Robinette v. PNC Bank, N.A. , 2016 Ohio 767 ( 2016 )


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  • [Cite as Robinette v. PNC Bank, N.A., 2016-Ohio-767.]
    COURT OF APPEALS
    LICKING COUNTY, OHIO
    FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
    CYNTHIA ROBINETTE, et al.                         :     JUDGES:
    :     Hon. John W. Wise, P.J.
    Plaintiffs - Appellants                   :     Hon. Patricia A. Delaney, J.
    :     Hon. Craig R. Baldwin, J.
    -vs-                                              :
    :
    PNC BANK, NA, et al.                              :     Case No. 15-CA-47
    :
    Defendants - Appellees                    :     OPINION
    CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING:                                Appeal from the Licking County
    Court of Common Pleas, Case No.
    2014 CV 0712
    JUDGMENT:                                               Affirmed
    DATE OF JUDGMENT:                                       February 25, 2016
    APPEARANCES:
    For Plaintiffs-Appellants                               For Defendant-Appellee Carrara
    Restoration of Northeast Ohio, Inc.
    C. DANIEL HAYES                                         MARK I. WACHTER
    Hayes Law Offices                                       Wachter Kurant, LLC
    195 E. Broad Street                                     30195 Chagrin Blvd, Suite 300
    PO Box 958                                              Cleveland, Ohio 44124
    Pataskala, Ohio 43062
    Licking County, Case No. 15-CA-47                                                     2
    Baldwin, J.
    {¶1}    Plaintiffs-appellants Cynthia Robinette and Ashley Robinette appeal from
    the June 10, 2015 Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law issued by the Licking County
    Court of Common Pleas granting judgment in favor of defendant-appellee Carrara
    Restoration of Northeast Ohio, Inc.
    STATEMENT OF THE FACTS AND CASE
    {¶2}    In the summer of 2012, a storm damaged the residence of Jerry Robinette
    and appellant Cynthia Robinette, causing structural damage. Appellee Carrara
    Restoration of Northeast Ohio, Inc., which provides restoration services to damaged
    property, assessed the damage to the property at the request of Motorists Mutual
    Insurance Company, the insurer. Appellee determined that the cost to repair the home
    would be $18,251.92.
    {¶3}    Motorists Mutual Insurance Company, after approving the damage
    estimate, issued a check dated July 12, 2012 in the amount of $17,316.73 payable to
    Jerry Robinette, appellant Cynthia Robinette and appellee.   Jerry Robinette was listed
    as the insured on the check. On or about August 31, 2012, appellee entered in to an
    agreement with Jerry Robinette to provide restoration services to the property. Appellee
    and Jerry Robinette entered in to an agreement whereby the check would be endorsed
    by the Robinettes and delivered to appellee. Appellee then would exchange the check for
    a check to the Robinettes in the amount of one half of the check amount and the
    Robinettes would hold the remaining funds until the work was completed. Appellee did
    not receive any payment prior to starting work.
    Licking County, Case No. 15-CA-47                                                                       3
    {¶4}    After the work was completed by appellee and Jerry Robinette failed to
    make any payments, appellee contacted Motorists Mutual Insurance Company and was
    provided with a copy of the July 12, 2012 check. The check had been endorsed in writing
    by Jerry Robinette and appellant Cynthia Robinette and contained a handwritten
    endorsement by “Justin Sucato for Carrara Restoration.” The check had been deposited
    into the Robinette’s joint account at PNC Bank. Justin Sucato, contending that his
    signature on the check was forged, had PNC freeze the accounts at PNC owned by
    appellant Cynthia Robinette and Jerry Robinette.
    {¶5}    Jerry Robinette died on January 11, 2014.
    {¶6}    On August 6 2014, appellants Cynthia Robinette and Ashley Robinette1 filed
    a complaint for declaratory judgment against PNC Bank. Appellants, in their complaint,
    asserted that the accounts had been frozen because appellee had alleged that Jerry
    Robinette had “deposited his own insurance proceeds with the Defendant [PNC] in
    violation of an agreement between the third party and Jerry Robinette.” Appellants further
    argued that since no claim had been filed against the Estate of Jerry Robinette, PNC had
    no reason to hold, freeze or otherwise restrict access to their accounts. They asked that
    their funds be returned to them.
    {¶7}    Thereafter, on September 4, 2014, PNC Bank filed an answer, a
    counterclaim and a third-party complaint against appellee. Appellee filed an answer and
    a crossclaim against appellant Cynthia Robinette on October 14, 2014, setting forth
    causes of action for conversion and unjust enrichment.
    1Appellant Ashley Robinette and appellant Cynthia Robinette owed a joint account that had been frozen
    by PNC.
    Licking County, Case No. 15-CA-47                                                    4
    {¶8}   As memorialized in an Order filed on October 28, 2014, the trial court
    granted PNC leave to deposit up to $17,316.73 contained in specified accounts with the
    Clerk of Courts. PNC was dismissed with prejudice. On November 25, 2014, $14,060.77
    was deposited with the Clerk.
    {¶9}   A bench trial was held on April 28, 2015 after which the parties filed
    proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law. Pursuant to Findings of Fact and
    Conclusions of Law filed on June 10, 2015, the trial court granted judgment in favor of
    appellee and against appellant Cynthia Robinette in the amount of $17,316.73, the
    amount of the check issued by Motorists Mutual.
    {¶10} Appellee, on July 1, 2015, filed a motion seeking to have the funds held by
    the Clerk of Courts released to appellee. The next day, appellants filed a Notice of
    Appeal. As memorialized in an Order filed on July 8, 2015, the trial court ordered the
    Clerk to pay to appellee the sum of $14,060.77, less statutory poundage.
    {¶11} Appellants now raise the following assignments of error on appeal:
    {¶12} I. THE TRIAL COURT’S ENTRY IN RELATION TO APPELLEE’S CLAIM
    FOR CONVERSION IS CONTRARY TO LAW AND IN ERROR.
    {¶13} II. THE TRIAL COURT’S ENTRY IN RELATION TO APPELLEE’S CLAIM
    FOR CONVERSION IS AGAINST THE MANIFEST WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE AS IT
    IS NOT SUPPORTED BY COMPETENT AND / OR CREDIBLE RECORD EVIDENCE.
    {¶14} III. THE TRIAL COURT’S ENTRY IN RELATION TO APPELLEE’S CLAIM
    FOR UNJUST ENRICHMENT IS CONTRARY TO LAW AND IN ERROR.
    {¶15} IV. THE TRIAL COURT’S ENTRY IN RELATION TO APPELLEE’S CLAIM
    FOR UNJUST ENRICHMENT IS AGAINST THE MANIFEST WEIGHT OF THE
    Licking County, Case No. 15-CA-47                                                        5
    EVIDENCE AS IT IS NOT SUPPORTED BY COMPETENT AND/OR CREDIBLE
    RECORD EVIDENCE.
    {¶16} However, before addressing the merits of appellants’ assignments of error,
    we must first determine whether or not, as appellee alleges, appellants’ appeal should be
    dismissed as moot. Appellee specifically contends that the appeal is moot because the
    underlying judgment has been satisfied. Appellee notes that appellants took no action to
    stay execution of the judgment and that, as a result, the trial court released the funds to
    appellee.
    {¶17} It is a well-established principle of law that a satisfaction of judgment
    renders an appeal from that judgment moot. “ ‘Where the court rendering judgment has
    jurisdiction of the subject-matter of the action and of the parties, and fraud has not
    intervened, and the judgment is voluntarily paid and satisfied, such payment puts an end
    to the controversy, and takes away from the defendant the right to appeal or prosecute
    error or even to move for vacation of judgment.’ ” Rauch v. Noble, 
    169 Ohio St. 314
    , 316,
    
    159 N.E.2d 451
    , 453 (1959) , quoting Lynch v. Lakewood City School Dist. Bd. of Edn.,
    
    116 Ohio St. 361
    , 
    156 N.E. 188
    (1927), paragraph three of the syllabus.
    {¶18} Appellants, in turn, argue that the release of the funds by the Clerk in this
    case was not voluntary. Appellants point out that appellee filed its motion seeking to have
    the funds held by the Clerk of Courts released to appellee on July 1, 2015 and the trial
    court granted such motion on July 8, 2015 without giving appellants an opportunity to be
    heard as required by Licking County Common Pleas Court Local Rule 5, which states, in
    relevant part, as follows:
    Licking County, Case No. 15-CA-47                                                   6
    Rule 5. MOTION DOCKET
    (A) All motions shall be accompanied by a brief or
    memorandum stating the grounds thereof and citing the
    authorities relied upon.    In the absence of such brief or
    memorandum, such motion may be stricken from the files.
    (B) All motions shall be submitted to the Court for docketing
    at the time they are filed with the Clerk of Courts. At the time
    of the submittal of the motion, the moving party shall submit
    to the Court an order or notice of hearing scheduling an oral
    or non-oral hearing upon the motion. The motion and order
    or notice of hearing containing the oral or non-oral hearing
    date shall be served upon all opposing parties or their counsel
    by the moving party.
    (C) In accordance with Rule 6(D) of the Ohio Rules of Civil
    Procedure, the oral or non-oral hearing may be set no earlier
    then seven (7) days after the date of service of the motion,
    unless the Court in an order explicitly affixes a shorter time
    period. All motions for summary judgment, in accordance with
    Rule 56(C) of the Ohio Rules of Civil Procedure, shall be
    scheduled for oral or non-oral hearing not earlier than fourteen
    (14) days after the date of the service of the motion.
    {¶19} In the case sub judice, appellee’s motion was not set for non-oral hearing
    “no earlier than seven (7) days after the date of service of the motion,…” We find,
    Licking County, Case No. 15-CA-47                                                         7
    therefore, that appellants did not have an opportunity to respond to the motion before it
    was granted and the funds released and that the Clerk’s release of the funds does not
    constitute voluntary payment. We find that the appeal is not moot for such reason.
    {¶20} We will now turn to appellants’ assignments of error. For purposes of judicial
    economy, we shall address the assignments of error out of sequence.
    III, IV
    {¶21} Appellants, in their third and fourth assignment of error, argue that the trial
    court’s judgment with respect to the unjust enrichment claim is contrary to law and against
    the manifest weight of the evidence.
    {¶22} A judgment supported by some competent, credible evidence will not be
    reversed by a reviewing court as against the manifest weight of the evidence. C.E. Morris
    Co. v. Foley Constr. Co., 
    54 Ohio St. 2d 279
    , 
    376 N.E.2d 578
    (1978). A reviewing court
    must not substitute its judgment for that of the trial court where there exists some
    competent and credible evidence supporting the judgment rendered by the trial court.
    Myers v. Garson, 
    66 Ohio St. 3d 610
    , 
    614 N.E.2d 742
    (1993).
    {¶23} The elements of an unjust enrichment claim are: (1) a benefit conferred by
    a plaintiff upon a defendant; (2) knowledge by the defendant of the benefit; and (3)
    retention of the benefit by the defendant under circumstances where it would be unjust to
    do so without payment. Hambleton v. R.G. Barry Corp., 
    12 Ohio St. 3d 179
    , 183, 
    465 N.E.2d 1298
    (1984). Under Ohio law, unjust enrichment is a claim under quasi-contract
    law that arises out of the obligation cast by law upon a person in receipt of benefits that
    he is not justly entitled to retain. See Beatley v. Beatley, 
    160 Ohio App. 3d 600
    , 2005-
    Ohio-1846, 
    828 N.E.2d 180
    . Unjust enrichment entitles a party only to restitution of the
    Licking County, Case No. 15-CA-47                                                         8
    reasonable value of the benefit conferred. St. Vincent Med. Ctr. v. Sader, 100 Ohio
    App.3d 379, 384, 
    654 N.E.2d 144
    (6th Dist. 1995).
    {¶24} In the case sub judice, appellant Cynthia Robinette admitted in her answer
    to appellee’s crossclaim that, during the summer of 2012, her residence was damaged
    during a storm. At the bench trial, Michael Roe, the project manager, testified that he went
    over the nature of the work that needed to be performed by appellee with Jerry Robinette
    and appellant Cynthia Robinette. The check that was issued by Motorists Mutual for the
    repair work was payable to appellant Cynthia Robinette, her husband and appellee. The
    money from the check was deposited into the Robinette’s joint account. Testimony was
    adduced at the bench trial that appellee had never been paid for the work that it had
    performed. As noted by the trial court in its decision, appellant       Cynthia Robinette
    “received the benefit of the work done by Carrara, to wit, the restoration of her home, but
    did not pay anything for the work. Additionally, she has received the benefit of the deposit
    into her account of the insurance proceeds intended to pay Carrara for the work it
    performed.”
    {¶25} With respect to the reasonable value of the services, both Justin Sucato and
    Michael Roe testified at the bench trial that the reasonable value of the services that
    appellee performed was $18,251.00, the amount of the contract. There was no evidence
    to the contrary.
    {¶26} Based on the foregoing, we find that the trial court’s judgment with respect
    to the unjust enrichment claim is not contrary to law or against the manifest weight of the
    evidence. We find that there was competent and credible evidence that appellant Cynthia
    Robinette received a benefit that was conferred upon her by appellee, that she had
    Licking County, Case No. 15-CA-47                                                         9
    knowledge of the benefit, and that retention of the benefit by her without payment to
    appellee would be unjust.
    {¶27} Appellants’ third and fourth assignments of error are, therefore, overruled.
    I, II
    {¶28} Appellants, in their first and second assignment of errors, argue that the trial
    court’s judgment with respect to appellee’s conversion claim is contrary to law and against
    the manifest weight of the evidence.
    {¶29} Based on our disposition of appellants’ third and fourth assignments of
    error, appellants’ first and second assignments of error are moot.
    {¶30} Accordingly, the judgment of the Licking County Court of Common Pleas is
    affirmed.
    By: Baldwin, J.
    Wise, P.J. and
    Delaney, J. concur.