State v. Corn , 2022 Ohio 3095 ( 2022 )

[Cite as State v. Corn, 2022-Ohio-3095.]
STATE OF OHIO ) IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
)ss: NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
COUNTY OF MEDINA )
STATE OF OHIO C.A. No. 22CA0010-M
Appellant
v. APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT
ENTERED IN THE
MAURICE EDWARD CORN, SR. MEDINA MUNICIPAL COURT
COUNTY OF MEDINA, OHIO
Appellee CASE No. 21 TRC 01959
DECISION AND JOURNAL ENTRY
Dated: September 6, 2022
SUTTON, Judge.
{¶1} Appellant, the State of Ohio, appeals from the decision of the Medina Municipal
Court, granting a motion to suppress filed by Appellee, Maurice Corn. This Court reverses.
I.
{¶2} Just before 10:00 p.m. one Sunday evening, Ohio State Highway Patrol Sergeant
John Nemastil was traveling northbound on Interstate 71. He spotted a stopped vehicle on the
right berm of the highway and slowed his cruiser. The stopped vehicle’s right turn signal was
activated, but its hazard lights were off. Consistent with his department’s policy, Sergeant
Nemastil activated his cruiser’s lights and pulled behind the stopped vehicle to perform a welfare
check.
{¶3} Sergeant Nemastil approached the stopped vehicle on the passenger’s side to speak
with the driver, Mr. Corn, and his front seat passenger. The sergeant detected an odor of alcohol
coming from the vehicle and noticed that Mr. Corn had red, bloodshot, and glassy eyes. He also
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noticed that Mr. Corn had an unlit cigarette hanging from his lips and, at different times, slurred
his words. Although Mr. Corn admitted to having consumed alcohol that evening, he claimed
several hours had elapsed since his last drink. Concerned that Mr. Corn might be impaired,
Sergeant Nemastil asked him to step out of the vehicle. He subsequently performed field sobriety
testing and arrested Mr. Corn.
{¶4} Mr. Corn was charged with one count of operating a vehicle under the influence of
alcohol (“OVI”) and one count of OVI with a prohibited blood alcohol concentration. He moved
to suppress the evidence against him, arguing that Sergeant Nemastil lacked reasonable suspicion
to detain him once his welfare check was complete. The State filed a brief in opposition to Mr.
Corn’s motion, and the trial court held a hearing. At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court
issued a ruling from the bench as well as a written journal entry. The trial court concluded that
Sergeant Nemastil lacked reasonable suspicion for Mr. Corn’s continued detention and granted
Mr. Corn’s motion to suppress.
{¶5} The State now appeals from the trial court’s suppression ruling and raises two
assignments of error for our review.
II.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR I
THE ACTING JUDGE OF THE MEDINA MUNICIPAL COURT ERRED IN
GRANTING [MR. CORN’S] MOTION TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE.
{¶6} In its first assignment of error, the State argues the trial court erred when it granted
Mr. Corn’s motion to suppress. Specifically, the State challenges the trial court’s determination
that Sergeant Nemastil lacked reasonable suspicion to extend Mr. Corn’s detention beyond its
initial purpose. Upon review, this Court sustains the State’s first assignment of error.
{¶7} The Supreme Court of Ohio has stated:
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Appellate review of a motion to suppress presents a mixed question of law and fact.
When considering a motion to suppress, the trial court assumes the role of trier of
fact and is therefore in the best position to resolve factual questions and evaluate
the credibility of witnesses. Consequently, an appellate court must accept the trial
court’s findings of fact if they are supported by competent, credible evidence.
Accepting these facts as true, the appellate court must then independently
determine, without deference to the conclusion of the trial court, whether the facts
satisfy the applicable legal standard.
(Internal citations omitted.) State v. Burnside, 100 Ohio St.3d 152, 2003-Ohio-5372, ¶ 8.
{¶8} Mr. Corn concedes that Sergeant Nemastil lawfully initiated their exchange based
on the community caretaking exception to the warrant requirement. See, e.g., State v. Delong, 9th
Dist. Lorain No. 18CA011306, 2018-Ohio-5262, ¶ 10 (describing community caretaking
exception); State v. Clapper, 9th Dist. Medina No. 11CA0031-M, 2012-Ohio-1382, ¶ 13
(“[C]ommunity caretaking functions have been recognized in cases where a vehicle is stationary
in an area where it should not be parked, as it gives rise to an inference as to the vehicle’s or the
driver’s impairment.”). The only question before the trial court was whether it was unlawful for
the sergeant to keep detaining Mr. Corn once he concluded his welfare check. Accordingly, this
Court limits its review to that issue.
{¶9} “An officer may not prolong a stop for the purpose of conducting inquiries
unrelated to the original purpose [for the stop] without ‘the reasonable suspicion ordinarily
demanded to justify detaining an individual.’” State v. Iloba, 9th Dist. Wayne No. 20AP0030,
2021-Ohio-3700, ¶ 9, quoting Rodriguez v. United States, 575 U.S. 348, 355 (2015). If, during
the stop, “the officer discovers additional facts from which it is reasonable to infer additional
criminal activity[,] the officer is permitted to lengthen the duration of the stop to investigate such
suspicions.” State v. Williams, 9th Dist. Lorain No. 09CA009679, 2010-Ohio-3667, ¶ 15. Accord
State v. Robinette, 80 Ohio St.3d 234, 241 (1997). “The question is whether, under the totality of
the circumstances, the officer possessed reasonable suspicion to extend the detention.” State v.
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Lee, 9th Dist. Summit No. 29597, 2020-Ohio-4970, ¶ 9. “A totality of the circumstances review
includes consideration of ‘(1) [the] location; (2) the officer’s experience, training or knowledge;
(3) the suspect’s conduct or appearance; and (4) the surrounding circumstances.’” State v.
Kordich, 9th Dist. Medina No. 15CA0058-M, 2017-Ohio-234, ¶ 7, quoting State v. Biehl, 9th Dist.
Summit No. 22054, 2004-Ohio-6532, ¶ 14. Reasonable suspicion is based on the facts known to
the officer at the time of his investigation. See State v. Hunter, 9th Dist. Lorain No. 06CA008871,
2006-Ohio-5810, ¶ 5.
{¶10} The trial court made each of the following factual findings. At approximately 9:51
p.m. on a Sunday evening, Sergeant Nemastil spotted a stopped vehicle while traveling northbound
on Interstate 71. At the time, the sergeant had ten years’ worth of experience as an Ohio State
Highway Patrolman and had conducted at least 1,000 OVI arrests. The vehicle that Sergeant
Nemastil spotted was located on the right berm of the highway, and its right turn signal was
activated. The sergeant ultimately approached the vehicle on the passenger’s side and spoke with
Mr. Corn and his front seat passenger. The sergeant quickly determined that Mr. Corn’s vehicle
was sound and that neither he, nor his passenger, was having a medical emergency. Mr. Corn
notified the sergeant that he had pulled over to change the setting on his GPS and to use the
bathroom.
{¶11} During his conversation with Mr. Corn, Sergeant Nemastil observed several
indicators of impairment. Specifically, he noted the odor of alcohol in the vehicle, the fact that
Mr. Corn had red, bloodshot, and glassy eyes, and the fact that an unlit cigarette was hanging from
Mr. Corn’s lips. Mr. Corn also admitted that he had consumed alcohol that evening but claimed it
had been several hours since he had done so “because he ‘was a CDL driver.’” Mr. Corn had no
trouble producing his license or insurance and did not display any impaired motor skills while
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inside the vehicle. After speaking with Mr. Corn and making the foregoing observations, Sergeant
Nemastil asked him to exit the vehicle.
{¶12} The trial court found that Sergeant Nemastil acted unlawfully when he asked Mr.
Corn to step out of his vehicle, and therefore, any evidence the sergeant garnered from that point
forward was inadmissible. The court found that a few factors pointed toward Mr. Corn’s possible
impairment, including the appearance of his eyes and the smell of alcohol coming from his vehicle.
The court also reasoned, however, that other factors weighed against the conclusion that he was
impaired. Those factors included the time and day of the stop, the location of the stop, the lack of
any erratic driving on the part of Mr. Corn, the lack of any third-party reporting he might be
intoxicated, Mr. Corn’s cooperative demeanor, and Mr. Corn’s limited admission of an unspecified
amount of alcohol several hours earlier.
{¶13} Acknowledging that Sergeant Nemastil noticed Mr. Corn’s speech was slurred, the
trial court found that the slurred speech was “not an indication of impairment in and of itself.” The
court found that Mr. Corn suffered from a speech impediment based on testimony he offered during
the suppression hearing. Further, the court noted, Sergeant Nemastil never described the intensity
of the odor of alcohol he smelled while standing outside Mr. Corn’s vehicle. Finding that more
factors weighed in favor of Mr. Corn, the court identified as “the tipping point” in its analysis the
fact that “no impaired or erratic driving was witnessed by the trooper, nor were any actions of [Mr.
Corn] while still in the vehicle indicating a lack of coordination.” Based on its consideration of
the totality of circumstances, the trial court concluded that Sergeant Nemastil lacked reasonable
suspicion for Mr. Corn’s continued detention.
{¶14} The State has not challenged any of the trial court’s factual findings, and our review
of the record supports the conclusion that those findings are based on competent, credible
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evidence. Accordingly, this Court accepts those findings as true. See Burnside, 100 Ohio St.3d
152, 2003-Ohio-5372, at ¶ 8. We limit our review to the trial court’s legal conclusion that Sergeant
Nemastil lacked reasonable suspicion to detain Mr. Corn once he completed his welfare check.
See id.{¶15} The State argues that multiple factors supported Sergeant Nemastil’s continued
detention of Mr. Corn. Those factors included the sergeant finding Mr. Corn parked on the berm
of the highway at 10:00 p.m., the smell of alcohol coming from his vehicle, the unlit cigarette
hanging from his mouth, his red, bloodshot, and glassy eyes, his slurred speech, and his admission
that he had consumed alcohol that evening. While Sergeant Nemastil did not observe any impaired
driving on the part of Mr. Corn, the State argues that any such observation was an impossibility
given that Mr. Corn’s vehicle was already stopped when the sergeant first observed it. The State
notes that Sergeant Nemastil had significant experience conducting OVI investigations and
arresting impaired individuals. Under the totality of the circumstances, the State argues, the
sergeant was justified in continuing to detain Mr. Corn to investigate his possible impairment.
{¶16} As previously noted, reasonable suspicion is adjudged under a standard of objective
reasonableness based on the facts known to an officer at the time of his investigation. Hunter,
2006-Ohio-5810, at ¶ 6. It is not entirely clear whether the trial court gave any weight to Mr.
Corn’s slurred speech in conducting its totality of the circumstances review as it wrote that Mr.
Corn’s speech was not an indication of impairment “in and of itself.” To the extent the trial court
did not consider Mr. Corn’s slurred speech as a possible indicator of impairment, however, we
must conclude that it erred by failing to do so. Even if Mr. Corn’s slurred speech was caused by
a speech impediment, Sergeant Nemastil was not aware of that fact while conducting his
investigation. See id. Moreover, “[f]acts which could be given an innocent interpretation will
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support the decision to briefly detain someone for questioning, ‘so long as one may rationally infer
from the totality of the circumstances that the person may be involved in criminal activity.’” Id.
at ¶ 6, quoting State v. Jones, 9th Dist. Summit No. 20810, 2002 WL 389055, *3 (Mar. 13, 2002).
Sergeant Nemastil noted Mr. Corn’s slurred speech in conjunction with the other indicators of
impairment he observed that evening.
{¶17} Based on a review of the totality of the circumstances, this Court must conclude
that Sergeant Nemastil possessed reasonable suspicion to detain Mr. Corn to investigate his
possible impairment. The sergeant encountered Mr. Corn at a late hour, he smelled alcohol
emanating from Mr. Corn’s vehicle, he saw that Mr. Corn’s eyes were red, bloodshot, and glassy,
he heard Mr. Corn slur words while speaking with him, and Mr. Corn admitted he had consumed
alcohol that evening. Compare State v. High, 9th Dist. Medina No. 17CA0019-M, 2017-Ohio-
8264, ¶ 10-13 (reasonable suspicion lacking where officer failed to categorize intensity of alcohol
odor he detected, failed to ask follow-up questions about alcohol consumption, and never testified
as to any red, glossy, or bloodshot eyes or slurred speech). “While it would have been prudent for
[Sergeant Nemastil] to ask [Mr. Corn] additional questions about his alcohol consumption and to
describe the intensity of the odor he detected, we cannot conclude that his failure to do so was fatal
to his determination of reasonable suspicion.” State v. Butcher, 9th Dist. Medina No. 19CA0038-
M, 2020-Ohio-3524, ¶ 14. Likewise, the fact that the sergeant did not witness any impaired driving
on the part of Mr. Corn is inapposite as the sergeant reasonably could have relied on physiological
factors as evidence of Mr. Corn’s impaired driving ability. See State v. Snowberger, 9th Dist.
Summit No. 29853, 2022-Ohio-279, ¶ 12. Sergeant Nemastil’s experience, in conjunction with
the location of the stop, Mr. Corn’s appearance, and the surrounding circumstances, gave rise to
reasonable suspicion for Mr. Corn’s continued detention. See Kordich, 2017-Ohio-234, at ¶ 7,
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quoting Biehl, 2004-Ohio-6532, at ¶ 14. As such, we must conclude that the trial court erred when
it granted Mr. Corn’s motion to suppress. The State’s first assignment of error is sustained.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR II
THE ACTING JUDGE OF THE MEDINA MUNICIPAL COURT ERRED IN
TAKING JUDICIAL NOTICE OF [MR. CORN’S] SLURRED SPEECH
IMPEDIMENT.
{¶18} In its second assignment of error, the State argues the trial court erred when it took
judicial notice of the fact that Mr. Corn suffered from a slurred speech impediment. Given our
resolution of the State’s first assignment of error, its second assignment of error is moot, and we
decline to address it. See App.R. 12(A)(1)(c).
III.
{¶19} The State’s first assignment of error is sustained, and its second assignment of error
is moot. The judgment of the Medina Municipal Court is reversed, and the matter is remanded for
further proceedings in accordance with the foregoing opinion.
Judgment reversed,
and cause remanded.
There were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
We order that a special mandate issue out of this Court, directing the Medina Municipal
Court, County of Medina, State of Ohio, to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy
of this journal entry shall constitute the mandate, pursuant to App.R. 27.
Immediately upon the filing hereof, this document shall constitute the journal entry of
judgment, and it shall be file stamped by the Clerk of the Court of Appeals at which time the period
for review shall begin to run. App.R. 22(C). The Clerk of the Court of Appeals is instructed to
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mail a notice of entry of this judgment to the parties and to make a notation of the mailing in the
docket, pursuant to App.R. 30.
Costs taxed to Appellee.
BETTY SUTTON
FOR THE COURT
HENSAL, P. J.
CARR, J.
CONCUR.
APPEARANCES:
J. MATTHEW LANIER, Prosecuting Attorney, for Appellant.
DAVID SHELDON, Attorney at Law, for Appellee.