State v. King , 2020 Ohio 1373 ( 2020 )

[Cite as State v. King, 2020-Ohio-1373.]
COURT OF APPEALS
LICKING COUNTY, OHIO
FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
STATE OF OHIO : JUDGES:
: Hon. John W. Wise, P.J.
Plaintiff-Appellee : Hon. Patricia A. Delaney, J.
: Hon. Earle E. Wise, Jr., J.
-vs- :
:
JOSHUA L. KING : Case No. 2019 CA 00083
:
Defendant-Appellant : OPINION
CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING: Appeal from the Court of Common
Pleas, Case No. 17 CR 0596
JUDGMENT: Affirmed
DATE OF JUDGMENT: April 7, 2020
APPEARANCES:
For Plaintiff-Appellee For Defendant-Appellant
RACHEL M. TIMONERI PATRICK T. CLARK
20 South Second Street 250 East Broad Street
Fourth Floor Suite 1400
Newark, OH 43055 Columbus, OH 43215
Licking County, Case No. 2019 CA 00083 2
Wise, Earle, J.
{¶ 1} Defendant-Appellant, Joshua L. King, appeals the August 14, 2019
judgment entry of the Court of Common Pleas of Licking County, Ohio denying his petition
for postconviction relief. Plaintiff-Appellee is the state of Ohio.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
{¶ 2} On July 13, 2017, the Licking County Grand Jury indicted appellant on one
count of rape of a person under ten years of age in violation of R.C. 2907.02. Appellant
rejected a plea deal: rape by force removing the victim's age for a flat ten years in prison.
Appellant waived his right to a jury trial.
{¶ 3} A bench trial commenced on February 13, 2018. By judgment of conviction
and sentence filed February 14, 2018, the trial court found appellant guilty and sentenced
him to fifteen years to life in prison. His conviction and sentence were affirmed on appeal.
State v. King, 5th Dist. Licking No. 18-CA-19, 2019-Ohio-1100.
{¶ 4} On May 24, 2019, appellant filed a petition for postconviction relief, claiming
he was denied the effective assistance of counsel because his counsel failed to
communicate the risks of going to trial given appellant's intellectual disability and low IQ.
Attached to the petition were appellant's affidavit and a psychological report by Naeem
U. Khan, Ph.D. By judgment entry filed August 14, 2019, the trial court denied the petition
without holding a hearing.
{¶ 5} Appellant filed an appeal and this matter is now before this court for
consideration. Assignment of error is as follows:
Licking County, Case No. 2019 CA 00083 3
I
{¶ 6} "THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT DENIED A
HEARING ON JOSHUA'S POSTCONVICTION PETITION BASED ON FINDINGS MADE
ABOUT THE CREDIBILITY OF JOSHUA'S AFFIDAVIT."
I
{¶ 7} In his sole assignment of error, appellant claims the trial court erred in
denying his petition for postconviction relief without holding a hearing. We disagree.
{¶ 8} A trial court's decision to deny a petition for postconviction relief without
holding an evidentiary hearing is left to the sound discretion of the trial court. State v.
McKelton, 12th Dist. Butler No. CA2015-02-028, 2015-Ohio-4228. In order to find an
abuse of discretion, we must determine the trial court's decision was unreasonable,
arbitrary or unconscionable and not merely an error of law or judgment. Blakemore v.
Blakemore, 5 Ohio St. 3d 217, 450 N.E.2d 1140 (1983).
{¶ 9} R.C. 2953.21 governs petition for postconviction relief. Subsection (D)
states the following in pertinent part:
Before granting a hearing on a petition filed under division (A) of this
section, the court shall determine whether there are substantive grounds for
relief. In making such a determination, the court shall consider, in addition
to the petition, the supporting affidavits, and the documentary evidence, all
the files and records pertaining to the proceedings against the petitioner,
including, but not limited to, the indictment, the court's journal entries, the
Licking County, Case No. 2019 CA 00083 4
journalized records of the clerk of the court, and the court reporter's
transcript.
{¶ 10} In State v. Jackson, 64 Ohio St. 2d 107, 111, 413 N.E.2d 819 (1980), the
Supreme Court of Ohio held the following:
Before a hearing is granted, the petitioner bears the initial burden in
a post-conviction proceeding to submit evidentiary documents containing
sufficient operative facts to demonstrate the lack of competent counsel and
also that the defense was prejudiced by counsel's ineffectiveness.
Broad assertions without a further demonstration of prejudice do not
warrant a hearing for all post-conviction petitions. General conclusory
allegations to the effect that a defendant has been denied effective
assistance of counsel are inadequate as a matter of law to impose an
evidentiary hearing. See Rivera v. United States (C.A. 9, 1963), 318 F.2d
606.
{¶ 11} It is up to the trial court to judge the credibility of any affidavits presented.
State v. Calhoun, 86 Ohio St. 3d 279, 284, 714 N.E.2d 905 (1999). In assessing the
credibility of an affidavit, a trial court should consider relevant factors including "whether
the judge reviewing the postconviction relief petition also presided at the trial." Id. at 285,
citing State v. Moore, 99 Ohio App. 3d 748, 651 N.E.2d 1319 (1st Dist.1994).
Licking County, Case No. 2019 CA 00083 5
{¶ 12} In his petition at page 2, appellant claimed his rights were violated due to
ineffective assistance of trial counsel causing him to reject his plea deal and go to trial:
Because Joshua's trial counsel did not adequately accommodate his
disability [intellectual deficit] during plea counseling, the State's offer was
not presented in a way that allowed Joshua to comprehend the benefits of
pleading guilty. Counsel's ineffective conveyance of plea advice led to
Joshua's decision to reject the State's offer. Lafler v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 156,
160, 132 S. Ct. 1376, 182 L. Ed. 2d 389 (2012). Had trial counsel
accommodated Joshua's disability when counseling him on his plea, there
is a reasonable probability that Joshua would have agreed to the terms of
the plea and that this Court would have accepted it.
{¶ 13} The standard this issue must be measured against is set out in State v.
Bradley, 42 Ohio St. 3d 136, 538 N.E.2d 373 (1989), paragraphs two and three of the
syllabus. Appellant must establish the following:
2. Counsel's performance will not be deemed ineffective unless and
until counsel's performance is proved to have fallen below an objective
standard of reasonable representation and, in addition, prejudice arises
from counsel's performance. (State v. Lytle [1976], 48 Ohio St. 2d 391, 2
Ohio Op. 3d 495, 358 N.E.2d 623; Strickland v. Washington [1984], 466 U.S.
668, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674, followed.)
Licking County, Case No. 2019 CA 00083 6
3. To show that a defendant has been prejudiced by counsel's
deficient performance, the defendant must prove that there exists a
reasonable probability that, were it not for counsel's errors, the result of the
trial would have been different.
{¶ 14} "On the issue of counsel's ineffectiveness, the petitioner has the burden of
proof, since in Ohio a properly licensed attorney is presumably competent." Calhoun,
supra at 289.
{¶ 15} In support of his petition, appellant attached his own affidavit and a
psychological report by Naeem U. Khan, Ph.D. Dr. Khan interviewed appellant for four
hours, and also interviewed appellant's mother, his primary care provider during his
developmental period, for about four hours. Dr. Khan also conducted several
psychological and intelligence tests. In his report at pages 13-14, Dr. Khan stated the
following:
The intellectual and cognitive limitations determined and detailed in
the exhaustive sections on Intelligence Testing above (pages 6-10) prove
with high psychological certainty and without doubt doubt (sic) that Joshua
King is exceeded by 99 percent of his age peers in the amount of intellectual
capacity and power. With an IQ of 67, it is certain that he has grossly
deficient ability to understand the complete concept and consequences of
plea bargaining down to a lesser charge to obtain a lesser punishment while
waiving his constitutional rights that such plea entail[s]. In the absence of
Licking County, Case No. 2019 CA 00083 7
specialized and simplified, elemental coaching, counseling and counsel, it
is certain that Joshua King was not able to weigh down his thought and
decision making.
{¶ 16} Dr. Khan concluded at pages 14-15:
Due to sufficient and gross deficiencies in intelligence and
processing it is doubtful beyond psychological certitude that he would have
understood the concept and process of plea bargaining or have the
competence to make the "reasoned choice" which is essential to the validity
of a plea of guilty and the waiver of constitutional rights such a plea entails.
{¶ 17} In his affidavit, appellant averred that his defense counsel told him the plea
deal was in his best interest and told him who he expected to testify, but "did not talk to
me about what they would say. He did not role pla[y] to show me what their testimony
might look like."
{¶ 18} In support of his arguments to the trial court, appellant cited the case of
Lafler v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 156, 132 S. Ct. 1376, 182 L. Ed. 2d 389 (2012). In Lafler at
paragraph one of its holding, the United States Supreme Court held the following:
Where counsel's ineffective advice led to an offer's rejection, and
where the prejudice alleged is having to stand trial, a defendant must show
that but for the ineffective advice, there is a reasonable probability that the
Licking County, Case No. 2019 CA 00083 8
plea offer would have been presented to the court, that the court would have
accepted its terms, and that the conviction or sentence, or both, under the
offer's terms would have been less severe than under the actual judgment
and sentence imposed.
{¶ 19} In Lafler, defense counsel advised the defendant to reject the plea deal and
go to trial. In the case sub judice, as acknowledged by appellant's affidavit, defense
counsel advised appellant to take the plea deal, that the plea deal was in his best interest,
but appellant chose to reject the plea deal and go to trial.
{¶ 20} In its August 14, 2019 judgment entry denying appellant's petition, the trial
court noted appellant did not argue "that he was incompetent to stand trial, nor does there
appear to be any reason to believe defendant was not competent to stand trial." The trial
court acknowledged the psychological report and appellant's affidavit, and stated the
following:
Defendant offers nothing but his self-serving affidavit to suggest his
attorney did not adequately counsel him concerning the plea offer and trial
evidence. There is nothing to suggest counsel's representation fell below
an objective standard of reasonableness or (sic) overcome the presumption
of counsel's competence. There is nothing in the record that suggests
defendant did not understand the consequences of rejecting the plea offer
and going to trial.
Licking County, Case No. 2019 CA 00083 9
{¶ 21} Prior to trial, the trial court asked appellant about his desire to reject the plea
deal and proceed to trial without a jury. The prosecutor set forth the plea deal on the
record, defense counsel agreed that was the deal, and appellant acknowledged that he
was rejecting the deal. February 13, 2018 T. at 7-8. Appellant did not have any questions
regarding the deal. Id. at 8. At no time during the trial or in his direct appeal did appellant
raise the issue of his intellectual ability or inability to understand the proceedings.
{¶ 22} The trial judge who reviewed appellant's postconviction relief petition was
the same judge who presided over the bench trial and subsequent sentencing. Appellant
testified at the trial and the trial judge was able to assess his intellectual abilities firsthand.
"[T]he trial judge was familiar with the underlying proceedings and was in the best position
to observe the defendant and his attorney" and therefore assess the credibility of his
affidavit. Calhoun, supra at 286.
{¶ 23} Appellant's affidavit itself provides no information that defense counsel's
performance fell below an objective standard of reasonable representation. Appellant
wants the trial court to find that his level of competency was such that his trial counsel
had to make extraordinary efforts to ensure that he understood the plea offer. Appellant
is either competent to enter a plea or he is not. The trial court correctly found that the
psychological report did not challenge appellant's competency to enter into a plea. Trial
counsel's representation is presumed to be competent. The trial court had the opportunity
to personally address appellant regarding the plea deal and observe him during the trial.
{¶ 24} The trial court, in its discretion, did not find "sufficient operative facts" to
demonstrate the need for an evidentiary hearing. The trial court found trial counsel did
not fall below the objective level of competence nor was appellant prejudiced.
Licking County, Case No. 2019 CA 00083 10
{¶ 25} Upon review, we find the trial court did not abuse its discretion in not holding
an evidentiary hearing and in denying appellant's petition for postconviction relief.
{¶ 26} The sole assignment of error is denied.
{¶ 27} The judgment of the Court of Common Pleas of Licking County, Ohio is
hereby affirmed.
By Wise, Earle, J.
Wise, John, P.J. and
Delaney, J. concur.
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