State v. Blair , 2017 Ohio 5865 ( 2017 )

[Cite as State v. Blair, 2017-Ohio-5865.]
COURT OF APPEALS
STARK COUNTY, OHIO
FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
JUDGES:
STATE OF OHIO : Hon. Patricia A. Delaney, P.J.
: Hon. W. Scott Gwin, J.
Plaintiff-Appellee : Hon. Earle E. Wise, J.
:
-vs- :
: Case No. 2016CA00180
LIONELL BLAIR :
:
Defendant-Appellant : OPINION
CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING: Criminal appeal from the Stark County
Court of Common Pleas, Case No.
2016CR1255
JUDGMENT: Affirmed
DATE OF JUDGMENT ENTRY: July 17, 2017
APPEARANCES:
For Plaintiff-Appellant For Defendant-Appellee
JOHN D. FERRERO VICTORIA BADER
STARK COUNTY PROSECUTOR ASSISTANT PUBLIC DEFENDER
BY: KRISTINE BEARD 250 East Broad Street, Ste. 1400
110 Central Plaza South, Ste. 510 Columbus, OH 43215
Canton, OH 44702
Stark County, Case No. 2016CA00180 2
Gwin, J.,
{¶1} Appellant Lionell Blair [“Blair”] appeals the June 30, 2016 Judgment Entry
of the Stark County Court of Common Pleas, Juvenile Division, Case No. 2016JCR00453
transferring jurisdiction of his case to the adult court. After the case was transferred to
the Stark County Court of Common Pleas, Blair entered a negotiated guilty plea to one
count of felonious assault, in violation of R.C. 2903.11(A)(1), a felony of the second
degree. (Stark County Court of Common Pleas, Case No. 2016CR1255). The trial
court sentenced him to six years in the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation. In
exchange, the state agreed not to pursue Blair’s Serious Youthful Offender sentence
on a prior juvenile court case.
Facts and Procedural History
{¶2} On March 9, 2016, a complaint was filed in the Stark County Juvenile Court,
alleging that then 17-year-old, Lionell Blair was delinquent of one count of felonious
assault, in violation of R.C. 2903.11(A)(1), a felony of the second degree if committed by
an adult.
{¶3} On March 10, 2016, the state filed a Motion to Relinquish Jurisdiction
asserting that Blair was not amenable to care or rehabilitation in the juvenile system. The
motion was set for both a probable cause hearing and an amenability hearing.
{¶4} At the probable cause hearing, Blair stipulated to his date of birth as January
30, 1999. (T. Apr. 26, 2016 at 3). The State called one witness, Trooper Dora Gonzales.
{¶5} Trooper Gonzales is assigned to investigate crimes that occur at the Indian
River Department of Youth Services Facility (DYS). At the time of the felonious assault,
Blair was serving time for an aggravated robbery with a firearm specification at Indian
Stark County, Case No. 2016CA00180 3
River. Trooper Gonzales testified that Blair and another juvenile resident, (Martin) got
into a verbal altercation. Blair claimed Martin was making disparaging remarks about his
dead grandmother. Blair assaulted Martin causing lacerations to his Martin's face and
breaking Martin's jaw. Because of the assault, Martin was treated at Mercy Medical
Center where Martin got stitches in his face and had his broken jaw wired shut. Trooper
Gonzales testified that Blair admitted to assaulting Martin. Blair further admitted that
Martin did not assault Blair at any time. (T. Apr. 26, 2016 at 12).
{¶6} Upon hearing this testimony, the court held that the state had established
probable cause to support that Blair had committed the offense of felonious assault. The
court set the matter for an amenability hearing and ordered a psychological evaluation.
{¶7} On June 28, 2016, the court conducted an amenability hearing. At the
hearing, the state presented the testimony of two witnesses, Juvenile Probation Officer
Lindsay Showalter and Doctor Erin Nicole Smith, and introduced Dr. Smith's
psychological report into evidence. (T. June 28, 2016 at 17-18; 37; State’s Exhibit 3).
{¶8} Showalter was Blair's probation officer from 2012 to 2015. Blair was initially
placed on probation after being found delinquent of having committed a status offense,
unruly. While on probation, Blair received counseling and case management at Phoenix
Rising, his family received coordinated wrap around services, and he was given multiple
trauma screens in an effort to improve his individual therapy. Blair was given graduated
sanctions including being placed on parental house arrest and electronically monitored
house arrest. While on probation, Blair's participation in the various programs was
sporadic. Blair was also in and out of the juvenile attention center on several occasions
for probation violations based on non-compliance with the terms of his probation including
Stark County, Case No. 2016CA00180 4
failure to comply with court ordered counseling. (T. June 28, 2016 at 6-7). Showalter
testified that none of the sanctions had any effect upon Blair’s behavior. (Id.).
{¶9} Additionally, while on probation, Blair's school attendance was sporadic.
When he was in school, Blair was insubordinate and disrespectful toward the teaching
staff. Blair was expelled for bringing marijuana onto school grounds. Blair lied and
stole from others. Teachers from the schools attempted to provide intervention but
were unsuccessful due to Blair's attitude and behavior. (June 28, 2016 at 11-12).
{¶10} In December 2014, Blair received court placement at Rogers Children's
Residential Center [“Rogers”]. Rogers is not a secure facility but provides youth with 24-
hour supervision. Rogers is typically a 6-9 month program. At Rogers, Blair was to be
provided with individual trauma based treatment services, anger management and group
counseling. He was also to be coached in improving his social skills and independent
living skills. 17 days after the placement at Rogers Blair went AWOL and was returned
to the juvenile attention center. Rogers agreed to give him another chance in their
placement program. Blair's placement was terminated when he went AWOL from Rogers
for a second time in February 2015. (T. June 28, 2016 at 8).
{¶11} After leaving Rogers without consent, Blair was arrested in Lisbon, Ohio, on
charges of theft and felonious assault. (T. June 28, 2016 at 9). Blair was convicted and
remanded to Stark County for disposition. At disposition, Blair was ordered into the
Residential Treatment Center [“RTC”]. RTC is a locked facility where Blair was to receive
counseling, drug and alcohol education, anger management and life skills training. (Id.
at 9). At RTC Blair's program participation was "rocky.” Blair was involved in multiple
assaults and was disrespectful to staff. (T. June 28, 2016 at 9). Eventually Blair
Stark County, Case No. 2016CA00180 5
developed a working relationship with his counselor and earned enough points to have a
home visit. (Id.). During the home visit, Blair went AWOL again and a warrant was issued
for his arrest. While absent without leave, Blair committed another offense of violence-
aggravated robbery with a firearm. (T. June 28, 2016 at 10). Blair was found delinquent
for the new charges and given a blended sentence with the adult commitment stayed and
a DYS commitment imposed. (T. June 28, 2016 at 47; Stark County Court of Common
Pleas, Case No. 2016CR1255, Transcript of Plea and Sentencing Hearing, Aug. 31, 2016
at 14-15).
{¶12} Dr. Erin Nicole Smith, a licensed psychologist employed at Northeast Ohio
Behavioral Health, performed Blair's psychological assessment. The psychological
assessment involved examining dispositional factors, administering a Child Post
Traumatic Disorder Symptom Scale and a youth's mental health exam to determine
whether Blair could be rehabilitated in the juvenile justice system. (T. June 28, 2016
at 17; 23). During the evaluation, Blair was questioned about his family history,
educational history, peer relationships, friendship history, criminal history and mental
health symptoms.
{¶13} When he was young, Blair witnessed domestic violence perpetrated by
his father against his mother. (State’s Exhibit 3 at 3). When his parents separated,
Blair, his mother, and his sisters moved frequently to escape the threat of continued
physical violence at the hands of his father. As a result, Blair reported that he lived in
at least six cities, in two different states throughout his childhood. At age 13, he resumed
visitations with his biological father, who often used drugs and alcohol during their visits
and encouraged Blair to do the same.
Stark County, Case No. 2016CA00180 6
{¶14} Blair’s life has been marked by severe trauma. In his young life, he
experienced at least 11 traumatic life events. (State’s Exhibit 3 at 8). Many of Blair’s
family members and friends are gang affiliated or have been incarcerated. Blair has
witnessed his best friend's murder, witnessed another friend be hit by a car, had his own
life threatened on multiple occasions, and has had a bullet removed from his body.
{¶15} Smith diagnosed Blair with Persistent Depressive Disorder and Dependent
Personality Disorder. Further Blair exhibited signs of Post-traumatic Stress Disorder
[“PTSD”]. Smith testified that Post Traumatic Stress Disorder in males tends to correlate
with criminal activity. (T. June 28, 2016 at 19). Smith stated that Post Traumatic Stress
Disorder is difficult to treat and treatment programs may take longer if the disorder has
been present for an extended period of time without treatment.
{¶16} Dr. Smith gave an expert opinion as to whether Blair was amenable to
treatment in the juvenile justice system. Smith stated that compared to the general
population Blair has an increased risk for violence and future criminal activity. In support,
Smith listed several factors from his history including caregiver disruptions and Blair's
disregard for home rules; problematic school achievement; poor coping skills and a need
for approval from other criminally involved peers; difficulty managing anger; difficulty
trusting others; failure to take responsibility for his own actions; and, substance abuse.
(T. June 28, 2016 at 22).
{¶17} Dr. Smith also considered the history of the extensive effort to provide Blair
with intervention and treatment efforts including probation, home based treatment, court
placement at Rogers and RTC and Blair's current DYS placement. Smith recognized that
none of these efforts had any effect on Blair's rehabilitation. Dr. Smith stated, "He's kind
Stark County, Case No. 2016CA00180 7
of got an unfortunate negative history of not being amenable to treatment.” Furthermore,
although during the sessions Blair appeared to indicate a willingness to make efforts and
be amenable, treatment was likely to "take a long time"- "many years in a lifetime.” (T.
June 28, 2016 at 22; 24). In conclusion, Dr. Smith stated Blair was not amenable to
rehabilitation in the juvenile justice system.
{¶18} At the hearing, Blair testified on his own behalf. Blair testified about his
initial success in his daily routine at the DYS facility including individual counseling, anger
management and substance abuse counseling. He testified that he refused to join a gang
called "Heartless Felons" because, in Blair's words, anyone who was heartless couldn't
be trusted. (T. June 28, 2016 at 42). The felonious assault that perpetuated the bind-
over proceedings occurred despite his current incarceration and rehabilitative treatment
efforts at DYS.
{¶19} On June 30, 2016, the Juvenile Court issued Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of law. Pertinent to this appeal the Court found that Blair was not amenable
to rehabilitation in the juvenile justice system. In the findings of fact, the court
acknowledged that Blair has had a life full of stressful and traumatic events that has
resulted in an extreme level of post-traumatic stress related symptoms. The court found
that his criminal history includes violence and involvement with weapons. The court took
into account Blair's history, Blair's testimony and the opinion of Dr. Smith that Blair was
not amenable to rehabilitation in the juvenile justice system. In the conclusion of law, the
court addressed the factors set forth in R.C. 2151.12 and Juv.R. 30. The court found that
there were reasonable grounds that Blair is not amenable to care or rehabilitation within
Stark County, Case No. 2016CA00180 8
a juvenile facility and that the community safety may require restraint that possibly
extends beyond Blair's majority.
{¶20} The court further held that there were no relevant factors weighing against
the transfer. Specifically the court held that while Blair could receive many beneficial
services and treatment at DYS, "his past history does not demonstrate that he is open
and committed to treatment and services.” Furthermore, Blair, "knowing that he had a
SYO blended sentence, with an adult sentence stayed, could still not manage to refrain
from criminal behavior in DYS.” The court granted the State's Motion to Transfer and
ordered that Blair be transferred to the General Division of the Court of Common Pleas
for prosecution as an adult.
{¶21} Upon transfer, Blair was indicted by the Stark County Grand Jury for one
count of Felonious Assault a felony of the second degree. After indictment in the general
division, Blair pleaded guilty to the offense as charged. The trial court sentenced him to
six years in the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation ("DRC"). (Stark County
Court of Common Pleas, Case No. 2016CR1255, Transcript of Plea and Sentencing
Hearing, Aug. 31, 2016 at 15). In exchange, the state agreed not to pursue his Serious
Youthful Offender sentence on a prior juvenile court case. (Stark County Court of
Common Pleas, Case No. 2016CR1255, Transcript of Plea and Sentencing Hearing, Aug.
31, 2016 at 14-15).
Assignment of Error
{¶22} Blair presents one assignment of error for our consideration:
{¶23} “I. THE JUVENILE COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AND VIOLATED
17-YEAR-OLD LIONELL BLAIR'S RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS OF LAW WHEN IT
Stark County, Case No. 2016CA00180 9
DETERMINED THAT HE WAS NOT AMENABLE TO TREATMENT IN THE JUVENILE
SYSTEM, IN VIOLATION OF R.C. 2152.12(B); FIFTH AND FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENTS TO THE U.S. CONSTITUTION, AND ARTICLE 1, SECTIONS 10 AND
16, OHIO CONSTITUTION. (6/30/16 JUDGMENT ENTRY, P.9).”
Law and Analysis
{¶24} In his sole assignment of error, Blair contends that the Juvenile Court
abused its discretion when it found that Blair was not amenable to treatment in the juvenile
justice system.
Standard of Review
{¶25} An amenability hearing is a broad assessment of individual circumstances
and is inherently individualized and fact-based. Thus, a juvenile court’s determination
regarding a child’s amenability to rehabilitation in the juvenile system is reviewed by an
appellate court under an abuse-of-discretion standard. In re A.J.S., 120 Ohio St.3d 185,
2008-Ohio-5307, 897 N.E.2d 629, ¶ 39, 40; In re M.P., 124 Ohio St.3d 445, 2010-Ohio-
599, 923 N.E.2d 584, ¶ 14.
Burden of Proof
{¶26} R.C. 2152.12(D) lists the following factors that a juvenile court must
consider in favor of transferring a juvenile to the general division of the common pleas
court:
(1) The victim of the act charged suffered physical or psychological
harm, or serious economic harm, as a result of the alleged act.
Stark County, Case No. 2016CA00180 10
(2) The physical or psychological harm suffered by the victim due to
the alleged act of the child was exacerbated because of the physical or
psychological vulnerability or the age of the victim.
(3) The child’s relationship with the victim facilitated the act charged.
(4) The child allegedly committed the act charged for hire or as a part
of a gang or other organized criminal activity.
(5) The child had a firearm on or about the child’s person or under
the child’s control at the time of the act charged, the act charged is not a
violation of Section 2923.12 of the Revised Code, and the child, during the
commission of the act charged, allegedly used or displayed the firearm,
brandished the firearm, or indicated that the child possessed a firearm.
(6) At the time of the act charged, the child was awaiting adjudication
or disposition as a delinquent child, was under a community control
sanction, or was on parole for a prior delinquent child adjudication or
conviction.
(7) The results of any previous juvenile sanctions and programs
indicate that rehabilitation of the child will not occur in the juvenile system.
(8) The child is emotionally, physically, or psychologically mature
enough for the transfer.
(9) There is not sufficient time to rehabilitate the child within the
juvenile system.
{¶27} The juvenile court must then weigh the factors in R.C. 2152.12(D) against
the factors listed in R.C. 2152.12(E) that weigh against transfer of jurisdiction, including:
Stark County, Case No. 2016CA00180 11
(1) The victim induced or facilitated the act charged.
(2) The child acted under provocation in allegedly committing the act
charged.
(3) The child was not the principal actor in the act charged, or, at the
time of the act charged, the child was under the negative influence or
coercion of another person.
(4) The child did not cause physical harm to any person or property,
or have reasonable cause to believe that harm of that nature would occur,
in allegedly committing the act charged.
(5) The child previously has not been adjudicated a delinquent child.
(6) The child is not emotionally, physically, or psychologically mature
enough for the transfer.
(7) The child has a mental illness or is a mentally retarded person.
(8) There is sufficient time to rehabilitate the child within the juvenile
system and the level of security available in the juvenile system provides a
reasonable assurance of public safety.
{¶28} In addition to considering the factors listed in R.C. 2152.12(D) and (E), the
juvenile court “shall order an investigation into the child’s social history, education, family
situation, and any other factor bearing on whether the child is amenable to juvenile
rehabilitation, including a mental examination of the child by a public or private agency or
a person qualified to make the examination.” R.C. 2152.12(C).
{¶29} What constitutes “reasonable grounds” for relinquishing jurisdiction under
R.C. 2151.26(A)(3) is within the sound discretion after an investigation is made. State v.
Stark County, Case No. 2016CA00180 12
Carmichael, 35 Ohio St.2d 1, 298 N.E.2d 568(1973). There is no requirement that each
of the five factors in Juv.R. 30(E) is resolved against the child before the court enters a
proper transfer order, so long as the totality of the evidence supports a finding that the
juvenile is not amenable to treatment. State v. Douglas, 20 Ohio St.3d 34, 36, 485 N.E.2d
711(1985).
Balancing the Factors
{¶30} R.C. 2152.12 is silent with regard to how a juvenile court should weigh the
factors in R.C. 2152.12(D) and (E). Thus, the juvenile court has the discretion to
determine how much weight should be accorded to any given factor. See State v.
Morgan, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 13AP–620, 2014–Ohio–5661, ¶ 37; Accord, State v.
Marshall, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-150383, 2016-Ohio-3183, ¶15. “As long as the court
considers the appropriate statutory factors and there is some rational basis in the record
to support the court’s findings when applying those factors, [this court] cannot conclude
that the trial court abused its discretion in deciding whether to transfer jurisdiction.” State
v. West, 167 Ohio App.3d 598, 2006–Ohio–3518, 856 N.E.2d 285, ¶ 10 (4th Dist.); State
v. Marshall, ¶15.
{¶31} In Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 561, 86 S.Ct. 1045, 16 L.Ed.2d 1045(1966), the United States Supreme Court held that it is incumbent upon the Juvenile Court
to accompany its waiver order with a statement of the reasons therefor. The court held
that the statement need not be formal or necessarily include findings of fact. The Court
held the statement should be sufficient to demonstrate a full investigation had been made,
the Court carefully considered the matter, and the order is specific enough to permit
meaningful review.
Stark County, Case No. 2016CA00180 13
{¶32} In State v. Douglas, 20 Ohio St.2d 34, 36, 485 N.E.2d 711 (1985) the Ohio
Supreme court held in a per curiam opinion under a prior version of the transfer statute
and juvenile rule regarding transfer no written findings regarding the findings were
required. See State v. Erwin, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 09AP-918, 2012-Ohio-776, ¶14. In
a footnote, the Supreme Court in Douglas noted that the juvenile court sufficiently stated
its reasons for appellee’s transfer as required by Juv.R. 30(G) although the juvenile
court’s journal entry relinquishing jurisdiction was couched in the conclusory language of
R.C. 2151.26. [Cf. State v. Bonnell, 140 Ohio St.3d 209, 2014–Ohio–3177, 16 N.E.2d
659, ¶29, “[A]s long as the reviewing court can discern that the trial court engaged in the
correct analysis and can determine that the record contains evidence to support the
findings, consecutive sentences should be upheld.”].
{¶33} We are satisfied that the juvenile court’s transfer order meets the
requirements of R.C. 2152.12 and the constitutional mandates of due process.
{¶34} Blair contends the juvenile court abused its discretion in finding him not
amenable to rehabilitation as a juvenile. Specifically, Blair argues the trial court abused
its discretion because 1). The juvenile court did not consider how Blair had progressed in
DYS since the incident or how he would fare with consistent long-term, intensive
treatment at DYS; 2). Although not a specifically enumerated factor, the juvenile court did
not consider how trauma affected Blair and mitigated against transfer; 3). The juvenile
court did not consider what rehabilitative efforts could occur with the time remaining in the
juvenile system and 4).The juvenile court did not consider how Lionell would fare in adult
prison. [Appellant’s Brief at 7].
Stark County, Case No. 2016CA00180 14
{¶35} In the case at bar, there is competent credible evidence to establish, that
the victim of the assault by Blair did not “induce or facilitate the act charged.” R.C.
2152.12(E)(1); that Blair was the principal actor in committing the assault. R.C.
2152.12(E)(3); Blair did cause serious physical harm in committing the assault. R.C.
2152.12(E)(4); and Blair has previously been adjudicated a delinquent child. R.C.
2152.12(E)(5). In her report, Dr. Smith opined, “Lionell appears mentally and emotionally
mature enough for a transfer of jurisdiction.” State’s Exhibit 3 at 12, ¶5. R.C.
2152.12(E)(6).
{¶36} At the time of the assault, Blair was under sanctions for a prior adjudication
of delinquency and, specifically, had a suspended adult commitment under a blended
sentence for aggravated robbery with a firearm specification. R.C.2152.12(D)(6). Blair
did cause serious physical harm to Martin. R.C. 2152.12(D)(1); and Martin could not
avoid the attack because he was also committed to DYS. R.C. 2152.12(D)(3). Blair’s
probation officer testified that none of the previous juvenile court sanctions had any
effect upon Blair’s behavior. R.C. 2152.12(D)(7).
{¶37} During the amenability hearing, the following exchange occurred
between the Court and Dr. Smith,
Q. Just a couple of questions for you. I think we’ve already
touched on it but just to recap um since you’re not able to tell us how
long rehabilitation will take for Lionell you can’t say that he won’t be
rehabilitated in that four year period right?
A. I can say that it would…would be difficult. Yeah.
Stark County, Case No. 2016CA00180 15
Q. Um but if he were able to take advantage of that four years
of rehabilitation it would be…would it be fair to say that it would be more
likely that he would better assimilate into society after being released?
A. I…I don’t know the answer to that. I don’t know that I can
speculate. Um I think if he received the necessary treatment within that
amount of time then it would be possible that he could have the self-
confidence but I can’t say for sure that…that that would happen.
T. June 28, 2016 at 35. In her report, Dr. Smith specifically found, “7. There is
not sufficient time to rehabilitate Lionell within the Juvenile Justice System.”
State’s Exhibit 3, at 13.
{¶38} Clearly, the trial court did weigh the factors for and against transfer and
considered whether or not Blair could be rehabilitated within the juvenile court system.
Although the trial court did not directly address the factors that weighed against transfer
in its Judgment Entry, the trial court did hear Dr. Smith’s testimony and reviewed Dr.
Smith’s report. Thus, the trial court did not ignore the factors under R.C. 2152.12 in
making its amenability determination. See, State v. Marshall, 2016-Ohio-3184 at ¶17.
{¶39} In a case cited by Blair, State v. D.H., 2d Dist. No. 26383, 2015-Ohio-3259,
¶ 17, the Second District implied that a court considering relinquishing jurisdiction should
have performed a detailed analysis of the programs available to rehabilitate the child in
the juvenile system before concluding that the child could not be rehabilitated in the
juvenile system. While we agree that a court needs to genuinely consider the factors,
and the record needs to reflect that fact consistent with R.C. 2152.12(B)(3), other courts
have never gone as far as the Second District in directing the juvenile court’s analysis.
Stark County, Case No. 2016CA00180 16
See, State v. Reeder, 10th Dist. Nos. 15AP-203; 15AP-218, 2016-Ohio-212, 57 N.E.3d
458, ¶18; State v. Marshall, 2016-Ohio-3184, ¶15; State v. Rice, 12th Dist. Butler No.
CA2016-01-005, ¶18, n. 2.
{¶40} “As long as the court considers the appropriate statutory factors and there
is some rational basis in the record to support the court’s findings when applying those
factors, we cannot conclude that the [juvenile] court abused its discretion in deciding
whether to transfer jurisdiction.” State v. West, 167 Ohio App.3d 598, 2006-Ohio-3518,
856 N.E.2d 285 (4th Dist.), ¶ 10, citing R.C. 2152.12(B); State v. Watson, 47 Ohio St.3d
93, 95-96, 547 N.E.2d 1181(1989); State v. Douglas, 20 Ohio St.3d 34, 36–37, 485
N.E.2d 711 (1985); and State v. Hopfer, 112 Ohio App.3d 521, 535–536, 679 N.E.2d 321(2nd Dist. 1996).
In this broad assessment, any one particular circumstance may carry
more weight than other circumstances. For example, the seriousness of
the alleged act may speak not only to a child’s mental health, but also to her
threat to the community and to her need for rehabilitation beyond her
twenty-first birthday. See [State v. Watson, 47 Ohio St.3d 93, 96, 547
N.E.2d 1181, 1184 (1989)]. In sum, any evidence that reasonably supports
the juvenile court’s decision to relinquish jurisdiction will suffice to sustain
that court’s judgment.
State v. Hopfer, 112 Ohio App.3d 521 at 536, 679 N.E.2d 321. Accord, State v. Anderson,
5th Dist. Delaware No. 14 CAA 05 0034, 2015-Ohio-888, ¶ 48.
{¶41} While there is evidence in the record that supports the juvenile court
retaining jurisdiction over this case, there was also evidence supporting the transfer. The
Stark County, Case No. 2016CA00180 17
court expressly based its decision upon Blair’s prior conduct and failure of the juvenile
justice system to rehabilitate him. Nothing in the record supports Blair’s argument that
the juvenile court’s decision was based on erroneous facts, that the trial court failed to
weigh the appropriate factors or that the trial court’s decision was unreasonable, arbitrary,
or capricious.
{¶42} We find the trial court properly considered the factors set forth in R.C.
2152.12, along with all other relevant factors and circumstances. While Blair may
disagree with the weight given to these factors by the trial judge, the trial court did not
abuse its discretion, and therefore, we have no basis for concluding that the decision to
transfer Blair to adult court violated Blair’s right to due process of law.
{¶43} Accordingly, Blair’s sole assignment of error is overruled.
Stark County, Case No. 2016CA00180 18
{¶44} The judgment of the Stark County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed.
By Gwin, J.,
Delaney, P.J., and
Wise, Earle, J., concur