State v. McGowan , 2018 Ohio 2930 ( 2018 )


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  • [Cite as State v. McGowan, 
    2018-Ohio-2930
    .]
    Court of Appeals of Ohio
    EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
    COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA
    JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION
    No. 105806
    STATE OF OHIO
    PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE
    vs.
    LARRY ARTHUR McGOWAN
    DEFENDANT-APPELLANT
    JUDGMENT:
    AFFIRMED
    Criminal Appeal from the
    Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas
    Case Nos. CR-14-585017-A, CR-15-594005-A, and CR-16-610024-A
    BEFORE: Celebrezze, J., McCormack, P.J., and Keough, J.
    RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: July 26, 2018
    ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT
    Susan J. Moran
    55 Public Square, Suite 1616
    Cleveland, Ohio 44113
    ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
    Michael C. O’Malley
    Cuyahoga County Prosecutor
    BY: Maxwell Martin
    Assistant Prosecuting Attorney
    The Justice Center, 9th Floor
    1200 Ontario Street
    Cleveland, Ohio 44113
    FRANK D. CELEBREZZE, JR., J.:
    {¶1} Defendant-appellant, Larry McGowan (hereinafter “McGowan”), filed the instant
    appeal challenging the trial court’s imposition of consecutive sentences. More specifically,
    McGowan argues that the imposition of consecutive sentences was not supported by the record,
    and the sentences were contrary to law because the trial court did not consider the purposes and
    principles of the sentencing guidelines. After a thorough review of the record and law, this
    court affirms.
    I.         Factual and Procedural History
    {¶2} McGowan and the state reached a plea agreement under which McGowan agreed to
    plead guilty in three criminal cases pending against him. Pursuant to the plea agreement, the
    parties agreed to recommend an aggregate prison sentence of 25 years to life on all three cases.
    {¶3} First, in Cuyahoga C.P. No. CR-15-594005-A, McGowan pled guilty to 24 counts
    consisting of rape, kidnapping, aggravated robbery, and aggravated burglary related to violent
    physical attacks and rapes of five individual female victims.     All counts in this indictment share
    a particular set of gruesome facts, where McGowan would physically attack strangers he
    encountered on the street and would then forcibly rape them, some at gunpoint and one at
    knifepoint.    Further, all counts had accompanying firearm specifications and repeat violent
    offender specifications; however, all specifications were dismissed as part of the plea agreement.
    In this case, McGowan was sentenced to a cumulative prison term of ten years.
    {¶4} Second, in Cuyahoga C.P. No. CR-14-585017-A, McGowan pled guilty to
    aggravated murder and rape.         McGowan raped and brutally attacked the victim in a semi-trailer
    truck lot.    The victim died as a result of head, neck, and brain injuries sustained from being run
    over by a vehicle driven by McGowan. The victim was found with a large amount of mud in
    her mouth, airways, and stomach as a result of being run over by the vehicle. McGowan was
    sentenced to a prison term of 25 years to life.
    {¶5} Third, in Cuyahoga C.P. No. CR-16-610024-A, McGowan pled guilty to one count
    of felonious assault. In this case, McGowan assaulted a fellow inmate at Cuyahoga County jail
    while incarcerated on his other pending criminal charges.     McGowan was sentenced to a prison
    term of five years.
    {¶6} On April 28, 2017, the trial court held a sentencing hearing on all three cases and
    imposed the sentences listed above. The trial court then ordered that all three sentences were to
    be served consecutive to one another for a cumulative aggregate sentence of 40 years to life.
    These cases were also to be served consecutive to Summit C.P. No. 12-12-3401. In that case,
    McGowan had been previously convicted of one count of rape and received an 11-year prison
    sentence. McGowan began serving the sentence for the Summit County case on September 17,
    2013.
    {¶7} McGowan filed the instant appeal assigning a sole error for review:
    I. The trial court erred in imposing consecutive sentences as the sentence was not
    supported by the record and was contrary to law as it did not consider the
    purposes and principles of the felony sentencing guidelines.
    II. Law and Analysis
    {¶8} In his sole assignment of error, McGowan argues that the trial court erred in
    imposing consecutive sentences. More specifically, McGowan argues that the imposition of
    consecutive sentences was not supported by the record, and the sentences were contrary to law
    because the trial court did not consider the purposes and principles of the sentencing guidelines.
    {¶9} Our review of felony sentences is governed by R.C. 2953.08(G)(2). Pursuant to
    R.C. 2953.08(G)(2), “an appellate court may vacate or modify a felony sentence on appeal only if
    it determines by clear and convincing evidence that the record does not support the trial court’s
    findings under relevant statutes or that the sentence is otherwise contrary to law.”         State v.
    Marcum, 
    146 Ohio St.3d 516
    , 
    2016-Ohio-1002
    , 
    59 N.E.3d 1231
    , ¶ 1. A sentence is contrary to
    law if (1) the sentence falls outside the statutory range for the particular degree of offense, or (2)
    the trial court failed to consider the purposes and principles of felony sentencing set forth in R.C.
    2929.11 and the sentencing factors in R.C. 2929.12. State v. Maddox, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No.
    105140, 
    2017-Ohio-8061
    , ¶ 31, citing State v. Hinton, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 102710,
    
    2015-Ohio-4907
    .
    {¶10} In the instant matter, McGowan argues that the trial court did not consider the
    purposes and principles of sentencing under R.C. 2929.11, as the court failed to consider the
    impact of the sentence on government resources and because the court incorrectly concluded that
    the offenses were a continuous course of conduct under R.C. 2929.14(C). McGowan also
    argues that he had a reasonable expectation that the trial court would implement the agreed
    sentence. As there are three distinct issues within McGowan’s sole assignment of error, we
    address these issues separately.
    A. Purposes and Principles of Sentencing
    {¶11} R.C. 2929.11 directs a court to consider the “overriding” purposes of felony
    sentencing: (1) “protect[ion of] the public from future crime by the offender or others,” and (2)
    “punish[ing] the offender.” R.C. 2929.11(A). The sentencing court is to accomplish these
    purposes using “minimum sanctions” and without placing any “unnecessary burden on state or
    local government resources.” 
    Id.
     To achieve these purposes, a court must also consider the
    need for incapacitation, deterrence, rehabilitation, and restitution. 
    Id.
     An appropriate sentence
    is thus one “reasonably calculated” to achieve the overriding purposes of felony sentencing and is
    “commensurate with,” while “not demeaning the seriousness” of, the conduct and its impact.
    R.C. 2929.11(B).
    {¶12} Pursuant to R.C. 2929.12, the trial court has discretion to “determine the most
    effective way to comply with the purposes and principles of sentencing.” R.C. 2929.12(A).
    The court must consider applicable factors from divisions (B) and (C) relating to the “seriousness
    of the conduct,” and divisions (D) and (E) relating to recidivism. 
    Id.
        The statute also permits
    the trial court to consider “any other factors that are relevant to achieving those purposes and
    principles of sentencing.” 
    Id.
    {¶13} Our review of the sentencing hearing transcript demonstrates that the trial court
    considered the requisite sentencing factors pursuant to R.C. 2929.11. At the sentencing hearing,
    the trial court heard statements from the assistant prosecuting attorneys, several victims, several
    family members of victims, defense counsel, and from McGowan himself. The trial court then
    explained the purposes and principles of felony sentencing pursuant to R.C. 2929.11, stating:
    And the overriding purpose of a sentence in a criminal case is to punish the
    offender and protect the public from future crime by the offender or others and to
    do so by using the minimum amount of consequences or sanctions to accomplish
    that and recognizing the need that we’re trying to either deter crime in the future,
    recognize that someone has to be responsible for the conduct and the harm they’ve
    caused to others in the criminal context and, in certain situations, try to
    rehabilitate or provide restitution for others. And the sentence should be
    commensurate with those purposes. When we look at charges like this and when
    I look at charges like this, I have to evaluate the seriousness of these charges and
    listen to and be aware of the impact on the victims and the physical and
    psychological harm or serious harm that’s occurred and then, is there anything that
    would make this less serious because of circumstances.
    (Tr. 744.) The trial court then continued on, explaining the seriousness and recidivism factors
    under R.C. 2929.12:
    And then the next thing I have to look at, which is very different, is what is the
    likelihood that this person will cause a new crime in the future? And we do that
    based on looking at the individual’s, in this case Mr. McGowan’s, past criminal
    history and the criminal history of the charges or the criminal events or the
    circumstances in the case here and try to make a determination of whether it’s
    likely that he will re-offend in the future or whether he will not likely [re-offend]
    in the future. And once I hear all of that and consider all of those points, then I
    can reach a decision. And I’ve done so in this case.
    (Tr. 745.)
    {¶14} We note that, contrary to McGowan’s assertions, a review of the sentencing
    hearing transcript demonstrates that the trial court fulfilled its statutory obligation.    The trial
    court’s statements above demonstrate that it considered the required statutory factors and
    fulfilled its obligations under the sentencing statutes. See State v. Payne, 
    114 Ohio St.3d 502
    ,
    
    2007-Ohio-4642
    , 
    873 N.E.2d 306
    , ¶ 18; State v. Wright, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 95096,
    
    2011-Ohio-733
    , ¶ 4. First, the trial court adequately referenced the relevant statutory guidelines
    during the sentencing hearing.     Second, its journal entries imposing the sentences state that it
    “considered all required factors of the law” and further state that a prison term “is consistent with
    the purpose of R.C. 2929.11.” The case law is clear that a sentencing court need not state
    anything further than it considered all required statutory factors to fully comply with the
    sentencing statutes. State v. Kamleh, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 97092, 
    2012-Ohio-2061
    , ¶ 61.
    Thus, the trial court fulfilled its statutory obligation pursuant to R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12.
    {¶15} In light of the above, we find that the trial court’s sentence is not contrary to law.
    The trial court’s prison sentences on all counts in all three cases are within the permissible
    statutory range as set forth in R.C. 2929.14(A). We find no merit to McGowan’s argument that
    the trial court did not consider R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12 in imposing his sentence. The record
    reflects that the trial court considered the purposes and principles of felony sentencing set forth in
    R.C. 2929.11 and the seriousness and recidivism factors in R.C. 2929.12. As such, McGowan’s
    arguments here are without merit.
    B. Consecutive Sentences
    {¶16} McGowan argues that the trial court erred by imposing consecutive sentences and
    that the imposition of concurrent sentences in McGowan’s three cases would have accomplished
    the overriding purposes of R.C. 2929.11.
    {¶17} In order to impose consecutive sentences, the trial court must make the findings set
    forth in R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) and incorporate those findings into the court’s journal entry.   State
    v. Bonnell, 
    140 Ohio St.3d 209
    , 
    2014-Ohio-3177
    , 
    16 N.E.3d 659
    , ¶ 37. R.C. 2929.14(C)(4)
    provides that the trial court must find that (1) consecutive sentences are necessary to protect the
    public from future crime or to punish the offender, (2) that such sentences would not be
    disproportionate to the seriousness of the conduct and to the danger the offender poses to the
    public, and (3) that one of the following applies:
    (a) The offender committed one or more of the multiple offenses while the
    offender was awaiting trial or sentencing, was under a sanction imposed pursuant
    to section 2929.16, 2929.17, or 2929.18 of the Revised Code, or was under
    postrelease control for a prior offense.
    (b) At least two of the multiple offenses were committed as part of one or more
    courses of conduct, and the harm caused by two or more of the multiple offenses
    so committed was so great or unusual that no single prison term for any of the
    offenses committed as part of any of the courses of conduct adequately reflects the
    seriousness of the offender’s conduct.
    (c) The offender’s history of criminal conduct demonstrates that consecutive
    sentences are necessary to protect the public from future crime by the offender.
    {¶18} Compliance with R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) requires the trial court to make the statutory
    findings at the sentencing hearing, “and by doing so it affords notice to the offender and to
    defense counsel.”    Bonnell at ¶ 29. “Findings,” for these purposes, means that “‘the [trial]
    court must note that it engaged in the analysis’ and that it ‘has considered the statutory criteria
    and specified which of the given bases warrants its decision.’” Id. at ¶ 26, quoting State v.
    Edmonson, 
    86 Ohio St.3d 324
    , 326, 
    715 N.E.2d 131
     (1999). Further, the reviewing court must be
    able to determine that the record contains evidence to support the findings.    State v. Davis, 8th
    Dist. Cuyahoga No. 102639, 
    2015-Ohio-4501
    , ¶ 21, citing Bonnell at ¶ 29. The findings must
    be incorporated into the trial court’s sentencing journal entry. Bonnell at ¶ 37.
    {¶19} Our review of the record shows that McGowan was convicted of heinous and
    violent crimes, and thus, the trial court did not err in imposing consecutive prison sentences
    pursuant to R.C. 2929.14(C)(4). Further, in our review, the record reflects that the court made
    the necessary findings. Moreover, the trial court at the sentencing hearing found that:
    [E]ach one of these three cases will be sentenced — served consecutively * * *
    the defendant’s criminal history demonstrates that consecutive sentences are
    necessary to protect the public from future crime by the offender and that two or
    more of these cases were part of a common course of conduct and the harm
    caused by the multiple offenses was so great or unusual that no single term for the
    offenses committed adequately reflects the seriousness of the offender’s conduct *
    * *.
    And my view is, in certain circumstances the individual acts that are serious and
    — and so inflicting of injury on the victim and family members that it should be
    recognized by an individual sentence. And while the general law is that
    sentences are to be concurrent, there is a proper exception for consecutive
    sentences when necessary. And Mr. McGowan, I think your conduct over the
    years warrants that as an indication to you and to others who act in the same
    manner that those are the risks you wish upon yourself or bring upon yourself for
    your conduct. And I hope this sentence today is an accurate reflection based on
    your conduct and what needs to be expressed by my sentence. When I sentence
    anybody I try to match the conduct with the sentence and that’s why I reached the
    result in this case.
    (Tr. 752-754.) Thus, the trial court clearly considered the statutory criteria and specified that
    R.C. 2929.14(C)(4)(b) specifically warranted its decision.
    {¶20} We note that a review of the record reveals that at the sentencing hearing, the trial
    court did not explicitly state the “disproportionate” prong of R.C. 2929.14(C)(4), that
    consecutive sentences “would not be disproportionate to the seriousness of appellant’s conduct
    and to the danger appellant poses to the public.” However, this omission is not dispositive of
    McGowan’s arguments.       Indeed, this court rejected a similar argument in State v. Morris, 8th
    Dist. Cuyahoga No. 104013, 
    2016-Ohio-7614
    , and held that “[t]he trial court’s statements on the
    record indicate that it considered proportionality both with regard to the seriousness of [the
    defendant’s] conduct and the danger he poses to the public.” Id. at ¶ 34.
    {¶21} The Morris court relied on State v. Crawley, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 102781,
    
    2015-Ohio-5150
    .      In Crawley, this court rejected the defendant’s argument regarding the
    specificity of the trial court’s proportionality finding and concluded that “the trial court’s failure
    to identify the factors — or ‘the reasons’ — that were considered in its proportionality analysis
    does not render the consecutive sentences contrary to law.” Crawley at ¶ 12-13.
    {¶22} This court has examined this particular issue more recently in State v. Blevins, 8th
    Dist. Cuyahoga No. 105023, 
    2017-Ohio-4444
    . In Blevins, we noted that a trial court is not
    required to give a ‘“talismanic incantation of the words of [R.C. 2929.14(C)(4)], provided that
    the necessary findings can be found in the record and are incorporated in the sentencing entry.”’
    Blevins at ¶ 22, quoting Bonnell, 
    140 Ohio St.3d 209
    , 
    2014-Ohio-3177
    , 
    16 N.E.3d 659
    , at ¶ 37.
    {¶23} In the instant matter, the record reflects that the trial court did not state verbatim
    that consecutive sentences would not be disproportionate to the seriousness of McGowan’s
    conduct or the danger McGowan poses to the public. However, when viewed in their entirety,
    the trial court’s statements on the record undoubtedly indicate that it considered the
    disproportionate prong with regard to both the seriousness of McGowan’s conduct and the
    danger he posed to the public. As the trial court stated at the sentencing hearing, that in
    imposing consecutive sentences “the reason I do that is because I think under this circumstance
    it’s necessary and appropriate to do that.”       The trial court further noted that “in certain
    circumstances the individual acts that are serious and — and so inflicting of injury on the victim
    and family members that it should be recognized by an individual sentence.” It is clear from
    these findings   and in considering the trial court record in its entirety, that the trial court
    considered whether consecutive sentences would be disproportionate to the danger McGowan
    poses to the public, thus satisfying the disproportionate prong. Here, as in Blevins, when
    “[v]iewing the trial court’s statements in their entirety, we can discern that the trial court found
    that consecutive sentences are both not disproportionate to the seriousness of appellant’s conduct
    and not disproportionate to the danger appellant poses to the public.” Blevins at ¶ 25.
    {¶24} In addition, the trial court properly incorporated its findings into its sentencing
    journal entries as required. Id. at ¶ 26, citing Bonnell at syllabus. The trial court’s August 31,
    2016 sentencing journal entries provide, in relevant part:
    The court imposes prison terms consecutively finding that consecutive service is
    necessary to protect the public from future crime or to punish defendant; that the
    consecutive sentences are not disproportionate to the seriousness of defendant’s
    conduct and to the danger defendant poses to the public; and that, at least two of
    the multiple offenses were committed in this case as part of one or more courses
    of conduct, and the harm caused by said multiple offenses was so great or unusual
    that no single prison term for any of the offenses committed as part of any of the
    courses of conduct adequately reflects the seriousness of defendant’s conduct, or
    defendant’s history of criminal conduct demonstrates that consecutive sentences
    are necessary to protect the public from future crime by defendant.
    {¶25} For all of the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the trial court made the
    appropriate consecutive sentence findings both at the sentencing hearing and within the
    sentencing journal entries. The record clearly reflects that the trial court engaged in the correct
    analysis required under R.C. 2929.14(C)(4). See State v. Hart, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 104387,
    
    2017-Ohio-290
    , ¶ 7. Furthermore, we cannot clearly and convincingly find that the record does
    not support the trial court’s findings.   As this court stated in Bonnell, “as long as the reviewing
    court can discern that the trial court engaged in the correct analysis and can determine that the
    record contains evidence to support the findings, consecutive sentences should be upheld.”
    Bonnell, 
    140 Ohio St.3d 209
    , 
    2014-Ohio-3177
    , 
    16 N.E.3d 659
    , at ¶ 29. As the trial court made
    the requisite consecutive sentence findings at the sentence hearing and the trial court
    incorporated its findings into its sentencing journal entries as required by Bonnell, McGowan’s
    arguments here are without merit.
    C. Reasonable Expectation of Implementing Agreed Sentence
    {¶26} McGowan also argues that he had a reasonable expectation that the trial court
    would implement the agreed sentence of 25 years to life, and by failing to impose the agreed
    sentence, he was deprived of due process.
    {¶27} Relative to this argument, in State v. Dunbar, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 87317,
    
    2007-Ohio-3261
    , this court explained:
    [A] trial court is vested with sound discretion when implementing plea
    agreements. State v. Buchanan, 
    154 Ohio App.3d 250
    , [
    2003-Ohio-4772
    , 
    769 N.E.2d 1003
    , ¶ 13 (5th Dist.)], citing Akron v. Ragsdale, 
    61 Ohio App.2d 107
    ,
    
    399 N.E.2d 119
     [(9th Dist.1978)]. The court is not obligated to follow the
    negotiated plea entered into between the state and the defendant. 
    Id.
     However,
    once the court approves the plea agreement, its ability to deviate from it is limited.
    State v. Allgood, 9th Dist. [Lorain] No[s]. 90CA004903, 90CA004904,
    90CA004905, and 90CA004907, 
    1991 Ohio App. LEXIS 2972
    , at *3 (June 19,
    1991), citing U.S. v. Holman[,] 
    728 F.2d 809
    , [(6th Cir.1984)], certiorari denied
    (1984), 
    469 U.S. 983
    , 
    105 S.Ct. 388
    , 
    83 L.Ed.2d 323
    .
    ***
    “[T]he law is somewhat less settled in [the] cases where the trial court appears to
    indicate that it accepts the negotiated plea agreement before the court accepts the
    defendant’s plea, and then deviates from the recommended sentence or terms
    contained within the plea agreement at the time of sentencing. The analysis in
    these scenarios turns to due process concerns over whether the accused was put on
    [notice] that the trial court might deviate from the recommended sentence or other
    terms of the agreement before the accused entered his plea and whether the
    accused was given an opportunity to change or to withdraw his plea when he
    received this notice. See, generally, Katz & Giannelli, Criminal Law (1996)
    154-155, Section 44.8. n.2[.]” [(Emphasis deleted.) Warren v. Cromley, 
    1999 Ohio App. LEXIS 206
    , *7-8 (11th Dist.1999).]
    “A trial court does not err by imposing a sentence greater than ‘that forming the
    inducement for the defendant to plead guilty when the trial court forewarns the
    defendant of the applicable penalties, including the possibility of imposing a
    greater sentence than that recommended by the prosecutor.’” Buchanan [at ¶ 13,
    quoting State v. Pettiford, 12th Dist. Fayette No. CA2001-08-014, 
    2002 Ohio App. LEXIS 1891
    , *3 (Apr. 22, 2002)], citing State v. Darmour[, 
    38 Ohio App.3d 160
    , 161, 
    529 N.E.2d 208
     (8th Dist.1897)] ([This court held,] “no abuse of
    discretion is present when the trial court forewarns a defendant that it will not
    consider itself bound by any sentencing agreement and defendant fails to change
    his plea[”]).
    Dunbar at ¶ 112-115.
    {¶28} This court also very recently noted in State v. Huffman, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No.
    105805, 
    2018-Ohio-1192
    , ¶ 20, that:
    With regard to an agreed sentence that forms the basis of the plea, the sentence
    itself is part of the quid pro quo for the agreed plea. Although the trial judge is
    free to accept or reject that agreement, it is incumbent upon the court to do so
    expressly. To hold otherwise creates a false expectation in the mind of the
    defendant over the underlying nature of the plea agreement.
    {¶29} In the instant matter, we note that as part of the plea agreement, the parties agreed
    to “recommend” to the trial court a sentence of 25 years to life in prison. The prosecutor clearly
    represented to the trial court a plea offer for an agreed sentence of 25 years to life.1            Under these
    1
    We note the prosecutor’s explicit language stating “[i]t’s my understanding Mr. McGowan wishes to enter
    terms, defense counsel acknowledged his belief that a plea would be forthcoming.                     Therefore, it
    is apparent that McGowan entered his plea with an understanding that a sentence of 25 years to
    life in prison would be imposed.         The trial court’s journal entries from the plea hearing reflected
    its acceptance of the plea agreement simply stating that the “court accepts [McGowan’s] guilty
    plea.”
    {¶30} McGowan undeniably entered his plea with the understanding that he would be
    sentenced to the agreed-upon sentence; however, we must next determine if the trial court
    forewarned McGowan that a greater, or lesser, sentence could be imposed. Dunbar, 8th Dist.
    Cuyahoga No. 87317, 
    2007-Ohio-3261
    , at ¶ 115. At the time McGowan entered his plea, the
    trial court repeatedly stated to him that it was not accepting the recommended sentence.
    Further, the trial court repeatedly stated that the recommended sentence was, just that, merely a
    recommendation. Specifically, we note the following exchange between the trial court and
    McGowan, which took place after the prosecutor and defense counsel represented the agreed
    recommended sentence to the trial court:
    THE COURT:        Now I need to explain to you what an agreed plea
    recommendation is, what that means to me and this [c]ourt.
    ***
    So in the context of an agreed sentence, when the parties agree, the [s]tate agrees
    with you and you agree with the [s]tate to make a recommendation to me. I accept
    that recommendation for consideration that each of you know a great deal more
    about the case than I do. I will know a great deal more at sentencing. So I take
    the matter of an agreed sentence very seriously, but I also reserve the right to
    render my own decision based on the information I will hear at sentencing.
    So the long and short of it is it’s a recommendation to me.                   I give it serious
    a change of plea if there is an agreed-upon — if there is, along with the plea, an agreed-upon sentence that would be
    accepted by this [c]ourt of 25 years to life.” (Emphasis added.) (Tr. 673-674.)
    consideration and I’ll make the final decision at sentencing. There have been
    cases that I’ve gone lower, there have been cases that I’ve gone higher, there have
    been cases that I agree exactly with what the parties have recommended. Do you
    understand that?
    [McGOWAN]: Yes, sir.
    THE COURT:         Okay.    Are you willing to go forward on that basis?
    [McGOWAN]: Yes, sir.
    (Tr. 694.) Therefore, we find that McGowan was put on notice that the trial court could deviate
    from the agreed recommended sentence. Thus, McGowan could not have had a reasonable
    expectation that the trial court could only impose the agreed recommended sentence.
    McGowan’s arguments here are without merit.
    {¶31} Accordingly, McGowan’s sole assignment of error is overruled.
    III.   Conclusion
    {¶32} After thoroughly reviewing the record, we affirm the trial court’s sentence.        We
    find that the trial court’s sentence is not contrary to law.   The sentence is within the permissible
    statutory range, and the record reflects that the trial court considered the purposes and principles
    of felony sentencing set forth in R.C. 2929.11 and the seriousness and recidivism factors in R.C.
    2929.12. The trial court made the requisite consecutive sentence findings pursuant to R.C.
    2929.14(C)(4) at the sentencing hearing and incorporated its findings into its sentencing journal
    entries. Moreover, McGowan was put on notice that the trial court could deviate from the
    agreed recommended sentence, and therefore, he could not have had a reasonable expectation
    that the trial court could only impose the agreed recommended sentence.
    {¶33} Judgment affirmed.
    It is ordered that appellee recover from appellant costs herein taxed.
    The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
    It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the common pleas
    court to carry this judgment into execution. The defendant’s conviction having been affirmed,
    any bail pending appeal is terminated.    Case remanded to the trial court for execution of
    sentence.
    A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the
    Rules of Appellate Procedure.
    FRANK D. CELEBREZZE, JR., JUDGE
    TIM McCORMACK, P.J., and
    KATHLEEN ANN KEOUGH, J., CONCUR