State ex rel. Barnett v. Indus. Comm. , 2015 Ohio 3898 ( 2015 )


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  • [Cite as State ex rel. Barnett v. Indus. Comm., 
    2015-Ohio-3898
    .]
    IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
    TENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
    State of Ohio ex rel. Betty J. Barnett,                 :
    Relator,                               :
    v.                                                      :             No. 14AP-628
    Industrial Commission of Ohio and                       :          (REGULAR CALENDAR)
    Columbus Schools[,] Columbus Board
    of Education,                                           :
    Respondents.                           :
    D E C I S I O N
    Rendered on September 24, 2015
    Connor, Evans & Hafenstein, LLP, Katie W. Kimmet,
    Kenneth S. Hafenstein and Nicole E. Rager, for relator.
    Michael DeWine, Attorney General, and Natalie J. Tackett,
    for respondent Industrial Commission of Ohio.
    IN MANDAMUS
    ON OBJECTIONS TO THE MAGISTRATE'S DECISION
    HORTON, J.
    {¶ 1} Relator, Betty J. Barnett, brings this original action seeking a writ of
    mandamus ordering respondent, Industrial Commission of Ohio ("commission"), to
    vacate its order denying her permanent total disability ("PTD") compensation, and to
    order the commission to enter an order awarding her PTD compensation.
    {¶ 2} Pursuant to Civ.R. 53 and Loc.R. 13(M) of the Tenth District Court of
    Appeals, this matter was referred to a magistrate, who has now rendered a decision and
    recommendation that includes findings of fact and conclusions of law and is appended to
    this decision. The magistrate concluded that the Staff Hearing Officer's ("SHO") incorrect
    statement regarding relator's attempts to obtain vocational training did not require this
    No. 14AP-628                                                                               2
    court to issue a writ of mandamus, and that the commission did not abuse its discretion
    by considering relator's work history. Relator has filed objections to the magistrate's
    decision, and the matter is now before us for our independent review.
    {¶ 3} As reflected in the facts given in the magistrate's decision, relator was
    involved in a work-related injury on August 19, 2011, when she slipped and fell down the
    stairs of the school bus she was driving for her employer. Relator's industrial claim was
    allowed for the following conditions: fracture lumbar vertebra closed; lumbar disc
    protrusion L2-L3; substantial aggravation of pre-existing lumbar spinal stenosis L2-L3;
    lumbar facet arthropathy L4-L5; substantial aggravation of pre-existing lumbar
    spondylolisthesis L4-L5; substantial aggravation of pre-existing facet arthropathy at L2-
    L3.
    {¶ 4} Following her injury, relator was referred to the Ohio Bureau of Workers'
    Compensation ("bureau") vocational rehabilitation program. Relator's managed care
    organization ("MCO") vocational rehabilitation case specialist informed relator on
    August 26, 2013, that she was not a feasible candidate for vocational rehabilitation
    services. Relator appealed the MCO's determination, and on September 19, 2013, the
    bureau upheld the closure of relator's vocational rehabilitation for non-feasibility. Relator
    appealed the bureau's order and, following a hearing, a district hearing officer ("DHO")
    issued an order on October 22, 2013 denying relator's vocational rehabilitation referral
    request. The DHO found it improbable that relator would return to work as a result of
    vocational rehabilitation services, and thus concluded that relator was not a feasible
    candidate for such services.
    {¶ 5} Relator filed an application for PTD compensation on December 20, 2013.
    Following a July 18, 2014 hearing, the SHO issued an order denying relator's PTD
    application. The SHO relied on an April 1, 2014 report from James J. Powers, M.D., which
    concluded that relator had a 15 percent whole body impairment from her industrial injury
    and that she was capable of performing sedentary work.
    {¶ 6} The SHO addressed the nonmedical factors, including relator's age of 64,
    her high school education, and her work history. The SHO noted that relator had
    experience working as a store manager for a carry-out, a school bus driver, a cook, and
    doing piece work assembling electric parts. The SHO thus concluded that relator had "a
    No. 14AP-628                                                                             3
    varied work history with some of that work in the light and possibly sedentary categories
    (sit-down piece work)," and further concluded that "[t]he ability to follow directions as a
    cook and a bus driver, the ability to work with the public as a bus driver, and the
    responsibilities involved in managing a store all suggest transferrable work skills. The
    [SHO] therefore concludes the Injured Worker's vocational history is a vocational asset."
    (July 18, 2014 SHO Decision.) The SHO also stated that, while relator had "not
    participated in a rehabilitation program or indicated any effort to obtain training," the
    DHO's October 22, 2013 order denying relator vocational rehabilitation services did not
    "necessitate a finding of permanent total disability." (July 18, 2014 SHO Decision.)
    {¶ 7} Relator has filed the following objections to the magistrate's decision:
    (1) The Magistrate erred by finding there was no abuse of
    discretion on the part of the Commission when it incorrectly
    determined Barnett never made "any effort to obtain training
    to positions consistent with her restrictions" and failed to
    accept the prior findings from the Commission itself on the
    issue of vocational rehabilitation.
    (2) The Magistrate erred by finding no abuse of discretion in
    regards to the Commission's failure to comply with [State ex
    rel. Noll v. Indus. Comm., 
    57 Ohio St.3d 203
     (1991)] as well as
    its failure [to] identify any "transferrable skills" when
    conducting its nonmedical analysis.
    {¶ 8} Pursuant to Civ.R. 53(D)(4)(d), we undertake an independent review of the
    objected matters "to ascertain that the magistrate has properly determined the factual
    issues and appropriately applied the law." A relator seeking a writ of mandamus must
    establish: " '(1) a clear legal right to the relief prayed for, (2) a clear legal duty upon
    respondent to perform the act requested, and (3) that relator has no plain and adequate
    remedy in the ordinary course of the law.' " Kinsey v. Bd. of Trustees of the Police &
    Firemen's Disability & Pension Fund of Ohio, 
    49 Ohio St.3d 224
    , 225 (1990), quoting
    State ex rel. Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Gorman, 
    70 Ohio St.2d 274
    , 275 (1982). "A clear
    legal right exists where the [commission] abuses its discretion by entering an order which
    is not supported by 'some evidence.' " 
    Id.
    {¶ 9} This court will not determine that the commission abused its discretion
    when there is some evidence in the record to support the commission's finding. State ex
    rel. Rouch v. Eagle Tool & Mach. Co., 
    26 Ohio St.3d 197
    , 198 (1986). The some evidence
    No. 14AP-628                                                                               4
    standard "reflects the established principle that the commission is in the best position to
    determine the weight and credibility of the evidence and disputed facts." State ex rel.
    Woolum v. Indus. Comm., 10th Dist. No. 02AP-780, 
    2003-Ohio-3336
    , ¶ 4, citing State ex
    rel. Pavis v. Gen. Motors Corp., B.O.C. Group, 
    65 Ohio St.3d 30
    , 33 (1992).
    {¶ 10} The relevant inquiry in a determination of PTD is the claimant's ability to
    do any sustained remunerative employment. State ex rel. Domjancic v. Indus. Comm.,
    
    69 Ohio St.3d 693
     (1994); Ohio Adm.Code 4121-3-34(B)(1). An individual can engage in
    sustained remunerative employment if they can perform sedentary work. Dr. Powers'
    April 1, 2014 report found relator capable of performing sedentary work. Regarding the
    vocational factors, the SHO noted that relator's age alone was not a barrier to re-
    employment, that her high school education and ability to read, write, and perform
    basic math were assets to reemployment, and that her work history was a vocational
    asset. It is well-settled that the commission is the expert on the vocational or
    nonmedical factors in a PTD determination. State ex rel. Jackson v. Indus. Comm., 
    79 Ohio St.3d 266
    , 270-71 (1997). The SHO thus concluded that, given relator's "education
    and work history and the finding that the Injured Worker is capable of sedentary work,"
    relator was not entitled to PTD compensation. (July 18, 2014 SHO Decision.)
    {¶ 11} Relator's objections to the magistrate's decision essentially reargue the
    issues which the magistrate previously considered and rejected. Relator first contends
    that the magistrate erred by finding that the SHO's incorrect statement regarding relator's
    willingness to participate in vocational rehabilitation did not require this court to issue a
    writ of mandamus. The magistrate acknowledged that the SHO's statement regarding
    relator's unwillingness to participate in vocational rehabilitation was incorrect. However,
    after reviewing pertinent case law, the magistrate concluded that the SHO's incorrect
    statement could be easily separated from the remainder of the nonmedical analysis.
    Indeed, no other paragraph in the SHO's order contains any discussion of relator's efforts
    towards vocational rehabilitation, and the SHO's denial of PTD was not based on relator's
    failure to participate in vocational rehabilitation. Rather, the SHO relied on Dr. Powers'
    medical report and the SHO's own analysis of the nonmedical factors to conclude that
    relator was capable of performing sustained remunerative employment.
    No. 14AP-628                                                                               5
    {¶ 12} We find no error in the magistrate's conclusion that the SHO's incorrect
    statement regarding relator's willingness to participate in vocational rehabilitation was
    severable from the rest of the SHO's order, and thus did not necessitate the issuance of a
    writ of mandamus. See State ex rel. Retar v. Indus. Comm., 10th Dist. No. 08AP-856,
    
    2009-Ohio-5669
    , ¶ 37-39; Domjancic at 695. Relator's first objection is overruled.
    {¶ 13} Relator's second objection asserts that the magistrate erred by concluding
    that the SHO's order did not violate State ex rel. Noll v. Indus. Comm., 
    57 Ohio St.3d 203
    (1991). Relator contends that the SHO's order violates Noll, as the SHO concluded that
    relator's varied work history suggested transferable skills, but failed to particularly
    identify those transferrable skills. The magistrate concluded that, even if some of relator's
    skills were arguably not transferable work skills, as they were skills which would have pre-
    existed the job being performed, the commission did not abuse its discretion by
    articulating the abilities relator had demonstrated through her work history.
    {¶ 14} In Noll, the court held that in each commission order granting or denying
    benefits to a claimant, the commission "must specifically state what evidence has been
    relied upon, and briefly explain the reasoning for its decision. An order of the commission
    should make it readily apparent from the four corners of the decision that there is some
    evidence supporting it." Id. at 206. See also State ex rel. LeVan v. Young's Shell Service,
    
    80 Ohio St.3d 55
    , 57 (1997). Notably, however, while the "absence of transferable skills is
    germane" to the inquiry into a claimant's current and future abilities to perform sustained
    remunerative employment, the "lack of transferable skills also does not mandate a
    permanent total disability compensation award." State ex rel. Ewart v. Indus. Comm., 
    76 Ohio St.3d 139
    , 142 (1996). See also Ohio Adm.Code 4121-3-34(B)(3)(c)(iv)-(v). As such,
    the SHO's failure to particularly identify transferable skills does not entitle relator to an
    award of PTD. The SHO did not abuse its discretion in viewing relator's work history as a
    vocational asset. We find no error in the magistrate's decision. Relator's second objection
    is overruled.
    {¶ 15} Following independent review, pursuant to Civ.R. 53, we find the magistrate
    has properly determined the pertinent facts and applied the salient law to them.
    Accordingly, we adopt the magistrate's decision as our own, including the findings of fact
    No. 14AP-628                                                                         6
    and conclusions of law contained therein. In accordance with the magistrate's decision,
    we deny the request for a writ of mandamus.
    Objections overruled; writ denied.
    BROWN, P.J. and KLATT, J., concur.
    _________________
    No. 14AP-628                                                                       7
    APPENDIX
    IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
    TENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
    State of Ohio ex rel. Betty J. Barnett,       :
    Relator,                        :
    v.                                            :                  No. 14AP-628
    Industrial Commission of Ohio and            :                (REGULAR CALENDAR)
    Columbus Schools, Columbus Board
    of Education,                                :
    Respondents.                    :
    MAGISTRATE'S DECISION
    Rendered on April 30, 2015
    Connor, Evans & Hafenstein, LLP, Katie W. Kimmet,
    Kenneth S. Hafenstein and Nicole E. Rager, for relator.
    Michael DeWine, Attorney General, and Natalie J. Tackett,
    for respondent Industrial Commission of Ohio.
    IN MANDAMUS
    {¶ 16} In this original action, relator, Betty J. Barnett, requests a writ of
    mandamus ordering respondent, Industrial Commission of Ohio ("commission"), to
    vacate its order denying her permanent total disability ("PTD") compensation, and to
    enter an order awarding the compensation.
    Findings of Fact:
    No. 14AP-628                                                                            8
    {¶ 17} 1. On August 19, 2011, relator injured her lower back while employed as a
    bus driver for respondent Columbus Schools, Columbus Board of Education. On that
    date, relator slipped and fell down the bus stairs, landing on her tailbone.
    {¶ 18} 2. The industrial claim (No. 11-345090) is allowed for:
    Fracture lumbar vertebra closed; lumbar disc protrusion L2-
    L3; substantial aggravation of pre-existing lumbar spinal
    stenosis L2-L3; lumbar facet arthropathy L4-5; substantial
    aggravation of pre-existing lumbar spondylolisthesis L4-5;
    substantial aggravation of pre-existing facet arthropathy at
    L2-L3.
    {¶ 19} 3. Relator has not worked since the date of her industrial injury. She began
    receiving temporary total disability ("TTD") compensation.
    {¶ 20} 4. On July 25, 2013, at the request of the Ohio Bureau of Workers'
    Compensation ("bureau"), relator was examined by Denise L. Davis, M.D. In her four-
    page narrative report, Dr. Davis opined:
    In my medical opinion, there currently are no additional
    diagnostic or treatment services consistent with nationally
    accepted treatment guidelines such as The Official Disability
    Guidelines that should be considered. It is my medical
    opinion that there is no further treatment that will afford her
    a significant fundamental, functional, or physiological
    change.
    ***
    In my medical opinion, the injured worker is not capable of
    any level of work because she has too much pain and
    dysfunction to tolerate even sedentary level.
    ***
    In my medical opinion, the injured worker is MMI and a re-
    examination is not necessary.
    ***
    Vocational rehabilitation is not appropriate from a medical
    perspective because, in my medical opinion, the injured
    worker is MMI.
    No. 14AP-628                                                                             9
    {¶ 21} 5. On August 1, 2013, citing the report of Dr. Davis, the bureau moved to
    terminate TTD compensation on grounds that the industrial injury has reached maximum
    medical improvement ("MMI").
    {¶ 22} 6. On August 22, 2013, treating physician Steven Tanzer, D.O., completed a
    form captioned "Physician's Report of Work Ability." The bureau designates the form as
    the Medco-14.
    {¶ 23} In response to a preprinted query, Dr. Tanzer indicated by his mark that the
    industrial injury had reached MMI.
    {¶ 24} The Medco-14 also asks the treating physician: "Is the injured worker a
    candidate for a vocational rehabilitation services focusing on return to work?" Thereafter,
    the treating physician is invited to mark either a "yes" or "no" box. Dr. Tanzer failed to
    mark either box.
    {¶ 25} The Medco-14 asks the treating physician: "How many total hours is this
    injured worker potentially able to work?" In the space provided, Dr. Tanzer entered a
    zero.
    {¶ 26} The Medco-14 also asks the treating physician to list the work-related
    conditions and then asks: "Is the condition causing temporary total disability?" In
    response, Dr. Tanzer marked the "yes" box indicating temporary total disability.
    {¶ 27} 7. Following an August 23, 2013 hearing, a district hearing officer ("DHO")
    issued an order terminating TTD compensation effective the date of the hearing based
    upon a finding that the industrial injury has reached MMI. The DHO's order states
    reliance upon the report of Dr. Davis.
    {¶ 28} 8. Relator filed an administrative appeal from the DHO's order of
    August 23, 2013.
    {¶ 29} 9. On October 2, 2013, a staff hearing officer ("SHO") held a hearing on
    relator's administrative appeal of the DHO's order of August 23, 2013. Thereafter, the
    SHO issued an order stating that, prior to the hearing, relator had withdrawn her appeal
    and therefore the DHO's order of August 23, 2013 "remains in full force and effect."
    {¶ 30} 10. Earlier, there was a referral to the bureau's vocational rehabilitation
    program.
    No. 14AP-628                                                                          10
    {¶ 31} 11. On August 26, 2013, the bureau mailed an order: "You are eligible for
    vocational rehabilitation because you are receiving compensation. Your MCO will let you
    know if they are referring you to it."
    {¶ 32} 12. By letter dated August 26, 2013, from a MCO vocational rehabilitation
    case specialist, relator was informed:
    You have been referred for consideration of vocational
    rehabilitation services and our records indicate that you have
    been determined eligible for these services by BWC. As your
    managed care organization, we have reviewed your file and
    determined that you are currently not ready for vocational
    rehabilitation services at this time for the following reason:
    You are not feasible, as the current lack of
    employment is not due to your allowed diagnosis. As
    such, services through the Ohio BWC are neither
    necessary nor appropriate at this time.
    Once we have received a medical update indicating that this
    has been resolved, your file will again be reviewed to be sure
    that you are still eligible for vocational rehabilitation services
    and that you are capable of participating in such services.
    You may be contacted at that time to determine your
    interest.
    (Emphasis sic.)
    {¶ 33} 13. Relator, through counsel, administratively appealed the August 26,
    2013 decision of the MCO that determined that relator is not feasible for vocational
    rehabilitation.
    {¶ 34} 14. Thereafter, a MCO vocational rehabilitation specialist, Ron Janetzke,
    wrote:
    CareWorks has determined that the closure cannot be
    overturned. The [Injured Worker] was found to be MMI per
    the DHO hearing on 8/23/13. The [physician of record]
    submitted a Medco-14 dated 8/22/13 which has documented
    that the [Injured Worker] remains temporarily totally
    disabled and is MMI as of 7/15/13. The progress note from
    Khaled Amr, M.D. (pain management provider) documents
    that the [Injured Worker] continues to suffer from chronic
    severe back pain with numbness and tingling in the lower
    extremities and has a pain level of 6/10. Based on this
    information there are no VocRehab services that would be
    No. 14AP-628                                                                       11
    appropriate to offer the [Injured Worker]. The [Injured
    Worker] is not a feasible candidate.
    {¶ 35} 15. On September 18, 2013, John Finch, Ph.D., wrote for the MCO:
    In this reviewer's opinion, the closure of this case for non
    feasibility should be upheld.
    Rationale:
    [One] The above referenced injured worker's rehabilitation
    case was determined to be non-feasible on 8/26/13 due to
    current lack of employment not due to allowed diagnosis.
    Services through Ohio BWC are neither necessary nor
    appropriate at this time.
    [Two] The [attorney of record] appealed the determination
    on 9/4/13.
    [Three] Review of the file indicates the claimant was
    determined MMI per DHO hearing on 8/23/13. [physician of
    record] submitted Medco-14 on 8/22/13 with injured worker
    temporarily totally disabled as of 7/15/13. Progress note
    from Dr. Amr on 9/4/13 says claimant continues to have
    significant chronic back pain with tingling and numbness to
    lower extremities. Information also indicated claimant has
    retired from employer in August, 2011.
    [Four] Claimant is not released to [return to work] per
    Medco-14 as required by BWC Chapter 4. Claimant also is
    dealing with severe chronic pain. Claimant has also retired
    from employer, indicating lack of employment is not due to
    allowed claim. In my opinion the correct non-feasibility
    decision was made in this case, consistent with BWC Chapter
    4 guidelines.
    {¶ 36} 16. On September 19, 2013, the bureau mailed the following decision:
    Reconsideration of MCO decision dated 8/26/13 for non-
    feasibility of vocational rehabilitation services.
    BWC disallows the treatment/services.
    The closure of vocational rehabilitation for non-feasibility
    should be upheld, per peer review of John Finch, Ph.D., CRC,
    LPC dated 9/18/13. Claimant is not released to return to
    work per Medco-14 as required by BWC Chapter 4. Claimant
    No. 14AP-628                                                                    12
    also is dealing with severe chronic pain. Claimant has also
    retired from employer, indicating lack of employment is not
    due to allowed claim. The correct non-feasibility decision
    was made in this case, consistent with BWC Chapter 4
    guidelines.
    BWC based this decision on consideration of all submitted
    medical documentation, the allowed conditions in the claim,
    approved treatment guidelines, BWC policy, and workers'
    compensation law, including, but not limited to, the Miller
    criteria (Ohio Administrative Code 4123-6-16.2(B)(1)
    through (B)(3)), as follows:
    BWC Chapter 4 Guidelines, OAC 4123-18-02 and OAC 4123-
    18-05.
    {¶ 37} 17. On September 25, 2013, relator administratively appealed the
    September 19, 2013 order of the bureau.
    {¶ 38} 18. Following an October 18, 2013 hearing, a DHO mailed an order on
    October 22, 2013, stating:
    The order of the Administrator, issued 09/19/2013, is
    modified.
    It is the order of the District Hearing Officer that the Injured
    Worker's vocational rehabilitation referral request filed
    08/06/2013 is denied.
    The District Hearing Officer hereby affirms the Bureau of
    Workers' Compensation's decision to close the Injured
    Worker's vocational rehabilitation file, although the District
    Hearing Officer does not rely on all the same grounds relied
    upon in the Bureau of Workers' Compensation's order. The
    District Hearing Officer finds that the Injured Worker is not
    a feasible candidate for Vocational Rehabilitation Services at
    this time because the District Hearing Officer is not
    persuaded that there is a reasonable probability that the
    Injured Worker will benefit from Vocational Rehabilitation
    Services and return to work as a result of those services.
    This order is based on Ohio Administrative Code Section
    4123-18-03, and the rationale contained in the 07/25/2013
    report of Dr. Davis, Mr. Finch's 09/18/2013 report and Mr.
    Janetzke's 09/12/2013 report (however, the District Hearing
    Officer does not rely on the alleged ground of the Injured
    Worker's retirement, based on the Injured Worker's
    No. 14AP-628                                                                        13
    statement at hearing that what she is receiving is School
    Employees Retirement System disability).
    {¶ 39} 19. Apparently, the October 18, 2013 order of the DHO was not
    administratively appealed.
    {¶ 40} 20. On October 22, 2013, Dr. Tanzer wrote:
    I feel that this patient should be considered permanently and
    totally disabled due to the above claim injury, and that she is
    unable to return to gainful employment with her back injury,
    as agreed to by both independent evaluators as well as the
    Bureau's evaluator, feeling that this patient is unable to
    return to work; any type of gainful employment due to this
    injury. She suffers from chronic pain and disability
    secondary to it. She has altered functions of daily living. She
    has to require chronic pain medicine for use and functioning.
    This patient, due to her age and physical condition, is really
    unable to return to any type of gainful employment.
    {¶ 41} 21. On December 20, 2013, relator filed an application for PTD
    compensation.
    {¶ 42} 22. On February 19, 2014, at the employer's request, relator was examined
    by Rohn T. Kennington, M.D. In his four-page narrative report, Dr. Kennington opined:
    It is my medical opinion, based on a reasonable degree of
    medical certainty, and on the allowed conditions of the claim
    (Claim#11-345090), that Mrs. Barnett is not permanently
    and totally disabled * * * while she is not capable of returning
    to her former employment as a bus driver for the Columbus
    city schools, this should not preclude her from remunerative
    employment in a light capacity job with the above listed
    restrictions.
    {¶ 43} 23. On March 25, 2014, at the commission's request, relator was examined
    by James J. Powers, M.D. In his four-page narrative report dated April 1, 2014, Dr.
    Powers opines:
    We come to a total of 15% whole body impairment for the
    injuries suffered by the Injured Worker on 08/19/2011.
    ***
    No. 14AP-628                                                                       14
    The Injured Worker is exhibiting significant deconditioning.
    She has multilevel involvement. I would see her being able to
    do sedentary work.
    {¶ 44} 24. Following a July 18, 2014 hearing, an SHO issued an order denying the
    PTD application. The SHO's order explains:
    It is the order of the Staff Hearing Officer that the IC-2,
    Application for Permanent Total Disability Compensation,
    filed 12/20/2013 is denied. The Staff Hearing Officer finds
    the residual impairment from the allowed conditions, when
    combined with the Injured Worker's vocational factors, do
    not remove her from all sustained remunerative
    employment.
    The Injured Worker was injured on 08/19/2011 when she fell
    from her school bus. She has not worked since the date of
    injury. The Injured Worker underwent a lumbar
    vertebroplasty on 12/07/2011. Treatment thereafter has
    consisted of medial branch blocks, epidural steroid
    injections, radiofrequency ablations, and the use of
    prescription medications.
    Relying upon the opinion from James Powers, M.D. dated
    04/01/2014, the Staff Hearing Officer finds the allowed
    conditions prevent the Injured Worker from returning to her
    former position of employment as a school bus driver. Dr.
    Powers opined that the allowed conditions represent a 15%
    permanent partial impairment and restrict the Injured
    Worker to sedentary occupations. Dr. Powers' opinion was
    found persuasive.
    The Injured Worker is 63 years old. While she is near the
    typical age of retirement, age alone is not a barrier to re-
    employment and cannot be the sole basis for permanent total
    disability compensation. The Injured Worker is a high school
    graduate and she indicated on her application that she can
    read, write, and perform basic math. The Staff Hearing
    Officer finds the Injured Worker's education is a vocational
    asset for re-employment.
    Regarding her work history, the Injured Worker listed on her
    application two occupations. From 1989 to 1994 she was a
    store manager for a carry-out. She indicated on the
    application that her duties were banking and placing orders.
    The application further indicates that the Injured Worker
    was a school bus driver from 1994 to 2011. When questioned
    No. 14AP-628                                                                        15
    at today's hearing regarding the gaps in her employment
    history, the Injured Worker stated that she was unaware that
    she had to detail her complete work history. The Injured
    Worker indicated that she also worked for approximately two
    years doing piece work, which she described as a sit down
    job assembling electric parts. The Injured Worker also stated
    that she worked for MCL Cafeteria as a cook for
    approximately seven years. Regarding the store manager
    position, the Injured Worker testified that her husband
    owned two carry-outs and that she worked in one of them.
    While on the application she indicated that she was
    responsible for banking and placing orders, at today's
    hearing the Injured Worker testified that her husband did
    most of these duties and that she manned the store. The Staff
    Hearing Officer concludes the Injured Worker has a varied
    work history with some of that work in the light and possibly
    sedentary categories (sit-down piece work). The ability to
    follow directions as a cook and a bus driver, the ability to
    work with the public as a bus driver, and the responsibilities
    involved in managing a store all suggest transferrable work
    skills. The Staff Hearing Officer therefore concludes the
    Injured Worker's vocational history is a vocational asset.
    The Injured Worker has not participated in a rehabilitation
    program or indicated any effort to obtain training to
    positions consistent with her restrictions. The Staff Hearing
    Officer reviewed the District Hearing Officer order issued
    10/22/2013, which denied vocational rehabilitation services.
    This order made the finding that the Injured Worker would
    not benefit from services. This finding, however, does not
    necessitate a finding of permanent total disability.
    Given the Injured Worker's education and work history and
    the finding that the Injured Worker is capable of sedentary
    work, the Staff Hearing Officer finds the allowed conditions
    have not rendered the Injured Worker permanently and
    totally disabled. There are positions as clerks and
    dispatchers that are in the sedentary strength range that
    would be similar to prior positions in the Injured Worker's
    work history.
    {¶ 45} 25. On August 13, 2014, relator, Betty J. Barnett, filed this mandamus
    action.
    Conclusions of Law:
    No. 14AP-628                                                                            16
    {¶ 46} Two issues are presented: (1) whether the paragraph of the SHO's order of
    July 18, 2014 containing findings regarding an alleged failure to participate in vocational
    rehabilitation constitutes an abuse of discretion such that a writ of mandamus must issue;
    (2) whether the commission abused its discretion in its consideration of relator's work
    history.
    First Issue
    {¶ 47} Turning to the first issue, the Supreme Court of Ohio has repeatedly
    addressed the obligation of a PTD claimant to undergo opportunities for rehabilitation.
    State ex rel. B.F. Goodrich Co. v. Indus. Comm., 
    73 Ohio St.3d 525
     (1995); State ex rel.
    Bowling v. Natl. Can Corp., 
    77 Ohio St.3d 148
     (1996); State ex rel. Wood v. Indus.
    Comm., 
    78 Ohio St.3d 414
     (1997); State ex rel. Wilson v. Indus. Comm., 
    80 Ohio St.3d 250
     (1997); State ex rel. Cunningham v. Indus. Comm., 
    91 Ohio St.3d 261
     (2001).
    {¶ 48} Here, in the second to the last paragraph of the order (as quoted above), the
    SHO states:
    The Injured Worker has not participated in a rehabilitation
    program or indicated any effort to obtain training to
    positions consistent with her restrictions. The Staff Hearing
    Officer reviewed the District Hearing Officer order issued
    10/22/2013, which denied vocational rehabilitation services.
    This order made the finding that the Injured Worker' would
    not benefit from services. This finding, however, does not
    necessitate a finding of permanent total disability.
    {¶ 49} With respect to the first sentence of the paragraph at issue, it is indeed
    undisputed that relator has not participated in a rehabilitation program. However, the
    record belies the remaining part of the sentence. That is, the SHO was incorrect to state
    that relator has not "indicated any effort to obtain training to positions consistent with
    her restrictions." (Emphasis added.) That statement simply ignores that relator, through
    her counsel, repeatedly sought to be declared feasible for participation in vocational
    rehabilitation services.   Relator's requests to be determined feasible were repeatedly
    denied, albeit for the reasons set forth in the DHO's order of October 18, 2013.
    {¶ 50} While the paragraph of the SHO's order of July 18, 2014 at issue concludes
    with the legally correct finding that the DHO's order of October 18, 2013 (mailed October
    22, 2013) "does not necessitate a finding of permanent total disability" it is not entirely
    No. 14AP-628                                                                              17
    clear as to what extent, if any, the SHO held the incorrect finding or statement against
    relator's PTD application. That is, the question here is whether the flawed paragraph of
    the order requires this court to issue a limited writ of mandamus for a new determination
    of relator's PTD application absent any further consideration of the vocational
    rehabilitation factor.
    {¶ 51} In State ex rel. Slater v. Indus. Comm., 10th Dist. No. 06AP-1137, 2007-
    Ohio-4413, this court determined that the commission abused its discretion in its denial
    of PTD compensation by holding the claimant, Glenn O. Slater, accountable for his failure
    to explore vocational rehabilitation and training when medical evidence indicated that
    Slater had undergone chemotherapy and a tracheostomy for treatment of his
    nonindustrial carcinoma. Specifically, in violation of State ex rel. Noll v. Indus. Comm., 
    57 Ohio St.3d 203
     (1991), the commission held Slater accountable for his failure to pursue
    vocational rehabilitation absent any reasoning supported by some evidence.
    {¶ 52} In Slater, this court issued a writ of mandamus ordering the commission to
    issue a new order that adjudicates the PTD application.
    {¶ 53} In Slater, this court, through its magistrate, distinguished this court's
    decision in State ex rel. Searles v. Indus. Comm., 10th Dist. No. 01AP-970, 2002-Ohio-
    3097, affirmed 
    98 Ohio St.3d 390
    , 
    2003-Ohio-1493
    .
    {¶ 54} In Searles, this court states:
    The commission may state separate, alternative grounds for
    denial of PTD. State ex rel. Speelman v. Indus. Comm.
    (1992), 
    73 Ohio App.3d 757
    , * * *. If the commission does
    choose to use alternative grounds, "those grounds should not
    be merged together and should be explained separately so
    that a reviewing court can understand what has been done."
    Id. at 761, * * *. The commission's decision, in separate
    paragraphs, details the grounds utilized to deny relator's
    PTD application. One basis for the denial of PTD was
    relator's failure to participate in rehabilitation. But the
    commission also focused on factors that would be assets for
    relator in obtaining employment. Although the commission
    did not expressly state that these were all separate reasons
    for denial, the decision did explain the grounds separately,
    thereby allowing this court to properly review that decision.
    Even if the commission improperly weighed relator's failure
    to participate in rehabilitation, we find that there was other
    No. 14AP-628                                                                            18
    evidence in the record to support the commission's decision
    to deny relator's PTD application.
    Id. at ¶ 5-6.
    In Slater, this court, through its magistrate, distinguished Searles:
    Unlike the situation in Searles, the SHO's order here does
    not address the failure to pursue vocational rehabilitation in
    a separate paragraph. Actually, the SHO points to the failure
    to pursue vocational rehabilitation in the two key paragraphs
    in which the other nonmedical factors such as age, education
    and work history are addressed. That is, the SHO's finding of
    a failure to pursue vocational rehabilitation is intertwined
    with the analysis of the other nonmedical factors.
    Id. at ¶ 44.
    {¶ 55} In State ex rel. Retar v. Indus. Comm., 10th Dist. No. 08AP-856, 2009-
    Ohio-5669, despite the commission's flawed determination regarding vocational
    rehabilitation, this court, through its magistrate, determined that the commission's flawed
    determination can be separated from the remainder of the nonmedical analysis. The
    magistrate's order, as adopted by the court, states:
    Relator's alleged failure to participate in vocational
    rehabilitation is largely irrelevant to the commission's
    finding that relator "retains the functional capacity to be
    trained to perform work within the sedentary classification."
    Id. at ¶ 39
    {¶ 56} In State ex rel. Barfield v. Indus. Comm., 10th Dist. No. 10AP-61, 2010-
    Ohio-5552, this court was again confronted with a commission order denying PTD
    compensation that contained improper statements regarding the claimant's efforts toward
    vocational rehabilitation. Finding that the improper statements required this court to
    issue a limited writ, this court explains:
    The staff hearing officer in this case "bookends" her decision
    with a reference to vocational rehabilitation. Moreover, in
    the summary paragraph that explains the decision, the staff
    hearing officer first concludes relator "retains the physical
    functional capacity to perform sedentary employment
    activities which require limited use of the right hand and
    which are low stress activities." Acknowledging relator "has
    restrictions," the staff hearing officer in the same paragraph
    follows with the statement that relator "made no effort in the
    No. 14AP-628                                                                              19
    13 years since she last worked to participate in a program of
    rehabilitation designed to enhance or improve her ability to
    return to the work force." (Mag. Dec., ¶ 26.) In light of such a
    paragraph, we are compelled to conclude the staff hearing
    officer's erroneous analysis of the vocational rehabilitation
    issue is so intertwined with the analysis of the medical and
    nonmedical factors that we must grant a limited writ and
    return this matter to the commission to consider relator's
    application for permanent total disability compensation
    without at the same time considering that she did not engage
    in vocational rehabilitation.
    Id. at ¶ 7.
    {¶ 57} Here, applying the case law, the magistrate finds that the incorrect
    statement in the SHO's order regarding an alleged failure of relator to "indicate any effort
    to obtain training" does not require this court to issue a writ of mandamus.
    {¶ 58} No other paragraphs of the SHO's order, other than the one at issue, contain
    any discussion of relator's efforts towards vocational rehabilitation.         The incorrect
    statement can easily be separated from the SHO's analysis in the remainder of the
    paragraphs. The incorrect statement is not intertwined with the SHO's main analysis of
    the non-medical factors.
    Second Issue
    {¶ 59} The second issue, as previously noted, is whether the commission abused its
    discretion when it considered relator's work history.
    {¶ 60} In challenging the commission's review of relator's work history, relator sets
    forth four cases in which the Supreme Court of Ohio determined that the commission's
    consideration of the PTD applicant's work history violated State ex rel. Noll v. Indus.
    Comm., 
    57 Ohio St.3d 203
     (1991).
    {¶ 61} In chronological order, those cases are State ex rel. Rhoten v. Indus.
    Comm., 
    77 Ohio St.3d 8
     (1996), State ex rel. Bruner v. Indus. Comm., 
    77 Ohio St.3d 243
    (1997), State ex rel. Pierce v. Indus. Comm., 
    77 Ohio St.3d 275
     (1997), State ex rel.
    LeVan v. Young's Shell Serv., 
    80 Ohio St.3d 55
     (1997).
    {¶ 62} In Rhoten, the court states:
    No. 14AP-628                                                                      20
    Two assumptions by the commission further undermine its
    analysis. The first is that every job produces some
    transferable skill. The second is that this claimant's prior
    jobs left her with skills transferable to sedentary work.
    The commission's first assumption ignores the plethora of
    unskilled jobs in the workplace. The second ignores that
    none of claimant's jobs had been sedentary. It is thus unclear
    how claimant's jobs would yield sedentary skills.
    The commission could, of course, have facilitated review by
    identifying these perceived "skills." Under similar
    circumstances, the court in State ex rel. Haddix v. Indus.
    Comm., 
    70 Ohio St.3d 59
    , 61 (1994), held:
    The commission determined that claimant's prior work as a
    gas station attendant and press operator provided him with
    skills transferable to sedentary employment. The
    commission's order, however, does not identify what those
    skills are. Such elaboration is critical in this case, since
    common sense suggests that neither prior work is, in and of
    itself, sedentary.
    Id. at 11.
    {¶ 63} In Bruner, the court states:
    We are disturbed by the increasing frequency with which the
    commission has denied permanent total disability
    compensation based on "transferable skills" that the
    commission refuses to identify. This lack of specificity is even
    more troubling when those "skills" are derived from
    traditionally unskilled jobs.
    Id. at 245.
    {¶ 64} In Pierce, the court states:
    The commission's discussion of claimant's work history is
    also inadequate. With increasing, and disturbing, frequency
    we are finding that no matter what claimant's employment
    background is, the commission finds skills-almost always
    unidentified-that are allegedly transferable to sedentary
    work. In some cases, depending on the claimant's
    background, these skills are self-evident. In many cases, they
    are not.
    No. 14AP-628                                                                             21
    ***
    The present claimant was an ironworker-a position that is
    neither sedentary nor light duty. Again, however, the
    commission found skills transferable to light work, without
    specifying what those skills were. The reference to
    supervisory skills, without more, is not enough in this case,
    given claimant's tenure as a working, as opposed to purely
    administrative, supervisor.
    Id. at 277-78.
    {¶ 65} In Levan, the court states that "[a]t issue is the commission's non-medical
    analysis which we find to be deficient in two respects." Only the first issue is pertinent
    here:
    The first involves the commission's treatment of claimant's
    work history, which is little more than a recitation of
    claimant's past jobs. The commission's attempt to add a
    substantive dimension to this recitation by using the phrases
    "wide and varied" and "flexibility and adaptability" fails.
    Such hollow phrases are reminiscent of the boilerplate
    previously decried in Noll, and simply restate what the
    earlier recitation had already revealed-that claimant had
    worked many jobs prior to injury. These phrases do not
    explain how claimant's occupational history enhances his
    reemployment potential.
    Id. at 57.
    {¶ 66} Here, relator contends that the commission found skills transferable to
    sedentary work without specifying what those skills are. Relator also contends that the
    commission's use of the term "varied work history" in the SHO's order of July 18, 2014 is
    akin to the commission's use of the term "wide and varied" which the court found to be
    "hollow" in Levan. Id. at 57.
    {¶ 67} The magistrate disagrees with relator's contention that any of the four cited
    cases require this court to issue a writ of mandamus.
    {¶ 68} Ohio Adm.Code 4121-3-34 sets forth the commission's rules applicable to
    the adjudication of PTD applications.
    {¶ 69} Ohio Adm.Code 4121-3-34(B) sets forth definitions.
    {¶ 70} Ohio Adm.Code 4121-3-34(B)(3) is captioned "Vocational factors."
    No. 14AP-628                                                                             22
    {¶ 71} Ohio Adm.Code 4121-3-34(B)(3)(c) is captioned "Work experience."
    {¶ 72} Thereunder, the code provides:
    (iv) "Transferability of skills" are skills that can be used in
    other work activities. Transferability will depend upon the
    similarity of occupational work activities that have been
    performed by the injured worker. Skills which an individual
    has obtained through working at past relevant work may
    qualify individuals for some other type of employment.
    (v) "Previous work experience" is to include the injured
    worker's usual occupation, other past occupations, and the
    skills and abilities acquired through past employment which
    demonstrate the type of work the injured worker may be able
    to perform. Evidence may show that an injured worker has
    the training or past work experience which enables the
    injured worker to engage in sustained remunerative
    employment in another occupation. The relevance and
    transferability of previous work skills are to be addressed by
    the adjudicator.
    {¶ 73} At issue here, is the following portion of the SHO's order:
    The Staff Hearing Officer concludes the Injured Worker has
    a varied work history with some of that work in the light and
    possibly sedentary categories (sit-down piece work). The
    ability to follow directions as a cook and a bus driver, the
    ability to work with the public as a bus driver, and the
    responsibilities involved in managing a store all suggest
    transferrable work skills. The Staff Hearing Officer therefore
    concludes the Injured Worker's vocational history is a
    vocational asset.
    {¶ 74} The ability to follow directions, the ability to work with the public, and the
    responsibilities involved in managing a store are arguably not transferrable work skills.
    While those identified abilities may have been enhanced during the work history,
    ordinarily those work abilities would have pre-existed the job being performed.
    Therefore, those abilities are arguably not transferrable work skills because they were
    probably not "obtained through working" as indicated at Ohio Adm.Code 4121-3-
    34(B)(3)(c)(iv).
    {¶ 75} Nevertheless, even if it can be argued that the identified abilities are
    technically not transferrable work skills, it was not improper for the commission to
    No. 14AP-628                                                                                23
    articulate in its order the abilities that relator has demonstrated during her work history,
    especially when those abilities can assist relator in the performance of another job.
    {¶ 76} Instructive here is State ex rel. Ewart v. Indus. Comm., 
    76 Ohio St.3d 139
    (1996), wherein the court states:
    The freedom to independently evaluate nonmedical factors is
    important because nonmedical factors are often subject to
    different interpretation.
    ***
    The same can be said in this case with regard to claimant's
    work history. Claimant worked for Refiners Transport and
    Terminal as a trucker for twenty-two years. Claimant's long
    tenure can be viewed negatively because it prevented the
    acquisition of a broader range of skills that more varied
    employment might have provided. It also, however, suggests
    a stable, loyal and dependable employee worth making an
    investment in. This is an asset and is an interpretation as
    valid as the first.
    Id. at 141-42.
    {¶ 77} The Ewart court also states that a "lack of transferrable skills * * * does not
    mandate a permanent total disability award." Id. at 142.
    {¶ 78} Based upon the above analysis, the magistrate does not find an abuse of
    discretion in the commission's consideration of relator's work history.
    {¶ 79} Accordingly, for all the above reasons, it is the magistrate's decision that this
    court deny relator's request for a writ of mandamus.
    /S/ MAGISTRATE
    KENNETH W. MACKE
    NOTICE TO THE PARTIES
    Civ.R. 53(D)(3)(a)(iii) provides that a party shall not assign as
    error on appeal the court's adoption of any factual finding or
    No. 14AP-628                                                                   24
    legal conclusion, whether or not specifically designated as a
    finding of fact or conclusion of law under Civ.R.
    53(D)(3)(a)(ii), unless the party timely and specifically objects
    to that factual finding or legal conclusion as required by Civ.R.
    53(D)(3)(b).