State v. Balbi , 2015 Ohio 4075 ( 2015 )


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  • [Cite as State v. Balbi, 
    2015-Ohio-4075
    .]
    Court of Appeals of Ohio
    EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
    COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA
    JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION
    No. 102321
    STATE OF OHIO
    PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE
    vs.
    ORLANDO JOSE MARTINEZ BALBI
    DEFENDANT-APPELLANT
    JUDGMENT:
    AFFIRMED
    Criminal Appeal from the
    Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas
    Case No. CR-14-584996-A
    BEFORE:           Stewart, J., E.A. Gallagher, P.J., McCormack, J.
    RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: October 1, 2015
    ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT
    Christopher M. Kelley
    75 Public Square, Suite 700
    Cleveland, OH 44113
    ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
    Timothy J. McGinty
    Cuyahoga County Prosecutor
    Brett Kyker
    Assistant County Prosecutor
    Justice Center, 8th Floor
    1200 Ontario Street
    Cleveland, OH 44113
    MELODY J. STEWART, J.:
    {¶1} Defendant-appellant Orlando Jose Martinez Balbi pled guilty to 17 counts of
    pandering sexually oriented material involving a minor, in violation of R.C.
    2907.322(A)(2) (Counts 1-17); 22 counts of pandering sexually oriented material
    involving a minor, in violation of R.C. 2907.322(A)(1) (Counts 18-39); and one count of
    possession of criminal tools, in violation of R.C. 2923.24(A) (Count 100). The court
    ordered Balbi to serve concurrent, five-year sentences on Counts 1-17; concurrent
    five-year sentences on Counts 18-39, and a 12-month sentence on Count 100, served
    concurrent with Counts 1-39. The court ordered the five-year sentences on Counts 1-17
    to be served consecutive to the five-year sentences on Counts 19-39, for a total prison
    term of ten years. The sole issue on appeal is whether the record supports the findings
    that the court made before ordering consecutive service.
    {¶2} R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) permits the court to order consecutive service of
    sentences if:
    [T]he court finds that the consecutive service is necessary to protect the
    public from future crime or to punish the offender and that consecutive
    sentences are not disproportionate to the seriousness of the offender’s
    conduct and to the danger the offender poses to the public, and if the court
    also finds any of the following:
    (a) The offender committed one or more of the multiple
    offenses while the offender was awaiting trial or
    sentencing, was under a sanction imposed
    pursuant to section 2929.16, 2929.17, or
    2929.18 of the Revised Code, or was under
    postrelease control for a prior offense.
    (b) At least two of the multiple offenses were committed as part of one or
    more courses of conduct, and the harm caused by two or more of the
    multiple offenses so committed was so great or unusual that no single
    prison term for any of the offenses committed as part of any of the courses
    of conduct adequately reflects the seriousness of the offender’s conduct.
    (c) The offender’s history of criminal conduct demonstrates that
    consecutive sentences are necessary to protect the public from future crime
    by the offender.
    {¶3} Our ability to review sentencing decisions by a trial court is circumscribed by
    R.C. 2953.08(G)(2). That section makes it clear that our standard of review is not
    whether the sentencing court abused its discretion. Rather, a criminal sentence can be
    reversed only if it is “contrary to law” or if the appellate court clearly and convincingly
    finds that “the record does not support the sentencing court’s findings” under R.C.
    2929.14(C)(4).
    {¶4} A sentence is “contrary to law” if the sentencing court failed to make the
    findings required to order consecutive service of sentences under R.C. 2929.14(C)(4).
    See R.C. 2953.08(G)(2)(a); State v. Bonnell, 
    140 Ohio St.3d 209
    , 
    2014-Ohio-3177
    , 
    16 N.E.3d 659
    , ¶ 28. Balbi does not argue on appeal that the sentencing judge failed to
    make the required findings, nor does he argue that the sentencing judge failed to
    incorporate those findings into the sentencing entry as required by Crim.R. 32(A) and
    Bonnell.
    {¶5} Balbi’s appeal asserts that the record does not support the sentencing judge’s
    findings for consecutive service. We have noted that our review of claims that the record
    does not support the sentencing judge’s findings under R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) is “extremely
    deferential.” State v. Venes, 
    2013-Ohio-1891
    , 
    992 N.E.2d 453
    , ¶ 21 (8th Dist.). This is
    because R.C. 2953.08(G)(2) states that “it is the court of appeals that must clearly and
    convincingly find that the record does not support the court’s findings. In other words,
    the restriction is on the appellate court, not the trial judge.”        
    Id.
       “Clearly and
    convincingly” has the same meaning as it does in other contexts — it is that quantum of
    evidence that instills a firm belief or conviction as to the allegations sought to be
    established. Cross v. Ledford, 
    161 Ohio St. 469
    , 477, 
    120 N.E.2d 118
     (1954).
    {¶6} Balbi first argues that the record does not support the court’s finding that
    consecutive sentences were necessary to protect the public from future crime or to punish
    him. He maintains that he had no criminal record before his arrest in this case, he had
    been a law-abiding resident of the United States (Balbi is not a United States citizen), and
    that his crimes were committed under circumstances that were unlikely to recur. He
    claimed that he “accidently” viewed images of child pornography and then continued to
    do so because those pictures triggered repressed memories of his own molestation as a
    child. He denied having a sexual interest in children and said that he gained no sexual
    gratification from looking at the photographs.
    {¶7} The state countered Balbi’s assertion that he “accidentally” came across
    images of child pornography by noting that Balbi had used file-sharing software not only
    to view images, but to share them with others. Investigators were able to download
    images of child pornography from Balbi’s computer and later obtained a search warrant,
    the execution of which uncovered more images on Balbi’s computer. When confronted
    by the police, Balbi told them he had approximately 15 images of child pornography, but
    in fact he had 83 images and 274 videos of child pornography on three different storage
    devices. Forensic software used by the police enabled them to determine that Balbi was
    searching for child pornography using the terms “10Y” (ten years old); “little girls;”
    “PTHC black” (preteen hardcore black); and “PTHC Tai [sic].” Tr. 47. And to counter
    Balbi’s assertion that he had no sexual interest in children, the state noted that one file
    stored on Balbi’s computer was titled: “Two Little Boy, Baby Boy Sex-One Boy, Toddler,
    One Man” that showed “a prepubescent boy being masturbated by an adult man.” Tr. 49.
    {¶8} Given these facts, we cannot clearly and convincingly find that the record
    does not support the sentencing judge’s conclusion that consecutive sentences were
    necessary to protect the public from future crime or to punish Balbi. The sheer quantity
    of child pornography found in Balbi’s possession undermined his claim that he
    “stumbled” upon it and did not use it for sexual gratification but to explore his own
    victimization.
    {¶9} In addition, there was no evidence to support Balbi’s claim that he had been
    molested as a child — in fact, the state represented that Balbi told the police at the time of
    his arrest that he had a “sickness.” The record tends to show that the child pornography
    viewed and shared by Balbi was for sexual gratification and not for therapeutic purposes.
    And Balbi’s argument that he was entitled to lenity because he had only viewed child
    pornography for a few months might have carried more weight had the quantity of what
    he viewed in that time period not been so voluminous.
    {¶10} Balbi next argues that consecutive sentences were unnecessary to protect the
    public because he will be deported after serving his prison sentence. Assuming the
    certainty of Balbi’s deportation, it is not a valid reason to find that it supersedes the
    state’s interest in punishing him and that he will not resume his activity elsewhere. Apart
    from the self-serving nature of the argument, any deterrence factor in his punishment
    would be lost. See State v. Vlahopoulos, 
    154 Ohio App.3d 450
    , 
    2003-Ohio-5070
    , 
    797 N.E.2d 580
    , ¶ 5 (8th Dist.).
    {¶11} We likewise cannot clearly and convincingly find that the record does not
    support the sentencing judge’s conclusion that consecutive sentences are not
    disproportionate to Balbi’s conduct and the danger that he poses to the public. Child
    pornography is not a victimless crime and Balbi’s assertions that he did nothing more than
    view and download this material in private ignore the severity of the harm caused to the
    children depicted in that material. State v. Carlisle, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 93266,
    
    2010-Ohio-3407
    , ¶ 37 (“It requires no citation to authority for the proposition that acts of
    sexual abuse committed against children are considered among the most heinous of
    crimes.”).   Although Balbi’s lack of a prior criminal record was a factor for the
    sentencing judge to consider, it is not by itself dispositive of whether he may reoffend
    and, in the process, remain a danger to the public.
    {¶12} Judgment affirmed.
    It is ordered that appellee recover of said appellant costs herein taxed.
    The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
    It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the common
    pleas court to carry this judgment into execution.
    A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of
    the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
    ______________________________________________
    MELODY J. STEWART, JUDGE
    EILEEN A. GALLAGHER, P.J., and
    TIM McCORMACK, J., CONCUR