Rickard v. Solley , 188 Ohio App. 3d 205 ( 2010 )

[Cite as Rickard v. Solley, 188 Ohio App.3d 205, 2010-Ohio-2786.]
STATE OF OHIO, MAHONING COUNTY
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
SEVENTH DISTRICT
RICKARD, )
) CASE NO. 09 MA 139
APPELLEE, )
)
v. ) OPINION
)
SOLLEY, )
)
APPELLANT. )
CHARACTER OF PROCEEDINGS: Civil Appeal from Common Pleas
Court, Case No. 09 CV 1706.
JUDGMENT: Reversed in part, Vacated in Part
and Remanded.
APPEARANCES:
Siciliano & Gallito and Robyn R. Gallito, for appellee.
Philip Arbie, for appellant.
JUDGES:
Hon. Mary DeGenaro
Hon. Joseph J. Vukovich
Hon. Gene Donofrio
Dated: June 10, 2010
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DEGENARO, Judge.
{¶1} This timely appeal comes for consideration upon the trial court record and the
parties' briefs. Defendant-appellant, Lisa Solley, appeals the judgment of the Mahoning
County Common Pleas Court that transferred a breach-of-contract action filed by plaintiff-
appellant, Cynthia Rickard, back to the Youngstown Municipal Court. On appeal, Solley
argues that the common pleas court erred by transferring the case. Solley also claims that
the common pleas court erred by failing to rule on her motion to dismiss Rickard's
complaint.
{¶2} Upon review, we conclude that Solley's transfer argument is meritorious. The
transfer was erroneous because the amount of damages Solley requested in her amended
counterclaim exceeds the jurisdictional limits of the municipal court pursuant to R.C.
1901.17. Solley's challenge to the common pleas court's failure to rule on her motion to
dismiss is not ripe for appellate review. Finally, we sua sponte address the fact that the
appealed judgment in this case erroneously rules on a motion filed in a separate but
related case. Accordingly, we reverse the portion of the judgment transferring the case to
the municipal court, vacate the portion of the judgment that rules on a motion not filed in
this case, and remand this cause to the common pleas court for further proceedings
consistent with this court's decision.
Facts and Procedural History
{¶3} Rickard and Solley were roommates for many years, during which time they
accumulated real and personal property together and shared expenses. At some point,
their relationship ended and Solley moved out of the house the parties' co-owned. Both
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parties retained attorneys to address the numerous issues regarding property division and
finances that arose from the end of the partnership. On July 11, 2006, Solley filed a
separate action in the Mahoning County Common Pleas Court (case No. 06 CV 2621)
against Rickard, seeking partition of real estate co-owned by the parties in Youngstown.
Eventually, the parties entered into a settlement that concerned not only the real estate but
also a number of other issues, including a timeshare in Cancun and a Jeep lease. As part
of this agreement, Solley quit-claimed her interest in the Youngstown property and the
Cancun timeshare to Rickard, and Rickard in turn agreed to pay Solley $15,000. Solley
agreed to assume the Jeep lease. The trial court dismissed the case and entered
judgment for the terms of the settlement agreement on January 8, 2007.
{¶4} Over 16 months later, on May 27, 2008, Rickard filed the present action in the
Youngstown Municipal Court, case No. 08CVF02291Y, seeking $12,272.23 from Solley for
various household bills that the parties allegedly accumulated during their relationship.
{¶5} On June 25, 2008, Solley filed a motion to dismiss and a motion for
sanctions. Solley argued that all issues relating to the parties' former partnership had been
resolved in the January 8, 2007 settlement agreement in case No. 06 CV 2621. She
claimed that any issues not raised by Rickard in the other suit were extinguished. Further,
Solley contended that the new action was frivolous and designed to harass her, and
therefore moved for sanctions against Rickard and her attorney pursuant to Civ.R. 11. She
also requested that the court order Rickard to pay her attorney fees and costs. Rickard
responded, asserting that the claim involved in the instant case is distinct from the previous
action, which was for partition of real estate.
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{¶6} On July 23, 2008, after being granted leave to plead, Solley filed an answer
and counterclaim. Solley denied owing any money to Rickard and again claimed that the
issues raised in this lawsuit were conclusively settled in the other case. In her
counterclaim, Solley claimed that Rickard had failed to comply with the terms of the
settlement agreement in the other case by failing to remove Solley's name from the
mortgage on the Youngstown property. She further asserted that Rickard's lawsuit was
wholly frivolous and claimed to have suffered damages and incurred legal expenses as a
result of Rickard's wrongdoing. Solley prayed for judgment in the amount of $15,000,
which is the jurisdictional limit for the municipal court. Rickard filed an answer to Solley's
counterclaim.
{¶7} On March 6, 2009, Solley filed a "Supplement to Motion to Dismiss," in which
she attached correspondence between the parties' attorneys, as parol evidence to attempt
to demonstrate that the prior settlement agreement in the partition case encompassed and
therefore extinguished claims raised in the present action. The docket reveals that the
municipal court never ruled on Solley's motion to dismiss or her motion for sanctions.
{¶8} On April 9, 2009, without moving for leave, Solley filed a first amended
answer and counterclaim, in which she restated her previous counterclaims involving
breach of the settlement agreement in the partition action and the filing of a frivolous
lawsuit. For each of these counterclaims, she increased the amount of damages sought.
While in her original counterclaim she had prayed for damages totaling exactly $15,000, in
her amended counterclaim she prayed for damages in excess of $25,000 for each of those
claims. She also added a new counterclaim alleging breach of contract for Rickard's
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alleged failure to reimburse Solley for her services as a caregiver for Rickard's mother.
With regard to this counterclaim, Rickard also prayed for damages exceeding $25,000.
{¶9} That same day, Solley filed a motion to transfer the case to the common
pleas court, alleging that the amount in controversy exceeded the jurisdictional limit of the
municipal court. Then on April 21, 2009, Solley filed a motion to continue trial, a motion to
compel discovery, and a renewal jury demand.
{¶10} On April 22, 2009, the municipal court issued a judgment entry transferring
the case to the common pleas court pursuant to Civ.R. 13(J) and R.C. 1901.17, because
the counterclaim exceeded the jurisdictional limit for the municipal court. However,
according to the docket, notice of the transfer was not provided to the parties by the
municipal court. Because of this, Rickard continued to file motions in the municipal court,
including replies to Solley's April 21, 2009 motions. Rickard later refiled these exact
motions with the common pleas court.
{¶11} According to the common pleas court's docket, the complaint and municipal
court record were filed with the common pleas court on May 8, 2009, and assigned a case
number of 09 CV 1706. On May 19, 2009, the common pleas court sent notice to the
parties confirming that the case had been transferred. Notably, there are no judgment
entries or notations in the docket suggesting that the common pleas court consolidated the
transferred case (09 CV 1706) with the previous common pleas partition action (06 CV
2621).
{¶12} On June 8, 2009, Rickard filed a motion for leave to move, plead, or respond.
Several days later, she filed a Civ.R. 60(B) motion that challenged the municipal court's
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April 22, 2009 judgment entry transferring the case to the common pleas court. The
common pleas court later denied the Civ.R. 60(B) motion, stating that it had no jurisdiction
to vacate a municipal court order.
{¶13} Meanwhile, in the separate partition case (06 CV 2621), Solley filed a motion
for relief from the January 8, 2007 settlement agreement. However, instead of ruling on
that motion under that case number, the trial court began issuing decisions and orders
under case No. 09 CV 1706, the instant suit.
{¶14} For example, on July 9, 2009, a magistrate's decision was issued under case
No. 09 CV 1706 that addresses issues from both cases. It begins by stating: "This matter
came on for hearing before the Magistrate on June 3, 2009 on the Plaintiff's Motion for
Settlement Agreement filed on March 3, 2009." The magistrate's decision proceeds to
overrule the motion for relief from settlement agreement. It also rules that "this case,"
presumably 09 CV 1706, is to be transferred back to the Youngstown Municipal Court.
{¶15} Solley filed objections to the magistrate's decision in which she contended
that the magistrate had somehow confused the two cases. She noted that the motion for
relief from settlement was not filed in this case, and she claimed that any decision
regarding a different case in a finding pertaining to this case is defective per se. She also
objected to the magistrate's failure to rule on her motion to dismiss Rickard's claims.
Finally, Solley objected to the transfer, as she claimed to have a counterclaim pending that
exceeds the jurisdictional limits of the municipal court.
{¶16} On August 12, 2009, the common pleas court issued a judgment overruling
the objections to the magistrate's decision, denying the motion for relief from settlement,
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and transferring the case back to the municipal court. Solley filed an appeal the same day.
{¶17} In a September 30, 2009 judgment entry, this court ordered Solley to file a
jurisdictional memorandum stating a brief case history clarifying the proceedings to date
and the statutory authority for this court to review the August 12, 2009 judgment as a final,
appealable order. Solley filed a jurisdictional memorandum on October 15, 2009, and on
November 19, 2009, this court issued a judgment concluding that the August 12, 2009
order is final and appealable as defined by R.C. 2505.02 and that this court has jurisdiction
to proceed.
Transfer to Municipal Court
{¶18} In Solley's first assignment of error, she asserts:
{¶19} "The Court of Common Pleas had no authority to transfer the case back to
the Youngstown Municipal Court because the amount of the counterclaim exceeds the
jurisdictional limits of a municipal court as defined by ORC § 1901.17 and Civ.R. 13(J)."
{¶20} This assignment of error concerns the jurisdiction of the municipal court,
which is a question of law. We review legal issues de novo. E. Sav. Bank v. Bucci, 7th
Dist. No. 08 MA 28, 2008-Ohio-6363, at ¶28. See also Ferron v. Fifth Third Bank, 5th Dist.
Nos. 06CAE110086 and 07CAG020010, 2007-Ohio-3094, at ¶15 (applying de novo
standard of review to an issue involving transfer of a case to municipal court).
{¶21} R.C. 1901.17 governs the monetary jurisdiction of municipal courts in Ohio
and states:
{¶22} "A municipal court shall have original jurisdiction only in those cases in which
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the amount claimed by any party, or the appraised value of the personal property sought to
be recovered, does not exceed fifteen thousand dollars, except that this limit does not
apply to the housing division or environmental division of a municipal court.
{¶23} "Judgment may be rendered in excess of the jurisdictional amount, when the
excess consists of interest, damages for the detention of personal property, or costs
accrued after the commencement of the action."
{¶24} Civ.R. 13(J) provides the mechanism for transfer to the court of common
pleas in the event that a defendant's counterclaim exceeds the monetary jurisdiction of the
municipal court. "In the event that a counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim exceeds
the jurisdiction of the court, the court shall certify the proceedings in the case to the court of
common pleas." Civ.R. 13(J).
{¶25} Here, the municipal court certified the proceedings to the common pleas court
pursuant to Civ.R. 13(J) because Solley's amended counterclaim prayed for damages in
excess of $25,000. The common pleas court subsequently transferred the case back to
the municipal court, reasoning that "the original filing and jurisdictional requirements are
met."
{¶26} Solley contends that this was improper because her amended counterclaim
remained pending at the time of the second transfer and exceeded the jurisdictional limit of
the municipal court. To the contrary, Rickard argues that the transfer was correct because
the municipal court never granted Solley leave to file her amended counterclaim and that
the counterclaim was therefore never properly before the court. Solley counters that by
certifying the record to the common pleas court, the municipal court impliedly granted leave
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and accepted Solley's amended counterclaim. Solley is correct.
{¶27} Certification to the common pleas court is not automatic when a counterclaim
is filed that prays for damages in excess of the municipal court's jurisdiction. Crisalli v.
Mearini, 8th Dist. No. 84245, 2004-Ohio-6018, at ¶ 2. "Rather, the municipal court should
first determine if the counterclaim satisfies the formalities of the civil rules and states a
claim showing that the party is entitled to relief." Id., citing Hersch v. Debreczeni (1973), 33
Ohio App.2d 235, 238-239, 62 O.O.2d 349, 294 N.E.2d 918. Thus, by certifying the record
to the common pleas court, the municipal court accepted Solley's amended counterclaim.
{¶28} Once in the common pleas court, the amended counterclaim, which prayed
for damages in excess of $25,000, was never dismissed. A motion to strike the amended
counterclaim was filed, but no ruling thereon was issued by the common pleas court.
Because the amended counterclaim remained pending, it appears that the common pleas
court erred by transferring the case back to the municipal court. The damages alleged in
Solley's amended counterclaim exceed the monetary jurisdiction of the municipal court
pursuant to R.C. 1901.17. Accordingly, Solley's first assignment of error is meritorious.
Motion to Dismiss
{¶29} Solley's second and third assignments of error are related and therefore will
be discussed together. They assert:
{¶30} "Because the settlement agreement entered into by the parties in a previous
lawsuit (2006-CV 02621—Mahoning County Court of Common Pleas) was incorporated
into a judgment entry signed by the judge and because the claim Plaintiff/Appellee is
making in the instant suit is one that could have been litigated in the previous lawsuit, the
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claims of Plaintiff/Appellee are not allowed under Civ.R. 13(A)."
{¶31} "Because there is a valid settlement agreement in effect that settles all
existing claims of the parties, the trial court erred in not dismissing the complaint of
Plaintiff/Appellee."
{¶32} Solley presents several arguments why the common pleas court erred by
failing to grant her motion to dismiss Rickard's complaint. Specifically, she claims that
Rickard should have brought her claim as a compulsory counterclaim in the partition action
and that the settlement agreement in that action extinguishes the claim made by Rickard in
the instant suit.
{¶33} These issues are not ripe for review. The common pleas court, like the
municipal court before it, never ruled on Solley's motion to dismiss. Rather, the common
pleas court transferred the case back to the municipal court. A claim is not ripe for
appellate review unless the trial court "has arrived at a definitive position on the issue that
inflicts an actual, concrete injury." Karches v. Cincinnati (1988), 38 Ohio St.3d 12, 14-15,
526 N.E.2d 1350. See also Orwick v. Orwick, 7th Dist. No. 04 JE 14, 2005-Ohio-5055, at
¶61 (concluding that assignment of error was not ripe for appellate review where trial court
had issued no judgment ruling on the issue raised). Accordingly, absent any ruling on the
motion to dismiss in this case, it appears that the issue is not ripe for this court's review.
Moreover, even if the common pleas court's failure to rule on the motion could somehow
be taken as an implied denial thereof, the denial of a motion to dismiss is generally not a
final, appealable order. See Polikoff v. Adam (1993), 67 Ohio St.3d 100, 103, 616 N.E.2d
213. Accordingly, Solley's second and third assignments of error are not ripe for appellate
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review.
Irregularities in the August 12, 2009 Entry
{¶34} Finally, we sua sponte address the fact that the August 12, 2009 judgment
entry, which is the subject of this appeal, as well as the magistrate's decision that preceded
it, refer to a motion that was not filed in this case. Specifically, the August 12, 2009 order
states: "The Plaintiff's Motion for Relief from Settlement Agreement filed on March 3, 2009
is denied." However, the motion for relief from settlement agreement was not filed in the
instant case. Rather, it was filed by Solley, who was the plaintiff in the separate partition
case (06 CV 2621). There is no indication that the trial court consolidated the present case
(09 CV 1706) with the partition case (06 CV 2621) upon transfer of the present case to the
common pleas court. Although it would have been reasonable to consolidate the two
cases, there is no judgment entry doing so in either case. See Civ.R. 42(A)(1). Although
not assigned as an error here, this issue was raised by Solley at the trial court level.
{¶35} The common pleas court acted without authority when it ruled in this case on
Solley’s motion filed in the partition case, absent a consolidation order. See State ex rel.
Gains v. Go Go Girls Cabaret, Inc., 2010-Ohio-870, at ¶37 (holding that trial court lacked
authority in a civil nuisance case to order the return of property seized pursuant to a search
warrant in a separate but related criminal case). Pursuant to App.R. 12(A), we exercise
our discretion to sua sponte notice this error. Accordingly, we vacate the portion of the
August 12, 2009 entry that rules on Solley’s motion for relief from the settlement
agreement in the partition action. That motion should be properly resolved in the context of
the partition case, which is not the subject of this appeal.
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Conclusion
{¶36} Solley's first assignment of error is meritorious. Since Solley's amended
counterclaim prayed for damages in excess of $25,000, the common pleas court erred by
transferring the case. Solley's second and third assignments of error are not ripe for
appellate review. Additionally, we exercise our discretion to sua sponte notice an error
contained in the appealed judgment, namely that a portion thereof rules on a motion filed in
a completely separate, although related case. Accordingly, we reverse the portion of the
judgment transferring the case to the municipal court, vacate the portion of the judgment
that rules on a motion not filed in this case, and remand this cause to the common pleas
court for further proceedings consistent with this court's decision.
Judgment accordingly.
VUKOVICH, P.J., and DONOFRIO, J., concur.
_____________________