In re J.S. , 2019 Ohio 4959 ( 2019 )

[Cite as In re J.S., 2019-Ohio-4959.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
MEIGS COUNTY
IN THE MATTER OF: :
:
J.S. : Case No. 18CA24
:
: DECISION AND
: JUDGMENT ENTRY
_____________________________________________________________
APPEARANCES:
David J. Winkelmann, Millfield, Ohio, for Appellant.
Robert W. Bright, Middleport, Ohio, for Appellee.
_____________________________________________________________
Smith, P.J.
{¶1} This an appeal from a judgment filed in the Juvenile Division of the
Meigs County Common Pleas Court naming Appellee, D.S., as the residential
custodian of the minor child, J.S., and awarding the Appellant, the child’s mother,
N.L., parenting time three weekends a month, along with the court’s standard
holiday and vacation parenting time schedule. Because the trial court’s best
interest determination as to the allocation of parental rights and responsibilities is
supported by competent, credible evidence, and because the trial court did not
abuse its discretion in the allocation of parental rights and responsibilities,
Meigs App. No. 18CA24 2
Appellant’s sole assignment of error is overruled. Accordingly, the judgment of
the trial court is affirmed.
FACTS
{¶2} The parties’ initial involvement with the court began soon after J.S.
was born on August 18, 2016. D.S. and N.L were not married at the time of the
child’s birth and have never since been married, however, they lived together with
the child on property owned by D.S.’s grandparents in Meigs County. The Meigs
County Child Support Agency filed a complaint seeking to determine the child’s
paternity on September 27, 2016. Because N.L. admitted D.S. was the child’s
father, which was also confirmed through genetic testing, a paternity order was
filed on February 9, 2017. Thereafter, D.S. filed a complaint in the Juvenile
Division of the Meigs County Court of Common Pleas seeking custody of the child
on March 10, 2017. D.S. dismissed his complaint on March 17, 2017, but then
filed another complaint seeking emergency custody of the child in November of
2017.
{¶3} It appears from the record that the emergency motion was filed after
N.L. made domestic violence allegations against D.S., which ultimately led to a
safety plan being implemented by Meigs County Children’s Services (hereinafter
“MCCS”). Part of the safety plan required N.L. to move out of the residence due
to the fact that a drug screen performed indicated marijuana was in her system.
Meigs App. No. 18CA24 3
During the investigation conducted by MCCS, N.L. admitted to smoking marijuana
and D.S. admitted that he provided it to her. N.L. moved out of the residence at
that time and returned to Columbus, Ohio, where she was from originally. The
trial court thereafter granted D.S.’s request for emergency custody on November
17, 2017 and the child has remained in his custody since that time. Temporary
orders that were issued granted N.L. parenting time three weekends a month, as
well as holiday and vacation time per the court’s standard orders.
{¶4} Several hearings were held during the course of the proceedings below.
Both D.S. and N.L. testified, along with several family members of D.S., friends of
N.L., the Guardian Ad Litem (Paul Koch), and an MCCS employee. The record
before us indicates that J.S. was approximately two years old at the time of the
final hearing and that during the course of the proceedings was diagnosed as
having an Autism Spectrum Disorder. As a result, he receives multiple therapy
services, including speech, hearing and language. His services are provided locally
by a team of providers from Ohio University in Athens, Ohio and from Nationwide
Children’s Hospital in Columbus, Ohio that comes to the region where he lives to
provide services. At the time of the final hearing J.S. had weekly therapy
appointments every Monday and was getting ready to start receiving therapy twice
a week, instead of once.
Meigs App. No. 18CA24 4
{¶5} D.S. testified that he was currently and had always been the primary
caretaker of J.S. He testified that his employer was flexible and allowed him to
work around J.S.’s medical needs and appointments, and that when he needed
assistance, he had a local network of family members that assisted in J.S.’s care.
He also testified that J.S. is cared for by D.S.’s grandparents while he works and,
thus, no one outside the family is needed to assist with J.S.’s care. D.S. testified
that therapy appointments have always been weekly on Mondays but that N.L. has
never attended. He also testified that since starting therapy, J.S. is improving.
D.S. testified he wanted N.L.’s parenting time to be at his convenience and limited
to no more than what she currently had.
{¶6} While N.L.’s testimony indicated a strong desire to be named the
residential parent of her child, it was clear that N.L. did not have family support or
a strong network to assist her in the care of J.S. She testified that she had found an
appropriate daycare facility where therapy services could be incorporated. She
also testified to her belief that the Columbus area offered better care and more
services for J.S. than could be provided in rural Meigs County. She testified that
she had not attended therapy appointments thus far due to D.S.’s failure to
communicate with her about the dates and times, and explained that if the child
were to reside with her in Columbus, she could take him for evening therapy
sessions or could take time off during her lunch hour to transport him to necessary
Meigs App. No. 18CA24 5
appointments. However, she conceded that she had not confirmed evening therapy
services were available.
{¶7} Several of D.S.’s family members testified on his behalf regarding their
opinion that he was the better parent and should be the primary custodian. In
particular, D.S.’s sister, Shainna Sisler, testified that J.S. was happy and
progressing and had made a lot of improvements since his diagnosis. Further,
D.S.’s paternal aunt, Kellie Howes, testified that she has helped care for J.S. and
that when he returns from weekend visits with his mother he does not want to be
touched by women and takes a while to “warm up.” She testified that J.S. is
emotionally closest to his father and does well with him because there is a stable,
set schedule.
{¶8} MCCS employee, April Booth, also testified. She testified that
although N.L. tested positive for drugs when the investigation was initially started,
there had been no issues since that time and neither parent posed any risk to the
child. Guardian Ad Litem, Paul Koch, testified and also filed a report. He noted
that shared parenting was not an option in light of the poor relationship of the
parties. N.L. conceded this fact in her testimony as well. Koch testified that he
had consulted with J.S.’s team of therapy providers as to the extensive therapy J.S.
is receiving for his autism diagnosis. He also testified that N.L. had failed to
attend any of J.S.’s therapy appointments. However, Koch testified that the child
Meigs App. No. 18CA24 6
appropriately interacted with both parents, that both residences were clean and well
maintained, and that he did not believe either parent had any current substance
abuse problems. Nevertheless, Koch recommended in his report that the custody
arrangement remain the same, but that N.L.’s parenting time should be
“maximized.”
(¶9) The trial court issued an eleven-page decision naming D.S. as the
residential parent on October 12, 2018, after what the court described as an
admittedly “difficult decision that the Court has spent weeks reviewing * * *.”
The Court noted that it was clear both parents loved the child, wanted to be the
custodial parent and had the capability to provide for the child’s needs. However,
the court further noted that shared parenting was not an option due to the “toxic
relationship” between D.S. and N.L., which the court attributed to both parents
equally and even included a section its decision titled “Mutually Unsavory
Conduct Allegations.” In that section of its decision the court noted that both
parents had made multiple accusations against one another, including stalking,
sabotage, murder, narcissism and parental alienation, just to name a few. The trial
court expressly considered the testimony of the parties and their witnesses, the
report and testimony of the guardian ad litem, the MCCS investigation, as well as
the fact the investigation had been remedied and closed, and the child’s
developmental issues.
Meigs App. No. 18CA24 7
{¶10} Ultimately, the court ordered that legal custody should remain with
D.S. and that N.L.’s parenting schedule should continue as previously ordered,
which was three weekends a month as set forth above. In reaching its decision, the
court noted that it was “significantly concerned * * * about mother’s highly
dramatic beliefs and opinions[,]” which included allegations that D.S. murdered
someone, stalked her, had improper relations with the judge, has Munchausen by
Proxy and essentially “conjured up the autism diagnosis[,]” but yet had never
attended any of the child’s appointments with his specialists. Thus, the trial court
rejected the guardian ad litem’s recommendation that N.L.’s parenting time be
maximized. It is from this October 12, 2018 final order that N.L. has filed an
appeal, setting forth a single assignment of error for our review.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
I. “THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT
GRANTED CUSTODY TO THE APPELLEE AND LIMITED
APPELLANT’S VISITATION.”
LEGAL ANALYSIS
{¶11} In her sole assignment of error, Appellant contends the trial court
abused its discretion when it granted custody to D.S. and limited her visitation, or
parenting time. Appellant argues the trial court predicated its decision upon four
factors, which she argues was improper and constituted an abuse of discretion.
Meigs App. No. 18CA24 8
Appellee responds by arguing that the trial court’s decision was supported by
competent, credible evidence and thus did not constitute an abuse of discretion.
{¶12} As set forth above, J.S. was born out of wedlock to parents that never
ultimately married. Further, at the time the case was filed below there had been no
prior judicial decree allocating parental rights and responsibilities. Thus, N.L.’s
custody of J.S. “arose by operation of law” in accordance with R.C. 3109.042,
which provides that an unmarried female who gives birth to a child is the child’s
sole residential parent and legal custodian until another person is so designated by
a court of competent jurisdiction. Mitchell v. Manders, 5th Dist. Morrow No.
14CA0011, 2015-Ohio-1529, ¶ 62. As noted by the trial court in its decision, in
situations such as these involving initial allocations of parental rights and
responsibilities as to children born to unmarried parents, the juvenile court had
exclusive, original jurisdiction under R.C. 2151.23 to determine the custody of the
child at issue, as he was not a ward of any other court. However, R.C. 2151.23
further provides in section (F)(1) that “the juvenile court shall exercise its
jurisdiction in child custody matters in accordance with sections 3109.04 and
3127.01 to 3127.53 of the Revised Code and, as applicable, sections 5103.20 or
5103.23 to 5103.237 of the Revised Code.” Of importance and relevance here,
R.C. 3109.04 governs courts awarding parental rights and responsibilities and
requires the best interests of the child be taken into consideration in making those
Meigs App. No. 18CA24 9
determinations. See R.C. 3109.04(B)(1). Furthermore, “[a]s between two parents,
which is the situation here, the universally applied standard to be used in initial
custody determinations is the best interests of the child.” In the Matter of A.B.,
2019-Ohio-90, 128 N.E.3d 694, ¶ 39 (2019); citing Boyer v. Boyer, 46 Ohio St.2d
83, 87, 346 N.E.2d 286 (1976); see also In re Webster II, 4th Dist. Athens No.
92CA1559, 1993 WL 373784, *4.
{¶13} R.C. 3109.04 provides in pertinent part, as follows, regarding the best
interest factors that must be considered by a trial court:
(F)(1) In determining the best interest of a child pursuant
to this section, whether on an original decree allocating
parental rights and responsibilities for the care of children
or a modification of a decree allocating those rights and
responsibilities, the court shall consider all relevant factors,
including, but not limited to:
(a) The wishes of the child's parents regarding the child's care;
(b) If the court has interviewed the child in chambers pursuant to
division (B) of this section regarding the child's wishes and
concerns as to the allocation of parental rights and responsibilities
concerning the child, the wishes and concerns of the child, as
expressed to the court;
Meigs App. No. 18CA24 10
(c) The child's interaction and interrelationship with the
child's parents, siblings, and any other person who may
significantly affect the child's best interest;
(d) The child's adjustment to the child's home, school,
and community;
(e) The mental and physical health of all persons involved
in the situation;
(f) The parent more likely to honor and facilitate court-approved
parenting time rights or visitation and companionship rights;
(g) Whether either parent has failed to make all child support
payments, including all arrearages, that are required of that
parent pursuant to a child support order under which that
parent is an obligor;
(h) Whether either parent or any member of the household
of either parent previously has been convicted of or pleaded
guilty to any criminal offense involving any act that resulted
in a child being an abused child or a neglected child; whether
either parent, in a case in which a child has been adjudicated
an abused child or a neglected child, previously has been
determined to be the perpetrator of the abusive or neglectful
Meigs App. No. 18CA24 11
act that is the basis of an adjudication; whether either parent
or any member of the household of either parent previously
has been convicted of or pleaded guilty to a violation of
section 2919.25 of the Revised Code or a sexually oriented
offense involving a victim who at the time of the commission
of the offense was a member of the family or household that
is the subject of the current proceeding; whether either parent
or any member of the household of either parent previously
has been convicted of or pleaded guilty to any offense
involving a victim who at the time of the commission of
the offense was a member of the family or household that
is the subject of the current proceeding and caused physical
harm to the victim in the commission of the offense; and
whether there is reason to believe that either parent has
acted in a manner resulting in a child being an abused child
or a neglected child;
(i.) Whether the residential parent or one of the parents
subject to a shared parenting decree has continuously
and willfully denied the other parent's right to parenting
time in accordance with an order of the court;
Meigs App. No. 18CA24 12
(j) Whether either parent has established a residence, or is
planning to establish a residence, outside this state.
{¶14} Further, appellate courts generally review trial court decisions
regarding the allocation of parental rights and responsibilities with the utmost
deference. Davis v. Flickinger, 77 Ohio St.3d 415, 418, 674 N.E.2d 1159 (1997),
Miller v. Miller, 37 Ohio St.3d 71, 74, 523 N.E.2d 846 (1988). Consequently, “a
trial court's decision in a custody proceeding is subject to reversal only upon a
showing of abuse of discretion.” In re A.J., 148 Ohio St.3d 218, 2016–Ohio–8196,
69 N.E.3d. 733, ¶ 27. “ ‘Abuse of discretion’ has been defined as an attitude that is
unreasonable, arbitrary or unconscionable.” AAAA Ents., Inc. v. River Place
Community Urban Redevelopment Corp., 50 Ohio St.3d 157, 161, 553 N.E.2d 597(1990), citing Huffman v. Hair Surgeon, Inc., 19 Ohio St.3d 83, 87, 482 N.E.2d
1248 (1985). Accord Westlake Civ. Serv. Comm. v. Pietrick, 142 Ohio St.3d 495,
2015–Ohio–961, 33 N.E.3d 18, ¶ 36. “A decision is unreasonable if there is no
sound reasoning process that would support that decision.” AAAA Ents., Inc.,
supra, at 161. An unconscionable or arbitrary decision generally means a
“ ‘ “view or action ‘that no conscientious judge, acting intelligently, could honestly
have taken.’ ” ’ ” State v. Cunningham, 113 Ohio St.3d 108, 2007–Ohio–1245,
863 N.E.2d 120, ¶ 25, quoting State ex rel. Wilms v. Blake, 144 Ohio St. 619, 624,
30 O.O. 220, 60 N.E.2d 308 (1945), quoting Long v. George, 296 Mass. 574, 579,
Meigs App. No. 18CA24 13
7 N.E.2d 149 (1937), quoting Davis v. Boston Elevated Ry. Co., 235 Mass. 482,
497, 126 N.E. 841 (1920). In other words, in order to find an abuse of discretion, “
‘the result must be so palpably and grossly violative of fact or logic that it
evidences not the exercise of will but the perversity of will, not the exercise of
judgment but the defiance of judgment, not the exercise of reason but instead
passion or bias.’ ” Vaught v. Cleveland Clinic Found., 98 Ohio St.3d 485, 2003–
Ohio–2181, 787 N.E.2d 631, ¶ 13, quoting Nakoff v. Fairview Gen. Hosp., 75 Ohio
St.3d 254, 256, 662 N.E.2d 1 (1996). Accord Freshwater v. Mt. Vernon City
School Dist. Bd. of Edn., 137 Ohio St.3d 469, 2013–Ohio–5000, 1 N.E.3d 335,
¶ 77; Pons v. Ohio State Med. Bd., 66 Ohio St.3d 619, 621, 614 N.E.2d 748 (1993)
(“The appellate court is to determine only if the trial court has abused its
discretion, i.e., being not merely an error of judgment, but perversity of will,
passion, prejudice, partiality, or moral delinquency.”) A decision is not
unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable “simply because the appellate court
might not have reached the same conclusion or is, itself, less persuaded by the trial
court's reasoning process than by the countervailing arguments.” State v. Morris,
132 Ohio St.3d 337, 2012–Ohio–2407, 972 N.E.2d 528, ¶ 14, citing AAAA Ents.,
Inc., supra 161 (stating “[i]t is not enough that the reviewing court, were it
deciding the issue de novo, would not have found that reasoning process to be
persuasive, perhaps in view of countervailing reasoning processes that would
Meigs App. No. 18CA24 14
support a contrary result”). Thus, when applying the abuse of discretion standard,
a reviewing court may not substitute its judgment for that of the trial court. E.g.,
Savage v. Correlated Health Serv., Ltd., 64 Ohio St.3d 42, 55, 591 N.E.2d 1216(1992); Freshwater at ¶ 77, quoting Graziano v. Bd. of Educ., 32 Ohio St.3d 289,
294, 513 N.E.2d 282 (“ ‘Absent an abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court,
the court of appeals may not engage in what amounts to a substitution of judgment
of the trial court.’ ”).
{¶15} In Davis v. Flickinger, supra, the court more specifically defined the
standard of review that applies in custody proceedings as follows:
Where an award of custody is supported by a substantial
amount of credible and competent evidence, such an award
will not be reversed as being against the weight of the evidence
by a reviewing court. (Trickey v. Trickey [1952], 158 Ohio
St. 9, 47 O.O. 481, 106 N.E.2d 772, approved and followed.)
[Bechtol v. Bechtol (1990), 49 Ohio St.3d 21, 550 N.E.2d 178,
syllabus].
{¶16} The reason for this standard of review is that the trial judge
has the best opportunity to view the demeanor, attitude, and credibility of
each witness, something that does not translate well on the written page. As
Meigs App. No. 18CA24 15
we stated in Seasons Coal Co. v. Cleveland (1984), 10 Ohio St.3d 77, 80–
81, 10 OBR 408, 410–412, 461 N.E.2d 1273, 1276–1277:
‘The underlying rationale of giving deference to the findings
of the trial court rests with the knowledge that the trial judge
is best able to view the witnesses and observe their demeanor,
gestures and voice inflections, and use these observations in
weighing the credibility of the proffered testimony. [* * *]
* * * A reviewing court should not reverse a decision simply
because it holds a different opinion concerning the credibility
of the witnesses and evidence submitted before the trial court.
A finding of an error in law is a legitimate ground for reversal,
but a difference of opinion on credibility of witnesses and
evidence is not. The determination of credibility of testimony
and evidence must not be encroached upon by a reviewing
tribunal, especially to the extent where the appellate court
relies on unchallenged, excluded evidence in order to justify
its reversal.’
Davis v. Flickinger, supra, at 418–419.
{¶17} Additionally, deferring to the trial court on matters of credibility is
“crucial in a child custody case, where there may be much evident in the parties'
Meigs App. No. 18CA24 16
demeanor and attitude that does not translate to the record well.” Id. at 419.
Furthermore, “custody issues are some of the most difficult and agonizing
decisions a trial judge must make. Therefore, a trial judge must have wide latitude
in considering all the evidence.” Id. at 418. As the Ohio Supreme Court has
previously explained:
In proceedings involving the custody and welfare of children
the power of the trial court to exercise discretion is peculiarly
important. The knowledge obtained through contact with and
observation of the parties and through independent investigation
cannot be conveyed to a reviewing court by printed record.
Trickey v. Trickey, supra, at 13. Thus, this discretionary standard of review does
not permit us to reverse a trial court's decision if we simply disagree with it. We
may, however, reverse a trial court's custody decision if the court made an error of
law, if its decision is unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable, or if substantial
competent and credible evidence fails to support it. Davis v. Flickinger, supra, at
418–419, 421.
{¶18} As set forth above, Appellant argues the trial court improperly
predicated its decision upon four factors. Those four factors are as follows: 1) the
child’s close proximity to a family support network bearing in mind that, 2) the
child had been diagnosed with autism, 3) the fact the child was receiving
Meigs App. No. 18CA24 17
healthcare needs in the area, and 4) the inability of the child’s parents to get along.
Despite Appellant’s argument, however, it appears the trial court not only
considered these four factors, but also considered the best interests of the child in
accordance with the best interest factors set forth above. Furthermore, we believe
the four factors Appellant cites actually fall within a best-interest analysis. For
instance, the child’s close proximity to family support network is directly relevant
under R.C. 3109.04(F)(1)(c) and (d). Further, taking into consideration the child
has been diagnosed as autistic directly bears upon R.C. 3109.04(F)(1)(e). The fact
that the child’s healthcare needs were being met in the area where D.S. lives is
pertinent under R.C. 3109.04(F)(1)(c)(d) and (e). Finally, considering whether the
parents get along is always a relevant consideration in ruling out shared parenting
before deciding with which parent to place the child. Thus, to the extent the trial
court’s decision relied upon these four factors as Appellant argues, we find no
error or abuse of discretion.
{¶19} Further, and importantly, the trial court made the following findings
in support of its decision and these findings were supported by the record: 1) D.S.
has provided a stable home and has a positive family support system to help him
care for the child; 2) D.S.’s residence has essentially been the only home the child
has known since birth; 3) D.S. has set up and taken care of all of the child’s
exceptional medical needs and the child’s autism treatment and therapy should
Meigs App. No. 18CA24 18
remain consistent and stable; 4) despite N.L.’s desires the court will not move the
child to another city which would require him to be completely uprooted and to
start over with his weekly schedule, medical care, daycare, and therapy; 5) the
child requires extraordinary care and needs stability; 6) N.L. lives by herself in
Columbus and has identified no family that can help her with the child; and 7) D.S.
makes extraordinary efforts to ensure the child attends his therapy appointments
and N.L.’s employer would likely not permit the flexibility needed in the long run.
Thus, despite Appellant’s arguments that the trial court erred and abused its
discretion in naming Appellee as the custodial parent, the trial court’s decision is
clearly supported by competent, credible evidence that D.S. is a suitable primary
custodian of the child and that remaining in D.S.’s home is in the child’s best
interest.
{¶20} Furthermore, with respect to the parties’ conflicting testimony
regarding the “mutually unsavory” allegations against one another, as explained
above the trial court was in the best position to evaluate the credibility of the
witnesses who testified in this matter and deferring to the trial court on matters of
credibility is crucial in child custody cases. Davis v. Flickinger, supra, at 419.
Accord In re Christian, 4th Dist. Athens No. 04CA10, 2004–Ohio–3146, ¶ 7. The
trial court expressed that although both parents had made allegations against one
another, it was “significantly concerned” about N.L.’s “highly dramatic” beliefs
Meigs App. No. 18CA24 19
and opinions which included the belief that the child’s father had “conjured up” his
medical issues, despite the fact the child had a team of therapists providing weekly
therapy which N.L. had never attended. Although this Court is mindful of the fact
that N.L. claimed D.S. had failed to communicate appointment times to her, we
must defer to the trial court’s credibility determinations on that issue.
Additionally, although this Court may question whether N.L.’s “highly dramatic”
beliefs have some basis in fact, the trial court heard her testimony and ultimately
determined both parents, including D.S., were capable of adequately caring for the
child. As set forth above, it is not appropriate for this Court to question the trial
court’s credibility determinations and factual findings.
{¶21} As explained by the guardian ad litem and the trial court, and as
conceded to by N.L., due to the poor or “toxic” relationship between these parents,
shared parenting was not an option here. Further, because the parties live one-and-
one-half hours away from each other, a split week parenting schedule was not an
option either. The court had to make a ruling and it ruled in favor of not uprooting
and moving the child, which it expressly stated it had major concerns about doing.
In making its ruling the trial court reasoned that the child was established with his
father, had a network of family support, was receiving “the most comprehensive
and specialized available care,” and that it was in the child’s best interest to remain
in the custody of D.S.
Meigs App. No. 18CA24 20
{¶22} Additionally, although the trial court did not “maximize” N.L.’s
parenting time as recommended by the guardian ad litem, we note that “trial courts
are not obligated to follow a guardian ad litem’s recommendation.” Wolford v.
Willis, supra, at ¶ 21; see also Gould v. Gould, 4th Dist. Lawrence No. 16CA30,
2017-Ohio-6896, ¶ 57 (explaining that although guardians ad litem play important
roles in evaluating the best interest of children, trial courts must be free to evaluate
all of the evidence and determine the child’s best interest based upon all of the
evidence.). Thus, we find no error or abuse of discretion in the trial court’s refusal
to fully adopt the recommendation of the guardian ad litem.
{¶23} In light of the foregoing and after a thorough review of the record, it
appears the judgment of the trial court was supported by competent, credible
evidence and, as such, was not an abuse of discretion. Thus, we find no merit to
the sole assignment of error raised by N.L. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial
court is affirmed.
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED.
Meigs App. No. 18CA24 21
JUDGMENT ENTRY
It is ordered that the JUDGMENT AFFIRMED. Appellant shall pay the
costs.
The Court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this Court directing the
Meigs County Common Pleas Court Juvenile Division to carry this judgment into
execution.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule
27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
McFarland, J. & Hess, J.: Concur in Judgment and Opinion.
For the Court,
BY: __________________________________
Jason P. Smith, Presiding Judge
NOTICE TO COUNSEL
Pursuant to Local Rule No. 14, this document constitutes a final
judgment entry and the time period for further appeal commences from the
date of filing with the clerk.