State v. Medina , 2021 Ohio 1727 ( 2021 )

[Cite as State v. Medina, 2021-Ohio-1727.]
COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA
STATE OF OHIO, :
Plaintiff-Appellee, :
No. 109693
v. :
JONATHAN MEDINA, :
Defendant-Appellant. :
JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION
JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED
RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: May 20, 2021
Criminal Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas
Case No. CR-19-646338-A
Appearances:
Michael C. O’Malley, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting
Attorney, and Kelly N. Mason, Assistant Prosecuting
Attorney, for appellee.
Rick L. Ferrara, for appellant.
EMANUELLA D. GROVES, J.:
Defendant-appellant Jonathan Medina (“Medina”) appeals his
convictions after entering guilty pleas that he now contends were in violation of
Crim.R. 11. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm.
Procedural and Factual History
In December 2019, a grand jury indicted Medina1 on four counts of
gross sexual imposition with a sexually violent predator specification attached and
four counts of endangering children. The indictments alleged that Medina sexually
abused his ten-year-old stepson. In February 2020, pursuant to a plea agreement,
Medina pled guilty to all four counts of gross sexual imposition, without the
sexually violent predator specification attached, and a single count of endangering
children. In accordance with the plea agreement, Medina stipulated that none of
the counts were allied offenses.
In March 2020, the trial court imposed concurrent prison sentences of
three years on the four counts of gross sexual imposition. In addition, the trial court
imposed a prison sentence of seven and a half to ten and a half years for the count
of endangering children. The trial court ordered Medina to serve the prison
sentence for endangering children consecutively to the concurrent sentences for
gross sexual imposition. Further, the trial court classified Medina as a Tier II
sexual offender.
Medina now appeals, assigning the following two errors for review:
Assignment of Error No. 1
The trial court erred in accepting appellant’s guilty plea without first
finding that it complied with Crim.R. 11 to establish that the plea was
knowing, intelligent and voluntary.
1 Medina’s wife, Ashley Havarcik, was also indicted, subsequently pled guilty to
amended charges, and was sentenced to two years of community control. Havarcik is not
part of this appeal and will only be discussed tangentially in the first assignment of error.
Assignment of Error No. 2
The sentencing under Ohio law violated the Separation of Powers
Doctrine of the Constitution of the state of Ohio and the United States,
Due Process of Law, are void for vagueness and conflict internally with
other Ohio law.
Law and Analysis
In the first assignment of error, Medina argues the trial court failed to
comply with Crim.R. 11 when it accepted his pleas.
Due process requires that a defendant’s plea be made knowingly,
intelligently, and voluntarily; otherwise, the defendant’s plea is invalid. State v.
Bishop, 156 Ohio St.3d 156, 2018-Ohio-5132, 124 N.E.3d 766, ¶ 10, citing State v.
Clark, 119 Ohio St.3d 239, 2008-Ohio-3748, 893 N.E.2d 462, ¶ 25; see also State
v. Engle, 74 Ohio St.3d 525, 527, 1996-Ohio 179, 660 N.E.2d 450. (“When a
defendant enters a plea in a criminal case, the plea must be made knowingly,
intelligently, and voluntarily. Failure on any of those points renders enforcement
of the plea unconstitutional under both the United States Constitution and the Ohio
Constitution.”).
The purpose of Crim.R. 11(C) is to provide the defendant with relevant
information so that he can make a voluntary and intelligent decision whether to
plead guilty. State v. Ballard, 66 Ohio St.2d 473, 480, 423 N.E.2d 115 (1981).
Before accepting a guilty plea in a felony case, a court must comply with Crim.R.
11(C) and “conduct an oral dialogue with the defendant to determine that the plea
is voluntary, and the defendant understands the nature of the charges and the
maximum penalty involved, and to personally inform the defendant of the
constitutional guarantees he is waiving by entering a guilty plea.” State v. Martin,
8th Dist. Cuyahoga Nos. 92600 and 92601, 2010-Ohio-244, ¶ 5.
Recently, in an effort to simplify an appellate courts’ analysis of Crim.R.
11(C) issues, the Ohio Supreme Court, in State v. Dangler, 162 Ohio St.3d 1, 2020-
Ohio-2765, 164 N.E.3d 286, reiterated that “[w]hen a criminal defendant seeks to
have his conviction reversed on appeal, the traditional rule is that he must establish
that an error occurred in the trial-court proceedings and that he was prejudiced by
that error.” Id. at ¶ 13, citing State v. Perry, 101 Ohio St.3d 118, 2004-Ohio-297,
802 N.E.2d 643, ¶ 14-15; Stewart at 93; Crim.R. 52.
The Dangler court continued that it made a limited exception to the
prejudice component of that rule in the criminal-plea context. Specifically, when
a trial court fails to explain the constitutional rights that a defendant waives by
pleading guilty or no contest, we presume that the plea was entered involuntarily
and unknowingly, and no showing of prejudice is required. Dangler at ¶ 14, citing
Clark, 119 Ohio St.3d 239, 2008-Ohio-3748, 893 N.E.2d 462, at ¶ 31; Veney at
syllabus.
Further, the Dangler court created one additional exception to the
prejudice requirement namely: a trial court’s complete failure to comply with a
portion of Crim.R. 11(C) eliminates the defendant’s burden to show prejudice. Id.
at ¶ 15, citing State v. Sarkozy, 117 Ohio St.3d 86, 2008-Ohio-509, 881 N.E.2d 1224,
¶ 22.
Finally, the Dangler court underscored that aside from these two
exceptions, the traditional rule continues to apply, that is, a defendant is not
entitled to have his plea vacated unless he demonstrates he was prejudiced by a
failure of the trial court to comply with the provisions of Crim.R. 11(C). Id. at ¶ 16,
citing Nero, 56 Ohio St.3d at 108, 564 N.E.2d 474. The test for prejudice is
“whether the plea would have otherwise been made.” Id.Moreover, to aid our analysis, the Dangler court also provided a three-
question test namely: “(1) has the trial court complied with the relevant provision
of [Crim.R. 11]? (2) if the [trial] court has not complied fully with the rule, is the
purported failure of a type that excuses a defendant from the burden of
demonstrating prejudice? and (3) if a showing of prejudice is required, has the
defendant met that burden?” Id. at ¶ 17.
We now apply the Dangler court’s three-question test to the facts in
the instant matter.
Within this assignment of error, Medina argues the trial court failed
to ask him whether he understood that he was waiving his right to subpoena
witnesses or to elicit a response that signaled an acknowledgement that he was
waiving that right.
In this matter, the trial court held a joint plea hearing and alternatively
addressed each defendant, prior to accepting their pleas. The following exchange
took place:
THE COURT: [E]ven though your lawyers have already explained your
rights to you, I must be satisfied you understand your rights. Do you
understand that you’re presumed innocent in this case and that by
entering a plea of guilty to the amended indictment that you admit to
the truth of those facts and your full guilt?
DEFENDANT MEDINA: Yes, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Do you understand that you have a right to a trial, your
choice of either a jury trial or to the Court, at which time the State must
prove your guilt and that you’re giving up that right?
DEFENDANT MEDINA: Yes, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Do you understand that you have the right to confront
and cross-examine witnesses the State must bring forth at such a trial
and that you’re giving up that right?
DEFENDANT MEDINA: Yes, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Do you understand you have the right to subpoena
witnesses to testify in your favor at a trial of your case and that you’re
giving up that right?
DEFENDANT HAVARCIK: Yes.
THE COURT: You don’t understand that?
DEFENDANT HAVARCIK: I didn’t hear you.
THE COURT: Pardon me?
DEFENDANT HAVARCIK: No.
THE COURT: All right. You have the right to, you know, have
witnesses come forward that are -- can testify in your favor. If they
don’t want to, you know, the Court can issue a process to compel them
to come forward and testify on your behalf. That’s what that means. I
can subpoena people. If they don’t comply with the subpoena, I can
have sheriffs go out, pick them up, arrest them, bring them back here,
force them to testify; understand?
DEFENDANT HAVARCIK: Yes.
THE COURT: You have that right; do you understand?
DEFENDANT HAVARCIK: Yes, I understand.
THE COURT: Pardon me?
DEFENDANT HAVARCIK: Yes, Your Honor.
THE COURT: All right. Do you understand you have the right to have
the State prove you guilty beyond a reasonable doubt at a trial of your
case and that you’re giving up that right?
DEFENDANT MEDINA: Yes, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Do you understand you have the right to -- not to testify
at the time of the trial of your case which no one may use against you
and that you’re giving up that right?
DEFENDANT MEDINA: Yes, Your Honor.
Tr. 9-12.
A review of the above colloquy and the sentencing transcript reveals
that the trial court gave the proper advisements, regarding the constitutional rights
enumerated in Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(c), that ensured that Medina understood he was
waiving those rights by pleading guilty. Thus, we can answer the first question in
the affirmative.
Although the transcript does not contain an affirmative response from
Medina on the issue of his right to subpoena witnesses to testify on his behalf, the
above excerpt clearly indicates that the trial court tracked the language of Crim.R.
11(C), using words in a reasonably intelligible manner. Except for this sole instance,
Medina repeatedly indicated that he understood the rights he was waiving.
Importantly, when the trial court offered further explanation of the
right to subpoena witnesses, for Havarcik’s benefit, there was no indication that
Medina did not understand. Arguably, Medina could also have benefitted from the
trial court’s additional explanation on this issue.
In addition, the record reveals that defense counsel had reviewed the
plea offer with Medina, along with his constitutional rights. The record also reveals
that both the prosecutor and defense counsel stated that they were satisfied with
the trial court’s compliance with Crim.R. 11. The record demonstrates that Medina
was informed of and understood the nature of the charges, the maximum penalty
involved, the effect of his guilty pleas, and the constitutional rights he would waive
by pleading guilty.
As such, the trial court met its duty in carrying out the specific
mandate of Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(c). Because the trial court complied with the relevant
provision of the rule, we need not engage in any further analysis under the Dangler
three-question test. Id. at ¶ 17.
Following our review of the record, we find that the trial court
complied with Crim.R. 11(C)(2), and that Medina entered his guilty pleas
knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily.
Accordingly, we overrule the first assignment of error.
In his second assignment of error, Medina argues the indefinite
sentencing scheme established by the Regan Tokes Law2 is unconstitutional
2On March 22, 2019, the Ohio legislature enacted the Reagan Tokes Law that
changed the terms of felony sentencing for qualifying felonies of the first or second
degree. See R.C. 2929.14.
because it violates, among other things, constitutional guarantees of separation of
powers and due process.
However, Medina failed to preserve any objection because he did not
raise the issue of the constitutionality of the Reagan Tokes Law at his sentencing
hearing. “It is well established that ‘the question of the constitutionality of a statute
must generally be raised at the first opportunity and, in a criminal prosecution, this
means in the trial court.’” State v. Jenkins, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 109323, 2021-
Ohio-123, ¶ 21, citing State v. Alexander, 12th Dist. Butler No. CA2019-12-204,
2020-Ohio-3838, ¶ 8, quoting State v. Buttery, Slip Opinion No. 2020-Ohio-2998,
¶ 7.
This court has recently declined to address constitutional challenges
to the Reagan Tokes Law when defendants did not object to their sentences or
otherwise raise the constitutionality of the act at their sentencing hearing. See State
v. White, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 109652, 2021-Ohio-126, ¶ 9; State v. Dames, 8th
Dist. Cuyahoga No. 109090, 2020-Ohio-4991, ¶ 12-19; State v. Hollis, 8th Dist.
Cuyahoga No. 109092, 2020-Ohio-5258, ¶ 47-54; and State v. Stone, 8th Dist.
Cuyahoga No. 109322, 2020-Ohio-5263, ¶ 6-10. Therefore, we decline to address
Medina’s constitutional arguments raised for the first time on appeal.
In taking this path, we have acknowledged that we have discretion to
review arguments that were not raised in the trial court for plain error. Recently,
in Dames, we noted:
Even if the appellant failed to object to the constitutionality of the
statute at the trial-court level, appellate courts may still review a trial
court decision for plain error. State v. Quarterman, 140 Ohio St.3d
464, 2014-Ohio-4034, 19 N.E.3d 900, ¶ 16. However, in order to
review for plain error “we require a showing that there was an error,
that the error was plain or obvious, that but for the error the outcome
of the proceeding would have been otherwise, and that reversal must
be necessary to correct a manifest miscarriage of justice.” Dames did
not make any plain error showing for this court to review.
Id. at ¶ 14; see also Hollis at ¶ 50 (“Furthermore, like Dames, appellant failed to raise
a plain error argument in this appeal, and we decline to construct a plain error
argument on appellant’s behalf.”); Stone at ¶ 10 (“In addition to failing to raise a
constitutional challenge of the Reagan Tokes Law in the trial court, Stone also has
not argued plain error in this appeal. Consequently, we decline to address this issue
for the first time on appeal.”). Id.
Accordingly, we overrule the second assignment of error.
Judgment affirmed.
It is ordered that appellee recover from appellant costs herein taxed.
The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the
common pleas court to carry this judgment into execution.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27
of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
_________________________
EMANUELLA D. GROVES, JUDGE
MARY J. BOYLE, A.J., and
SEAN C. GALLAGHER, J., CONCUR