State v. Tipton , 2020 Ohio 3680 ( 2020 )


Menu:
  • [Cite as State v. Tipton, 2020-Ohio-3680.]
    IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
    SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
    MONTGOMERY COUNTY
    STATE OF OHIO                                     :
    :
    Plaintiff-Appellee                       :   Appellate Case No. 28602
    :
    v.                                                :   Trial Court Case No. 2019-CRB-2266
    :
    FRED TIPTON, III                                  :   (Criminal Appeal from
    :   Municipal Court)
    Defendant-Appellant                      :
    :
    ...........
    OPINION
    Rendered on the 10th day of July, 2020.
    ...........
    AMY B. MUSTO, Atty. Reg. No. 0071514, City of Dayton Prosecutor’s Office, 335 West
    Third Street, Room 372, Dayton, Ohio 45402
    Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellee
    JAMES S. SWEENEY, Atty. Reg. No. 0086402, 285 South Liberty Street, Powell, Ohio
    43065
    Attorney for Defendant-Appellant
    .............
    HALL, J.
    -2-
    {¶ 1} Following a bench trial in the Dayton Municipal Court, Fred Tipton III was
    found guilty of aggravated menacing and sentenced to 180 days in jail, which was
    suspended. He appeals from the municipal court’s judgment. We affirm.
    Factual and Procedural Background
    {¶ 2} On May 13, 2019, Tipton was charged with one count of aggravated
    menacing, in violation of R.C. 2903.21(A), a first-degree misdemeanor. Tipton pleaded
    not guilty, and the matter proceeded to a bench trial. The evidence presented showed the
    following facts.
    {¶ 3} Hester Tipton, who goes by her middle name, Renee, is Fred Tipton’s sister.
    At the time of the events in this case, she had custody of Tipton’s 13-year-old daughter.
    Tipton had no visitation rights and apparently had not seen his daughter since Renee was
    given custody three years earlier. Since then, Renee and Tipton had not had a good
    relationship, and Renee had blocked Tipton’s phone number.
    {¶ 4} On May 9, 2019, Renee and her long-time fiancé, Marvin McDermott, were
    having dinner at a Dayton restaurant when McDermott received an angry phone call from
    Tipton. He was angry because his daughter was in the hospital and Renee had not called
    to tell him. Tipton was cursing and talking so loudly that Renee could hear him. McDermott
    went outside, and Renee followed. Outside the restaurant, McDermott turned on his
    phone’s speakerphone. He did not tell Tipton that he had turned it on or that others could
    hear their conversation. Renee and McDermott listened as Tipton threatened to send
    someone to “beat up” Renee and threatened numerous times to kill her. Renee testified
    that Tipton also threatened to have someone “shoot up” her house, though McDermott
    -3-
    did not remember that threat. Renee also said that Tipton claimed that the hospital was
    being watched and that Renee needed to watch her back. It was then that Renee called
    the police from her own phone. When the police arrived, McDermott was still on the phone
    with Tipton. An officer told McDermott to hang up, and he did. The officer testified that
    Renee appeared very frantic and scared and worried.
    {¶ 5} Tipton testified in his own defense. He said that he did not know that
    McDermott had turned on speakerphone and did not know that anyone else was around
    to hear the conversation. Tipton said that he did not know that Renee overheard the
    phone call.
    {¶ 6} On October 10, 2019, the municipal court entered a judgment finding Tipton
    guilty of aggravated menacing. On October 29, he was sentenced to 180 days in jail, all
    of which was suspended. Tipton was also ordered to complete an anger management
    program, a psychological evaluation, and to pay court costs of $120.
    {¶ 7} Tipton appeals.
    Analysis
    {¶ 8} Tipton’s sole assignment of error alleges that his conviction for aggravated
    menacing was against the manifest weight of the evidence.
    {¶ 9} When reviewing a weight-of-the-evidence challenge, an appellate court
    reviews the entire record, weighs the evidence and all reasonable inferences, considers
    the credibility of witnesses, and determines whether, in resolving conflicts in the evidence,
    the finder of fact clearly lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice
    that the conviction must be reversed and a new trial ordered. State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio
    St.3d 380, 387, 
    678 N.E.2d 541
    (1997), quoting State v. Martin, 
    20 Ohio App. 3d 172
    , 175,
    -4-
    
    485 N.E.2d 717
    (1st Dist.1983).
    {¶ 10} The aggravated menacing statute pertinently states that “[n]o person shall
    knowingly cause another to believe that the offender will cause serious physical harm to
    the person * * *.” R.C. 2903.21(A). “A person acts knowingly, regardless of purpose, when
    the person is aware that the person’s conduct will probably cause a certain result or will
    probably be of a certain nature. A person has knowledge of circumstances when the
    person is aware that such circumstances probably exist.” R.C. 2901.22(B).
    {¶ 11} Tipton argues that he did not know his threats were being conveyed or
    would be conveyed to Renee. The plain language of R.C. 2903.21 does not require that
    the threats be made directly to the victim. “[A] threat to cause harm need not be made
    directly to the intended victim but may be sufficient if made to a third-party * * * whom the
    defendant knew or reasonably * * * should have known would convey the threat to the
    intended victim.” State v. McWilliams, 5th Dist. Stark No. 2011-CA-00051, 2012-Ohio-
    663, ¶ 23. Accord Dunn v. Clark, 12th Dist. Warren No. CA2015-06-055, 2016-Ohio-641,
    ¶ 14 (the defendant was aware that the third-party was in an intimate relationship with the
    victim, so it could be inferred that the defendant “knew or reasonably should have known”
    the third-party would tell the victim about threats); State v. Knoble, 9th Dist. Lorain No.
    08CA9359, 2008-Ohio-5004, ¶ 25 (concluding that the defendant’s threats were made
    knowingly because it was “more likely than not” that a third-party would inform the victim).
    {¶ 12} Tipton’s threats were made knowingly, that is, he was aware that his
    conduct would probably cause a certain result, namely, Renee’s belief that he would
    seriously harm her. Tipton was aware that McDermott was Renee’s long-time fiancé, so
    it could reasonably be inferred that Tipton knew or reasonably should have known that
    -5-
    McDermott would tell Renee about Tipton’s threats against her. See Dunn.
    {¶ 13} Tipton’s argument relies on two apparent contradictions between
    McDermott’s and Renee’s testimony. The first concerns whether McDermott told Tipton
    that Renee could hear the conversation. Renee testified that, during the call, Tipton could
    hear her and that McDermott told him that she was within earshot. But McDermott testified
    that he never told Tipton that anyone else could hear the conversation. The second
    alleged contradiction concerns who called the police. Renee testified that she called the
    police; McDermott testified that neither he nor Renee called the police. We think that there
    were ways to reconcile this testimony and that neither of the apparent contradictions was
    significant; moreover, contradictions in evidence are matters for the trial court to resolve.
    Ultimately, the trial court could also have reasonably concluded that Tipton should have
    expected McDermott to tell Renee of his threats. The evidence supports the conclusion
    that Tipton should have expected such communication.
    {¶ 14} This is not an “ ‘exceptional case in which the evidence weighs heavily
    against the conviction.’ ” 
    Thompkins, 78 Ohio St. 3d at 387
    , 
    678 N.E.2d 541
    ,
    quoting 
    Martin, 20 Ohio App. 3d at 175
    , 
    485 N.E.2d 717
    . We conclude that the municipal
    court neither lost its way nor created a miscarriage of justice in convicting Tipton of
    aggravated menacing.
    Conclusion
    {¶ 15} The sole assignment of error is overruled. The municipal court’s judgment
    is affirmed.
    .............
    FROELICH, J. and WELBAUM, J., concur.
    -6-
    Copies sent to:
    Amy B. Musto
    James S. Sweeney
    Hon. Mia Wortham Spells
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 28602

Citation Numbers: 2020 Ohio 3680

Judges: Hall

Filed Date: 7/10/2020

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 7/10/2020