State v. Williams ( 2020 )

[Cite as State v. Williams, 2020-Ohio-6755.]
COURT OF APPEALS
TUSCARAWAS COUNTY, OHIO
FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
STATE OF OHIO : JUDGES:
:
: Hon. John W. Wise, P.J.
Plaintiff-Appellee : Hon. Patricia A. Delaney, J.
: Hon. Earle E. Wise, Jr., J.
-vs- :
: Case Nos. 2019AP100042
: 2019AP100043
THOMAS J. WILLIAMS :
:
:
Defendant-Appellant : OPINION
CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING: Appeal from the New Philadelphia
Municipal Court, Case Nos. TRC
1903355 A,B,C and CRB 1900658
JUDGMENT: REVERSED AND REMANDED
DATE OF JUDGMENT ENTRY: December 17, 2020
APPEARANCES:
For Plaintiff-Appellee: For Defendant-Appellant:
LACEE FELIX MATTHEW W. ONEST
DOVER CITY PROSECUTOR KRUGLIAK, WILKINS, et al.
339 Oxford St. 4775 Munson St. N.W.
Dover, OH 44622 P.O. Box 36963
Canton, OH 44735-6963
Tuscarawas County, Case Nos. 2019AP100042, 2019AP100043 2
Delaney, J.
{¶1} Appellant Thomas J. Williams appeals from the October 18, 2019 Judgment
Entry of the New Philadelphia Municipal Court incorporating the trial court’s August 22,
2019 Judgment Entry overruling his motion to suppress. Appellee is the state of Ohio.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
{¶2} The following evidence is adduced from the record of the suppression
hearing on August 13, 2019. The hearing was brief and limited to the issue of whether
the officer had reasonable suspicion to traffic-stop appellant.
{¶3} This case arose on May 27, 2019, around 9:40 p.m., as a Dover police
officer monitored traffic from a stationary location in a parking lot. Appellant drove by on
South Wooster Avenue. Several people were in appellant’s car and the officer believed
one of them “gave him the finger.” The officer pulled out and followed appellant, who
approached the traffic light at the intersection of South Wooster Avenue and Union
Avenue.
{¶4} Before this intersection, South Wooster Avenue consists of two lanes of
southbound travel divided by a dotted white line. Approaching the intersection, the center
line becomes a solid white line. The intersection is a “Y,” with South Wooster Avenue
continuing at a 45-degree angle to the left and Union Avenue intersecting at a slight right
angle. The left lane is a left-turn-only lane controlled by a large white left arrow painted
on the pavement and a traffic light. The traffic light for the left-turn lane is a left-turn arrow.
{¶5} Appellant approached this intersection in the left lane and entered the area
of the left-turn-only portion as designated by the solid white line. When the traffic light
Tuscarawas County, Case Nos. 2019AP100042, 2019AP100043 3
turned green, however, appellant waited, signaled a right turn, pulled into the right-hand
lane, and continued southbound.
{¶6} The officer performed a traffic stop on the basis of an improper lane change.
Appellant was ultimately cited with two counts of O.V.I., one count of “improper lane
change” pursuant to Dover City Ordinance 331.08, and one count of child endangering.
{¶7} Appellant entered pleas of not guilty and filed a motion to suppress, arguing
the officer had no justification for the traffic stop based upon the marked-lanes violation.
The matter proceeded to an evidentiary hearing and the trial court overruled the motion
to suppress by judgment entry dated August 22, 2019.
{¶8} Appellant appeared before the trial court on October 18, 2019 and changed
his pleas of not guilty to ones of no contest. Appellant was convicted upon one count of
O.V.I. (third offense in 10 years), marked lanes, and child endangering. Appellee
dismissed the remaining count of O.V.I. and the trial court sentenced appellant to, e.g., a
jail term of 90 days.
{¶9} Appellant now appeals from the October 18, 2019 Judgment Entry of the
New Philadelphia Municipal Court, incorporating the trial court’s judgment entry of August
22, 2019, overruling his motion to suppress.
{¶10} Appellant raises one assignment of error:
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
{¶11} “THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY FAILING TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE
BECAUSE THE TRAFFIC STOP WAS BASED ON A MISTAKE OF LAW.”
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ANALYSIS
{¶12} Appellant argues the trial court should have granted his motion to suppress.
We agree.
{¶13} There are three methods of challenging a trial court's ruling on
a motion to suppress on appeal. First, an appellant may challenge the trial court's finding
of fact. In reviewing a challenge of this nature, an appellate court must determine whether
the trial court's findings of fact are against the manifest weight of the evidence. See, State
v. Fanning, 1 Ohio St.3d 19, 437 N.E.2d 583 (1982); State v. Klein, 73 Ohio App.3d 486,
597 N.E.2d 1141 (4th Dist.1991). Second, an appellant may argue the trial court failed to
apply the appropriate test or correct law to the findings of fact. In that case, an appellate
court can reverse the trial court for committing an error of law. See, Williams, supra.
Finally, an appellant may argue the trial court has incorrectly decided the ultimate or final
issues raised in a motion to suppress. When reviewing this type of claim, an appellate
court must independently determine, without deference to the trial court's conclusion,
whether the facts meet the appropriate legal standard in any given case. State v. Curry,
95 Ohio App.3d 93, 96,620 N.E.2d 906 (8th Dist.1994).
{¶14} Appellant’s argument is a combination of the latter two claims. He argues
the officer lacked reasonable and articulable suspicion for the traffic stop. The Fourth
Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits warrantless searches and
seizures, rendering them per se unreasonable unless an exception applies. Katz v. United
States, 389 U.S. 347, 357, 88 S.Ct. 507 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967). An investigative stop,
or Terry stop, is a common exception to the Fourth Amendment warrant
requirement. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1503, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968). Because
Tuscarawas County, Case Nos. 2019AP100042, 2019AP100043 5
the “balance between the public interest and the individual's right to personal security”
tilts in favor of a standard less than probable cause in such cases, the Fourth Amendment
is satisfied if the officer's action is supported by reasonable suspicion to believe that
criminal activity “may be afoot.” United States v. Brignoni–Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 878, 95
S.Ct. 2574, 45 L.Ed.2d 607 (1975); United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7, 109 S.Ct.
1581, 104 L.Ed.2d 1 (1989). In Terry, the Supreme Court held that a police officer may
stop an individual if the officer has a reasonable suspicion based upon specific and
articulable facts that criminal behavior has occurred or is imminent. See, State v.
Chatton, 11 Ohio St.3d 59, 61, 463 N.E.2d 1237 (1984).
{¶15} The propriety of an investigative stop must be viewed in light of the totality
of the circumstances surrounding the stop “as viewed through the eyes of the reasonable
and prudent police officer on the scene who must react to events as they unfold.” State
v. Andrews, 57 Ohio St.3d 86, 87–88, 565 N.E.2d 1271 (1991); State v. Bobo, 37 Ohio
St.3d 177, 178, 524 N.E.2d 489 (1988). The Supreme Court of the United States has re-
emphasized the importance of reviewing the totality of the circumstances in making
a reasonable-suspicion determination:
When discussing how reviewing courts should
make reasonable-suspicion determinations, we have said
repeatedly that they must look at the “totality of the circumstances”
of each case to see whether the detaining officer has a
“particularized and objective basis” for suspecting legal wrongdoing.
This process allows officers to draw on their own experience and
specialized training to make inferences from and deductions about
Tuscarawas County, Case Nos. 2019AP100042, 2019AP100043 6
the cumulative information available to them that “might well elude
an untrained person.” Although an officer's reliance on a mere
“hunch” is insufficient to justify a stop, the likelihood of criminal
activity need not rise to the level required for probable cause, and it
falls considerably short of satisfying a preponderance of the
evidence standard.
United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273, 122 S.Ct. 744, 151
L.Ed.2d 740 (2002), citing United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411,
417–418, 101 S.Ct. 690, 66 L.Ed.2d 621 (1981).
{¶16} Traffic stops based upon observation of a traffic violation are
constitutionally permissible. Dayton v. Erickson, 76 Ohio St.3d 3, 11–12, 1996–Ohio–
431, 665 N.E.2d 1091. This Court has held that any traffic violation, even a de
minimis violation, may form a sufficient basis upon which to stop a vehicle. State v.
Bangoura, 5th Dist. No. 08 CA 95, 2009–Ohio–3339, ¶ 14, citing State v. McCormick, 5th
Dist. No.2000CA00204, 2001 WL 111891 (Feb. 2, 2001); State v. Woods, 5th Dist.
Licking No. 12-CA-19, 2013-Ohio-1136, ¶ 60.
{¶17} In the instant case, the trial court found the Dover police officer
had reasonable suspicion to stop appellant for a violation of Dover Codified Ordinance
331.08, “Driving in Marked Lanes or Continuous Lines of Traffic.” Appellant argues this
decision was in error because the officer did not have reasonable suspicion to stop and
detain him; his conduct in crossing the single, solid white line from the left-turn-only lane
into the straight lane of travel was not illegal.
Tuscarawas County, Case Nos. 2019AP100042, 2019AP100043 7
{¶18} We begin with the ordinance, which is similar to former R.C. 4511.33. Dover
Codified Ordinance 331.08 states:
(a) Whenever any roadway has been divided into two or more
clearly marked lanes for traffic or wherever traffic is lawfully moving
in two or more substantially continuous lines in the same direction,
the following rules apply:
(1) A vehicle shall be driven, as nearly as is practicable,
entirely within a single lane or line of traffic and shall not be moved
from such lane or line until the driver has first ascertained that such
movement can be made with safety.
(2) Upon a roadway which is divided into three lanes and
provides for two-way movement of traffic, a vehicle shall not be
driven in the center lane except when overtaking and passing
another vehicle where the roadway is clearly visible and such center
lane is clear of traffic within a safe distance, or when preparing for a
left turn, or where such center lane is at the time allocated exclusively
to traffic moving in the direction the vehicle is proceeding and is
posted with signs to give notice of such allocation.
(3) Official signs may be erected directing specified traffic to
use a designated lane or designating those lanes to be used by traffic
moving in a particular direction regardless of the center of the
roadway, or restricting the use of a particular lane to only buses
Tuscarawas County, Case Nos. 2019AP100042, 2019AP100043 8
during certain hours or during all hours, and drivers of vehicles shall
obey the directions of such signs.
(4) Official traffic control devices may be installed prohibiting
the changing of lanes on sections of roadway and drivers of vehicles
shall obey the directions of every such device.
(b) Except as otherwise provided in this subsection, whoever
violates this section is guilty of a minor misdemeanor. If, within one
year of the offense, the offender previously has been convicted of or
pleaded guilty to one predicate motor vehicle or traffic offense,
whoever violates this section is guilty of a misdemeanor of the fourth
degree. If, within one year of the offense, the offender previously
has been convicted of two or more predicate motor vehicle or traffic
offenses, whoever violates this section is guilty of a misdemeanor of
the third degree.
If the offender commits the offense while distracted and the
distracting activity is a contributing factor to the commission of the
offense, the offender is subject to the additional fine established
under Section 303.991 of the Traffic Code.
{¶19} At the suppression hearing, the police officer conceded he did not include
a subsection on appellant’s citation. The officer opined, though, that appellant could have
been stopped pursuant to subsection (a)(1) or (a)(4). T. 19-20. A violation of (a)(1) would
require a showing that appellant failed to change lanes without first ascertaining he could
safely do so. The officer testified he did not observe any traffic in the right lane of travel;
Tuscarawas County, Case Nos. 2019AP100042, 2019AP100043 9
appellant signaled his turn from the left-turn-only lane into the right lane of travel; and did
so safely. T. 10-11. In fact, the officer also moved from the left-turn-only-lane into the
right lane of travel as he followed appellant, and did so safely.
{¶20} We are left with a potential violation of 331.08(a)(4). The issue remains
whether the officer had a reasonable and articulable suspicion that appellant failed to
obey the direction of an official traffic device. “Traffic control device” means a “flagger,
sign, signal, marking, or other device used to regulate, warn, or guide traffic, placed on,
over, or adjacent to a street, [or] highway * * * *.” R.C. 4511.01(QQ). In this case, the
traffic control device at issue is the solid white line appellant crossed when changing
lanes. Appellee asserts appellant was essentially locked into a left turn once he was in
the left-turn lane. In the officer’s estimation, “when there’s a solid white line it’s put there
for a reason. Once you enter that left-turn lane you’re obligated to make the left-hand
turn, not proceed back into the right lane and head southbound.” T. 8.
{¶21} Appellant argues the officer therefore erred in stating a driver must remain
inside the lane bounded by a solid white line. Appellant points to the pertinent section of
the Ohio Manual of Uniform Traffic Control Devices (“OMUTCD”) stating, “Where crossing
the lane line markings is discouraged, the lane line markings shall consist of a normal or
wide solid white line.” (Emphasis added). OMUTCD Sec. 3B.04.1
{¶22} We have previously noted that when an officer is confronted with a situation
requiring the application of an unclear statute, the officer can still make a valid stop if the
1 The goal of traffic laws and regulations is to promote highway safety. Maple
Heights v. Smith, 131 Ohio App.3d 406, 408, 722 N.E.2d 607 (8th Dist.1999). R.C.
4511.09 provides that “[t]he department of transportation shall adopt a manual and
specifications for a uniform system of traffic control devices,” and the resulting manual is
the OMUTCD. Maple Heights at 408.
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officer's mistaken interpretation of the law is reasonable. State v. Hill, 5th Dist. Stark No.
2015 CA 00078, 2016-Ohio-1510, ¶ 18, citing State v. Millerton, 2nd Dist. Montgomery
No. 26209, 2015–Ohio–34, 26 N.E.3d 317, ¶ 16, and Heien v. North Carolina, 574 U.S.
54, 135 S.Ct. 530, 533, 190 L.Ed.2d 475 (2014). The United States Supreme Court
in Heien considered whether a police officer's erroneous interpretation of a motor vehicle
statute was objectively reasonable. Id. The Court cautioned, “The Fourth Amendment
tolerates only reasonable mistakes, and those mistakes—whether of fact or of law—must
be objectively reasonable.” Id. at 539. The Court added, “We do not examine the
subjective understanding of the particular officer involved.” Id.{¶23} In the instant case, the traffic device at issue is the solid white line
demarcating the left-turn only line. The officer determined appellant failed to obey the
direction of the device by stopping in the lane, signaling a turn, and entering the right lane.
Appellant was obligated, according to the officer, to make the left turn and would have
had to circle the block to comply with the law. We do not find the officer's mistake of law
to be objectively reasonable. If a driver is inside a left-turn-only lane and does not intend
to make a left turn, and can safely complete a lane change and in fact signals the lane
change, we are unable to discern a violation of Dover City Ordinance 331.08(a)(1) or
331.08(a)(4). Appellant was not required to make a left turn when he could safely travel
into the right lane, and the officer’s belief he was statutorily-obligated to do so was based
upon his subjective understanding of 331.08. State v. Trout, 5th Dist. No. 18-CA-00043,
2019-Ohio-124, 128 N.E.3d 900, ¶ 21.
{¶24} We are cognizant that whether the evidence would be sufficient to support
a finding of guilt upon the improper lane change offense is beyond the scope of our
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review. The sole issue to be resolved at the suppression hearing was whether the officer
had reasonable suspicion to initiate the traffic stop, and it is well-established that an
officer's reasonable articulable suspicion does not require proof beyond a reasonable
doubt that the defendant's conduct has satisfied the elements of the offense. State v.
Willis, 5th Dist. Licking No. 14 CA 103, 2015–Ohio–3739, ¶ 25, citing Westlake v.
Kaplysh, 118 Ohio App.3d 18, 20, 691 N.E.2d 1074 (8th Dist.1997). Nevertheless, we
are tasked with evaluating whether the totality of the circumstances indicates the officer
had a particularized and objective basis for suspecting legal wrongdoing. Arvizu, supra.We find the officer’s mistaken interpretation of the ordinance—an absolute prohibition
against crossing a solid white line--was unreasonable. See, Trout, supra, 2019-Ohio-124at ¶ 17, citing Heien, supra.{¶25} Appellant's sole assignment of error is sustained.
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CONCLUSION
{¶26} Appellant’s sole assignment of error is sustained and the judgment of the
New Philadelphia Municipal Court is reversed. Appellant's convictions are vacated and
the matter is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings in accordance with our
opinion and the law. See, Trout, supra, 2019-Ohio-124 at ¶ 26.
By: Delaney, J.,
Wise, John, P.J. and
Wise, Earle, J., concur.