In re K.V. ( 2022 )


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  • [Cite as In re K.V., 
    2022-Ohio-4290
    .]
    COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
    EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
    COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA
    IN RE K.V., ET AL.                            :
    :            No. 111668
    A Minor Child                                 :
    :
    [Appeal by Mother]                            :
    JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION
    JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED
    RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: December 1, 2022
    Civil Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas
    Juvenile Division
    Case Nos. AD-20-910497, AD-20-910498, and AD-20-910499
    Appearances:
    Gregory T. Stralka, for Mother.
    Michael C. O’Malley, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting
    Attorney, and Joseph C. Young, Assistant Prosecuting
    Attorney, for appellee.
    MARY J. BOYLE, J.:
    In this consolidated appeal, appellant-mother (“Mother”), appeals
    from the juvenile court order awarding permanent custody of her children, K.V.,
    M.V., and G.G., to the Cuyahoga County Division of Children and Family Services
    (“CCDCFS”). Mother argues the trial court abused its discretion when it denied her
    motion for continuance and CCDCFS failed to present sufficient evidence to
    establish a basis upon which permanent custody could be granted. For the reasons
    set forth below, we affirm.
    I. Facts and Procedural History
    On December 4, 2020, CCDCFS filed a complaint in juvenile court,
    alleging that K.V. (d.o.b. 12/07/2015), M.V. (d.o.b. 12/28/2016), G.G. (04/19/2018)
    (collectively, “the children”), and two other siblings, J.G. and S.G. (not the subject
    of this appeal) were abused, neglected, and dependent and requested
    predispositional temporary custody. The complaint alleges that C.V. (“Father”), the
    alleged father of K.V., M.V. and G.G., was arrested. Upon his arrest, a gun and illegal
    drugs were found in Father’s possession. Father also has multiple convictions for
    drug-related offenses. The complaint further alleges that Mother fails to provide for
    the children’s basic needs on a consistent basis. Mother regularly leaves the children
    home for extended periods of time without an appropriate plan of care for the
    children, and K.V was previously adjudicated delinquent. The complaint further
    alleges that Mother was previously convicted of drug possession and child
    endangering and G.G. was the victim of child endangering.
    After a hearing held on December 15, 2020, the juvenile court ordered
    that the children be placed in the predispositional temporary custody of CCDCFS.
    The court held a hearing on the complaint for temporary custody on March 1, 2021.
    After the conclusion of this hearing, the court adjudicated the children abused,
    neglected, and dependent, and they were committed to the temporary custody of
    CCDCFS. Within the adjudication order, the court found “that the allegations of the
    Complaint, as amended by the Court based on the testimony presented, have been
    proven by clear and convincing evidence. The amended complaint is attached to the
    order as Exhibit A and marked as Court’s Exhibit A.” (Judgment Entry, Mar. 4,
    2021.) The allegations included facts relating to Mother’s failure to provide for the
    children’s educational and basic needs, the children’s prior adjudication due to
    Mother’s substance abuse issues, Mother’s prior convictions for drug possession and
    child endangering, and the discovery of illegal drugs in Mother’s purse and home.
    The court also approved and attached the case plan, which included
    objectives relating to Mother’s substance abuse and parenting issues. The case plan
    reflects that Mother “has a history of substance abuse, specifically cocaine and
    amphetamines. She tested positive recently for both. Her drug use has interfered
    with her ability to provide care to her children on a daily basis.” (Judgment Entry,
    Mar. 4, 2021.) The case plan required Mother to undergo a drug and alcohol
    assessment, successfully complete any recommended treatment and aftercare, sign
    a release of information, submit to random screens, and successfully complete a
    parenting program approved by CCDCFS.
    On September 23, 2021, CCDCFS filed a motion to modify temporary
    custody to permanent custody. The affidavit attached in support of the motion
    indicated that Mother “ha[d] not engaged in case plan services,” “has only had
    limited communication with the assigned Agency worker,” and “ha[d] unresolved
    charges of Possession of Meth * * * and Attempted Possession of Drugs.”
    On May 24, 2022, the matter proceeded to trial on CCDCFS’s
    permanent custody motion. Prior to the start of trial, Mother’s attorney requested
    a continuance, stating,
    I respectfully request a continuance of today’s hearing. This is my first
    meeting with my client in quite some time. She informs me of some
    progress that she has made on the case plan and since the older two
    children, there already is an extension of temporary custody, I
    respectfully request the same opportunity regarding the three younger
    children.
    (May 24, 2022, tr. 5.) The trial court noted that the extension for the two older
    children was based on their father’s progress with his case plan and not due to
    Mother’s situation. (May 24, 2022, tr. 5-6.) CCDCFS objected to the continuance
    request, stating that
    this [permanent custody] motion was filed in September of 2021.
    We’ve got them pending for roughly eight months. In that time, mother
    has not appeared.
    While I understand counsel’s desires to talk to her client and see where
    her client has been. The fact remains it’s been eight months and she
    has been missing from this case. She has been for several months
    missing from the purview of the Agency. We’ve made several attempts
    to contact her and have been unsuccessful. So we are prepared to move
    forward today, your Honor.
    (May 24, 2022, tr. 6.)
    The trial court stated that it had scheduled numerous hearings on the
    permanent custody motion dating back to before January “to allow the mother an
    opportunity to show up. Every time we have come in [Mother’s trial counsel] has
    informed the Court of all of the very numerous efforts that she has made to try to
    contact her client.” (May 24, 2022, tr. 7.) The court then denied the continuance
    request.   Father’s attorney then advised the court that Father is currently
    incarcerated, has pending federal charges, and anticipates a prison sentence of at
    least ten years. (May 24, 2022, tr. 8.) Father’s attorney further advised that Father
    is in agreement with permanent custody to CCDCFS. (May 24, 2022, tr. 8.)
    At trial, testimony was first received from CCDCFS child protection
    specialist Kenneth Orlowski (“Orlowski”). Orlowski testified that the children first
    came to the attention of CCDCFS in 2020 due to educational neglect. (May 24,
    2022, tr. 16-17.) He stated that “from March 9th of 2020 through mid September of
    2020 [the children] had not attended school at all.” (May 24, 2022, tr. 17.) The
    initial investigation revealed additional concerns relating to drug charges, gun
    charges, and deplorable housing. (May 24, 2022, tr. 17.) Orlowski further testified
    that J.G., S.G., and K.V. had previously been in agency custody due to similar issues
    involving parenting and substance abuse, as well as housing, domestic violence, and
    anger management. (May 24, 2022, tr. 20-22.)
    After the children were ordered placed in agency custody, a case plan
    was developed and implemented to promote the permanency plan of reunification.
    (May 24, 2022, tr. 20-22.) CCDCFS referred Mother to services through Recovery
    Resources to address her parenting issues and had completed all but one class before
    she became unlocatable. (May 24, 2022, tr. 22-23.) The parenting program was
    willing to have her come in and complete her remaining class to finish the program
    in early December 2021, but indicated that if she failed to appear as scheduled, she
    would have to start over with the service. (May 24, 2022, tr. 23.) CCDCFS was
    unable to locate Mother at that time, and the parenting objective remained
    incomplete due to her failure to complete all of the required parenting classes.
    (May 24, 2022, tr. 23-24.) Orlowski explained, “[W]hen we were trying to get in
    touch with mother it was really hard to actually establish any kind of
    communication. Phone numbers would change and although sometimes mother
    would make visits to the children, it was often very difficult to set up any kind of
    services.” (May 24, 2022, tr. 24.) Orlowski further explained that he attempted to
    arrange Mother’s services through Recovery Resources because he was aware that
    Mother
    had an outstanding warrant and I knew that at the time recovery
    resources would potentially do her classes through the prison and then
    they could also do that with the substance treatment because I’ve had
    clients in the past where they’ve done both of those while I’ve had a
    client that has been incarcerated and this way we could keep all of the
    services under one roof at the time so that mother could sort out her
    warrant and be able to do her services at the same time.
    (May 24, 2022, tr. 24-25.)
    Orlowski referred Mother to Recovery Resources for substance abuse
    services as well. (May 24, 2022, tr. 25.) He urged her to engage with them, and
    Mother completed an assessment, but then never returned to complete the
    recommended treatment or to submit to drug screening as requested. (May 24,
    2022, tr. 25-26.) Orlowski requested screening from Mother whenever he met with
    her but noted that “she would disappear for months at a time[.]” (May 24, 2022, tr.
    26.) Other than an initial failed attempt to screen, Mother never submitted to any
    of the other screens as requested. (May 24, 2022, tr. 25-26.) Aside from her failure
    to address her substance abuse issues, CCDCFS’s
    biggest concern [was] that mother would disappear. She was gone
    from mid December through either late April or early May where she
    hadn’t seen the kids, she hadn’t talked to the maternal grandmother
    who had the kids, she hadn’t been in contact with the Agency. And to
    be gone for several months at a time was concerning.
    ***
    In addition there had been several criminal run-ins in the past. * * *
    [M]other had been incarcerated and has been working on trying to get
    her warrants worked out, but she still does have outstanding criminal
    charges.
    (May 24, 2022, tr. 27.)
    Despite repeated efforts to contact Mother by phone, text, and
    through her own mother, Orlowski has not been able to speak with Mother and had
    not seen her from December of 2021, until the day of trial on May 24, 2022.
    (May 24, 2022, tr. 29.) Mother also had outstanding criminal charges at the time
    of trial related to failure to appear in court and attempted drug possession, for which
    there was an outstanding warrant for Mother’s arrest. (May 24, 2022, tr. 27-28.)
    CCDCFS set up visitation so that Mother could have weekly visits with
    the children at the maternal grandmother’s house. (May 24, 2022, tr. 32.) When
    Mother did attend these visits, “she tended to be good with the kids. She paid
    attention to them.” (May 24, 2022, tr. 32.) Orlowski testified that Mother’s
    attendance at visitation with the children was sporadic and, at the time of trial in
    May 2022, she had not seen the children at all since December 2021. (May 24, 2022,
    tr. 32-34.)
    On cross-examination, Orlowski testified that all three children could
    go to interested parties or relatives through adoption. (May 24, 2022, tr. 38.) He
    further testified that the children have been in CCDCFS custody since December 15,
    2020, and Mother
    had had a parenting class previously when she had lost custody before
    now and regained the children and although she regained the children,
    she also retained her substance issue and although she had nearly
    finished her parenting class, she was still picking up legal charges and
    still abusing substances[.]
    (May 24, 2022, tr. 43-44.) Mother also failed to demonstrate the ability to obtain
    and maintain appropriate housing. (May 24, 2022, tr. 43-44.)
    Testimony was next received from the children’s maternal
    grandmother. She testified that the children would be brought to her house by their
    foster mother and that they visited with their maternal grandparents and their two
    older siblings, J.G. and S.G, who were at her house. (May 24, 2022, tr. 48-49, 56.)
    These visits were one day a week. (May 24, 2022, tr. 49-50.) The children, who
    were four, five, and six years old at the time of trial, engaged with the family in a
    loving manner during visits. (May 24, 2022, tr. 50.) She indicated that Mother was
    attending the weekly visits but stopped attending in December 2021 and had not
    been back to visit since then. (May 24, 2022, tr. 50-51.) She acknowledged that
    when Mother is “good, she’s a phenomenal mommy, [and does] crafts, breakfast,
    lunch and dinner. She does everything by the book. When she falters, she goes
    down, she needs help right now and she can do it.” (May 24, 2022, tr. 53.) Maternal
    grandmother further testified about Mother’s ability to care for the children, stating
    that “[s]he’s very good when she’s good. When she’s not, forget it, you know, and I
    have to take care of them.” (May 24, 2022, tr. 55.) Maternal grandmother testified
    that Mother needs “detox and rehab.” (May 24, 2022, tr. 54.) She testified to
    Mother’s substance abuse issues and failure to engage in treatment, stating “I think
    [Mother] just denied what she was doing. She was hiding it and we all knew, but she
    hides it and I just think [it’s] her mindset. I just can tell when she pleads inside that
    she wants out of this hole and she wants out. She’s not enjoying her life right now
    at all.” (May 24, 2022, tr. 59.)
    The children’s guardian ad litem (“GAL”) stated on the record his
    recommendation in favor of permanent custody, noting that Mother had not made
    any significant progress on her case plan objectives and that “there’s no reason for
    an extension of temporary custody” because Mother “hasn’t made any significant
    progress to warrant that extension.” (May 24, 2022, tr. 61-62.) The GAL concluded
    that “[w]e can’t wait for [Mother] to get her act together.           These kids need
    permanency.” (May 24, 2022, tr. 62.)
    After the conclusion of trial, the court issued a judgment entry for
    each of the children in which it terminated parental rights and found by clear and
    convincing evidence that it is in the best interests of the children to be placed in the
    permanent custody of CCDCFS. The court further found that children cannot be
    placed with either of their parents within a reasonable period of time or should not
    be placed with either parent.
    It is from this order that Mother appeals, raising the following two
    assignments of error for review:
    Assignment of Error No. 1: The trial court’s denial of [Mother’s]
    request for a continuance was an abuse of discretion since it effectively
    denied the [Mother’s] right to counsel.
    Assignment of Error No. 2: [CCDCFS] failed to present sufficient
    evidence to establish a basis upon which permanent custody could be
    granted.
    II. Law and Analysis
    A. Motion for Continuance
    The decision to grant or deny a motion for a continuance rests within
    the broad discretion of the trial court. State v. Froman, 
    162 Ohio St.3d 435
    , 2020-
    Ohio-4523, 
    165 N.E.3d 1198
    , ¶ 91, citing State v. Unger, 
    67 Ohio St.2d 65
    , 67, 
    423 N.E.2d 1078
    , syllabus (1981). This broad discretion is also afforded to the trial court
    in a permanent custody hearing. In re A.W., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 109239, 2020-
    Ohio-3373, ¶ 25.
    We recognize that “[b]iological parents have a constitutionally
    protected right to be present at a permanent custody hearing.” In re A.W. at ¶ 25,
    citing In re Sears, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 01AP-715, 
    2002-Ohio-368
    , ¶ 11. ““‘There
    are no mechanical tests for deciding when a denial of a continuance is so arbitrary
    as to violate due process. The answer must be found in the circumstances present
    in every case, particularly in the reasons presented to the trial judge at the time the
    request is denied.”’” Id. at ¶ 26, quoting Unger at 67, quoting Ungar v. Sarafite, 
    376 U.S. 575
    , 589, 
    84 S.Ct. 841
    , 
    11 L.Ed.2d 269
     (1964). Factors to consider include:
    “[T]he length of the delay requested; whether other continuances have
    been requested and received, the inconvenience to litigants, witnesses,
    opposing counsel and the court; whether the requested delay is for
    legitimate reasons or whether it is dilatory, purposeful, or contrived;
    whether the defendant contributed to the circumstance which gives rise
    to the request for a continuance; and other relevant factors, depending
    on the unique facts of each case.”
    In re A.W. at ¶ 26, quoting Unger at 67-68.
    In addition, Juv.R. 23 provides that “[c]ontinuances shall be granted
    only when imperative to secure fair treatment for the parties” and Loc.R. 35(C) of
    the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas, Juvenile Division provides:
    No case will be continued on the day of trial or hearing except for good
    cause shown, which cause was not known to the party or counsel prior
    to the date of trial or hearing, and provided that the party and/or
    counsel have used diligence to be ready for trial and have notified or
    made diligent efforts to notify the opposing party or counsel as soon as
    he/she became aware of the necessity to request a postponement. This
    rule may not be waived by consent of counsel.
    “Because the termination of parental rights has been described as the
    family law equivalent of the death penalty in a criminal case, courts have required
    that ‘great care be taken to ensure that due process is afforded parents in parental
    termination proceedings.’’’ In re A.W., 
    2020-Ohio-3373
    , at ¶ 29, quoting In the
    Matter of Rachal, 6th Dist. Lucas No. L-02-1306, 
    2003-Ohio-1041
    , ¶ 12. The parent
    facing termination of parental rights, however, “‘must exhibit cooperation and must
    communicate with counsel and with the court in order to have standing to argue that
    due process was not followed in a termination proceeding.’” 
    Id.,
     quoting In re Q.G.,
    
    170 Ohio App.3d 609
    , 
    2007-Ohio-1312
    , 
    868 N.E.2d 713
    , ¶ 12 (8th Dist.).
    Here, Mother argues the trial court’s denial of her request for a
    continuance was an abuse of discretion since it effectively denied her the right to
    counsel. Mother’s counsel requested a continuance because Mother disappeared for
    a period of time and counsel needed an opportunity to prepare the case. Mother
    argues that since this was the first requested trial continuance and continuances are
    given greater consideration in permanent custody cases, the denial of the
    continuance was an abuse of discretion.
    The record reflects that while Mother did appear for trial, her
    counsel’s statement at the beginning of the proceedings made clear that Mother had
    not kept in regular contact with her attorney prior to the trial date. Mother’s
    appearance at trial was the first contact she had with counsel in “some time.”
    Mother’s counsel stated that “[t]his is my first meeting with my client in quite some
    time. She informs me of some progress that she had made on the case plan and since
    the older two children, there already is an extension of temporary custody, I
    respectfully request the same opportunity regarding the three younger children.”
    (May 24, 2021, tr. 5). The trial court noted, however, that the extension for the two
    older children was based on their father’s progress with his case plan, and not due
    to Mother’s situation. The court further noted that it had scheduled a number of
    hearings on the permanent custody motion “to allow [Mother] an opportunity to
    show up. Every time we have come in [Mother’s counsel] has informed the Court of
    all of the very numerous efforts that she has made to try to contact her client.”
    (May 24, 2021, tr. 6-7.) CCDCFS stated that the permanent custody motion had
    been “pending for roughly eight months. In that time, mother has not appeared. *
    * * [I]t’s been eight months and mother has been missing from this case. She has
    been for several months missing from the purview of the Agency. We’ve made
    several attempts to contact her and have been unsuccessful.” (May 24, 2021, tr. 6.)
    While Mother argues that the court’s denial of her motion for
    continuance was an abuse of discretion, she has not explained her unexpected
    absence from the court proceedings. Under Loc.R. 35(C), good cause must be shown
    for a case to be continued on the day of trial. Here, the children have been in
    CCDCFS’s custody since December 2020.          Since the filing of the motion for
    permanent custody in September 2021, there had been at least six hearing dates
    prior to trial, and Mother failed to remain in communication with her trial counsel.
    Mother’s counsel was unable to provide any justifiable reason for delaying the trial
    other than Mother’s failure to clearly and consistently communicate with counsel
    and Mother’s failure to timely engage in case plan services. Therefore, under the
    Unger factors, we are unable to conclude that the trial court abused its discretion
    when it denied the continuance after Mother failed to communicate with the court
    or her counsel regarding the circumstances of her absence.
    To the extent Mother argues that she was denied the right to effective
    assistance of counsel, we note that Mother’s claim is unsupported by the record,
    which demonstrates that Mother was fully represented throughout the proceedings
    and that any alleged lack of preparation was the sole result of her own inaction. At
    trial, Mother’s counsel gave an opening statement, cross-examined the witnesses,
    and gave a closing statement. In In re A.M.N., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 111155, 2022-
    Ohio-2048, this court rejected a similar argument, noting that despite a claim of
    ineffectiveness due to a lack of preparation, father’s trial counsel gave an opening
    and a closing statement, conducted the direct examination of father, and cross-
    examined the other witnesses. Id. at ¶17. Likewise, in the instant case, we cannot
    say that the juvenile court abused its discretion by denying counsel’s 11th-hour
    request for a continuance.
    Therefore, the first assignment of error is overruled.
    B. Permanent Custody
    1. Standard of Review
    When reviewing a juvenile court’s judgment in child custody cases,
    the Ohio Supreme Court has stated that the “court’s decision in a custody proceeding
    is subject to reversal only upon a showing of abuse of discretion.” In re A.J., 
    148 Ohio St.3d 218
    , 
    2016-Ohio-8196
    , 
    69 N.E.3d 733
    , ¶ 27, citing Davis v. Flickinger, 
    77 Ohio St.3d 415
    , 417, 
    674 N.E.2d 1159
     (1997).
    2. R.C. 2151.414 Test for Determining Permanent Custody
    We recognize that the “[t]ermination of parental rights is an
    alternative of last resort but is sanctioned when necessary for the welfare of a child.”
    In re M.S. at ¶ 7, citing In re Wise, 
    96 Ohio App.3d 619
    , 624, 
    645 N.E.2d 812
     (9th
    Dist.1994). Before a court may terminate parental rights and award permanent
    custody of a child to the proper agency, it must determine by clear and convincing
    evidence that (1) one of the factors enumerated in R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(a)-(e) applies,
    and (2) an award of permanent custody is in the child’s best interest.              R.C.
    2151.414(B).
    “‘Clear and convincing evidence’ is evidence that ‘will produce in the
    mind of the trier of facts a firm belief or conviction as to the allegations sought to be
    established.’” In re C.B., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 92775, 
    2011-Ohio-5491
    , ¶ 28,
    quoting Cross v. Ledford, 
    161 Ohio St. 469
    , 477, 
    120 N.E.2d 118
     (1954). “Where clear
    and convincing proof is required at trial, a reviewing court will examine the record
    to determine whether the trier of fact had sufficient evidence before it to satisfy the
    requisite degree of proof.” In re T.S., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 92816, 2009-Ohio-
    5496, ¶ 24, citing State v. Schiebel, 
    55 Ohio St.3d 71
    , 74, 
    564 N.E.2d 54
     (1990).
    “‘An appellate court will not reverse a juvenile court’s termination of
    parental rights and award of permanent custody to an agency if the judgment is
    supported by clear and convincing evidence.’” In re J.M-R., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No.
    98902, 
    2013-Ohio-1560
    , ¶ 28, quoting In re Jacobs, 11th Dist. Geauga No. 99-G-
    2231, 
    2000 Ohio App. LEXIS 3859
    , 11 (Aug. 25, 2000), citing In re Taylor, 11th Dist.
    Ashtabula No. 97-A-0046, 
    1999 Ohio App. LEXIS 2620
     (June 11, 1999). See also In
    re AR.S., 
    2021-Ohio-1958
    , 
    174 N.E.3d 28
     (8th Dist.)
    a. R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(a)-(e) Factors
    Relevant to the instant case, the factors set forth in R.C.
    2151.414(B)(1) include the following: the child cannot be placed with either parent
    within a reasonable period of time or should not be placed with either parent. R.C.
    2151.414(B)(1)(a). We note that “[o]nly one of the factors must be present to satisfy
    the first prong of the two-part analysis for granting permanent custody to an
    agency.” In re D.H., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 110505, 
    2021-Ohio-3821
    , ¶ 27, citing
    In re L.W., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 104881, 
    2017-Ohio-657
    .
    Here, the juvenile court found that the children “cannot be placed
    with either of the child’s parents within a reasonable time or should not be placed
    with the child’s parents” as set forth in R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(a). In cases where R.C.
    2151.414(B)(1)(a) applies, courts look to the factors set forth in R.C. 2151.414(E) to
    determine whether a child cannot be placed with a parent within a reasonable time
    or should not be placed with a parent.
    In the judgment entry granting permanent custody, the juvenile court
    considered the following factors set forth in R.C. 2151.414(E): Mother had failed to
    remedy the conditions that caused the children to be placed outside her home (R.C.
    2151.414(E)(1)); Mother’s chemical dependency is so severe that it makes her unable
    to presently, or within one year of trial, provide an adequate permanent home for
    the children (R.C. 2151.414(E)(2)); Mother demonstrated a lack of commitment
    toward the children by failing to support, visit, or communicate with the children or
    provide an adequate permanent home for them (R.C. 2151.414(E)(4)); Mother has
    abandoned the children (R.C. 2151.414(E)(10)); Father was incarcerated at the time
    of the filing of the motion for permanent custody (R.C. 2151.414(E)(12)); Mother is
    unwilling to provide food, clothing, shelter, and other basic necessities for the
    children (R.C. 2151.414(E)(14)); and “any other factor the court considers relevant,”
    which in this case is the fact that Father entered into an agreement to permanent
    custody (R.C. 2151.414(E)(16)).
    Only one of the enumerated factors under R.C. 2151.414(E) is
    required for the court to make the finding that “‘the child cannot be placed with
    either parent within a reasonable time or should not be placed with either parent.’”
    In re L.W., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 107708, 
    2019-Ohio-1343
    , ¶ 29, quoting In re
    Glenn, 
    139 Ohio App.3d 105
    , 113, 
    742 N.E.2d 1210
     (8th Dist.2000), and citing In re
    R.M., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga Nos. 98065 and 98066, 
    2012-Ohio-4290
    , ¶ 14 (the
    existence of only one factor will support the court’s finding that the child cannot be
    reunified with the parent within a reasonable time).
    Citing to R.C. 2151.414(E)(1) and 2151.414(E)(2), Mother’s argument
    focuses on the juvenile court’s findings that the children should not be placed with
    either parent within a reasonable amount of time. She further argues that there was
    no evidence that her chemical dependency prevented her from providing an
    adequate home for her children within a year. As a result, our discussion will
    address these two factors.
    Our review of the record clearly and convincingly supports the
    juvenile court’s determination that the children could not be placed with Mother
    within a reasonable period of time. Trial testimony demonstrates that Mother’s case
    plan objectives were incomplete due to her failure to make herself available or to
    complete all parenting classes as required.       While Mother did complete an
    assessment, she never completed the recommended treatment or submitted to drug
    screening as requested. Orlowski requested drug screenings from Mother but noted
    that “she would disappear for months at a time[.]” (May 24, 2021, tr. 26). Despite
    repeated efforts to contact Mother by phone call, text, and through her own mother,
    Orlowski had not been able to speak with Mother and had not met with her since
    December 2021.       Mother also had outstanding criminal charges, including
    attempted drug possession, at the time of trial and an outstanding warrant for her
    arrest.   At the time of trial, Mother had not demonstrated through changed
    behaviors any benefit from the services she had engaged in, she did not complete
    any of the services as referred, and she did not demonstrate the ability to achieve or
    maintain sobriety. Mother also failed to demonstrate the ability to obtain and
    maintain appropriate housing.
    The record further supports the juvenile court’s determination that
    Mother’s chronic chemical dependency is so severe that it makes her unable to
    provide an adequate permanent home for the children. The amended original
    complaint that resulted in the children being adjudicated dependent contained
    allegations that directly implicate Mother’s chemical dependency. The allegations
    included facts relating to the children’s prior adjudication due to Mother’s substance
    abuse issues, prior convictions for drug possession and child endangering, and the
    discovery of illegal drugs in her purse and home. The case plan included objectives
    relating to Mother’s substance abuse issues and indicated that Mother “has a history
    of substance abuse, specifically cocaine and amphetamines.” The evidence at trial
    revealed that S.G. and J.G, as well as K.V., had previously been in agency custody
    due to substance abuse. Moreover, Mother’s ongoing chemical dependency issues
    were also acknowledged at trial by her own mother, who testified that Mother “needs
    help.” Orlowski referred Mother to Recovery Resources and had urged her to engage
    with them, and while Mother did complete an assessment, she never returned to
    complete the recommended treatment or to submit to drug screening as requested.
    We recognize that Mother has taken steps to address her chemical
    dependency and that she is “very good” with the children when she’s sober.
    However, as this court has previously stated, “[a]lthough commendable, this does
    not of itself preclude a grant of permanent custody to a children services agency.
    Substantial compliance with a case plan does not mean that the parent has achieved
    the ultimate goals of the plan or that the parent has substantially remedied the
    conditions that caused the children to be removed.” In re A.P., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga
    No. 104129, 
    2016-Ohio-5848
    , ¶ 19, citing In re J.B., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga Nos. 98566
    and 98567, 
    2013-Ohio-1706
    . Although Mother participated in case plan services
    and had visitation, she abandoned the children for approximately five months and
    did not provide any support or other assistance to them during the entire time the
    children were in the temporary custody of CCDCFS.
    Collectively, this evidence supports the juvenile court’s finding that
    Mother failed to remedy the conditions that caused the children to be placed outside
    the home. While these actions alone are sufficient to satisfy the first prong of R.C.
    2151.414(B), Mother’s actions also demonstrated that she abandoned the children,
    she had a lack of commitment towards the children, and she was unable to provide
    the children with a safe and permanent home. Accordingly, we find the record
    clearly and convincingly supports the court’s conclusion that the children could not
    or should not be placed with Mother within a reasonable time.
    Having found that the trial court properly concluded that at least one
    of the R.C. 2151.414(B)(1) conditions applies, we must next determine whether the
    trial court appropriately found by clear and convincing evidence that granting
    permanent custody to the agency is in the children’s best interest.
    b. The Children’s Best Interest
    In determining the best interest of a child, the juvenile court must
    consider all relevant factors, including, but not limited to, the following:
    (a) The interaction and interrelationship of the child with the child’s
    parents, siblings, relatives, foster caregivers and out-of-home
    providers, and any other person who may significantly affect the child;
    (b) The wishes of the child, as expressed directly by the child or through
    the child's guardian ad litem, with due regard for the maturity of the
    child;
    (c) The custodial history of the child, including whether the child has
    been in the temporary custody of one or more public children services
    agencies or private child placing agencies for twelve or more months of
    a consecutive twenty-two-month period * * *;
    (d) The child’s need for a legally secure permanent placement and
    whether that type of placement can be achieved without a grant of
    permanent custody to the agency;
    (e) Whether any of the factors in divisions (E)(7) to (11) of this section
    apply in relation to the parents and child.
    R.C. 2151.414(D)(1).
    Although a trial court is required to consider each relevant factor
    under R.C. 2151.414(D)(1) in deciding to award permanent custody, “[t]here is not
    one element that is given greater weight than the others pursuant to the statute.” In
    re Schaefer, 
    111 Ohio St.3d 498
    , 
    2006-Ohio-5513
    , 
    857 N.E.2d 532
    , ¶ 56. This court
    has stated that only one of these enumerated factors needs to be resolved in favor of
    the award of permanent custody. In re L.W., 
    2019-Ohio-1343
    , at ¶ 39, citing In re
    Moore, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 76942, 
    2000 Ohio App. LEXIS 3958
     (Aug. 31,
    2000).
    Here, the juvenile court found that a grant of permanent custody is in
    the best interest of the children and the children cannot be placed with one of their
    parents within a reasonable time or should not be placed with either parent. As
    stated above, the testimony presented at trial demonstrated that while Mother acted
    appropriately with the children when she did visit them, she had not seen the
    children in the five months that passed since December 2021. While Mother did
    engage in parenting classes, she did not complete the program before she became
    unlocatable. Mother was also unable to demonstrate proof of sobriety and failed to
    obtain stable housing of her own. Additionally, Father was incarcerated pending
    federal charges, anticipated a prison sentence of at least ten years, and agreed to
    permanent custody. Furthermore, the children were removed and had been in
    CCDCFS custody for approximately 18 months by the time of trial in May 2022.
    Moreover, the GAL recommended that the court find permanent
    custody to be in the children’s best interests. The GAL noted that the children were
    six, five, and four years old and were too young to decide their own wishes. The GAL
    stated that Mother had not made any significant progress on her case plan objectives
    and that “there’s no reason for an extension of temporary custody” because Mother
    “hasn’t made any significant progress to warrant that extension.” (May 24, 2022, tr.
    61-62.) The GAL concluded that “[w]e can’t wait for [Mother] to get her act together.
    These kids need permanency.” (May 24, 2022, tr. 62.)
    Based on the foregoing, we find there is clear and convincing evidence
    in the record to support the juvenile court’s determination that permanent custody
    to CCDCFS is in the children’s best interests.
    Therefore, the second assignment of error is overruled.
    III. Conclusion
    Mother failed to demonstrate that the juvenile court abused its
    discretion by denying her request for continuance on the day of trial when Mother’s
    actions caused the delay. In addition, the juvenile court’s findings and its judgments
    granting permanent custody of the children to CCDCFS are supported by clear and
    convincing evidence in the record.
    Accordingly, judgment is affirmed.
    It is ordered that appellee recover from appellant costs herein taxed.
    The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
    It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the
    common pleas court, juvenile division, to carry this judgment into execution.
    A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27
    of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
    MARY J. BOYLE, JUDGE
    ANITA LASTER MAYS, P.J., and
    EILEEN T. GALLAGHER, J., CONCUR
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 111668

Judges: Boyle

Filed Date: 12/1/2022

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 12/1/2022