State v. Chambers , 2014 Ohio 390 ( 2014 )

[Cite as State v. Chambers, 2014-Ohio-390.]
Court of Appeals of Ohio
EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA
JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION
No. 99864
STATE OF OHIO
PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE
vs.
LONNIE CHAMBERS, JR.
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT
JUDGMENT:
AFFIRMED
Criminal Appeal from the
Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas
Case No. CR-568780
BEFORE: Jones, P.J., E.A. Gallagher, J., and Stewart, J.
RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: February 6, 2014
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT
Christopher M. Kelley
75 Public Square
Suite 700
Cleveland, Ohio 44113
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Timothy J. McGinty
Cuyahoga County Prosecutor
BY: Carl Sullivan
Assistant County Prosecutor
The Justice Center, 8th Floor
1200 Ontario Street
Cleveland, Ohio 44113
LARRY A. JONES, SR., P.J.:
{¶1} Defendant-appellant Lonnie Chambers appeals his conviction for felonious
assault. We affirm.
I. Procedural History and Facts
{¶2} In 2012, Chambers was charged with one count each of felonious assault and
kidnapping. The matter proceeded to a bench trial at which the following pertinent
evidence was presented.
{¶3} 60 year-old Kenneth Straka testified that Chambers was his boyfriend and
had lived with him for the past six years. Neither man was employed, but Straka
supported them with his social security disability checks.
{¶4} On the day of the assault, Chambers and Straka started drinking beer and
wine; Straka testified that Chambers eventually graduated to 80-proof vodka. Both men
were drunk. The men were in the hallway of their apartment when, according to Straka,
Chambers, unprovoked, started punching him. Chambers repeatedly punched Straka in
the face and also choked him. Straka testified that Chambers broke his ribs and a bone
in his eye, and he remembered being on the ground, but could not remember if Chambers
kicked him in the ribs. Straka testified he could not remember everything because
Chambers just kept punching him. When Chambers went to use the bathroom, Straka
escaped and called the police.
{¶5} Straka was transported to the emergency room by ambulance and admitted to
the hospital. He received morphine to help with the pain and was released with a
prescription for two painkillers. He testified that he got a restraining order against
Chambers and had had no contact with Chambers since the assault, except Chambers had
written him three or four letters from jail.
{¶6} Straka admitted on cross-examination that he was manic depressive and
bipolar and had not been taking his medication when the assault occurred.
{¶7} Lakewood police officers Robert Drake and Ryan Lavelle responded to the
scene. Officer Drake observed “extensive injuries” to Straka’s face, some of which
appeared to be old, and noted that Straka was upset and had been drinking. Straka told
the officer that his rib was hurting and that his “live-in boyfriend,” Chambers, had
assaulted him.
{¶8} When Officer Drake approached Chambers, he observed that he was highly
intoxicated, had bloodshot eyes, had a strong odor of an alcoholic beverage on his breath,
had slurred speech, was slightly incoherent, and was yelling and screaming. Officer
Drake testified that he observed open scabs on Chambers’s knuckles consistent with his
having punched something. Chambers told the officer that he gave Straka a black eye
but he had done so several days earlier.
{¶9} Officer Lavelle also noted Straka’s black eye and that Chambers was
intoxicated, unsteady on his feet, and had open scabs on his knuckles.
{¶10} Lakewood detective Scott Trommer interviewed Chambers shortly after he
was arrested. Chambers told the detective that he did not remember what had happened.
He admitted that he and Straka had argued in the past, but denied that the arguments
ever turned physical. Chambers conceded he had been drinking all day but maintained
he did not remember assaulting Straka.
{¶11} Dr. Mourad El-Gazzer of Lakewood Hospital testified that he treated Straka
for a broken rib and broken zygomatic arch (bone around the eye), hematomas in both
eyes, and a concussion. He testified that Straka complained of seeing black spots,
having nausea, vomiting, and blurred vision, and facial and chest pain. The doctor
further noted that Straka had lost consciousness during the assault. Dr. El-Gazzer
diagnosed Straka with a blunt fracture of the left zygomatic arch and an acute fracture to
one of his ribs. He testified that he had different specialists consult to assess if there was
any further damage. The doctor recommended follow-up care to Straka, including
seeing a plastic surgeon for his eye.
{¶12} Chambers testified on his own behalf. He maintained that he was not
Straka’s boyfriend or “lover,” and had never had “sexual relations” with him. He
admitted he was drunk the night of the incident. According to Chambers, he was trying
to sleep when Straka came in and started “groping” on him, so he punched him to get him
away. After he punched him, Straka “bounced off the table.” Chambers admitted to
punching Straka “once or twice,” but denied choking or kicking him. He stated “it was
just a fight. I hit him with my hands. * * * I’ve been known to get drunk and punch
walls too when I’m drunk.”
{¶13} On cross-examination, Chambers stated that he had been diagnosed with
depression, talked to himself, was an alcoholic, and would black out when he drank too
much. He contended that he never told police his version of events: that he hit Straka
because Straka was groping him, because he did not want to talk about “gay stuff.” He
admitted that when he got drunk he sometimes would get mad and lose his temper.
Chambers admitted: “I mean, I punched him. Fighting. Yeah. I’m guilty of that. * * * I
remember punching him.”
{¶14} The trial court found Chambers guilty of felonious assault but acquitted him
of kidnapping and sentenced him to two years in prison.
II. Law and Analysis
Assignments of Error
[I]. The evidence was insufficient as a matter of law to prove beyond a
reasonable doubt that Mr. Chambers was guilty of felonious assault under
R.C. 2903.11(A)(1).
[II.] Plain error occurred with the admission of Mr. Chamber’s [sic] prior
bad acts testimony in violation of Article I, Section 16 of the Ohio
Constitution and the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution.
[III.] Lonnie Chambers, Jr. was deprived his right to effective assistance of
counsel guaranteed by Article I, Section 16 of the Ohio Constitution and the
Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution by trial
counsel’s failure to zealously present Mr. Chambers’ narrative and theory of
the case.
[IV.] Lonnie Chambers, Jr. was denied his right to effective assistance of
counsel guaranteed by Article I, Section 16 of the Ohio Constitution and the
Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution when
his attorney failed to object to inadmissible prior acts testimony.
Sufficiency of the Evidence
{¶15} In the first assignment of error, Chambers contends that the state presented
insufficient evidence of the element of “serious physical harm” necessary to convict him
of felonious assault.
{¶16} In evaluating a sufficiency of the evidence argument, courts are not to assess
whether the state’s evidence is to be believed but whether, if believed, the evidence
against a defendant would support a conviction. The relevant inquiry is whether, after
viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact
could have found the essential elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt.
State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 386, 678 N.E.2d 541 (1997). The weight and
credibility of the evidence are left to the trier of fact. State v. Jackson, 8th Dist.
Cuyahoga No. 86542, 2006-Ohio-1938, ¶ 23.
{¶17} R.C. 2903.11(A)(1) provides that “no person shall knowingly cause serious
physical harm to another or another’s unborn.” According to Chambers, although Straka
suffered “significant injuries,” his injuries did not rise to the level of serious physical
harm. We disagree.
{¶18} Serious physical harm, as defined by R.C. 2901.01(A)(5), is any of the
following:
(a) Any mental illness or condition of such gravity as would normally
require hospitalization or prolonged psychiatric treatment;
(b) Any physical harm that carries a substantial risk of death;
(c) Any physical harm that involves some permanent incapacity, whether
partial or total, or that involves some temporary, substantial incapacity;
(d) Any physical harm that involves some permanent disfigurement or that
involves some temporary, serious disfigurement;
(e) Any physical harm that involves acute pain of such duration as to result
in substantial suffering or that involves any degree of prolonged or
intractable pain.
{¶19} Straka testified that Chambers punched him multiple times and choked him
until he lost consciousness and blacked out. Specifically, Straka testified that Chambers
“punched me repeatedly, over and over in my face. He strangled me and broke all the
blood vessels in [my left eye]. I had bruises all over my neck. I had a cracked rib and
three fractured ribs, which is finally healed.”
{¶20} Dr. El-Gazzer testified that he treated Straka after he was admitted to the
hospital from the emergency room. Straka complained of nausea, vomiting, blurred
vision, and a loss of consciousness, and suffered from a concussion, hematomas in both
eyes, a fracture in the bone under his left eye and a fracture to his rib. His left eye was
completely swollen shut and he complained of facial and rib pain.
{¶21} The doctor testified he had four or five different specialists consult with
Straka to rule out further injuries. He also ordered a CAT scan and x-rays. To control
his pain, the doctor prescribed morphine in the hospital and Tramadol and Celebrex once
Straka was released from the hospital.
{¶22} In light of the above, we conclude that the state presented sufficient
evidence to show that Chambers caused serious physical harm to Straka. This court has
repeatedly determined that a factfinder does not err in finding serious physical harm
where the evidence establishes the victim suffered injuries necessitating medical
treatment. State v. Andrews, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 93104, 2010-Ohio-3864, ¶ 18;
State v. Morris, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 90820, 2008-Ohio-5469, ¶ 30; State v. Scott, 8th
Dist. Cuyahoga No. 81235, 2003-Ohio-5374; State v. Davis, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No.
81170, 2002-Ohio-7068.
{¶23} Additionally, a loss of consciousness, “irrespective of its duration,” satisfies
the requirements for a temporary, substantial incapacity. State v. Sales, 9th Dist.
Summit No. 25036, 2011-Ohio-2505, ¶ 19; see also State v. Booker, 2d Dist.
Montgomery No. 22990, 2009-Ohio-1039, ¶ 16 (concluding “[t]emporary
unconsciousness constitutes a temporary substantial incapacity, and therefore serious
physical harm”); State v. Swank, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 81AP-749, 1982 Ohio App.
LEXIS 12471 (Feb. 23, 1982) (concluding the state presented sufficient evidence of
serious physical harm in that the victim was knocked temporarily unconscious after being
struck and choked, her face was battered and bleeding, and her eye required six stitches);
State v. Chappell, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 79589, 2002-Ohio-676 (state presented
sufficient evidence of serious physical harm when a defendant hit the victim over the
head with a beer bottle, which caused a loss of consciousness and five stitches over the
eye).
{¶24} Clearly, the fact that Straka suffered a broken bone under his eye, a broken
rib, blurred vision, loss of consciousness, was prescribed morphine and other painkillers,
was hospitalized overnight and saw several specialists for diagnosis and treatment
presented sufficient evidence of the element of “serious physical harm.” Therefore, the
trial court properly overruled Chambers’s motion for judgment of acquittal.
{¶25} The first assignment of error is overruled.
Prior Criminal Conviction
{¶26} In the second assignment of error, Chambers argues that the trial court
committed plain error by admitting into evidence testimony with regard to his prior
attempted felonious assault conviction. Chambers concedes that because his attorney
did not object to the admission of this evidence, he has waived all but plain error.
{¶27} Notice of plain error under Crim.R. 52(B) is to be taken with the utmost
caution, under exceptional circumstances and only to prevent a manifest miscarriage of
justice. State v. Long, 53 Ohio St.2d 91, 372 N.E.2d 804 (1978), at paragraph three of
the syllabus.
{¶28} During the state’s cross-examination of Chambers, the assistant prosecutor
inquired:
State: Now, let’s talk more about your violence. Okay? Let’s talk about
your attempted felonious assault conviction. Do you remember that?
Chambers: Felonious assault? Yeah. That was back in '99 I think.
State: And you went to prison, right?
Chambers: Yeah.
State: And you were placed on parole afterwards, weren’t you?
Chambers: Uh-huh.
State: Okay. So did you have a violent temper back then as well?
Chambers: No. I was mad because my girlfriend was cheating on me.
State: Okay. So you committed another felonious assault?
Chambers: No. She was hollering where’s her half of the wine, so I
airmailed it to her and put some stitches in her head.
State: So you threw the wine bottle at her?
Chambers: Yes.
State: Okay.
Chambers: I did three years over it.
State: Yeah. Did you ever throw wine or glass bottles at Mr. Straka?
Chambers: No.
{¶29} Chambers contends that the above-elicited testimony was inadmissible
under Evid.R. 404(B). The state argues that the testimony was admissible pursuant to
Evid.R. 404(A)(1) and 609(D). The state further argues that Chambers “opened the
door” to the testimony.
Evid.R. 404(B)
{¶30} Chambers argues that his prior attempted felonious assault conviction was
prohibited from coming into evidence by Evid.R. 404(B). Generally, “evidence that an
accused committed a crime other than the one for which he is on trial is not admissible
when its sole purpose is to show the accused’s propensity or inclination to commit crime
or that he acted in conformity with bad character.” State v. Williams, 134 Ohio St.3d
521, 2012-Ohio-5695, 983 N.E.2d 1278, ¶ 15, citing State v. Curry, 43 Ohio St.2d 66, 68,
330 N.E.2d 720 (1975).
{¶31} Evid.R. 404(B) provides:
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the
character of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith. It
may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive,
opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of
mistake or accident. In criminal cases, the proponent of evidence to be
offered under this rule shall provide reasonable notice in advance of trial, or
during trial if the court excuses pretrial notice on good cause shown, of the
general nature of any such evidence it intends to introduce at trial.
{¶32} In determining whether to permit other-acts evidence to be admitted, trial
courts should conduct a three-step analysis set forth in Williams: (1) determine if the
other-acts evidence “is relevant to making any fact that is of consequence to the
determination of the action more or less probable than it would be without the evidence”
under Evid.R. 401; (2) determine if the other acts “is presented to prove the character of
the accused in order to show activity in conformity therewith or whether the other acts
evidence is presented for a legitimate purpose, such as those stated in Evid.R. 404(B)”;
and (3) consider “whether the probative value of the other acts evidence is substantially
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.” Id. at ¶ 20.
{¶33} In this case, the state gave no advance notice of its intent to introduce
other-acts evidence. And, on appeal, the state does not respond to Chambers’s argument
that Evid.R. 404(B) prohibited the testimony about his prior crime; instead the state
focuses on Evid.R. 404(A)(1) and 609 as its avenue for admissibility.
{¶34} Notwithstanding these facts, Chambers’s prior conviction was clearly not
admissible pursuant to Williams. His 1999 conviction for attempted felonious assault
was not relevant to his current case, there was no legitimate purpose to present the
evidence other than to show that Chambers acted in conformity with his past behavior,
and the unfair prejudice to Chambers outweighed any probative value.
Evid.R. 609
{¶35} Evid.R. 609 addresses impeachment of a witness by evidence of conviction
of a crime, stating in relevant part:
(A)(2) * * * [E]vidence that the accused has been convicted of a crime is
admissible if the crime was punishable by death or imprisonment in excess
of one year pursuant to the law under which the accused was convicted and
if the court determines that the probative value of the evidence outweighs
the danger of unfair prejudice, of confusion of the issues, or of misleading
the jury.
(B) Evidence of a conviction under this rule is not admissible if a period of
more than ten years has elapsed since the date of the conviction or of the
release of the witness from the confinement, or the termination of
probation, * * * or parole * * * unless the court determines, in the interests
of justice, that the probative value of the conviction supported by specific
facts and circumstances substantially outweighs its prejudicial effect.
{¶36} Therefore, if a conviction such a felonious assault is more than ten years old,
Evid.R. 609(B) requires a trial court to set forth “specific facts” on the record that reflect
the facts and circumstances justifying the admission of the “stale” conviction. State v.
Triplett, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 97522, 2012-Ohio-3804, ¶ 38, citing State v. Shepherd,
8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 81926, 2003-Ohio-3356, ¶ 23. Stale convictions, moreover,
should be admitted only in rare circumstances. Triplett citing id.{¶37} In this case, Chambers was convicted of attempted felonious assault in 1999.
Although he was sentenced to three years in prison in his 1999 case and placed on parole
after he was released from prison, there was no evidence presented in the current case that
his release date from parole was less than ten years from the trial date in this case.
Therefore, the court cannot assume that his conviction falls within the ten-year time limit
established by Evid.R. 609 and, consequently, his conviction dating from 1999 was
inadmissible without a determination by the trial court that the probative value of this
evidence outweighed its prejudicial effect. Because the trial court did not make such
specific findings before permitting the state to introduce the evidence, the court clearly
erred in allowing in this evidence. See Triplett at ¶ 40.
Evid.R. 404(A)(1)
{¶38} The state also contends that Chambers “opened the door” to the testing of
his credibility by taking the stand and testifying on his own behalf. Although evidence
about a person’s character is generally inadmissible, “[e]vidence of a pertinent trait of
character offered by an accused, or by the prosecution to rebut the same is admissible.”
Evid.R. 404(A)(1). In other words, a court will not find error “when the defense opens
the door to otherwise inadmissible evidence.” State v. Davis, 195 Ohio App.3d 123,
2011-Ohio-2387, 958 N.E.2d 1260, ¶ 26 (8th Dist.).
{¶39} Here, defense counsel did not ask any questions of Chambers, nor did
Chambers offer any information, that would have opened the door to questioning about
his prior convictions. During his direct examination, Chambers admitted to being an
alcoholic and to drinking on the day in question. He denied having a romantic
relationship with Straka. He asserted that on the evening of the assault he was trying to
sleep when Straka started groping him and he punched Straka one or two times.
Chambers never gave evidence of a “pertinent trait of character” that the prosecutor could
attempt to rebut with questions about his prior conviction. Therefore, the testimony was
not admissible under Evid.R. 404(A)(1).
Harmless Error Analysis
{¶40} Even though we have determined that it was error for the trial court to allow
in testimony about Chambers’s 1999 conviction, error in the admission of evidence is
harmless if there is no reasonable possibility that exclusion of the evidence would have
affected the result of the trial. State v. Boczar, 11th Dist. Ashtabula No. 2007-A-0034,
2008-Ohio-834, ¶ 50, citing State v. Webb, 70 Ohio St.3d 325, 335, 638 N.E.2d 1023(1994).
{¶41} In order to determine whether the admission of testimony on the prior
convictions is prejudicial, an appellate court must review that evidence in light of the
totality of other evidence properly introduced by the prosecution at trial. Id. The
admission of the testimony regarding past convictions will be deemed harmless error if
there is overwhelming evidence of guilt. Id.; see also State v. Walker, 8th Dist.
Cuyahoga No. 94875, 2011-Ohio-1556, ¶ 38. A review of the entire record in this case
demonstrates that the error was harmless.
{¶42} Chambers argues that the trial court improperly relied on his past conviction
in finding him guilty of the felonious assault against Straka. To support this contention,
Chambers cites to the following statement the trial court made in reading its verdict:
“[Chambers] testified [about] a prior relationship when he found out that his girlfriend
cheated on him, he airmailed a wine bottle to her, and that was the earlier incident in his
lifetime. So apparently we have an issue of a little bit of intoxication and issues coming
up during that.”
{¶43} Although we are concerned that the trial court mentioned Chambers’s 1999
conviction during the verdict, it could hardly have considered that Chambers was likely to
have committed the instant offense based upon that conviction. More importantly, there
was overwhelming evidence of Chambers’s guilt, including his own admission that he
was the one who punched Straka. Specifically, Chambers testified on
cross-examination: “I never denied blacking his eye. I wasn’t trying to break anything
or anything like that. * * * I didn’t do it on purpose. No, I didn’t deny I hit him. * * *
I didn’t mean to break anything * * * that wasn’t on purpose.”
{¶44} In sum, although the trial court erred in allowing in evidence of Chambers’s
prior conviction, it was not reversible error given the overwhelming evidence of
Chambers’s guilt.
{¶45} The second assignment of error is overruled.
Effective Assistance of Counsel
{¶46} In the third and fourth assignments of error, Chambers argues that he was
afforded ineffective assistance of counsel at trial.
{¶47} We review a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel under the two-part
test set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674(1984). In order to prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, an appellant
must demonstrate that his counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of
reasonable representation; and if so, show there was a reasonable probability that his
counsel’s errors affected the outcome of the proceedings. Id.{¶48} Chambers complains that trial counsel did not zealously represent him by
failing to cross-examine the police officers in the case with regard to whether they came
upon Chambers asleep in his bed, as he claimed, or came upon him awake. This
omission, according to Chambers, was central to his theory of the case and a material fact
because it supports his argument that he assaulted Straka after Straka groped him.
Chambers also complains that the trial court, in rendering its verdict, found that his
testimony was not credible because his attorney did not thoroughly cross-examine the
state’s witnesses. Finally, Chambers argues that his attorney did not effectively
represent him because counsel failed to object to testimony about his prior attempted
felonious assault conviction.
{¶49} A review of the trial transcripts shows that Chambers received effective
assistance of counsel. It is apparent from defense counsel’s opening argument that
Chambers’s did not deny punching Straka; the theory of the case was that he was
provoked by Straka’s romantic advances and Straka’s injuries did not rise to the level of
serious physical harm. Thus, whether Chambers was asleep when the police arrived was
not necessarily central to his theory of the case. In so far as Chambers complains about
defense counsel’s chosen method of cross-examination, we will not second-guess
counsel’s trial tactics.
{¶50} Finally, as we have found no reversible error in the admission of evidence
of Chambers’s prior conviction, we do not find Chambers was denied the effective
assistance of trial counsel for counsel’s failure to object to the admission of said evidence.
{¶51} Therefore, Chambers is unable to show that his trial counsel’s representation
fell below an acceptable standard of reasonable representation or that counsel’s errors
affected the outcome of the trial.
{¶52} The third and fourth assignments of error are overruled.
{¶53} Accordingly, judgment is affirmed.
It is ordered that appellee recover from appellant costs herein taxed.
The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the common
pleas court to carry this judgment into execution. The defendant’s conviction having
been affirmed, any bail pending appeal is terminated. Case remanded to the trial court
for execution of sentence.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of
the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
LARRY A. JONES, SR., PRESIDING JUDGE
EILEEN A. GALLAGHER, J., and
MELODY J. STEWART, J., CONCUR