Manning v. FCA US, L.L.C. ( 2020 )

[Cite as Manning v. FCA US, L.L.C., 2020-Ohio-706.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
LUCAS COUNTY
Gary D. Manning Court of Appeals No. L-19-1144
Appellant Trial Court No. CI0201802712
v.
FCA US, LLC and Sarah D. Morrison,
Administrator, Bureau of Workers’
Compensation DECISION AND JUDGMENT
Appellee Decided: February 28, 2020
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Thomas G. Schlageter, for appellant.
Carrie L. Urrutia and William D. Holt, for appellee FCA US, LLC.
*****
PIETRYKOWSKI, J.
{¶ 1} Appellant, Gary D. Manning, appeals from the June 20, 2019 judgment of
the Lucas County Court of Common Pleas, which granted summary judgment to
appellee, FCA US, LLC, hereinafter “FCA.” For the reasons which follow, we affirm.
On appeal, Manning presents two assignments of error:
1. Because the Industrial Commission of Ohio never previously
addressed the injured worker’s request for an additional claim allowance
based on a flow-through theory of causation the doctrine of res judicata
does not apply.
2. A mandamus action is the proper way to challenge the Industrial
Commission’s exercise of its continuing jurisdiction.
{¶ 2} Manning was injured at work on February 10, 2015, and an Ohio Bureau of
Workers’ Compensation (“BWC”) claim was allowed for a lumbar sprain/strain and left
lateral herniated disc L4-5 on a substantial aggravation basis. On April 4, 2016, Manning
had surgery for the allowed claim. Manning asserts that in May 2016, he experienced
increased low back pain during post-surgery therapy and his doctor determined the L3-4
disc had collapsed. On August 9, 2016, Manning filed a motion to additionally allow a
claim for a “herniated disc at L3-4.” Attached to the motion was the July 27, 2016 chart
note of his doctor and MRI reports from 2014, 2015, and June 2016.
{¶ 3} The Ohio Industrial Commission (“IC”) district hearing officer (“DHO”)
disallowed the claim on December 10, 2016. The DHO found Manning’s “herniated disc
L3-4” was the result of a degenerative process based on the “the more persuasive”
November 16, 2016 report of Dr. Purewal, who opined, based on a 2015 MRI, that
Manning did not sustain a herniated disc at L3-4 as a direct and proximate or substantial
aggravation basis of the original injury. Manning appealed this decision to the IC staff
hearing officer (“SHO”).
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{¶ 4} On January 28, 2017, the SHO affirmed and modified the order of the DHO.
The SHO added the motion was disallowed “on the direct and proximate and substantial
aggravation basis” pursuant to IC Memo S11.1 The SHO based her decision on the same
1
The SHO stated Memo S11 provided:
If there is evidence on file or presented at hearing to support the
theories of direct causation, aggravation (date of injury or disability prior to
August 25, 2006)/substantial aggravation (date of injury or disability on or
after August 25, 2006), a request to allow a condition in a claim is to be
broadly construed to cover either theory of causation (i.e. direct
aggravation/substantial aggravation). The Hearing Officer shall address the
origin of the condition under both theories of causation without referring
the claim back to the prior hearing level or the Bureau of Workers’
Compensation.
Memo S11 now provides:
If there is evidence on file or presented at hearing to support the
theories of direct causation, aggravation (date of injury or disability prior to
August 25, 2006)/substantial aggravation (date of injury or disability on or
after August 25, 2006), or flow-through, a request to allow a condition in a
claim is to be broadly construed to cover those theories of causation. The
hearing officer shall address the origin of the condition under those alleged
theories of causation without referring the claim back to the prior hearing
level or the Bureau of Workers’ Compensation. Where a new theory, not
formerly requested, is raised at hearing or where new evidence regarding an
alternative theory of causation is submitted by any party, hearing officers
and/or hearing administrators shall ensure that all parties are given adequate
opportunity to obtain evidence in support of their position by continuing the
hearing for a period of at least 30 days, unless the parties agree that less
time is sufficient for obtaining the necessary evidence. The hearing officers
and/or hearing administrators shall state in their order or compliance letter
the period of time allotted to obtain the necessary evidence.
NOTE: Ohio Adm.Code 4121-3-09(A)(1)(b).
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2016 report of Dr. Purewal. Manning did not appeal this decision to the court of common
pleas.
{¶ 5} On January 5, 2018, Manning moved for an additional allowed claim “on a
flow-through basis” for the specific injury of a “disc protrusion, disc herniation, and
central canal stenosis at L3-L4.” Additional medical treatment records relating to
Manning’s operation and aftercare were attached to the motion. This second motion did
not seek reconsideration of the prior order rejecting an allowance for an additional claim
of “herniated disc at L3-4.” Instead, it was a claim for an additional allowance based on
a different theory of causation to connect the injury to the original industrial injury.
{¶ 6} In a March 22, 2018 order, the DHO disallowed the second motion on the
ground that the “conditions at the L3-L4 level pre-existed the industrial injury and were
not substantially aggravated. As the conditions pre-existed the industrial injury, the
injuries were not allowable on a flow-through basis.” The DHO based her decision on
the updated 2018 report of Dr. Purewal. Manning appealed. FCA opposed the appeal on
the basis that the doctrine of res judicata precluded consideration of this motion because
this theory of causation could have been litigated within the first motion filed on
August 10, 2016.
{¶ 7} In a May 15, 2018 order, the SHO addressed the FCA res judicata argument.
The SHO found the SHO’s order of January 20, 2017, specifically noted the “flow-
through theory of causation was not addressed” with respect to the first motion for an
additional allowance and, therefore, the second motion was not barred because it related
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to a “subsequent specific event which occurred in physical therapy in May of 2016.”
After reviewing the evidence of an updated report of Dr. Purewal, dated February 21,
2018, which was based on his examination of Manning post-surgery, and the treatment
records of Manning’s doctor, the SHO allowed the condition on a flow-through theory of
causation.
{¶ 8} FCA appealed the May 15, 2018 order to the IC which refused the appeal.
Thereafter, FCA appealed the decision to the Lucas County Court of Common Pleas.
FCA moved for summary judgment arguing the second motion for an allowed claim of
disc protrusion/herniation at L3-4 was barred under the doctrine of res judicata because
the IC had previously denied the claim. Manning argued res judicata was not applicable
because the theory of causation was different in the second motion.
{¶ 9} In its May 16, 2019 judgment, the trial court granted summary judgment to
FCA relying upon our decision in Brown v. Sheller Globe City Auto Stamping Co., 6th
Dist. Lucas No. L-98-1234, 1998 WL 880236 (Dec. 18, 1998). In Brown, we considered
whether the IC properly rejected, on res judicata grounds, a second motion to reactivate a
claim based on new medical evidence of an additional condition. Id. at *1. The IC
denied the first motion to reactivate a workers’ compensation claim due to “degenerative
arthritis” on the ground there was insufficient medical evidence to establish the condition
was related to the original industrial injury to the claimant’s left elbow. Id. That decision
was not appealed. Id. We agreed with the IC that a second motion to reactivate the claim
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for the condition of “left elbow degenerative joint disease” and “osteoarthritis” was
barred on res judicata grounds because the two claims involved the same condition. Id. at
*2.
{¶ 10} In the case before us, the trial court applied the reasoning of Brown and
initially found the conditions asserted in the two motions were not entirely the same and,
therefore, found res judicata did not bar the second motion entirely. However, on
reconsideration, the trial court concluded, in its June 20, 2019 judgment, that there was
no genuine issue of material fact and that “herniated disc at L3-4” and “disc protrusion,
disc herniation, and central canal stenosis at L3-L4” are a single condition. Therefore,
the court found res judicata barred adjudication of the second motion for allowance of the
same condition. Manning appeals.
{¶ 11} We address the assignments of error out of order to address appellant’s
second assignment of error first. In his second assignment of error, appellant argues
appellee must challenge the exercise of the IC’s continuing jurisdiction in a mandamus
action filed in the appellate court. Appellant relies on State ex rel. Belle Tire Distribs.,
Inc. v. Indus. Comm. of Ohio, 154 Ohio St.3d 488, 2018-Ohio-2122, 116 N.E.3d 102. In
Belle Tire, the Ohio Supreme Court held that when an issue is raised which relates to the
exercise of the continuing jurisdiction of the IC, rather than the factual issue of a right to
participate, the issue must be raised in a mandamus action rather than in an appeal under
R.C. 4123.512. Id. at ¶ 24-25.
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{¶ 12} “Flow-through” or residual injuries are conditions arising in a different part
of the body as a proximate result of the previously allowed injury or condition. Holbrook
v. OhioHealth Corp., 10th Dist. Franklin No. 14AP-507, 2015-Ohio-2354, ¶ 29;
Kirkwood v. Neptune World Wide Movers, 9th Dist. Medina No. 1837, 1990 WL 34842,
*2 (Mar. 28, 1990). Flow-through injuries are considered under the continuing
jurisdiction of the IC pursuant to R.C. 4123.52. R.C. 4123.84(C); Specht v. BP Am. Inc.,
86 Ohio St.3d 29, 711 N.E.2d 225 (1999), syllabus. Furthermore, the allowance of a
flow-through/residual condition impacts the right to participate and a challenge to the IC
order must be made in an appeal to the common pleas court. State ex rel. Bond v. Velotta
Co., 91 Ohio St.3d 418, 419, 746 N.E.2d 1071 (2001).
{¶ 13} Under Ohio’s workers’ compensation system, judicial review is limited to
three types of proceedings: direct appeal to the common pleas court, R.C. 4123.512; an
original action for a writ of mandamus, R.C. Chapter 2731; or a declaratory judgment,
R.C. Chapter 2721. Clendenin v. Girl Scouts of W. Ohio, 150 Ohio St.3d 300, 2017-
Ohio-2830, 81 N.E.3d 438, ¶ 9, citing Felty v. AT & T Technologies, Inc., 65 Ohio St.3d
234, 237, 602 N.E.2d 1141 (1992). Failure to seek the appropriate review precludes the
court from finding it has subject-matter jurisdiction, which would require that the court
dismiss the case. Id.{¶ 14} Pursuant to R.C. 4123.512, “[t]he claimant or the employer may appeal an
order of the industrial commission made under division (E) of section 4123.511 of the
Revised Code in any injury or occupational disease case, other than a decision as to the
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extent of disability to the court of common pleas * * *.” The Ohio Supreme Court has
strictly interpreted this provision and limited the jurisdiction of the common pleas court
to reviewing the grant or denial of the right to participate or continue to participate in the
workers’ compensation fund for the original injury/condition and any allowance for an
additional condition. Clendenin at ¶ 11, citing Felty at 238.
{¶ 15} However, an original action must be filed to challenge the exercise of the
continuing jurisdiction of the IC under R.C. 4123.52 to grant or deny a motion to
reconsider a former ruling due to changed circumstances, fraud, newly discovered
evidence, or some other valid criteria, Benton v. Hamilton Cty. Educ. Serv. Ctr., 123 Ohio
St.3d 347, 2009-Ohio-4969, 916 N.E.2d 778, ¶ 6, 17.
{¶ 16} In this case, the first motion requested the claim be additionally allowed for
a herniated disc at L3-4, which was denied and never appealed. The second motion
requested the claim be additionally allowed “on a flow-through basis” for a disc
protrusion, disc herniation, and central canal stenosis at L3-L4, which was granted.
Therefore, a challenge was made to whether an additional condition could be added to the
claim pursuant to the continuing jurisdiction of the IC, not whether the IC abused its
discretion in considering the motion. Therefore, an appeal to the trial court was the
appropriate review process. Accordingly, we find appellant’s second assignment of error
not well-taken.
{¶ 17} Having found this appeal is properly before us, we now address the merits
of appellant’s first assignment of error. In his first assignment of error, appellant argues
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the trial court erred by applying the doctrine of res judicata because the hearing officers
determining the first motion never addressed a flow-through theory of causation.
Manning asserts the issues presented in the two motions were substantially different
because of the different theories of causation specifically noted by the SHO.
{¶ 18} On appeal, we review both the application of the doctrine of res judicata
and the granting of summary judgment de novo. Holbrook, 10th Dist. Franklin No.
14AP-507, 2015-Ohio-2354, at ¶ 13 (res judicata); City of Dayton v. State, 2017-Ohio-
6909, 87 N.E.3d 176, ¶ 12 (summary judgment). “Res judicata” incorporates both the
concepts of “claim preclusion (historically called estoppel by judgment in Ohio) and
issue preclusion (traditionally known as collateral estoppel).” Grava v. Parkman Twp.,
73 Ohio St.3d 379, 381, 653 N.E.2d 226 (1995). The doctrine requires that a party must
“present every ground for relief in the first action, or be forever barred from asserting it.”
Id. at 382, quoting Rogers v. Whitehall, 25 Ohio St.3d 67, 69, 494 N.E.2d 1387 (1986).
See also Natl. Amusements, Inc. v. Springdale, 53 Ohio St.3d 60, 62, 558 N.E.2d 1178(1990). Accord Brown v. Dayton, 89 Ohio St.3d 245, 248, 730 N.E.2d 958 (2000)
(“[w]hether the original claim explored all the possible theories of relief is not
relevant.”).
{¶ 19} Generally, the doctrine of res judicata applies to administrative proceedings
before the IC. Tantarelli v. Decapua Ents., Inc., 156 Ohio St.3d 258, 2019-Ohio-517,
125 N.E.3d 850, ¶ 14. In a workers’ compensation action, a party asserting that res
judicata bars an action must establish that: the claimant has asserted a second “identical
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workers’ compensation claim[]” which “the parties * * * had ample opportunity to
litigate” in a prior proceeding; the issue was “conclusively decided in a valid, final
judgment on the merits,” and no appeal was taken from the first decision. Marinkovic v.
Diversified Inventory Solution, Inc., 147 Ohio App.3d 497, 2002-Ohio-453, 771 N.E.2d
291, ¶ 8 (9th Dist.), citing State ex rel. Kroger Co. v. Indus. Comm. of Ohio, 80 Ohio
St.3d 649, 687 N.E.2d 768 (1998) (other citations omitted).
{¶ 20} However, res judicata does not bar consideration of an additional flow-
through or residual injury because it does not “arise from the same nucleus of operative
facts” as the initial claim. Ward v. Kroger Co., 106 Ohio St.3d 35, 2005-Ohio-3560, 830
N.E.2d 1155, ¶ 10; Jacobs v. Teledyne, Inc., 39 Ohio St.3d 168, 171, 529 N.E.2d 1255(1988), quoting State ex rel. Westchester Estates, Inc., 61 Ohio St.2d 42, 45, 399 N.E.2d
81 (1980) (the doctrine of res judicata will not bar litigation when “a change in the facts
* * * raises a new material issue”). Furthermore, res judicata does not bar the IC from
exercising its continuing jurisdiction under R.C. 4123.52 because the General Assembly
specifically provided that the IC can modify its prior final order under one of the specific
circumstances permitted under the statute. Tantarelli.
{¶ 21} Manning argues our holding in Brown v. Sheller Globe City Auto Stamping
Co., 6th Dist. Lucas No. L-98-1234, 1998 WL 880236 (Dec. 18, 1998) is not directly on
point. The Brown case dealt with two motions to reactivate a claim so the facts in that
case are distinguishable. However, other cases have addressed the identical issue
presented in this case and hold a second motion for allowance of an additional claim is
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barred under the doctrine of res judicata where the claimant failed to appeal from the
denial of the first motion asserting the same condition but a different theory of causation.
Henderson v. Canton City Schools, 5th Dist. Stark No. 2018CA00073, 2019-Ohio-610,
¶ 21-28; Holbrook, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 14AP-507, 2015-Ohio-2354, at ¶ 29-31;
Robinson v. AT&T Network Systems, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 02AP-807, 2003-Ohio-
1513, ¶ 17-18; Kirkwood, 9th Dist. Medina No. 1837, 1990 WL 34842, at *2. The same
issue is presented in both motions regardless of the theories of causation—whether the
subsequent injury is related to the original industrial injury. Compare Starkey v. Builders
FirstSource Ohio Valley, L.L.C., 130 Ohio St.3d 114, 2011-Ohio-3278, 956 N.E.2d 267,
¶ 14-18 and Ward at ¶ 14 (which hold that a new theory of causation can be raised on
appeal because the issue of whether the condition should be allowed is the same).
{¶ 22} Manning argues, however, that this case is distinguishable because the IC
specifically limited its rulings as to each motion based on the different theories of
causation pursuant to IC Memo S11. At the time of the IC rulings in this case, the memo
stated: “If there is evidence * * * to support the theories of direct causation, aggravation,
* * * substantial aggravation, a request to allow a condition in a claim is to be broadly
construed to cover either theory of causation. The Hearing Officer shall address the
origin of the condition under both theories of causation without referring the claim back
to the prior hearing level or the Bureau of Workers’ Compensation.” This memo has
been amended to cover the flow-through theory of causation as well.
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{¶ 23} We find the purpose of this directive is to have a hearing officer consider
any theory of causation when it is raised at any stage of the administrative proceedings
rather than remanding the motion back to the prior hearing level or BWC. The memo has
no bearing on the issue of whether the doctrine of res judicata requires that all theories of
causation must be presented in a single amended allowance claim.
{¶ 24} We conclude, therefore, that the trial court properly found res judicata
would bar Manning’s second motion requesting the IC to modify his claim to add an
injury on a flow-through/residual basis after the IC had already denied a prior motion to
amend the claim regarding the same injury but based on theories of direct and proximate
or substantial aggravation basis. Manning’s first assignment of error is not well-taken.
{¶ 25} Having found that the trial court did not commit error prejudicial to
appellant and that substantial justice has been done, the judgment of the Lucas County
Court of Common Pleas is affirmed. Appellant is ordered to pay the costs of this appeal
pursuant to App.R. 24.
Judgment affirmed.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to App.R. 27.
See also 6th Dist.Loc.App.R. 4.
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Manning v. FCA US, LLC
C.A. No. L-19-1144
Mark L. Pietrykowski, J. _______________________________
JUDGE
Thomas J. Osowik, J.
_______________________________
Christine E. Mayle, J. JUDGE
CONCUR.
_______________________________
JUDGE
This decision is subject to further editing by the Supreme Court of
Ohio’s Reporter of Decisions. Parties interested in viewing the final reported
version are advised to visit the Ohio Supreme Court’s web site at:
http://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/ROD/docs/.
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