State v. Bocock ( 2022 )


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  • [Cite as State v. Bocock, 
    2022-Ohio-3344
    .]
    IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
    SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
    MONTGOMERY COUNTY
    STATE OF OHIO                                      :
    :
    Plaintiff-Appellee                         :   Appellate Case No. 29421
    :
    v.                                                 :   Trial Court Case No. 2021-CR-4217
    :
    DANIEL A. BOCOCK                                   :   (Criminal Appeal from
    :   Common Pleas Court)
    Defendant-Appellant                        :
    :
    ...........
    OPINION
    Rendered on the 23rd day of September, 2022.
    ...........
    MATHIAS H. HECK, JR. by ANDREW T. FRENCH, Atty. Reg. No. 0069384, Assistant
    Prosecuting Attorney, Montgomery County Prosecutor’s Office, Appellate Division, 301
    West Third Street, 5th Floor, Dayton, Ohio 45422
    Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellee
    MATTHEW M. SUELLENTROP, Atty. Reg. No. 0089655, 6 North Main Street, Suite 400,
    Dayton, Ohio 45402
    Attorney for Defendant-Appellant
    .............
    DONOVAN, J.
    -2-
    {¶ 1} Daniel A. Bocock appeals from his convictions on his guilty pleas for
    receiving stolen property and having weapons while under disability. He argues that the
    trial court erred in imposing a sentence of 36 months after inducing his guilty pleas with
    a promise of community control sanctions, including the MonDay program. The State
    concedes the error. The trial court’s judgment will be reversed, and the matter will be
    remanded for the trial court either to impose community control sanctions or to allow
    Bocock to withdraw his guilty pleas.
    {¶ 2} On January 6, 2022, Bocock was indicted in Montgomery C.P. No. 2021-CR-
    4217 on one count of receiving stolen property ($150,000), in violation of R.C.2913.51(A),
    and one count of having weapons while under disability (prior drug conviction), in violation
    of R.C. 2923.13(A)(3), both felonies of the third degree.1 He pled not guilty on January
    11, 2022.
    {¶ 3} A scheduling conference was held on February 16, 2022, at which substitute
    counsel stood in for Bobock’s attorney of record. At that time, the prosecutor indicated
    that it was his understanding that Bocock would plead guilty as charged to receiving stolen
    property and having weapons under disability, with no agreement between the parties as
    to sentencing. The following exchange then occurred:
    THE COURT: * * * [B]efore you make a decision on what you want
    to do Mr. Bocock, I will tell you that I am inclined to grant your community
    1
    Bocock’s brief lists two case numbers in its caption, Case Nos. 2020-CR-4001 and 2021-
    CR-4217. His notice of appeal, however, was only filed in Case No. 2021-CR-4217, and
    we will consider only that case on appeal.
    -3-
    control on the one offense with a - - with a MonDay screen and also that
    you attend the MonDay program. I would combine that with any pleas in
    the first case, so I’m basically telling you what I’m going to do ahead of time.
    So with that, [Defense Counsel], I’ll turn to you.      Is that your
    understanding of what we’re going to do?
    [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: That was my understanding * * *.
    THE COURT: * * * Mr. Bocock, is that what you want to do, is enter
    a plea of guilty to those two offenses?
    THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.
    {¶ 4} Additionally, the court indicated that it already had a PSI in Case No. 2020-
    CR-4001, that a PSI was to be prepared in the current case, and that the court needed to
    know about restitution. The court was prepared to proceed immediately to sentencing,
    but the State indicated that the victim needed to be notified of the sentencing hearing and
    asked the court to give the victim the opportunity to speak at sentencing. As such, the
    court accepted Bocock’s plea and set the sentencing for two weeks later. However, the
    court indicated that, in the meantime, “we can get the MonDay already set up and save
    some time.” The court asked Bobock if that’s what he wanted to do, and he answered
    affirmatively.
    {¶ 5} Bocock then entered pleas of guilty to the indicted offenses. Bocock’s plea
    forms were dated February 28, 2022. On the same date, the State filed a sentencing
    memorandum which requested that the court impose a sentence of 36 months.
    {¶ 6} On March 2, 2022, the trial court conducted the sentencing hearing;
    -4-
    Bocock’s counsel of record was in attendance.       The court sentenced Bocock to 36
    months for each offense, without objection.
    {¶ 7} Bocock appeals, raising two assignments of error. His first assignment of
    error is as follows:
    THE DEFENDANT-APPELLANT’S GUILTY PLEA(S) ARE VOID AS
    THEY WERE INDUCED BY THE TRIAL COURT.
    {¶ 8} Bocock asserts that the trial court induced him to plead guilty by promising
    him community control sanctions, and then it did not impose that sentence. The State
    concedes that, before Bocock made his decision about entering a plea, the trial court
    “implicitly promised Bocock that he was going to receive community control sanctions” in
    exchange for his guilty pleas; thus, Bocock’s pleas were not knowingly, intelligently, and
    voluntarily made.      The State further concedes that Bocock’s convictions must be
    reversed, and the matter must be remanded for the trial court to either impose community
    control sanctions or allow Bocock to withdraw his pleas.
    {¶ 9} In State v. Dehart, 
    2018-Ohio-865
    , 
    106 N.E.3d 1267
     (2d Dist.), we stated:
    When a defendant enters a plea in a criminal case, the plea must be
    made knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily.” State v. Barker, 
    129 Ohio St.3d 472
    , 
    2011-Ohio-4130
    , 
    953 N.E.2d 826
    , ¶ 9. “Crim.R. 11(C) requires
    a trial judge to determine whether that criminal defendant is fully informed
    of his or her rights and understands the consequences of his or her guilty
    plea.” Id. at ¶ 10. In determining whether Dehart's guilty plea was made
    knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily, we must review the record “to
    -5-
    ensure that Crim.R. 11 was followed by the trial court upon defendant's
    submission of the guilty plea.” State v. Spates, 
    64 Ohio St.3d 269
    , 272,
    
    595 N.E.2d 351
     (1992). * * *
    In State v. Mills, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 26619, 
    2015-Ohio-5385
    ,
    ¶ 14, we stated the following:
    * * * [A] plea agreement is a contract, and a breach of that contract
    is governed by contract law. State v. Adkins, 
    161 Ohio App.3d 114
    ,
    
    2005-Ohio-2577
    , 
    829 N.E.2d 729
     (4th Dist.).          A breach of that
    contract entitles the non-breaching party to recision or specific
    performance. Santobello v. New York, 
    404 U.S. 257
    , 
    92 S.Ct. 495
    ,
    
    30 L.Ed.2d 427
     (1971); State v. Layman, 2d Dist. Montgomery No.
    22307, 
    2008-Ohio-759
    . A promised sentence is an inducement to
    plea, and unless given as promised, the plea is not voluntary. State
    v. Gilroy, 
    195 Ohio App.3d 173
    , 
    2011-Ohio-4163
    , 
    959 N.E.2d 19
     (2d
    Dist.); Layman at ¶ 15, citing State v. Triplett, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No.
    69237, 
    1997 WL 64051
     (Feb. 13, 1997); State v. Bonnell, 12th Dist.
    Clermont No. CA2001-12-094, 
    2002-Ohio-5882
    .
    Id. at ¶ 13-14.
    {¶ 10} We concluded in Dehart that “the record clearly established that the trial
    court promised Dehart that he would receive community control sanctions if he pled guilty
    to two counts of violating a protection order * * *.”      Id. at ¶ 15.    Significantly, “no
    conditions were placed upon Dehart at the time of the plea that could account for the trial
    -6-
    court’s decision to disregard its promise of community control.” Id. As such, we found
    that “the trial court was obligated to sentence Dehart to community control sanctions or
    otherwise permit him to withdraw his guilty pleas,” and that “the trial court’s decision to
    disregard its promise of community control rendered Dehart’s guilty pleas unknowing,
    unintelligent, and involuntary.” Id. We reversed and remanded “for either the imposition
    of community control sanctions or to allow Dehart to withdraw his guilty pleas.” Id. at
    ¶ 20.
    {¶ 11} The same reasoning applies herein. As the State concedes, the trial court
    induced Bocock’s pleas by telling him, “I am inclined to grant your community control on
    the one offense * * * with a MonDay screen and also that you attend the MonDay program.
    * * * I’m basically telling you what I’m going to do ahead of time.” As in DeHart, no
    conditions were placed upon Bocock between the plea hearing and sentencing.
    Accordingly, Bocock’s first assignment of error is sustained.
    {¶ 12} Bocock’s second assignment of error is as follows:
    THE APPELLANT WAS DENIED HIS RIGHT TO THE EFFECTIVE
    ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL PURSUANT TO ARTICLE I, SECTION 10
    OF THE OHIO CONSTITUTION AND THE SIXTH AMENDMENT OF THE
    UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION.
    {¶ 13} Bocock asserts that he received ineffective assistance by trial counsel’s
    failure to object to the sentence imposed and failure to inquire about a motion to withdraw
    Bocock’s guilty pleas. The State responds that this argument need not be addressed
    due to the error conceded in the first assignment of error.
    -7-
    {¶ 14} Having sustained Bocock’s first assignment of error, which is dispositive of
    this appeal, we agree with the State that analysis of his second assignment of error is not
    required.
    {¶ 15} The judgment of the trial court is reversed, and the matter is remanded for
    the trial court to impose community control sanctions or to allow Bocock to withdraw his
    guilty pleas.
    .............
    TUCKER, P.J. and LEWIS, J., concur.
    Copies sent to:
    Mathias H. Heck, Jr.
    Andrew T. French
    Matthew M. Suellentrop
    Hon. Dennis J. Adkins
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 29421

Judges: Donovan

Filed Date: 9/23/2022

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 9/23/2022