Stanfield v. Reading Bd. of Educ. , 106 N.E.3d 197 ( 2018 )

[Cite as Stanfield v. Reading Bd. of Edn., 2018-Ohio-405.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO
HAMILTON COUNTY, OHIO
NICHOLAS JAMES STANFIELD, : APPEAL NO. C-160895
TRIAL NO. A-1500998
and :
SANDRA LYNN HALE, :
O P I N I O N.
Plaintiffs-Appellants, :
vs. :
READING BOARD OF EDUCATION, :
Defendant-Appellee, :
and :
CITY OF READING, OHIO, :
Defendant. :
Civil Appeal From: Hamilton County Court of Common Pleas
Judgment Appealed From Is: Affirmed in Part, Reversed in Part, and Cause
Remanded
Date of Judgment Entry on Appeal: February 2, 2018
The Law Office of John D. Hill, LLC, and John D. Hill, Jr., for Plaintiffs-Appellants,
Raymond H. Decker, Jr., for Defendant-Appellee.
OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
DETERS, Judge.
{¶1} Plaintiffs-appellants Nicholas Stanfield and Sandra Hale appeal the
decision of the trial court granting summary judgment to defendant-appellee
Reading Board of Education (the “Board”) on appellants’ personal-injury complaint,
arising from injuries Stanfield sustained during track-and-field practice. Because we
determine that the trial court erred in granting political-subdivision immunity to the
Board on the entirety of appellants’ complaint, we reverse a portion of the trial
court’s judgment.
I. Factual Background and Procedural Posture
{¶2} In 2014, Stanfield, then a senior at Reading High School, participated
in the school’s track-and-field program in the discus event. Reading’s track-and-field
students practiced at Reading Veteran’s Memorial Stadium (the “stadium facility”).
The Board does not own the stadium facility—it is owned by the City of Reading. The
stadium facility contained a discus area, consisting of a discus “cage” and a concrete
pad. The cage area was marked by a series of poles. At the start of the first practice
of the track-and-field season, Reading’s discus coach, with the aid of students,
retrieved netting from a shed on the facility and secured the netting to the poles with
ties. The discus coach instructed the students to stay behind the netting while
another student was throwing the discus. According to Stanfield, the netting gaped
near the poles and had several holes. Several days later, on March 17, 2014, during
discus practice, Stanfield suffered a severe head injury when a discus thrown by
another student hit Stanfield in the head.
{¶3} Stanfield and his mother, Hale, filed a complaint for money damages
against the City of Reading, the Board, and several John Doe defendants. The City of
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Reading filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing in part that it was immune
from liability under Ohio’s recreational-user statute. The Board also filed a motion
for summary judgment, arguing that it was immune from liability under Ohio’s
Political Subdivision Tort Liability Act. In relevant part, the Board argued that it was
entitled to the general grant of immunity under R.C. 2744.02(A)(1), and that the only
exception to immunity that could arguably apply would be R.C. 2744.02(B)(4), the
physical-defect exception. However, the Board argued that because it did not own
the stadium facility, Stanfield’s injury did not occur on school grounds and the Board
could not be held liable under this exception.
{¶4} The trial court granted the summary-judgment motions of the City of
Reading and the Board. Stanfield and Hale appeal the trial court’s decision with
respect to the Board only.
II. Political-Subdivision Immunity
{¶5} In a single assignment of error, appellants argue that the trial court
erred in granting summary judgment to the Board. This court conducts a de novo
review of a trial court’s summary-judgment decision, applying the standards set forth
in Civ.R. 56. See Grafton v. Ohio Edison Co., 77 Ohio St. 3d 102, 105, 671 N.E.2d 241
(1996). Moreover, issues regarding political-subdivision immunity under R.C.
Chapter 2744 present questions of law, “properly determined prior to trial and
preferably on a motion for summary judgment.” Scott v. Kashmiry, 2015-Ohio-
3902, 42 N.E.3d 339, ¶ 14 (10th Dist.).
{¶6} As an initial matter, we note that a political subdivision, such as a
public-school board, acts through its employees. Elston v. Howland Local Schools,
113 Ohio St. 3d 314, 2007-Ohio-2070, 865 N.E.2d 845, ¶ 18, 26. In determining
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whether a political subdivision is immune from a civil lawsuit for damages, a three-
tiered analysis applies. R.K. v. Little Miami Golf Ctr., 2013-Ohio-4939, 1 N.E.3d
833, ¶ 8 (1st Dist.). In the first tier, political subdivisions receive a general grant of
immunity in a civil action for damages allegedly caused by any act or omission of a
political subdivision or employee in connection with a governmental or proprietary
function. See R.C. 2744.02(A)(1). The second tier provides certain exceptions to the
general grant of immunity. See R.C. 2744.02(B). If one of the exceptions in R.C.
2744.02(B) applies, the third tier provides for reinstatement of immunity if the
political subdivision can show that one of the defenses contained in R.C. 2744.03
applies. Elston at ¶ 12.
III. Physical-Defect Exception to Immunity
{¶7} Appellants do not dispute that the Board is a political subdivision and
that the operation of a public school’s athletic program is a governmental function.
See R.C. 2744.01(F) and (C)(2)(c). Therefore, appellants agree that the Board is
entitled to the general grant of immunity under R.C. 2744.02(A)(1). Appellants also
agree that R.C. 2744.02(B)(4), the physical-defect exception, is the only exception to
the general grant of immunity which would apply in this case. Therefore, we begin
our legal analysis with the physical-defect exception.
{¶8} R.C. 2744.02(B)(4) provides in relevant part that “[p]olitical
subdivisions are liable for injury, death, or loss to person or property that is caused
by the negligence of their employees and that occurs within or on the grounds of, and
is due to physical defects within or on the grounds of, buildings that are used in
connection with the performance of a governmental function * * *.”
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OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
{¶9} In support of its motion for summary judgment, the Board argues that
the physical-defect exception requires that an injury occur on the grounds of the
Board’s property. In support of this proposition, the Board cites two cases from the
Tenth Appellate District, Bush v. Beggrow, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 03AP-1238,
2005-Ohio-2426, and Slane v. Hilliard, 2016-Ohio-306, 59 N.E.3d 545 (10th Dist.).
In Bush, a middle-school student was walking home from school on the berm of a
public road when he was hit by a car. The student sued the Columbus City School
Board, among others. The student alleged that the school board had been negligent
in failing to provide crossing guards, traffic assistance by police officers, or other
safety measures for students walking home. The Tenth District analyzed the
student’s claims under former R.C. 2744.02(B)(4), which omitted the physical-defect
requirement, and provided liability for political subdivisions for injury “caused by
the negligence of their employees and that occurs within or on the grounds of
buildings that are used in connection with the performance of a governmental
function * * *.” The Tenth District determined that even if the school board had been
negligent, the student had not been injured “on school premises,” and therefore
former R.C. 2744.02(B)(4) did not apply. Bush at ¶ 40.
{¶10} The facts of Slane are similar to those in Bush. In Slane, a student was
crossing a public street at a crosswalk on her way to school when she was injured.
The school-zone “flashers” for the crosswalk were not working or not activated, and
the pedestrian “walk/don’t walk” signals were also not working. The student filed a
complaint against the city of Hilliard and the Hilliard City School District. As to the
school district, the student argued that the district had been negligent in failing to
illuminate school-zone signs and in failing to maintain the “walk/don’t walk” signal
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for the before-school period. In affirming the trial court’s decision in favor of the
school district, the Tenth District determined that the student had sustained her
injury “on a public roadway and not within the grounds of buildings the district uses
in connection with the performance of its governmental function.” Slane at ¶ 42.
{¶11} The Board argues that Bush and Slane held that a student’s injury
must take place on school grounds, and in this case, because the Board does not own
the stadium facility, the city does, the physical-defect exception cannot apply to the
Board. In Bush and Slane, the undisputed evidence showed that the injured students
had been injured on public roadways—not on the “grounds of * * * buildings that are
used in connection with the performance of a governmental function[,]” as required
by the physical-defect exception. See R.C. 2744.02(B)(4). To the extent that Bush
can be read to require that the injury occur on school-owned property, we disagree.
Moreover, Slane actually relies on the plain language of R.C. 2744.02(B)(4), which
does not require the political subdivision to own the property where the injury
occurs. The statute does not speak to “ownership,” but requires only that the injury
or loss occur within or on the grounds of buildings “used in connection with the
performance of a governmental function.” Id. Therefore, the Board’s argument is
contrary to the plain language of the statute.
{¶12} In this case, the evidence in the record indicates that Stanfield was
injured on the grounds of a building used in connection with the performance of a
governmental function. The parties have agreed that the school’s track-and-field
program is a governmental function. Moreover, Stanfield testified that the stadium
facility, where all football and track events were held for the high school, had
contained a shed with a garage door where the discus netting had been kept.
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Therefore, the record indicates a building on the grounds. See R.K., 2013-Ohio-
4939, 1 N.E.3d 833, at ¶ 24, quoting Mathews v. Waverly, 4th Dist. Pike No.
08CA787, 2010-Ohio-347, ¶ 32 (“In determining whether a building is used in
connection with a governmental function, the building need not ‘house the actual,
physical operations, maintenance, etc., of a governmental body,’ but instead the
question is ‘whether the building is logically, not literally, connected to the
performance of a governmental function.’ ”).
{¶13} The Board warns that if it is held liable for the student’s injury in this
case, school districts will be subject to liability for defects wherever a school activity
might take place, regardless of the school district’s affiliation with the location. This
is not so. R.C. 2744.02(B)(4) requires that the injury or loss occur (1) due to
employee negligence, (2) within or on the grounds of a building used in connection
with the performance of a governmental function, and (3) because of a physical
defect within or on the grounds. See R.K., 2013-Ohio-4939, 1 N.E.3d 833, at ¶ 15.
Therefore, school districts will not be held liable for an injury due to defects
wherever a school activity might take place.
{¶14} The Board also summarily argues that appellants have been unable to
show that the netting constitutes a “physical defect.” In R.K., we defined physical
defect as “a perceivable imperfection that diminishes the worth or utility of the object
at issue.” R.K., 2013-Ohio-4939, 1 N.E.3d 833, at ¶ 16. According to Stanfield, the
netting had holes and gaped near the poles. Appellants provided an affidavit from
the discus coach at Moeller High School, in which the discus coach opined that the
netting he observed at the stadium facility was “dilapidated” and “unsatisfactory.”
The Board does not point to any evidence that would support the notion that a
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OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
gaping and holed netting, which is supposed to stop a two-pound discuss from
careening towards onlookers, is not defective. Therefore, we hold that the physical-
defect exception to immunity applies in this case.
IV. Defenses to Reinstate Immunity
{¶15} The Board contends that even if the physical-defect exception applies
to impose liability upon the Board for its employees’ negligence, immunity for the
Board would be restored by R.C. 2744.03(A)(3) and (A)(5). R.C. 2744.03(A)(3)
restores immunity for a political subdivision “if the action or failure to act by the
employee involved that gave rise to the claim of liability was within the discretion of
the employee with respect to policy-making, planning, or enforcement powers by
virtue of the duties and responsibilities of the office or position of the employee.”
R.C. 2744.03(A)(5) restores immunity for a political subdivision if the injury or loss
“resulted from the exercise of judgment or discretion in determining whether to
acquire, or how to use, equipment, supplies, materials, personnel, facilities, and
other resources unless the judgment or discretion was exercised with malicious
purpose, in bad faith, or in a wanton or reckless manner.” The Board argues that the
track-and-field coaches had discretion with respect to instruction and supervision of
the students, as well as the equipment used for practice.
{¶16} R.C. 2744.03(A)(3) and (A)(5) defenses are meant to protect the
exercise of discretion and judgment, and not those decisions requiring little
discretion or independent judgment. R.K., 2013-Ohio-4939, 1 N.E.3d 833, at ¶ 31,
citing Hall v. Bd. of Edn., Fort Frye Local School Dist., 111 Ohio App. 3d 690, 676
N.E.2d 1241 (4th Dist.1996). A “routine maintenance decision requiring little
judgment or discretion” does not fall within the purview of R.C. 2744.03(A)(3) and
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(A)(5). Perkins v. Norwood City Schools, 85 Ohio St. 3d 191, 193, 707 N.E.2d 868
(1999) (“decision of whom to employ to repair a leaking drinking fountain is not the
type of decision involving the exercise of judgment or discretion contemplated in
R.C. 2744.03(A)(5)”). By contrast, “teachers and coaches, as employees of a political
subdivision, have ‘wide discretion under R.C. 2744.03(A)(5) to determine what level
of supervision is necessary to ensure the safety of the children in’ their care.” Elston,
113 Ohio St. 3d 314, 2007-Ohio-2070, 865 N.E.2d 845, at ¶ 20, quoting Marcum v.
Talawanda City Schools, 108 Ohio App. 3d 412, 416, 670 N.E.2d 1067 (12th
Dist.1996).
A. Inadequate-Supervision Claims
{¶17} Two claims in appellants’ complaint allege that the Board failed to
adequately supervise the track-and-field events. These inadequate-supervision
claims fall within R.C. 2744.03(A)(5) regarding the exercise of judgment or
discretion in determining use of school personnel. See Elston, 113 Ohio St. 3d 314,
2007-Ohio-2070, 865 N.E.2d 845, at ¶ 20. However, even if claims fall within the
exercise of discretion or judgment under R.C. 2744.03(A)(5), political-subdivision
immunity can be lost once again if the exercise of judgment or discretion “was
exercised with malicious purpose, in bad faith, or in a wanton or reckless manner.”
See R.C. 2744.03(A)(5). Although appellants allege in their complaint that the Board
acted recklessly with respect to supervising the students, nothing in the record
indicates that the Board consciously disregarded or showed an indifference to an
obvious risk of harm to the students, which amounted to unreasonable conduct
under the circumstances. See Anderson v. Massillon, 134 Ohio St. 3d 380, 2012-
Ohio-5711, 983 N.E.2d 266, paragraph four of the syllabus. Stanfield testified that
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the discus coach had instructed the students regarding safety, and that the students
had been told to stay behind the netting. Therefore, to the extent that appellants’
claims assert that the Board failed to provide adequate supervision, the Board is
immune under R.C. 2744.03(A)(5).
B. Defective-Netting Claims
{¶18} The remainder of appellants’ claims allege that Stanfield’s injuries
resulted from defective netting. In R.K., we considered whether the maintenance of
tree limbs on a county-owned golf course involved judgment or discretion under R.C.
2744.03(A)(3) and (A)(5). We determined that allegations that a park district failed
to maintain a tree limb was not a discretionary decision, and therefore neither R.C.
2744.03(A)(3) nor (A)(5) applied. R.K., 2013-Ohio-4939, 1 N.E.3d 833, at ¶ 35.
Similarly, the decision by the Board’s employees to use netting, instead of repairing
or replacing the netting, does not result from the exercise of discretion and
judgment. See id. at ¶ 32, citing McVey v. City of Cincinnati, 109 Ohio App. 3d 159,
163, 671 N.E.2d 1288 (1st Dist.1995) (the operation of escalators at a stadium parking
facility does not involve discretion and judgment); Hall, 111 Ohio App. 3d at 700, 676
N.E.2d 1241 (the maintenance of an irrigation system on a high-school practice field
does not involve the exercise of judgment or discretion); Leasure v. Adena Local
School Dist., 2012-Ohio-3071, 973 N.E.2d 810 (4th Dist.) (an employee’s
maintenance of bleachers in a school gymnasium does not involve an exercise of
judgment). Therefore, we determine that neither R.C. 2744.03(A)(3) nor (A)(5)
apply to appellants’ claims alleging defective netting, and therefore immunity for the
Board is not restored with respect to those claims.
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V. R.C. 2744.03(A)(6) is Inapplicable
{¶19} Finally, the Board argues that appellants have not shown that an
employee of the Board could be found liable under R.C. 2744.03(A)(6). We interpret
the Board’s argument to mean that the Board is entitled to immunity because an
employee would be entitled to immunity under R.C. 2744.03(A)(6). R.C.
2744.03(A)(6) provides immunity to individual employees for negligent actions and
omissions. See Massillon at ¶ 18. R.C. 2744.03(A)(6) applies to claims against an
individual employee—not the political subdivision. See Fabrey v. McDonald Village
Police Dept., 70 Ohio St. 3d 351, 356, 639 N.E.2d 31 (1994) (“R.C. 2744.03(A)(6) by
its very terms applies only to individual employees and not to political
subdivisions.”). Thus, R.C. 2744.03(A)(6) has no bearing on the Board’s summary-
judgment motion or this appeal.
VI. Conclusion
{¶20} In conclusion, although the Board is entitled to the general grant of
immunity as a political subdivision under R.C. 2744.02(A)(1), we determine that the
physical-defect exception under R.C. 2744.02(B)(4) applies to abrogate the Board’s
immunity. As to Counts 13 and 17 of appellants’ complaint, which allege that the
Board failed to provide adequate supervision of the students, we determine that
immunity for the Board is reinstated under R.C. 2744.03(A)(5), and thus we hold
that the trial court did not err in granting summary judgment to the Board as to
Counts 13 and 17. With respect to the remainder of appellants’ claims against the
Board, which arise from allegations of defective netting, we hold that the trial court
erred in granting summary judgment to the Board. Therefore, we sustain appellants’
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assignment of error in part, and we reverse the judgment of the trial court with
respect to all claims against the Board, except Counts 13 and 17.
Judgment affirmed in part, reversed in part, and cause remanded.
MOCK, P.J., and CUNNINGHAM, J., concur.
Please note:
The court has recorded its own entry on the date of the release of this opinion.
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