State v. Mofford , 2022 Ohio 3601 ( 2022 )


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  • [Cite as State v. Mofford, 
    2022-Ohio-3601
    .]
    IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
    THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
    CRAWFORD COUNTY
    STATE OF OHIO,
    PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE,                               CASE NO. 3-22-04
    v.
    ROBERT MOFFORD,                                           OPINION
    DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.
    Appeal from Crawford County Common Pleas Court
    Trial Court No. 21-CR-0145
    Judgment Affirmed
    Date of Decision: October 11, 2022
    APPEARANCES:
    Howard A. Elliott for Appellant
    Bailey Higgins for Appellee
    Case No. 3-22-04
    MILLER, J.
    {¶1} Defendant-appellant, Robert Mofford, appeals the January 27, 2022
    judgment of sentence of the Crawford County Court of Common Pleas. For the
    reasons that follow, we affirm.
    Background
    {¶2} On May 11, 2021, the Crawford County Grand Jury indicted Mofford
    on one count of aggravated possession of drugs in violation of R.C. 2925.11(A), a
    fifth-degree felony, and one count of possession of marihuana in violation of R.C.
    2925.11(A), a minor misdemeanor. At arraignment on June 1, 2021, Mofford
    pleaded not guilty to the counts of the indictment.
    {¶3} A change-of-plea hearing was held on December 15, 2021. At the
    hearing, Mofford pleaded guilty to aggravated possession of drugs as charged in the
    indictment.   The trial court accepted Mofford’s plea, found him guilty, and
    continued sentencing pending preparation of a presentence investigation report. In
    addition, the trial court dismissed the single count of possession of marihuana
    charged in the indictment.
    {¶4} Mofford’s sentencing hearing was held on January 26, 2022. At the
    hearing, the trial court sentenced Mofford to six months in prison. The trial court
    filed its judgment entry of sentence on January 27, 2022.
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    Case No. 3-22-04
    {¶5} On February 25, 2022, Mofford filed a notice of appeal. He raises one
    assignment of error for our review.
    Assignment of Error
    The imposition of a prison sentence by the trial court upon the
    defendant/appellant was clearly and convincingly contrary to law
    in that the trial court had failed at the sentencing to give due
    consideration to Ohio Revised Code § 2929.11 concerning the
    principles and purposes of sentencing and did not apply Ohio
    Revised Code § 2929.12, and the less serious factors when
    imposing a sentence.
    {¶6} In his assignment of error, Mofford argues that the trial court erred by
    sentencing him to six months in prison.
    Standard of Review
    {¶7} Under R.C. 2953.08(G)(2), an appellate court will reverse a sentence
    “only if it determines by clear and convincing evidence that the record does not
    support the trial court’s findings under relevant statutes or that the sentence is
    otherwise contrary to law.” State v. Marcum, 
    146 Ohio St.3d 516
    , 
    2016-Ohio-1002
    ,
    ¶ 1. Clear and convincing evidence is that “‘which will produce in the mind of the
    trier of facts a firm belief or conviction as to the facts sought to be established.’” Id.
    at ¶ 22, quoting Cross v. Ledford, 
    161 Ohio St. 469
     (1954), paragraph three of the
    syllabus.
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    Case No. 3-22-04
    Relevant Authority
    {¶8} “‘Trial courts have full discretion to impose any sentence within the
    statutory range.’” State v. Smith, 3d Dist. Seneca No. 13-15-17, 
    2015-Ohio-4225
    , ¶
    9, quoting State v. Noble, 3d Dist. Logan No. 8-14-06, 
    2014-Ohio-5485
    , ¶ 9, citing
    State v. Saldana, 3d Dist. Putnam No. 12-12-09, 
    2013-Ohio-1122
    , ¶ 20. A sentence
    imposed within the statutory range is generally valid so long as the trial court
    considered the applicable statutory policies that apply to every felony sentencing,
    including those contained in R.C. 2929.11, and the sentencing factors of 2929.12.
    See State v. Watts, 3d Dist. Auglaize No. 2-20-10, 
    2020-Ohio-5572
    , ¶ 10, 14; State
    v. Maggette, 3d Dist. Seneca No. 13-16-06, 
    2016-Ohio-5554
    , ¶ 31.
    {¶9} R.C. 2929.11 provides, in pertinent part, that the “overriding purposes
    of felony sentencing are to protect the public from future crime by the offender and
    others, to punish the offender, and to promote the effective rehabilitation of the
    offender using the minimum sanctions that the court determines accomplish those
    purposes without imposing an unnecessary burden on state or local government
    resources.”   R.C. 2929.11(A).     To achieve the overriding purposes of felony
    sentencing, R.C. 2929.11 directs courts to “consider the need for incapacitating the
    offender, deterring the offender and others from future crime, rehabilitating the
    offender, and making restitution to the victim of the offense, the public, or both.”
    
    Id.
     In addition, R.C. 2929.11(B) instructs that a sentence imposed for a felony “shall
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    Case No. 3-22-04
    be reasonably calculated to achieve the three overriding purposes of felony
    sentencing * * *, commensurate with and not demeaning to the seriousness of the
    offender’s conduct and its impact upon the victim, and consistent with sentences
    imposed for similar crimes committed by similar offenders.”
    {¶10} “In accordance with these principles, the trial court must consider the
    factors set forth in R.C. 2929.12(B)-(E) relating to the seriousness of the offender’s
    conduct and the likelihood of the offender’s recidivism.” Smith at ¶ 10, citing R.C.
    2929.12(A). In addition, the trial court must consider “the factors set forth in [R.C.
    2929.12(F)] pertaining to the offender’s service in the armed forces of the United
    States.” R.C. 2929.12(A). “‘A sentencing court has broad discretion to determine
    the relative weight to assign the sentencing factors in R.C. 2929.12.’” Smith at ¶
    15, quoting State v. Brimacombe, 
    195 Ohio App.3d 524
    , 
    2011-Ohio-5032
    , ¶ 18 (6th
    Dist.), citing State v. Arnett, 
    88 Ohio St.3d 208
    , 215 (2000).
    Analysis
    {¶11} In the instant case, Mofford was sentenced for one count of aggravated
    possession of drugs in violation of R.C. 2925.11(A), a fifth-degree felony. For fifth-
    degree felony aggravated possession of drugs, “the prison term shall be a definite
    term of six, seven, eight, nine, ten, eleven, or twelve months.” R.C. 2929.14(A)(5).
    The trial court sentenced Mofford to six months in prison, which is within the
    statutory range.
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    Case No. 3-22-04
    {¶12} Furthermore, the record reflects that the trial court considered R.C.
    2929.11 and 2929.12 when it sentenced Mofford. At various points during the
    January 26, 2022 sentencing hearing, the trial court stated that it was “looking at”
    or “going to consider” R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12. (Jan. 26, 2022 Tr. at 10, 13). The
    trial court also specifically mentioned some of the principles of felony sentencing
    contained in R.C. 2929.11, and it discussed the extent to which several of the R.C.
    2929.12 factors were applicable. (Jan. 26, 2022 Tr. at 11-12). Furthermore, in its
    judgment entry of sentence, the trial court indicated that it had considered “the
    principles and purposes of sentencing under Ohio Revised Code section 2929.11,
    and * * * balanced the seriousness and recidivism factors under Ohio Revised Code
    section[s] 2929.12 and 2929.14.” (Doc. No. 31). While the trial court did not
    discuss its consideration of R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12 in exhaustive detail or
    specifically mention each of the R.C. 2929.12 factors, “[a] trial court’s statement
    that it considered the required statutory factors * * * is sufficient to fulfill its
    obligations under the sentencing statutes.” Maggette, 
    2016-Ohio-5554
    , at ¶ 32,
    citing State v. Abrams, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 103786, 
    2016-Ohio-4570
    , citing
    State v. Payne, 
    114 Ohio St.3d 502
    , 
    2007-Ohio-4642
    , ¶ 18. Therefore, because
    Mofford’s sentence is within the statutory range and the record supports that the
    trial court fulfilled its obligation of considering R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12,
    Mofford’s sentence is valid. See Watts, 
    2020-Ohio-5572
    , at ¶ 14.
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    Case No. 3-22-04
    {¶13} Nevertheless, Mofford argues that his sentence is contrary to law
    because the trial court “ignor[ed] the principles and purposes of sentencing” set
    forth in R.C. 2929.11 by improperly balancing the R.C. 2929.12 factors. He also
    claims that the record does not support some of the trial court’s findings under R.C.
    2929.12.   Mofford notes that the trial court found the R.C. 2929.12(B)-(C)
    seriousness factors to be inapplicable. He claims that this finding was at least
    partially erroneous as “the court ignored the factors under [R.C. 2929.12(C)] that
    there really was no victim to the offense[,] * * * that there was [no] strong
    provocation of this particular offense[,] [and that] * * * there was no physical harm
    threatened or caused to a person or property.” He further maintains that the trial
    court’s findings under R.C. 2929.12(D)-(E), relating to his likelihood of recidivism,
    were “inconsistent with the rest of the record.”
    {¶14} Although “R.C. 2953.08(G)(2)(a) permits an appellate court to modify
    or vacate a sentence if it clearly and convincingly finds that ‘the record does not
    support the sentencing court’s findings under’ certain specified statutory
    provisions[,] * * * R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12 are not among the statutory provisions
    listed in R.C. 2953.08(G)(2)(a).” State v. Jones, 
    163 Ohio St.3d 242
    , 2020-Ohio-
    6729, ¶ 28. Furthermore, “an appellate court’s determination that the record does
    not support a sentence does not equate to a determination that the sentence is
    ‘otherwise contrary to law’ as that term is used in R.C. 2953.08(G)(2)(b).” 
    Id.
     at ¶
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    Case No. 3-22-04
    32. Thus, R.C. 2953.08(G)(2) “does not provide a basis for an appellate court to
    modify or vacate a sentence based on its view that the sentence is not supported by
    the record under R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12.” Id. at ¶ 39. “[A]n appellate court errs
    if it * * * modifies or vacates a sentence ‘based on the lack of support in the record
    for the trial court’s findings under R.C. 2929.11 and R.C. 2929.12.’” State v.
    Dorsey, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 28747, 
    2021-Ohio-76
    , ¶ 17, quoting Jones at ¶
    29.
    {¶15} Accordingly, even if we were to agree with Mofford that his sentence
    is not supported by the record under R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12, we could not vacate
    or modify his sentence on that basis. As discussed above, Mofford’s sentence is
    within the statutory range and it is clear that the trial court considered R.C. 2929.11
    and 2929.12. Hence, Mofford’s sentence is not clearly and convincingly contrary
    to law, and it must therefore be affirmed. See State v. Slife, 3d Dist. Auglaize No.
    2-20-17, 
    2021-Ohio-644
    , ¶ 17.
    {¶16} Mofford’s assignment of error is overruled.
    {¶17} Having found no error prejudicial to the appellant herein in the
    particulars assigned and argued, we affirm the judgment of the Crawford County
    Court of Common Pleas.
    Judgment Affirmed
    SHAW and WILLAMOWSKI, J.J., concur.
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