
    , ¶ 31.
    {¶10} In State v. Gwynne, a plurality of the Supreme Court of Ohio held that an
    appellate court may only review individual felony sentences under R.C. 2929.11 and R.C.
    2929.12, while     R.C. 2953.08(G)(2) is the exclusive means of appellate review of
    consecutive felony sentences. 
    158 Ohio St.3d 279
    , 
    2019-Ohio-4761
    , 
    141 N.E.3d 169
    ,
    ¶16-18; State v. Anthony, 11th Dist. Lake No. 2019-L-045, 
    2019-Ohio-5410
    , ¶60.
    {¶11} R.C. 2953.08(G)(2) provides we may either increase, reduce, modify, or
    vacate a sentence and remand for resentencing where we clearly and convincingly find
    that either the record does not support the sentencing court’s findings under R.C.
    2929.13(B) or (D),      2929.14(B)(2)(e) or (C)(4), or 2929.20(I), or the sentence is
    otherwise contrary to law. See, also, State v. Bonnell, 
    140 Ohio St.3d 209
    , 2014–Ohio–
    3177, 
    16 N.E.2d 659
    , ¶ 28; State v. Gwynne, ¶16.
    {¶12} Clear and convincing evidence is that evidence “which will provide in the
    mind of the trier of facts a firm belief or conviction as to the facts sought to be established.”
    Cross v. Ledford, 
    161 Ohio St. 469
    , 
    120 N.E.2d 118
    (1954), paragraph three of the
    Fairfield County, Case No. 2020 CA 00001                                                   5
    syllabus. See also, In re Adoption of Holcomb, 
    18 Ohio St.3d 361
     (1985). “Where the
    degree of proof required to sustain an issue must be clear and convincing, a reviewing
    court will examine the record to determine whether the trier of facts had sufficient
    evidence before it to satisfy the requisite degree of proof.” Cross, 161 Ohio St. at 477
    
    120 N.E.2d 118
    .
    {¶13} As the Ohio Supreme Court noted in Gwynne,
    Because R.C. 2953.08(G)(2)(a) specifically mentions a sentencing
    judge’s findings made under R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) as falling within a court of
    appeals’   review,   the    General   Assembly    plainly   intended      R.C.
    2953.08(G)(2)(a) to be the exclusive means of appellate review of
    consecutive sentences. See State v. Vanzandt, 
    142 Ohio St.3d 223
    , 2015-
    Ohio-236, 
    28 N.E.3d 1267
    , ¶ 7 (“We primarily seek to determine legislative
    intent from the plain language of a statute”).
    While R.C. 2953.08(G)(2)(a) clearly applies to consecutive-sentencing
    review, R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12 both clearly apply only to individual
    sentences.
    
    158 Ohio St.3d 279
    , 
    2019-Ohio-4761
    , 
    141 N.E.3d 169
    , ¶¶16-17(emphasis in original).
    {¶14} “In order to impose consecutive terms of imprisonment, a trial court is
    required to make the findings mandated by R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) at the sentencing hearing
    and incorporate its findings into its sentencing entry[.]” State v. Bonnell, 
    140 Ohio St.3d 209
    , 
    2014-Ohio-3177
    , ¶37.         Otherwise, the imposition of consecutive sentences is
    contrary to law. See 
    Id.
     The trial court is not required “to give a talismanic incantation of
    Fairfield County, Case No. 2020 CA 00001                                                6
    the words of the statute, provided that the necessary findings can be found in the record
    and are incorporated into the sentencing entry.” 
    Id.
    ISSUE FOR APPEAL.
    A. Whether the trial court properly imposed consecutive sentences in
    Bellomy’s case.
    R.C. 2929.14 (C)(4) Consecutive Sentences.
    {¶15} R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) concerns the imposition of consecutive sentences. In
    Ohio, there is a statutory presumption in favor of concurrent sentences for most felony
    offenses. R.C. 2929.41(A). The trial court may overcome this presumption by making
    the statutory, enumerated findings set forth in R.C. 2929.14(C) (4). State v. Bonnell, 
    140 Ohio St.3d 209
    , 
    2014-Ohio-3177
    , 
    16 N.E.3d 659
    , ¶23. This statute requires the trial court
    to undertake a three-part analysis. State v. Alexander, 1st Dist. Hamilton Nos. C–110828
    and C–110829, 
    2012-Ohio-3349
    , 
    2012 WL 3055158
    , ¶ 15.
    {¶16} R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) provides,
    If multiple prison terms are imposed on an offender for convictions of
    multiple offenses, the court may require the offender to serve the prison
    terms consecutively if the court finds that the consecutive service is
    necessary to protect the public from future crime or to punish the offender
    and that consecutive sentences are not disproportionate to the seriousness
    of the offender’s conduct and to the danger the offender poses to the public,
    and if the court also finds any of the following:
    (a) The offender committed one or more of the multiple offenses
    while the offender was awaiting trial or sentencing, was under a sanction
    Fairfield County, Case No. 2020 CA 00001                                                     7
    imposed pursuant to section 2929.16, 2929.17, or 2929.18 of the Revised
    Code, or was under post-release control for a prior offense.
    (b) At least two of the multiple offenses were committed as part of
    one or more courses of conduct, and the harm caused by two or more of
    the multiple offenses so committed was so great or unusual that no single
    prison term for any of the offenses committed as part of any of the courses
    of conduct adequately reflects the seriousness of the offender’s conduct.
    (c) The offender’s history of criminal conduct demonstrates that
    consecutive sentences are necessary to protect the public from future crime
    by the offender.
    {¶17} Thus, in order for a trial court to impose consecutive sentences the court
    must find that consecutive sentences are necessary to protect the public from future crime
    or to punish the offender. The court must also find that consecutive sentences are not
    disproportionate to the offender’s conduct and to the danger the offender poses to the
    public. Finally, the court must make at least one of three additional findings, which include
    that (a) the offender committed one or more of the offenses while awaiting trial or
    sentencing, while under a sanction imposed under R.C. 2929.16, 2929.17, or 2929.18, or
    while under post release control for a prior offense; (b) at least two of the multiple offenses
    were committed as part of one or more courses of conduct, and the harm caused by two
    or more of the offenses was so great or unusual that no single prison term for any of the
    offenses committed as part of any of the courses of conduct would adequately reflect the
    seriousness of the offender’s conduct; or (c) the offender’s criminal history demonstrates
    Fairfield County, Case No. 2020 CA 00001                                                  8
    that consecutive sentences are necessary to protect the public from future crime by the
    offender. See, State v. White, 5th Dist. Perry No. 12-CA-00018, 
    2013-Ohio-2058
    , ¶36.
    {¶18} In this case, the record does support a conclusion that the trial court made
    all of the findings required by R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) at the time it imposed consecutive
    sentences.
    R.C. 2929.14(C)(4): [T]he court may require the offender to serve the
    prison terms consecutively if the court finds that the consecutive service is
    necessary to protect the public from future crime or to punish the offender
    and that consecutive sentences are not disproportionate to the seriousness
    of the offender’s conduct and to the danger the offender poses to the public.
    {¶19} In the case at bar, the trial court made this finding on the record and in its
    sentencing entry. Sent. T., Nov. 20, 2019 at 39-45; Sentencing Entry, filed Dec. 2, 2019
    at 3.
    R.C. 2929.14(C)(4)(a): The offender committed one or more of the
    multiple offenses while the offender was awaiting trial or sentencing, was
    under a sanction imposed pursuant to section 2929.16, 2929.17, or 2929.18
    of the Revised Code, or was under post-release control for a prior offense.
    {¶20} This factor does not apply in Bellomy’s case.
    R.C. 2929.14(C)(4)(b): At least two of the multiple offenses were
    committed as part of one or more courses of conduct, and the harm caused
    by two or more of the multiple offenses so committed was so great or
    unusual that no single prison term for any of the offenses committed as part
    Fairfield County, Case No. 2020 CA 00001                                                    9
    of any of the courses of conduct adequately reflects the seriousness of the
    offender’s conduct.
    {¶21} The Court made no findings concerning this factor in Bellomy’s case.
    R.C. 2929.14(C)(4)(c): The offender’s history of criminal conduct
    demonstrates that consecutive sentences are necessary to protect the
    public from future crime by the offender.
    {¶22} In the case at bar, the trial court made this finding on the record and in its
    sentencing entry. Sent. T., Nov. 20, 2019 at 39-45; Sentencing Entry, filed Dec. 2, 2019
    at 3.
    B. Whether the trial court’s decision to impose consecutive sentences in
    Bellomy’s case is supported by the record.
    {¶23} According to the Ohio Supreme Court, “the record must contain a basis
    upon which a reviewing court can determine that the trial court made the findings required
    by R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) before it imposed consecutive sentences.” Bonnell, ¶28. “[A]s
    long as the reviewing court can discern that the trial court engaged in the correct analysis
    and can determine that the record contains evidence to support the findings, consecutive
    sentences should be upheld.” Id. at ¶29.
    {¶24} The plurality of the Ohio Supreme Court in Gwynne held that appellate
    courts may not review consecutive sentences for compliance with R.C. 2929.11 and R.C.
    2929.12. See 2019-Ohio- 4761, ¶18.
    {¶25} In the case at bar, the trial court heard from the parents of the victims, heard
    from the witnesses presented by Bellomy, heard arguments from the state and defense
    counsel and reviewed the presentence investigation report before imposing a sentence.
    Fairfield County, Case No. 2020 CA 00001                                                     10
    {¶26} In the case at bar, the record supports that the harm caused to the victims
    was “more serious” because of the age of the victims [2929.12(B)(1)]. The offense was
    also more serious because Bellomy used his relationship with the victim to facilitate the
    offenses. [2929.12(B)(6)]. Additionally, there were two separate victims in Bellomy’s
    case. None of the factors set forth in 2929.12(C) are applicable to render the offenses
    “less serious.”
    {¶27} Given that the trial court is not obligated to refer to every factor listed in R.C.
    2929.12 as part of its sentencing analysis, “the defendant has the burden to affirmatively
    show that the court did not consider the applicable sentencing criteria or that the sentence
    imposed is ‘strikingly inconsistent’ with the applicable sentencing factors.” State v. Hull,
    11th Dist. Lake No. 2016-L-035, 2017-Ohio- 157, ¶8. Bellomy has failed in this burden.
    {¶28} Accordingly, the trial court considered the purposes and principles of
    sentencing [R.C. 2929.11] as well as the factors that the court must consider when
    determining an appropriate sentence. [R.C. 2929.12]. The trial court has no obligation
    to state reasons to support its findings. Nor is it required to give a talismanic incantation
    of the words of the statute, provided that the necessary findings can be found in the record
    and are incorporated into the sentencing entry.
    {¶29} Upon review, we find that the trial court's sentencing on the charges
    complies with applicable rules and sentencing statutes. The sentence was within the
    statutory sentencing range. We also find that the record in the case at bar supports the
    trial court’s findings under R.C. 2929.14(C)(4). Furthermore, the record reflects that the
    trial court considered the purposes and principles of sentencing and the seriousness and
    recidivism factors as required in Sections 2929.11 and 2929.12 of the Ohio Revised Code
    Fairfield County, Case No. 2020 CA 00001                                                    11
    and advised Bellomy regarding post-release control. While Bellomy may disagree with
    the weight given to these factors by the trial judge, Bellomy’s sentence was within the
    applicable statutory range and therefore, we have no basis for concluding that it is
    contrary to law.
    {¶30} Bellomy has failed to clearly and convincingly show that the trial court failed
    to consider the principles of felony sentencing, or that the sentence is otherwise contrary
    to law.
    {¶31} Upon review, we find that the trial court's sentencing on the charges
    complies with applicable rules and sentencing statutes. The sentence was within the
    statutory sentencing range. Further, the record contains evidence supporting the trial
    court’s findings under R.C. 2929.14(C)(4). Therefore, we have no basis for concluding
    that it is contrary to law.
    {¶32} Bellomy’s sole Assignment of Error is overruled.
    {¶33} The judgment of the Fairfield County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed.
    By Gwin, P.J.,
    Wise, John, J., and
    Baldwin, J., concur