Faulkner v. Cincinnati Civ. Serv. Comm. ( 2020 )

[Cite as Faulkner v. Cincinnati Civ. Serv. Comm., 2020-Ohio-6711.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO
HAMILTON COUNTY, OHIO
MICHELLE FAULKNER, : APPEAL NO. C-200010
TRIAL NO. A-1804374
Plaintiff-Appellant, :
vs. : O P I N I O N.
CITY OF CINCINNATI CIVIL :
SERVICE COMMISSION,
Defendant-Appellee. :
Civil Appeal From: Hamilton County Court of Common Pleas
Judgment Appealed From Is: Affirmed
Date of Judgment Entry on Appeal: December 16, 2020
Freking, Myers & Reul, LLC, and Jeffrey M. Silverstein, for Plaintiff-Appellant,
Andrew Garth, Interim City Solicitor, Paula Boggs Muething, Senior Assistant City
Solicitor, for Defendant-Appellee.
OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
Z A Y A S , Judge.
{¶1} Plaintiff-appellant Michelle Faulkner appeals the judgment of the
Hamilton County Court of Common Pleas affirming the City of Cincinnati Civil
Service Commission’s determination that Faulkner’s job is properly classified as an
Administrative Technician. For the following reasons, we affirm.
I. Background and Procedural History
{¶2} On April 15, 2015, Faulkner, a civilian employee with the Cincinnati
Police Department, requested a classification study of her job duties. Faulkner
believed she was working above her classification as an Administrative Technician
because she was performing increased responsibilities due to departmental
vacancies. Her request stated that “an accurate assessment of [her] duties would have
properly classified [her] as an Administrative Specialist.”
{¶3} Darrell Ludlow, a human resources analyst for the city of Cincinnati,
handled the classification study by conducting an audit of Faulkner’s job duties on
May 26, 2015, and collecting information from Faulkner’s superior, Sergeant Jamal
Smith, in October of 2015. Ludlow left the department in November of 2015 without
completing the study. The study remained incomplete despite several inquiries from
Faulkner. Due to interdepartmental changes, in December 2015 Faulkner’s assigned
work responsibilities were modified.
{¶4} On April 12, 2017, Faulkner requested another classification study. A
division manager for the Cincinnati Police Department completed this second
classification study on May 25, 2017. The 2017 study’s conclusion was that “the
review of Ms. Faulkner’s job duties illustrates that her scope of responsibilities,
2
OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
difficulty, and complexity of functions does not rise to the level of an Administrative
Specialist.”
{¶5} In early 2017, human resources analyst Amy Luthanen took over the
2015 classification study, the one initiated by Ludlow. This study was completed on
June 23, 2017, using the information Ludlow gathered from April to October of 2015.
The study’s conclusion was that Faulkner’s position “was correctly classified in 2015
as that of an Administrative Technician.”
{¶6} Faulkner appealed the results of both classification studies to the Civil
Service Commission (“Commission”). The Commission conducted evidentiary
hearings over three days. The Commission determined that the testimonial and
documentary evidence from the 2015 classification study “confirm[ed] that the
department relied heavily upon [] Faulkner’s program knowledge and experience,
allowing her to perform independent work duties at a level similar to that of an
Administrative Specialist.” The Commission therefore rejected the 2015 study’s
conclusion that the work Faulkner performed was within the Administrative
Technician classification. The Commission stated that “[h]ad there been a timely
conclusion to the request submitted by [] Faulkner in 2015, there may have been a
corresponding reclassification or a reassignment of duties at the time to ensure her
proper classification and corresponding job duties.”
{¶7} Additionally, the Commission determined that since December of 2015
Faulkner was not assigned and did not perform “any work responsibilities that are
significantly outside the realm of the responsibilities of an Administrative
Technician.” This conclusion was based upon the testimony of Sergeant Smith,
Faulkner, and Lieutenant Steven Saunders. The Commission relied on the fact that
Saunders had been assigned to lead Faulkner’s departmental unit in late 2015 and
3
OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
reorganized the unit and its programs, removing nonconforming duties from
Faulkner’s position.
{¶8} The Commission found that the evidence from the 2017 classification
study confirmed that Faulkner had not taken on responsibilities outside of her
classification as an Administrative Technician. Accordingly, the Commission
confirmed and approved the conclusions of the 2017 classification study.
{¶9} Faulkner appealed the Commission’s findings to the Hamilton County
Court of Common Pleas pursuant to R.C. 2506.04. She argued that as of April 2015,
she was entitled to be classified as an Administrative Specialist “with the salary,
benefit and rights attendant to that position.”
{¶10} Oral arguments took place before a magistrate on June 5, 2019. The
magistrate affirmed the decision of the Commission. Faulkner filed objections to the
magistrate’s decision, which were overruled by the trial court.
{¶11} Faulkner now appeals, asserting one assignment of error.
II. Analysis
Standard of Review
{¶12} Trial courts and the courts of appeals review administrative appeals
under differing standards of review. R.C. 2506.04; Groppe v. Cincinnati, 1st Dist.
Hamilton No. C-050385, 2005-Ohio-6390, ¶ 4. The trial court is required to weigh
the evidence in the record and to determine whether the order or decision at issue is
“unconstitutional, illegal, arbitrary, capricious, unreasonable, or unsupported by the
preponderance of substantial, reliable, and probative evidence.” Id. The trial court
has the power to reverse, vacate, modify, or remand the case. See R.C. 2506.04;
State ex rel. Chagrin Falls v. Geauga Cty. Bd. of Commrs., 96 Ohio St.3d 400, 403,
775 N.E.2d 512 (2002).
4
OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
{¶13} “The standard of review for courts of appeals, however, is limited to
questions of law and ‘does not include the same extensive power to weigh the
preponderance of substantial, reliable and probative evidence’ as is granted to the
common pleas court.” Groppe at ¶ 4, quoting Henley v. Youngstown Bd. of Zoning
Appeals, 90 Ohio St.3d 142, 147, 735 N.E.2d 433 (2000). “With respect to the weight
of the evidence, this court is limited to determining only whether the common pleas
court abused its discretion.” Id., citing Henley at 148. An abuse of discretion is more
than an error of law or judgment; it implies that the court’s attitude was
unreasonable, arbitrary or unconscionable. Blakemore v. Blakemore, 5 Ohio St.3d
217, 219, 450 N.E.2d 1140 (1983).
Discussion
{¶14} In her sole assignment of error, Faulkner argues that the trial court
erred in affirming the Commission’s classification decision.
{¶15} Faulkner argues that the 2015 study was both inadequate and untimely
and that she is entitled to prevail under Groppe v. Cincinnati, 1st Dist. Hamilton No.
C-050385, 2005-Ohio-6390. In Groppe, we affirmed the trial court’s decision to
remand a Commission decision, in part, because a city staff member investigating an
employee’s request for reclassification from an Administrative Technician to an
Administrative Specialist failed to compare the specifications for the positions. See
Groppe at ¶ 6. The trial court determined that without a classification study
comparing duties of the two positions, many of which overlapped, the record was
underdeveloped, and the Commission had failed to properly investigate the
employee’s claim.
{¶16} Faulkner asserts that like in Groppe, the Commission failed to
determine the extent to which her responsibilities fell under the Administrative
Specialist classification because, after Luthanen matched the 2015 job duties with the
5
OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
Technician classification, she did not look at the specifications for any other
classifications. However, the Commission rejected the 2015 classification study and
did not consider the 2015 study’s conclusion in its determination. Additionally, the
Commission did not base its decision regarding Faulkner’s 2017 classification study
on the 2015 study’s conclusion, but rather on the evidence submitted pursuant to the
2017 study. Thus, Faulkner’s arguments relating to how the 2015 classification study
was conducted are irrelevant.
{¶17} Additionally, Faulkner asserts that she is entitled to relief because
“[t]he trial court failed to analyze the relevant time period for [her] request for
reclassification,” which she argues is 2015. However, the Commission properly
considered the fact that in December 2015 Faulkner’s duties changed, and
independently reviewed her 2017 duties.
{¶18} Faulkner further argues that the Commission’s finding that she
“perform[ed] independent work duties at a level similar to that of an Administrative
Specialist” for a period in 2015 “entitled” her to “a reclassification audit that qualified
the extent to which her 2015 responsibilities merited Specialist credit,” and that the
trial court erred in affirming the Commission’s decision that she was not entitled to
this relief. To the extent that Faulkner is arguing that she deserves a credit for the
time period in which she performed Specialist duties, the Civil Service Rules do not
explicitly provide for such a credit.
{¶19} The Civil Service Rules do not provide for “de-facto” classification.
Rather, the rules specify that reclassification is a formal procedure. See Civil Service
Rule 4, Section 6 (“The Commission staff shall, after investigation and review of job
duties, work samples and/or any other appropriate documents or evidence, allocate
or reallocate every position to the appropriate class); Civil Service Rule 4, Section 3
(“When a substantial change of duties outside the current classification is made,
6
OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
except for a temporary period or by the addition of duties that are incidental to the
main employment, such change shall be reported to the Commission within 60 days
with a view to a possible reclassification of the position.”); Civil Service Rule 4,
Section 6 (“When a position is reclassified to a higher or different classification,
several resolutions are available.”).
{¶20} Significantly, Civil Service Rule 4, Section 6, does not contemplate an
automatic reclassification where an employee is in fact performing duties above his
or her current classification. Rather, even if the Commission had timely approved a
higher classification, the Cincinnati Police Department had the option to fill the
position at the classification approved by Commission or remove Faulkner from the
“higher level and/or nonconforming duties” and ensure that Faulkner was assigned
to duties within her classification. See Civil Service Rule 4, Section 6.
{¶21} Faulkner further argues that the Cincinnati Police Department cannot
rely on its own negligence in the delayed conclusion of the 2015 classification study
to justify Faulkner’s improper classification. Faulkner asserts that because the study
was not conducted in a timely manner, there was no reclassification or reduction in
duties in 2015, nor was Faulkner compensated for the level of work she was
performing. However, based on our limited standard of review, the record of this
case, and the text of the Civil Service Rules, we are unable to fashion a remedy that
compensates Faulkner for any time period she performed Administrative Specialist
duties. As discussed above, Civil Service Rule 4, Section 6, does not contemplate an
automatic reclassification where an employee is performing duties above his or her
current classification. Rather, the Civil Service Rules provide individual departments
with the option to fill the position at the classification approved by the Commission
or remove the nonconforming duties. We note that in this case, the nonconforming
duties were removed in December 2015.
7
OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
{¶22} Accordingly, the Commission’s approval of the Cincinnati Police
Department’s determination that the job duties Faulkner performed did not rise to
the level of Administrative Specialist is supported by the record. Nonconforming
duties identified in the 2015 classification study were removed from Faulkner’s
position in December of 2015 and she was not performing nonconforming duties
under the 2017 classification study. Under our limited standard of review, we find no
abuse of discretion in the trial court’s judgment affirming the decision of the
Commission.
III. Conclusion
{¶23} We therefore overrule Faulkner’s sole assignment of error and affirm
the judgment of the trial court.
Judgment affirmed.
MOCK, P.J., and BERGERON, J., concur.
Please note:
The court has recorded its own entry on the date of the release of this opinion.
8