State v. Henderson , 2021 Ohio 3943 ( 2021 )


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  • [Cite as State v. Henderson, 
    2021-Ohio-3943
    .]
    IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
    SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
    MONTGOMERY COUNTY
    STATE OF OHIO                                        :
    :
    Plaintiff-Appellee                           :   Appellate Case No. 28975
    :
    v.                                                   :   Trial Court Case No. 2020-CRB-1522
    :
    CHRISTY A. HENDERSON                                 :   (Criminal Appeal from
    :   Municipal Court)
    Defendant-Appellant                          :
    :
    ...........
    OPINION
    Rendered on the 5th day of November, 2021.
    ...........
    STEPHANIE L. COOK, Atty. Reg. No. 0067101 & ANDREW D. SEXTON, Atty. Reg. No.
    0070892, City of Dayton Prosecutor’s Office, 335 West Third Street, Room 390, Dayton,
    Ohio 45402
    Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellee
    DAWN S. GARRETT, Atty. Reg. No. 0055565, 70 Birch Alley, Suite 240-24005,
    Beavercreek, Ohio 45440
    Attorney for Defendant-Appellant
    .............
    -2-
    EPLEY, J.
    {¶ 1} Defendant-Appellant Christy A. Henderson was found guilty by a jury of
    misdemeanor assault in violation of R.C. 2903.13. The trial court sentenced her to 180
    days in jail with 60 days stayed and credit for time served. On appeal, Henderson argues
    that the verdict was based upon insufficient evidence and was against the manifest weight
    of the evidence. She also asserts that she was denied her constitutional right to effective
    assistance of counsel. For the reasons that follow, the trial court’s judgment will be
    affirmed.
    I.       Facts and Procedural History
    {¶ 2} According to hospital records, emergency medical personnel were
    dispatched to Henderson’s home on the morning of May 17, 2020, after her boyfriend
    found her lying in bed, foaming at the mouth, and experiencing “seizure-like activity.”
    Upon arrival, the emergency medical personnel reported that Henderson was extremely
    combative, and she was sedated to safely transport her to the hospital for treatment.
    {¶ 3} Once Henderson “came-to” in the emergency department, doctors and
    nurses reported that the combative, non-compliant behavior that she demonstrated with
    the EMS team returned. She was unable to provide an adequate history, refused to
    answer questions, and yelled at the staff.
    {¶ 4} Eventually, Henderson was admitted to the advanced neurological unit at
    Miami Valley Hospital with plans (from the doctors at least) to undergo an MRI and EEG
    to further determine if she had indeed suffered from a seizure and if there were other
    pressing medical concerns. Immediately upon arriving on the advanced neurological unit,
    the nursing staff noticed that Henderson was argumentative, difficult to redirect, and
    -3-
    refused all care, including a cardiac monitor. The pattern of confrontational behavior
    continued, and a “sitter” was placed in the room for the safety of the patient and staff.
    {¶ 5} Mona Woods, a patient care technician on the advanced neurological unit,
    was assigned the task. Woods testified that she was informed that the doctor was taking
    precautions because Henderson possibly suffered a seizure and was therefore a fall risk.
    Woods’ job was to sit in Henderson’s room, keep a close eye on her, and chart her
    activities. Woods entered Henderson’s room at approximately 7:15 p.m., introduced
    herself, and explained what she would be doing.
    {¶ 6} According to the record, having Woods in the room was problematic for
    Henderson. Woods testified that Henderson immediately began making fun of her youth
    (Woods was 26 at the time) and made the comment: “You’re a kid. Go over there and
    watch cartoons.” Henderson also became upset that she was not permitted to order Door
    Dash (due to COVID restrictions), as she did not want the food that hospital staff had
    given her. As her assignment required, Woods charted everything she saw happen in the
    room. Her entry at 7:42 p.m., less than a half hour into her shift, captured the tension in
    room:
    Patient started yelling. She doesn’t want her tray. She will order Door Dash.
    Nurse stated we can’t go downstairs. And [Henderson] started yelling.
    Patient started recording entire room with me in it and said she will post on
    Facebook and YouTube that she is being mistreated. She is on the phone
    talking to family member saying that the staff talked to her when she wasn’t
    with it. Patient also said she will get a lawyer involved and that they are
    being racist and sent a colored girl to sit will make it better [sic]. Patient
    -4-
    recorded on her phone that we haven’t given her anything to eat or drink,
    but she refused her two trays.
    Trial Tr. at 80. Woods later testified that Henderson did indeed make at least one
    Facebook Live post and did call a lawyer. Woods also testified that, despite being on the
    receiving end of hostilities, she remained calm and tried to ignore it the best she could.
    {¶ 7} A couple of hours into Woods’ watch, Henderson decided that she wanted to
    take a shower. Woods was unsure if the doctor had given her a “shower order,” so
    positioning herself halfway in and halfway out of the doorway, she poked her head out to
    ask the nearby doctor and nurses if Henderson could shower. While Woods was doing
    this, Henderson became even more agitated, demanding to take a shower immediately.
    The doctor and nurse soon confirmed that Henderson did not have the requisite order
    and could not shower. Woods relayed the message and informed Henderson that, while
    she was not permitted to shower, she could have a “bed bath” or wash up at the sink.
    {¶ 8} Not satisfied with this answer, Henderson turned on the shower anyway.
    Woods testified that she went into the bathroom, turned off the water, and explained again
    why a shower was off-limits, to which Henderson replied, “Bitch, I’ll do whatever I want to
    do. You can’t tell me what to do.” Trial Tr. at 97.
    {¶ 9} Woods went back to the door to inform the nurses and doctor of the
    escalating situation, again positioning herself partway in and partway out of the doorway.
    Henderson suddenly slammed the door shut, forcing Woods to jump out into the hallway
    to avoid injury. Woods immediately tried to push her way back into the room, but before
    she could open the door completely, it flew back open, and Henderson charged, yelling
    “Bitch, I’ll hit you.” Woods testified that the next thing she knew, Henderson grabbed her
    -5-
    by the hair and neck, and punched her in the face multiple times. She also recalled that
    Henderson kicked her.
    {¶ 10} The floor staff immediately rushed over and pulled Henderson off of Woods.
    After giving hospital police a statement, Woods was taken to the emergency department
    for treatment and was soon released. While no serious injuries were reported, she
    experienced swelling and bruising around her eye and persistent headaches which left
    her unable to work for more than a month. Henderson, who was unharmed, was arrested
    and taken to jail.
    {¶ 11} On May 19, 2020, Henderson was charged with one count of assault, a
    misdemeanor of the first degree. The case proceeded to trial on October 21, 2020, during
    which the jury heard testimony from Woods, hospital staff on duty when the incident
    occurred, and Henderson. After a short deliberation, Henderson was found guilty and
    sentenced to 180 days in jail with 60 days stayed and credit for time served. She was
    also placed on two years of supervised probation.
    {¶ 12} Henderson has filed a timely appeal.
    II.      The evidence supported conviction
    {¶ 13} In her first assignment of error, Henderson argues that the verdict was
    based upon insufficient evidence and was against the manifest weight of the evidence.
    {¶ 14} A sufficiency of the evidence argument disputes whether the prosecution
    has presented adequate evidence on each element of the offense to permit the case to
    go to the jury or to sustain the verdict as a matter of law. State v. Brock, 
    2019-Ohio-3116
    ,
    
    140 N.E.3d 1239
    , ¶ 16 (2d Dist.). Our role when reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence
    to support a conviction is to “examine the evidence admitted at trial to determine whether
    -6-
    such evidence, if believed, would convince the average mind of the defendant’s guilt
    beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. Jenks, 
    61 Ohio St.3d 259
    , 
    574 N.E.2d 492
     (1991),
    paragraph two of the syllabus.
    {¶ 15} When an appellate court reviews whether a conviction is against the
    manifest weight of the evidence, “[t]he court, reviewing the entire record, weighs the
    evidence and all reasonable inferences, considers the credibility of the witnesses and
    determines whether in resolving conflicts in the evidence, the jury clearly lost its way and
    created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the conviction must be reversed and
    a new trial ordered.” State v. Thompkins, 
    78 Ohio St.3d 380
    , 387, 
    678 N.E.2d 541
     (1997),
    quoting State v. Martin, 
    20 Ohio App.3d 172
    , 175, 
    485 N.E.2d 717
     (1st Dist.1983). A case
    should not be reversed as being against the manifest weight of the evidence except “in
    the   exceptional    case    in   which    the   evidence    weighs     heavily   against    the
    conviction.” (Emphasis added.) 
    Id.
     “When engaged in this limited reweighing, the
    appellate court may not merely substitute its view for that of the trier of fact[.]” State v.
    Thompson, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 16AP-812, 
    2017-Ohio-8375
    , ¶ 25.
    {¶ 16} It is well established that, when conflicting evidence is presented, a
    conviction is not against the manifest weight of the evidence simply because the trier of
    fact believed one party’s testimony over the other. We “will not substitute [our] judgment
    for that of the trier of facts on the issue of witness credibility unless it is patently apparent
    that the trier of fact lost its way in arriving at its verdict.” State v. Smith, 2d Dist.
    Montgomery No. 25462, 
    2013-Ohio-5345
    , ¶ 16.
    {¶ 17} In the case before us, Henderson was charged with violating R.C.
    2903.13(A), which provides that “[n]o person shall knowingly cause or attempt to cause
    -7-
    physical harm to another or to another’s unborn.” The evidence presented at trial left no
    doubt that the conviction was supported by the evidence.
    {¶ 18} The jury first heard testimony from Woods. She testified that after telling
    Henderson that she could not take a shower, Henderson slammed the door on her and
    then charged, yelling “Bitch, I’ll hit you.” Woods described that Henderson grabbed her
    by the hair and punched her. She also recounted being kicked by Henderson. Further,
    Woods told the jury that she suffered from swelling and bruising around her eye and
    chronic headaches. The jury saw pictures confirming the injury.
    {¶ 19} The testimony of other staff members corroborated Woods’s account. Dr.
    Samuel Theis, the covering physician on the neurological unit that night, testified that he
    watched as Woods backed out of the room and then observed Henderson come out and
    attack her. Dr. Theis stated that he ran over and physically removed Henderson from
    Woods and then escorted her back to her room and waited for security to arrive.
    {¶ 20} Javonne Baker, another patient care technician on the floor, gave the jury
    a similar account. Baker testified that around 12 or 12:30 a.m., she heard yelling and ran
    down to Henderson’s room to find her “grabbing [Woods] by her hair and swinging at her
    and kicking her.” Trial Tr. at 224. Baker further told the jury that “[Woods] was just holding
    her hands up. That was all she was doing and trying to get away.” Trial Tr. at 225.
    {¶ 21} Courtni Gustin, a registered nurse on the floor, testified that “[t]he patient
    was coming toward Ms. Woods. * * * And [Henderson] was screaming, yelling at her. She
    had [Woods] pinned * * * [a]nd she grabbed [Woods] by the hair * * * and twisted her hair
    underneath and started hitting [Woods].” Trial Tr. at 253.
    {¶ 22} Finally, nurse and team lead Kristi Pence testified that around midnight she
    -8-
    heard the door slam and heard Woods say, “She’s going to hit me.” Pence then recounted
    that she ran over to Henderson’s room and when she arrived, there was a mass of people
    trying to pry Henderson off Woods. Pence stated that she attempted to get Henderson’s
    fingers out of Woods’s hair.
    {¶ 23} While Henderson herself testified that she swung at Woods, her main point
    of contention was that she acted in self-defense because she was held at the hospital
    against her will.
    {¶ 24} Self-defense is an affirmative defense; it is a “justification for admitted
    conduct * * * [that] represent[s] not a mere denial or contradiction of the evidence, [but]
    * * * is a substantive or independent matter which the defendant claims exempts [her]
    from liability even if it is conceded that the facts claimed by the prosecution are true.”
    State v. Poole, 
    33 Ohio St.2d 19
    , 
    294 N.E.2d 888
     (1973). Stated differently, self-defense
    seeks to relieve a defendant’s culpability rather than negate an element of the offense.
    {¶ 25} To justify the use of less-than-deadly force in self-defense, a defendant
    must introduce evidence showing that: (1) she was not at fault in creating the violent
    situation; (2) she had a bona fide belief that she was in imminent danger of bodily harm;
    and (3) the only means to protect herself from danger was the use of force not likely to
    cause death or great bodily harm. State v. Bennett, 
    2019-Ohio-2996
    , 
    140 N.E.3d 1145
    ,
    ¶ 14 (2d Dist.), citing State v. Allison, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 26885, 
    2016-Ohio-5262
    ,
    ¶ 19. Additionally, R.C. 2901.05(B)(1) mandates that there must be evidence presented
    that supports the conclusion that the accused used the force in self-defense. If a
    defendant meets that burden, “the prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable doubt
    that the accused person did not use the force in self-defense[.]” R.C. 2901.05(B)(1).
    -9-
    {¶ 26} In this case, Henderson fails to directly address any of the self-defense
    factors but seems to stake her claim on the insinuation that she was being held against
    her will by Miami Valley Hospital. While she did testify that she felt strong enough to walk
    home, and the record does include some indication that Henderson expressed a desire
    at one point to be discharged, the totality of the evidence presented at trial painted a much
    different picture.
    {¶ 27} In addition to the physician narratives in Henderson’s medical records, the
    jury heard testimony from Dr. Theis and Nurse Pence that if Henderson wanted to leave
    the hospital, it was only on her terms. Dr. Theis testified that various times during her
    stay, he talked with Henderson about her options and concerns. One of the things they
    talked about, according to the doctor, was that Henderson could leave at any time. “The
    patient is not a captive in our hospital.” Trial Tr. at 146. He explained to the jury that
    Henderson did not have a capacity holder that would force her to stay, and she was not
    restrained in any way.
    {¶ 28} According to the record, Henderson, at times, wanted to leave the hospital,
    but she wanted to be discharged on her terms. Dr. Theis testified that Henderson wanted
    to be medically discharged, but that was not an option he was comfortable with because
    she had refused to undergo any medical tests to identify what caused the “seizure-like
    activity” that brought her to the hospital in the first place. “I believe she stated * * * she
    wasn’t going to leave the hospital unless I medically discharged her,” Dr. Theis testified.
    “She refused to sign anything for us.” Trial Tr. at 155.
    {¶ 29} Nurse Pence testified that she learned from the day shift nurses that
    Henderson vacillated between wanting to leave against medical advice and not. In fact,
    -10-
    Pence testified that when she arrived for her shift, hospital police were ready to give
    Henderson a ride home, but she refused to leave against medical advice. Pence also told
    the jury that she discussed options with Henderson and told her that “no one is keeping
    you here.” Henderson refused to leave without being medically discharged, something
    that medical personnel would not agree to without testing and treatment.
    {¶ 30} Woods also testified that she heard Henderson tell Dr. Theis that she
    wanted to leave, but only if the doctor would medically discharge her. When the doctor
    told her that she could leave against medical advice, Henderson stated that she “will live
    here and get three meals a day.” Trial Tr. at 88.
    {¶ 31} The record indicates that Henderson was not held against her will by the
    hospital. To the contrary, she voluntarily stayed because Dr. Theis would not discharge
    her on her terms. Therefore, her claim that the hospital held her against her will lacks
    merit.
    {¶ 32} In a similar vein, Henderson posits that Woods was keeping her trapped in
    her room by blocking the exit. Consequently, Henderson told the jury that she moved
    Woods out of the way by grabbing her hair, causing a fight to break out. Henderson’s
    version of the events was in stark contrast with the accounts of every other witness,
    including Woods, who experienced the situation firsthand. But even if we were to accept
    Henderson’s version of the incident as true, she would still have been required to
    demonstrate that she had a bona fide belief that she was in imminent danger of bodily
    harm and the only means to protect herself was the use of force. Bennett, 2019-Ohio-
    2996, 
    140 N.E.3d 1145
    , ¶ 14. There was nothing in the record that demonstrated
    Henderson was threatened with harm or that she was afraid she would be injured by
    -11-
    anyone in the advanced neurological unit of the hospital. Likewise, there was no evidence
    that she had to fight with Woods to escape from supposed danger. This claim lacks merit
    as well.
    {¶ 33} There is one more fatal flaw with Henderson’s self-defense claim: her
    counsel explicitly declined to pursue a self-defense instruction at trial. As we have stated
    in the past, a defendant waives a self-defense claim on appeal if it is not raised before
    the trial court. Id. at ¶ 18.
    {¶ 34} Based on the testimony and exhibits offered at trial, the State presented
    adequate evidence on each element of the offense to permit the case to go to the jury
    and to sustain the verdict as a matter of law; there was sufficient evidence to support the
    conviction. Similarly, this was not a case where the jury clearly lost its way and created a
    miscarriage of justice; the conviction was not against the manifest weight of the evidence.
    The first assignment of error is overruled.
    III.      Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
    {¶ 35} In her second assignment of error, Henderson asserts that her constitutional
    right to effective assistance of counsel was violated when trial counsel chose not to seek
    a self-defense instruction.
    {¶ 36} To prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, a defendant must
    prove that his or her attorney was ineffective under the standard test from Strickland v.
    Washington, 
    466 U.S. 668
    , 687, 
    104 S.Ct. 2052
    , 
    80 L.Ed.2d 674
     (1984). The test has two
    parts. First, the defendant must show that counsel’s performance was deficient. 
    Id. at 687
    . “This requires showing that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not
    functioning as the ‘counsel’ guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment. Second,
    -12-
    the defendant must show that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense.” 
    Id.
    {¶ 37} As to the first prong, much deference is given to trial counsel. “[A] court must
    indulge in a strong presumption that the challenged action might be considered sound
    trial strategy. Thus, judicial scrutiny of counsel’s performance must be highly deferential.”
    State v. Bird, 
    81 Ohio St.3d 582
    , 585, 
    692 N.E. 2d 1013
     (1998).
    {¶ 38} If the first prong is met, then “prejudice” may be considered. To demonstrate
    prejudice, “the defendant must prove that there exists a reasonable probability that, were
    it not for counsel’s errors, the result of the trial would have been different.” State v.
    Bradley, 
    42 Ohio St.3d 136
    , 
    538 N.E.2d 373
     (1998), first paragraph of the syllabus.
    {¶ 39} A failure to meet either prong defeats the claim.
    {¶ 40} Based on the evidence presented at trial, we determined in the previous
    assignment of error that Henderson could not have made a successful self-defense claim,
    even if it had been raised below. Consequently, her trial counsel was not ineffective for
    failing to raise the claim. The second assignment of error is overruled.
    IV.      Conclusion
    {¶ 41} The judgment of the trial court will be affirmed.
    .............
    TUCKER, P. J. and WELBAUM, J., concur.
    Copies sent to:
    Stephanie L. Cook
    Andrew D. Sexton
    Dawn S. Garrett
    Hon. Christopher D. Roberts