Runkle v. Stewart , 2019 Ohio 2356 ( 2019 )

[Cite as Runkle v. Stewart, 2019-Ohio-2356.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
MIAMI COUNTY
CASEY S. RUNKLE :
:
Plaintiff-Appellant : Appellate Case No. 2018-CA-27
:
v. : Trial Court Case No. 2018-DV-328
:
JACK STEWART : (Civil Appeal from
: Common Pleas Court)
Defendant-Appellee :
:
...........
OPINION
Rendered on the 14th day of June, 2019.
...........
CASEY S. RUNKLE, 222 Walker Street, Piqua, Ohio 45356
Plaintiff-Appellant, Pro Se
JACK STEWART, 517 First Street, Piqua, Ohio 45356
Defendant-Appellee, Pro Se
.............
WELBAUM, P.J.
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{¶ 1} Plaintiff-appellant, Casey S. Runkle, appeals pro se from a judgment of the
Miami County Court of Common Pleas denying her petition for a domestic violence civil
protection order (“DVCPO”) and terminating an ex parte DVCPO previously granted
against defendant-appellee, Jack Stewart. Because Runkle failed to file objections to
the decision as required by Civ.R. 65.1(G), the trial court’s judgment will be affirmed.
Facts and Course of Proceedings
{¶ 2} On October 10, 2018, Runkle filed a petition for a DVCPO against her ex-
boyfriend, Stewart. In the petition, Runkle alleged that Stewart had choked her multiple
times, hit her in the face, cut her pinky finger while he was trying to take her vehicle, and
threatened to kill her and rape her daughter. The same day Runkle filed the petition, a
trial court magistrate held a hearing on the matter. Following the hearing, the magistrate
issued an ex parte DVCPO against Stewart.
{¶ 3} On October 17, 2018, the magistrate held a full evidentiary hearing on
Runkle’s petition for a DVCPO. Both Runkle and Stewart appeared pro se at the
hearing. After hearing testimony from both Runkle and Stewart, the magistrate issued
an order denying Runkle’s petition and terminating the ex parte DVCPO issued on
October 10, 2018. In support of that decision, the magistrate made the following
findings:
Based upon the admissible evidence before it, the Court * * * finds
that [Runkle] has failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence
that [she] or [her] family or household member(s) are in danger of or have
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been a victim of domestic violence or sexually oriented offenses as defined
in R.C. 311.31(A) committed by [Stewart].
[Stewart] was driving the van and parked the van. [Runkle] decided
she wanted the van. The parties argued over the keys and [Runkle] was
injured when [Stewart] tried to get away. [Runkle] failed to establish that
[Stewart] was the aggressor. The court is left not knowing who was the
aggressor. There have been other incidents of [Runkle] attacking
[Stewart]. [Runkle] was placed in a diversion program from [a] domestic
violence case in Florida where [she] was the aggressor.
[Runkle] lacked credibility. [Runkle] accused [Stewart] of trying to
harm her daughter because he was walking into her daughter’s bedroom
without no other indication of harm. No other evidence was presented.
Order Denying Domestic Violence Civil Protection Order After Full Hearing (Nov. 8, 2018),
Docket No. 5, p. 1.
{¶ 4} The magistrate’s order denying the DVCPO also indicated that the trial court
judge had reviewed and adopted the order. After the order was adopted, on November
14, 2018, Runkle filed a handwritten statement with the trial court indicating that she
“would like to appeal the court[’]s decision in denying [the] domestic violence civil
protection order after the full hearing.” Runkle’s statement also set forth her reasons for
wanting to appeal the order. A month later, Runkle filed three photographs with the trial
court that depicted a cut on her finger and bruises on her arms that were purportedly
inflicted by Stewart.
{¶ 5} The trial court denominated Runkle’s November 14th handwritten statement
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as a notice of appeal. Runkle thereafter filed a pro se appellate brief with this court.
Contrary to App.R. 16, Runkle’s appellate brief does not contain any assignments of error
for this court to review. Instead, Runkle’s appellate brief consists of a single statement:
“I, Casey Runkle have submitted evidence that Jack Stewart has been abusive, and
would like to ask the court to reconsider the [DV]CPO.” Stewart did not file an appellate
brief in response. The matter is now ripe for consideration.
Law and Analysis
{¶ 6} Requests for DVCPOs are governed by Civ.R. 65.1. Pursuant to that rule,
“[w]hen a magistrate has denied or granted a protection order after a full hearing, the
court may adopt the magistrate’s denial or granting of the protection order upon review of
the order and a determination that there is no error of law or other defect evident on the
face of the order.” Civ.R. 65.1(F)(3)(c)(ii).
{¶ 7} A magistrate’s decision to grant or deny a DVCPO after a full hearing is not
subject to the requirements in Civ.R. 53(D)(2) or (3), which govern procedures for moving
to set aside a magistrate’s order and objecting to a magistrate’s decision. Civ.R.
65.1(F)(3)(b). “[T]he magistrate’s grant or denial of a protection order after a full hearing
is not effective until adopted by the court.” Heimann v. Heekin, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-
130613, 2014-Ohio-4276, ¶ 7, citing Civ.R. 65.1(F)(3)(c).
{¶ 8} Pursuant to Civ.R. 65.1(G), a trial court’s decision to adopt a magistrate’s
decision that grants or denies a DVCPO is a final, appealable order. However, pursuant
to a July 1, 2016 amendment to Civ.R. 65.1, a party must timely file objections to such an
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order prior to filing an appeal. 1 See Civ.R. 65.1(G). Specifically, Civ.R. 65.1(G)
provides that:
Notwithstanding the provisions of any other rule, an order entered by the
court under division (F)(3)(c) or division (F)(3)(e) of this rule is a final,
appealable order. However, a party must timely file objections to such an
order under division (F)(3)(d) of this rule prior to filing an appeal, and the
timely filing of such objections shall stay the running of the time for appeal
until the filing of the court’s ruling on the objections.
{¶ 9} Written objections to the trial court’s adoption of a magistrate’s decision
granting or denying a DVCPO must be filed within 14 days of the trial court filing its order.
Civ.R. 65.1(F)(3)(d)(i). “ ‘If an appellant fails to file timely objections to the trial court’s
adoption of the magistrate’s decision, the appeal must be dismissed.’ ” C.F. v. T.H.R.,
10th Dist. Franklin No. 18AP-536, 2019-Ohio-488, ¶ 6, quoting K.R. v. T.B., 10th Dist.
Franklin No. 17AP-302, 2017-Ohio-8647, ¶ 5.
{¶ 10} Here, the record reflects that Runkle failed to file objections to the trial
court’s adoption of the magistrate’s decision denying the DVCPO. Without timely-filed
objections, Runkle may not challenge the trial court’s decision on appeal. See J.S. v.
D.E., 7th Dist. Mahoning No. 17 MA 0032, 2017-Ohio-7507, ¶ 22, citing Civ.R. 65.1(G).
1 The former version of Civ.R. 65.1 provided a petitioner with two alternatives: (1) an
immediate appeal of the trial court’s adoption of the magistrate’s decision on the
protection order; or (2) the filing of timely objections in the trial court. J.S. v. D.E., 7th
Dist. Mahoning No. 17 MA 0032, 2017-Ohio-7507, ¶ 19, citing Schneider v. Razek, 2015-
Ohio-410, 28 N.E.3d 591, ¶ 31 (8th Dist.), citing 2012 Staff Note to Civ.R. 65.1(F)(3)(d)(i)
(stating the objection process is “an alternative to immediate appeal”).
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Conclusion
{¶ 11} Having found that Runkle failed to file timely objections to the trial court's
adoption of the magistrate’s decision denying the DVCPO after a full evidentiary hearing,
as required by Civ.R. 65.1(G), the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
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DONOVAN, J. and HALL, J., concur.
Copies sent to:
Casey S. Runkle
Jack Stewart
Hon. Stacy M. Wall