State v. Juarez , 2020 Ohio 6692 ( 2020 )

[Cite as State v. Juarez, 2020-Ohio-6692.]
COURT OF APPEALS
STARK COUNTY, OHIO
FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
STATE OF OHIO : JUDGES:
:
: Hon. Patricia A. Delaney, P.J.
Plaintiff-Appellee : Hon. Craig R. Baldwin, J.
: Hon. Earle E. Wise, Jr., J.
-vs- :
: Case No. 2020CA00067
:
RAMON CANTERA JUAREZ :
:
:
Defendant-Appellant : OPINION
CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING: Appeal from the Stark County Court of
Common Pleas, Case No. 2019CR1569
JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED
DATE OF JUDGMENT ENTRY: December 14, 2020
APPEARANCES:
For Plaintiff-Appellee: For Defendant-Appellant:
JOHN D. FERRERO, JR. BERNARD L. HUNT
STARK CO. PROSECUTOR 2395 McGinty Road NW
KRISTINE W. BEARD North Canton, OH 44720
110 Central Plaza South, Ste. 510
Canton, OH 44702-1413
Stark County, Case No. 2020CA00067 2
Delaney, P.J.
{¶1} Appellant Ramon Cantera Juarez appeals from the February 26, 2020
Judgment Entry of the Stark County Court of Common Pleas. Appellee is the state of
Ohio.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
{¶2} This case arose in the early morning hours of July 14, 2019, when appellant
forced entry in the home of his ex-girlfriend, Claudia, and attacked her boyfriend, Julio.
Appellee’s evidence
{¶3} Appellant and Claudia have known each other for about 12 years and had
an on and off again romantic relationship which ended about three years before this
incident. Both have new partners. Claudia’s boyfriend’s name is Julio. Appellant saw
Julio once, briefly, and knew Claudia was dating someone, but appellant and Julio did not
know each other. Julio has his own residence but sometimes visits Claudia overnight on
weekends.
{¶4} Appellant and Claudia share one minor child, J., age 11. Claudia lives in a
single-family residence in northwest Canton with her three minor children: M., age 17,
A., age 15, and J. Appellant sees J. occasionally but does not have regular visitation
with her. Claudia testified she tries to encourage a relationship between appellant and
J., but appellant has sporadic contact with J.
{¶5} On Friday, July 13, 2019, Julio came over to Claudia’s house after work.
The two ate dinner, watched television, and fell asleep in Claudia’s bedroom, which is on
the first floor of the residence. Claudia’s bedroom is directly accessed by sliding glass
Stark County, Case No. 2020CA00067 3
doors which are the “back door” of the residence. Julio testified they fell asleep around
midnight.
{¶6} Around 2:00 a.m., Claudia was awakened by the sound of someone
immediately outside pounding on the sliding glass doors. Claudia looked out and saw
appellant pounding on the doors. She put clothes and shoes on, and awakened Julio.
Claudia told Julio she would go outside and find out what appellant wanted, but she didn’t
want any trouble and Julio was not to come outside. Claudia said she would tell appellant
to leave.
{¶7} Claudia exited the house through the front door of the residence and
encountered appellant on his way to the front door. The two met in front of the house.
Appellant was calm at first, but he became increasingly upset, telling Claudia he could
not get over the fact that she had a new boyfriend. Appellant said he still loved her.
Claudia asked him to please leave, and appellant said “Julio wins.” Claudia said Julio is
her boyfriend now, and appellant said “Maybe no one’s going to win.” Claudia again
asked appellant to leave and appellant appeared to start walking away, toward the back
of the house.
{¶8} Claudia went back inside the residence, entered her bedroom, and laid
down. Julio was asleep. Claudia had just laid down when appellant began banging on
the door again, harder this time. Appellant screamed for Julio to come out. Claudia told
Julio again to stay in the bedroom, and she got up, intending to tell appellant to leave.
{¶9} As Claudia made her way toward the front door, her son A. came downstairs
from his bedroom. A. is a high-school football player and wrestler. This night, he was
awake in his upstairs bedroom, playing video games with a headset on. He was also
Stark County, Case No. 2020CA00067 4
dog-sitting a friend’s dog, and heard the dog suddenly barking a lot. A. came downstairs
to investigate and encountered his mother on her way to the front door. She asked him
to come outside with her, so he followed her out the front door and closed the door behind
him. He testified the front door of the residence was therefore closed but not locked.
{¶10} Claudia and A. proceeded around the back of the house to the patio and
the sliding glass doors. A. is familiar with appellant and knows him as “Munchie.” A.
observed appellant pounding on the glass doors, screaming for Julio. A. did not know at
first where Julio was inside the house. A. and Claudia testified appellant was screaming
for Julio to come out of the house, threatening him in Spanish that he would go to
Honduras and kill his family. Claudia argued with appellant and appellant said he would
kill Julio. A. observed Claudia and appellant near the family’s garage, where Julio’s car
was parked. Appellant punched the side mirror of Julio’s car and ripped the front license
plate off.
{¶11} Claudia continued to ask appellant to leave, and it briefly appeared as
though he was leaving, as he walked toward the alley alongside the house. Claudia and
A. saw appellant pick up a rock, and Claudia feared he might throw it through a window
or the front door. Claudia told A. to record appellant’s movements with his phone and to
check the front of the house.
{¶12} As A. rounded the corner of the house, he testified, “I see that the door is
slammed open and I see him run inside.” T. 170. A. yelled, “Munchie!” hoping to get
appellant to stop. A. saw appellant remove his belt and wrap it around his fist. Appellant
ran into Claudia’s bedroom and A. yelled “Julio!” Julio was awake and out of bed,
standing in the corner of the room holding a blanket. Appellant immediately charged into
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the room and attempted to strike Julio, who wrapped him in the blanket. Appellant
continued to throw punches as Julio and A. wrestled with him. A. eventually pulled
appellant off Julio and put him in a headlock.
{¶13} Claudia entered the room and turned on the lights. She said she was calling
the police and told appellant to leave. Appellant said “ok, ok, let me up,” got up, and
walked out with the belt. As appellant left the house, A. said, “Don’t come back.”
{¶14} During the struggle, appellant left visible injuries on Julio from scratching
and gouging him as the two fought.
{¶15} Canton police officers arrived on the scene and spoke to the witnesses. Ptl.
Robert Huber testified he was dispatched around 2:00 a.m. to the northwest city address
and found Claudia, A., and Julio present. Claudia provided appellant’s name and
identifying information, including a description of the silver truck in which he left the scene.
Huber observed visible injuries to Julio, including lacerations and scrapes on his face,
back, and chest. Huber testified some of the gouge marks were consistent with fingernail
scratches. Huber obtained written statements from the witnesses and took photos of
Julio.
{¶16} Huber found appellant’s name and address via a records search, and police
looked for him that night without success.
Appellant’s trial testimony
{¶17} At trial, appellant was the sole defense witness and told a markedly different
story of the events of July 13 and 14, 2019. Appellant said he saw Claudia earlier in the
day; he admitted he entered the sliding glass doors while she was sleeping and said he
customarily used those doors because Claudia didn’t want her children to know he was
Stark County, Case No. 2020CA00067 6
there. Appellant testified that also at some point earlier in the day, he gave his daughter,
J., money for school supplies.
{¶18} Later that night, therefore, appellant said he wanted to know what his
daughter spent the money on. He wasn’t interested in Claudia or her boyfriend; he
wanted to see his daughter and felt entitled to do so. When pressed upon cross-
examination about why he came to the house at 2:00 a.m. to speak to an 11-year-old,
appellant said these events happened much earlier in the evening and denied that any of
this occurred at 2:00 a.m. Appellant claimed he first knocked on the door at 11:00 p.m.
{¶19} Appellant testified that he first knocked on the sliding glass doors because
that was what he customarily did. At some point he left and was circling the block in his
vehicle, but became concerned when he saw an unknown male in boxer shorts standing
in the doorway of the residence. He parked his vehicle a short distance away and walked
toward the house, not looking for Claudia or Julio but for his daughter. He claimed the
front door was open and no one stopped him from entering to investigate. Inside, he
fought with a guy who bit his finger. Appellant also denied that he interacted with A. or
that A. was present during the incident.
Indictment, trial, and sentencing
{¶20} Appellant was charged by indictment with one count of aggravated burglary
pursuant to R.C. 2911.11(A)(1), a felony of the first degree, and one count of child
endangering pursuant to R.C. 2919.22(A), a misdemeanor of the first degree. Appellant
entered pleas of not guilty.
{¶21} The matter proceeded to trial by jury. Appellee moved to dismiss the count
of child endangering before trial and the trial court granted the motion.
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{¶22} Also before trial, appellant objected to admission of appellee’s exhibits 6
through 15, which are photos of Claudia’s residence. Appellant argued he was presented
with the photos ten minutes before trial, and appellee responded that the photos only
showed the home’s exterior and interior to permit the witnesses to illustrate their
movements on the night in question. The trial court noted appellant’s continuing objection
and ruled the photos were admissible, subject to any further issues raised during trial.
{¶23} Appellant moved for judgment of acquittal pursuant to Crim.R. 29(A) at the
close of appellee’s evidence and at the close of all of the evidence; the motions were
overruled. Appellant requested a jury instruction upon aggravated trespass; appellee
objected and the trial court declined to give the instruction.
{¶24} The jury found appellant guilty as charged. At a later sentencing hearing,
the trial court imposed a prison term of seven to ten and a half years.
{¶25} Appellant raises two assignments of error:
ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
{¶26} “I. THE TRIAL COURT’S FINDING OF GUILTY WAS AGAINST THE
MANIFEST WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE AND WAS NOT SUPPORTED BY
SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE.”
{¶27} “II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED TO THE PREJUDICE OF THE
DEFENDANT BY ADMITTING INTO EVIDENCE EXHIBITS 6-15.”
Stark County, Case No. 2020CA00067 8
ANALYSIS
I.
{¶28} In his first assignment of error, appellant argues his conviction upon one
count of aggravated burglary is against the manifest weight of the evidence and is not
support by sufficient evidence. We disagree.
{¶29} The criminal manifest-weight-of-the-evidence standard was explained
in State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 678 N.E.2d 541 (1997), in which the Court
distinguished between “sufficiency of the evidence” and “manifest weight of the evidence,”
finding that these concepts differ both qualitatively and quantitatively. Id. at 386. The
Court held that sufficiency of the evidence is a test of adequacy as to whether the
evidence is legally sufficient to support a verdict as a matter of law, but weight of the
evidence addresses the evidence's effect of inducing belief. Id. at 386–387. “In other
words, a reviewing court asks whose evidence is more persuasive—the state's or the
defendant's?” State v. Wilson, 113 Ohio St.3d 382, 2007-Ohio-2202, 865 N.E.2d 1264,
¶ 25. The Court noted that although there may be sufficient evidence to support a
judgment, it could nevertheless be against the manifest weight of the evidence.
Thompkins, supra at 387. “When a court of appeals reverses a judgment of a trial court
on the basis that the verdict is against the weight of the evidence, the appellate court sits
as a ‘thirteenth juror’ and disagrees with the factfinder's resolution of the conflicting
testimony.” Id., citing Tibbs v. Florida, 457 U.S. 31, 42, 102 S.Ct. 2211, 72 L.Ed.2d 652(1982).
{¶30} In a test for sufficiency, “‘the relevant question is whether, after reviewing
the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could
Stark County, Case No. 2020CA00067 9
have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.’” (Emphasis
sic.) State v. Stallings, 89 Ohio St.3d 280, 289, 731 N.E.2d 159, quoting Jackson v.
Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979). A sufficiency challenge
asks whether the evidence adduced at trial “is legally sufficient to support the jury verdict
as a matter of law.” State v. Lang, 129 Ohio St.3d 512, 2011-Ohio-4215, 954 N.E.2d 596,
at ¶ 219. Evaluation of the witnesses' credibility is not relevant to a sufficiency
analysis. State v. Yarbrough, 95 Ohio St.3d 227, 2002-Ohio-2126, 767 N.E.2d 216, at ¶
79.
{¶31} By contrast, to evaluate a manifest-weight claim, a court must review the
entire record, weigh the evidence and all reasonable inferences, and consider the
credibility of witnesses. State v. McKelton, 148 Ohio St.3d 261, 2016-Ohio-5735, 70
N.E.3d 508, at ¶ 328. The court must decide whether “‘the jury clearly lost its way and
created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the conviction must be reversed.’” Id.,quoting State v. Martin, 20 Ohio App.3d 172, 175, 485 N.E.2d 717 (1st Dist.1983).
{¶32} In the instant case, appellant was found guilty upon one count of aggravated
burglary pursuant to R.C. 2911.11(A)(1), which states in pertinent part: “No person, by
force, stealth, or deception, shall trespass in an occupied structure * * * when another
person other than an accomplice of the offender is present, with purpose to commit in the
structure * * * any criminal offense, if * * * [t]he offender inflicts, or attempts or threatens
to inflict physical harm on another.”
{¶33} Appellant first argues his aggravated burglary conviction is against the
manifest weight and sufficiency of the evidence because “the door was open and he
walked in;” he claims he did not use force, stealth, or deception to enter the home. This
Stark County, Case No. 2020CA00067 10
assertion is supported only by appellant’s own self-serving testimony. A. testified that he
came around the corner of the house in time to see appellant slam the front door open
and run inside, removing his belt and wrapping it around his fist to use as a weapon. A.,
Claudia, and Julio testified these events transpired shortly after appellant was outside
screaming for Julio to come out, threatening Julio and his family, and damaging Julio’s
vehicle.
{¶34} Appellant further argues Julio’s testimony was not credible because he had
a blanket over his head during the fight and declined medical attention, however, Julio’s
testimony was consistent with that of A. and Claudia. His testimony was also consistent
with the physical evidence of his injuries established by appellee’s photo exhibits one
through five. The jury could reasonably reject appellant’s claims that he was only worried
for his daughter, had no idea who Julio was, and did not attack him because of his
relationship with Claudia in light of the fact that appellant fled before police arrived, never
spoke with J., and didn’t indicate any concern for J’s whereabouts during the incident.
{¶35} Finally, the fact that the front door of the residence did not sustain damage
is not fatal to appellee’s case. Appellant did not have permission to enter the home and
effectively forced his way in that night after Claudia repeatedly told him to leave. In light
of his threats and the belt wrapped around his fist, the jury could reasonably conclude
appellant entered the residence for the purpose of assaulting Julio.
{¶36} Appellant’s conviction is supported by sufficient evidence and is not against
the manifest weight of the evidence. His first assignment of error is overruled.
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II.
{¶37} In his second assignment of error, appellant argues the trial court should
not have admitted appellee’s exhibits 6 through 15, the photos of the residence. We
disagree.
{¶38} Appellant argues the exhibits were not properly authenticated. We note
appellant did not raise this objection at trial, instead objecting generally that the photos
were provided only 10 minutes prior to the start of trial. Appellee’s proffered exhibits at
that time included the challenged photos of the residence [exhibits 6 through 15] and
Exhibit 16, a Google map of Claudia’s neighborhood depicting the location of her house,
street, and alley. Appellant specifically did not object to the map and did not raise the
question of authenticity of any of these exhibits.
{¶39} Exhibits 6 through 15 were introduced during Claudia’s testimony; she
identified the photos as the front, back, and side of the exterior of her house; the front
door and back sliding glass door; the interior of the residence from the front door and
looking toward the front door; and the interior of her bedroom. Julio was also shown
Exhibit 13, depicting a bedroom window, and testified that he watched appellant outside
through a different window.
{¶40} The trial court overruled appellant’s objections to the photos on the basis
that the photos would help the finder of fact understand the layout of the scene, which
appellant himself was familiar with, and the photos didn’t include any otherwise
objectionable evidence of the crime. They are merely photos of the house.
{¶41} The admission or exclusion of relevant evidence rests in the sound
discretion of the trial court. State v. Sage, 31 Ohio St.3d 173, 180, 510 N.E.2d 343 (1987).
Stark County, Case No. 2020CA00067 12
Generally, all relevant evidence is admissible. Evid.R. 402. Abuse of discretion means
more than an error of law or judgment. Rather, it implies that the court's attitude is
unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable. State v. Brooks, 5th Dist. No. 2019 CA 0104,
2020-Ohio-4123, 157 N.E.3d 387, ¶ 63, citing Blakemore v. Blakemore, 5 Ohio St.3d 217,
450 N.E.2d 1140 (1983). Absent an abuse of discretion resulting in material prejudice to
the defendant, a reviewing court should be reluctant to interfere with a trial court's decision
in this regard. Sage, 31 Ohio St.3d 173, 510 N.E.2d 343.
{¶42} Photographs are not objectionable if “they are properly identified, are
relevant and competent and are accurate representations of the scene which they purport
to portray.” Hensel v. Childress, 1st Dist. No. C-180100, 2019-Ohio-3934, 145 N.E.3d
1159, ¶ 8, appeal not allowed, 157 Ohio St.3d 1563, 2020-Ohio-313, 138 N.E.3d 1157,
citing State v. Woodards, 6 Ohio St.2d 14, 25, 215 N.E.2d 568(1966). Authentication of photographs simply requires that a witness, based on his
familiarity with the subject matter of the photographs, establish that the photographs
depict what the proponent claims they represent. Hensel, supra, citing State v. Searles,
1st Dist. Hamilton Nos. C-180339 and C-180340, 2019-Ohio-3109, ¶ 7-8 and State v.
Roseberry, 197 Ohio App.3d 256, 2011-Ohio-5921, 967 N.E.2d 233, ¶ 68 (8th Dist.) [“A
witness with personal knowledge of the subject of the photographs may authenticate them
by testifying that the photographs fairly and accurately depict the subject at the time they
were taken.”]. Further, “[i]t is unnecessary to show who took the photograph or when it
was taken, provided that there is testimony that the photograph is a fair and accurate
representation of what it represents.” State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Anders, 197 Ohio
App.3d 22, 2012-Ohio-824, 965 N.E.2d 1056, ¶ 30 (10th Dist.).
Stark County, Case No. 2020CA00067 13
{¶43} In the instant case, Claudia identified each of the challenged photos as a
true and accurate depiction of the inside and outside of her home. There is no suggestion
in the record that the photos represent anything other than what they were claimed to
represent. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the challenged
evidence.
{¶44} Appellant’s second assignment of error is overruled.
CONCLUSION
{¶45} Appellant’s two assignments of error are overruled and the judgment of the
Stark County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed.
By: Delaney, P.J.,
Baldwin, J. and
Wise, Earle, J., concur.