State v. Chambers , 2023 Ohio 1107 ( 2023 )

[Cite as State v. Chambers, 2023-Ohio-1107.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
CRAWFORD COUNTY
STATE OF OHIO,
PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, CASE NO. 3-22-41
v.
THOMAS CHAMBERS, OPINION
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.
Appeal from Crawford County Common Pleas Court
Trial Court No. 22-CR-0246
Judgment Affirmed
Date of Decision: April 3, 2023
APPEARANCES:
Christopher Bazeley for Appellant
Bailey Higgins for Appellee
Case No. 3-22-41
WALDICK, J.
{¶1} Defendant-appellant, Thomas Chambers (“Chambers”), brings this
appeal from the September 27, 2022, judgment of the Crawford County Common
Pleas Court sentencing him to nine months in prison after he pled guilty to, and was
convicted of, Aggravated Possession of Drugs. On appeal, Chambers argues that his
plea was not knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. For the reasons that follow we
affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Background
{¶2} On July 26, 2022, Chambers was indicted for Aggravated Possession of
Drugs in violation of R.C. 2925.11(A), a fifth degree felony, and Illegal Use or
Possession of Drug Paraphernalia in violation of R.C. 2925.14(C)(1), a fourth
degree misdemeanor. Chambers originally pled not guilty to the charges.
{¶3} On September 26, 2022, Chambers entered into a written, negotiated
plea agreement wherein he agreed to plead guilty to Aggravated Possession of
Drugs as charged. In exchange, the State agreed to dismiss the remaining charge.
{¶4} Subsequently, the trial court conducted a Crim.R. 11 dialogue with
Chambers and determined that he was entering a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary
guilty plea. Chambers’s plea was accepted and he was found guilty.
{¶5} The case proceeded immediately to sentencing, with the trial court
sentencing Chambers to serve a nine-month prison term. A judgment entry
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memorializing his sentence was filed September 27, 2022. It is from this judgment
that Chambers appeals, asserting the following assignment of error for our review.
Assignment of Error
Chambers’ guilty plea was not knowingly or intelligently given.
{¶6} In his assignment of error, Chambers contends that his plea was not
knowing and intelligent because the trial court did not adequately inform him that
his plea was a complete admission of guilt.
Relevant Authority
{¶7} “All guilty pleas must be made knowingly, voluntarily, and
intelligently.” State v. Moll, 3d Dist. Defiance Nos. 4-14-17 and 4-14-18, 2015-
Ohio-926, ¶ 9, citing State v. Engle, 74 Ohio St.3d 525, 527 (1996). “Failure on any
of those points renders enforcement of the plea unconstitutional under both the
United States Constitution and the Ohio Constitution.” Engle at 527.
{¶8} Criminal Rule 11(C)(2), which governs guilty pleas for felony-level
offenses, provides:
In felony cases the court may refuse to accept a plea of guilty or a
plea of no contest, and shall not accept a plea of guilty or no
contest without first addressing the defendant personally and
doing all of the following:
(a) Determining that the defendant is making the plea
voluntarily, with understanding of the nature of the charges and
of the maximum penalty involved, and if applicable, that the
defendant is not eligible for probation or for the imposition of
community control sanctions at the sentencing hearing.
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(b) Informing the defendant of and determining that the
defendant understands the effect of the plea of guilty or no
contest, and that the court, upon acceptance of the plea, may
proceed with judgment and sentence.
(c) Informing the defendant and determining that the defendant
understands that by the plea the defendant is waiving the rights
to jury trial, to confront witnesses against him or her, to have
compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in the defendant's
favor, and to require the state to prove the defendant's guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt at a trial at which the defendant
cannot be compelled to testify against himself or herself.
{¶9} A trial court must strictly comply with Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(c) and orally
advise a defendant before accepting a felony plea that the plea waives the
defendant’s constitutional rights. State v. Veney, 120 Ohio St.3d 176, 2008-Ohio-
5200, ¶ 31. When a trial court fails to strictly comply with this duty, the defendant’s
plea is invalid. Id. However, a trial court is only required to substantially comply
with the non-constitutional notifications in Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(a) and (b). Id. at ¶ 14-
17.
{¶10} An appellate court reviews the substantial-compliance standard based
upon the totality of the circumstances surrounding the defendant’s plea and
determines whether he subjectively understood the implications of his plea and the
rights he waived. State v. Sarkozy, 117 Ohio St.3d 86, 2008-Ohio-509, ¶
20. “Furthermore, a defendant who challenges his guilty plea on the basis that it was
not knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily made must show a prejudicial effect. *
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* * The test is whether the plea would have otherwise been made.” State v. Nero,
56 Ohio St.3d 106, 108 (1990).
Analysis
{¶11} Chambers’s contention that the trial court failed to inform him of the
“effect of his plea” requires us to review a portion of the Crim.R. 11 dialogue from
the change-of-plea hearing. During the following exchange, the trial court discussed
the rights Chambers would be waving by entering his guilty plea in this case.
THE COURT: Is this your signature on the Plea Agreement?
MR. CHAMBERS: Yes, sir.
THE COURT: Okay, No. 1, you’re giving up you’re right to have
a full Jury Trial; do you understand that?
MR. CHAMBERS: Yes, sir.
THE COURT: At this Jury Trial you could Cross-Examine the
State’s witnesses, you could require the State to prove your guilt
beyond any reasonable doubt, all 12 Jurors would have to
unanimously find you guilty before I could enter a finding of
guilty. You would have to have, you would have the right to use
the Subpoena power of the Court to Summon witnesses to come
in for you, but you could not be forced to testify against yourself;
do you understand that?
MR. CHAMBERS: Yes, sir.
THE COURT: All right, so there is no recommendation in this
case. I’ve explained Community Control to you, Post-Release
Control to you, the sentences that are available, I’ve explained the
rights that you’re giving up, by pleading guilty you’re basically
admitting the charge, waiving any defenses. It’s a little different,
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but I think I’ve covered everything, did I cover everything from
the State, Defense, does anybody have anything that I’ve missed?
[PROSECUTOR]: No, Your Honor.
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: No, Your Honor.
(Sept. 26, 2022, Tr. at 5-7).
{¶12} Chambers contends that the trial court’s statement of “by pleading
guilty you’re basically admitting the charge, waving any defenses” did not explain
the effect of his guilty plea, making his plea invalid. More specifically, he argues
that the trial court failed to inform him that his plea of guilty constituted “a complete
admission of [his] guilt.” Crim.R. 11(B)(1).
{¶13} In our own review of the matter, we emphasize that a trial court’s “
‘[l]iteral compliance with Crim.R. 11, in all respects, remains preferable to inexact
plea hearing recitations.’ ” State v. Clark, 119 Ohio St.3d 239, 2008-Ohio-3748, ¶
29, quoting State v. Griggs, 103 Ohio St.3d 85, 2004-Ohio-4415, ¶ 19, fn. 2.
Nevertheless, “literal compliance” is not the standard; rather, the standard for
evaluating whether a defendant was informed of the effect of his plea is “substantial
compliance.” State v. Jones, 3d Dist. Crawford No. 3-19-11, 2020-Ohio-3919, ¶ 11.
{¶14} Here, Chambers was informed at the plea hearing that he was
admitting the charge and waving any defenses. In addition, his written plea
agreement, which he signed prior to the Crim.R. 11 dialogue, also contained the
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language, “By pleading, I admit the truth of the facts and circumstances alleged.”1
(Doc. No. 11). We have previously held that nearly identical language constituted
substantial compliance with Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(b)/(B)(1). Jones, supra, at ¶ 14
(“Specifically, the written-plea agreement reflects that Jones acknowledged that
“[b]y pleading, [he] admit[s] the truth of the facts and circumstances alleged[.]”).
{¶15} Moreover, even if the trial court had failed to substantially comply
with Crim.R. 11, Chambers has demonstrated no prejudice here. He has presented
no evidence that he would not have entered his plea if the trial court had used the
actual language contained in Crim.R. 11 regarding the effect of his guilty plea. State
v. Lindemayer, 5th Dist. Licking No. 08-CA-142, 2009-Ohio-3982, ¶ 77. Finally,
he did not assert a claim of actual innocence at the plea hearing. “A defendant who
has entered a guilty plea without asserting actual innocence is presumed to
understand that he has completely admitted his guilt.” Griggs, 103 Ohio St.3d 85,
2004-Ohio-4415, at syllabus
{¶16} In sum, based on the record before us, we find that the trial court was
in substantial compliance with Crim.R. 11, and that, in any event, Chambers has
demonstrated no prejudice from any alleged departure from Crim.R. 11. Chambers
1
Chambers actually focuses his argument in his brief by arguing that the written plea agreement did not
adequately inform him of the effect of his plea. However, he can be informed orally or in writing of the effect
of his plea, thus both the Crim.R. 11 dialogue and his written plea agreement are relevant to a determination
of whether he was adequately informed of the effect of his plea. See State v. Jones, 116 Ohio St.3d 211, 2007-
Ohio-6093, ¶ 51.
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has thus not demonstrated that his plea was anything less than knowing, intelligent,
and voluntary. For all of these reasons, Chambers’s assignment of error is overruled.
Conclusion
{¶17} Having found no error prejudicial to Chambers in the particulars
assigned and argued, we affirm the judgment of the Crawford County Common
Pleas Court.
Judgment Affirmed
MILLER, P.J. and ZIMMERMAN, J., concur.
/jlr
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