State v. Stewart , 2021 Ohio 2294 ( 2021 )


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  • [Cite as State v. Stewart, 
    2021-Ohio-2294
    .]
    IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
    THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
    SENECA COUNTY
    STATE OF OHIO,
    PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE,                                 CASE NO. 13-21-05
    v.
    DARRION A. STEWART,                                        OPINION
    DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.
    Appeal from Seneca County Common Pleas Court
    Trial Court No. 07 CR 0154
    Judgment Affirmed
    Date of Decision: July 6, 2021
    APPEARANCES:
    Gene P. Murray for Appellant
    Derek W. DeVine for Appellee
    Case No. 13-21-05
    ZIMMERMAN, J.
    {¶1} Defendant-appellant, Darrion A. Stewart (“Stewart”), appeals the
    January 25, 2021 judgment entry of the Seneca County Court of Common Pleas
    denying his motion to vacate his conviction. We affirm.
    {¶2} In 2008, Stewart was convicted of 23 drug-related counts. State v.
    Stewart, 3d Dist. Seneca No. 13-08-18, 
    2009-Ohio-3411
    , ¶ 34, 36. The trial court
    sentenced Stewart on May 14, 2008 to an aggregate sentence of 36 years and 11
    months in prison, and Stewart appealed the trial court’s judgment entry of
    conviction.1 Stewart at ¶ 1; (Doc. Nos. 192, 199).2 In that direct appeal, we affirmed
    the judgment of the trial court. Stewart at ¶ 109.
    {¶3} On December 29, 2020, Stewart filed a motion to vacate his conviction
    arguing that his conviction is void because “the State cannot produce a case
    numbered motion docketed file for the warrant * * * .” (Emphasis sic.) (Doc. No.
    220). On January 14, 2021, the State filed a memorandum in opposition to Stewart’s
    motion to vacate. (Doc. No. 221). On January 25, 2021, the trial court denied
    Stewart’s motion to vacate after concluding that his motion is untimely and barred
    by the doctrine of res judicata. (Doc. No. 212).
    1
    In Stewart’s direct appeal from his conviction, this court recited much of the factual and procedural
    background of this case, and we will not duplicate those efforts here. See State v. Stewart, 3d Dist. Seneca
    No. 13-08-18, 
    2009-Ohio-3411
    .
    2
    On March 22, 2011, the trial court issued a nunc pro tunc judgment entry of sentence to correct a clerical
    entry. (Doc. No. 216).
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    Case No. 13-21-05
    {¶4} On February 22, 2021, Stewart filed his notice of appeal and raises one
    assignment of error for our review. (Doc. No. 223).
    Assignment of Error
    The Trial Court Abused its Discretion by Dismissing and Not
    Even Allowing a Hearing on Defendant-Appellant’s Motion to
    Vacate Verdicts and Sentencings, and With Motion to Dismiss,
    When the Defendant-Appellant Finally and Long After Trial,
    Through No Fault of His Own, Became Aware of the State’s
    Application for a Search Warrant, with a State Affidavit in
    Support Thereof, and With the State Search Warrant Itself, in an
    Unnumbered (and Thus Secret) Sealed Filing Which Could Not
    be Accessed or Otherwise Found by the Defense, and From Which
    the State Obtained Alleged Evidence Upon Which The Entire
    Indictment Against the Defendant-Appellant Was Based,
    Thereby Violating the Defendant-Appellant’s Fundamental and
    Substantial Rights Under the Search and Seizure Warrant
    Requirements of the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution of
    the United States, and also Violating the Defendant’s
    Fundamental and Substantial Rights as Guaranteed by the Due
    Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution
    of the United States.
    {¶5} In his assignment of error, Stewart argues that the trial court erred by
    denying his motion to vacate without an evidentiary hearing. In particular, he argues
    that his conviction is void because the State failed to provide “to the defense as
    discovery for trial * * * the motion for [the] search warrant, the affidavit in support
    of the [search warrant], the receipt for [the] property itemization, and the search
    warrant itself.” (Appellant’s Brief at 2).
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    Case No. 13-21-05
    Standard of Review
    {¶6} Because it raises a question of jurisdiction, we review de novo the
    denial of a motion to vacate a void judgment. State v. Megarry, 4th Dist. Adams
    No. 17CA1051, 
    2018-Ohio-4242
    , ¶ 9; State v. Bigelow, 6th Dist. Lucas No. L-17-
    1306, 
    2018-Ohio-3508
    , ¶ 12; State v. Brown, 11th Dist. Lake No. 2017-L-038,
    
    2017-Ohio-7963
    , ¶ 8. See also State v. Miles, 3d Dist. Hancock No. 5-18-06, 2018-
    Ohio-3317, ¶ 8. “De novo review is independent, without deference to the lower
    court’s decision.” State v. Hudson, 3d Dist. Marion No. 9-12-38, 
    2013-Ohio-647
    , ¶
    27.
    Analysis
    {¶7} “‘Ohio’s Criminal Rules and statutes provide for the direct review of
    criminal judgments through appeal, and collateral attacks through postconviction
    petitions, habeas corpus, and motions to vacate.’” State v. Love, 7th Dist. Mahoning
    No. 17 MA 0039, 
    2018-Ohio-1140
    , ¶ 17, quoting Lingo v. State, 
    138 Ohio St.3d 427
    , 
    2014-Ohio-1052
    , ¶ 44. Thus, “[t]he authority to vacate a void judgment is ‘an
    inherent power possessed by Ohio courts.’” Id. at ¶ 18, quoting Patton v. Diemer,
    
    35 Ohio St.3d 68
     (1988), paragraph four of syllabus, and citing Lingo at ¶ 48.
    {¶8} A judgment rendered by a court lacking subject-matter jurisdiction is
    void and issues of voidness can be raised at any time. Id. at ¶ 18-19; Miles at ¶ 8.
    “Furthermore, the doctrine of res judicata can be surmounted where a judgment is
    void for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.” Love at ¶ 19, citing Bank of Am., N.A.
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    Case No. 13-21-05
    v. Kuchta, 
    141 Ohio St.3d 75
    , 
    2014-Ohio-4275
    , ¶ 17, State Wilson, 
    73 Ohio St.3d 40
    , 44-45 (1995), fn. 6, and State v. Perry, 
    10 Ohio St.2d 175
    , 178-179 (1967).
    {¶9} “However, a court faced with a motion filed after a conviction can
    proceed to analyze the motion under the postconviction relief statutes where the
    defendant’s voidness argument fails.” Id. at ¶ 21. “R.C. 2953.21 governs petitions
    for post-conviction relief.” State v. Wine, 3d Dist. Auglaize No. 2-15-07, 2015-
    Ohio-4726, ¶ 10, citing State v. Kinstle, 3d Dist. Allen No. 1-12-32, 
    2013-Ohio-850
    ,
    ¶ 10. The statute (in effect at the time Stewart filed his motion) sets forth the time
    requirements for filing a petition for post-conviction relief and provides, in its
    relevant part, “a petition under division (A)(1) of this section shall be filed no later
    than three hundred sixty-five days after the date on which the trial transcript is filed
    in the court of appeals in the direct appeal of the judgment of conviction or
    adjudication.” R.C. 2953.21(A)(2). Importantly, a trial court lacks jurisdiction to
    entertain an untimely or successive petition for post-conviction relief unless the
    defendant demonstrates that one of the R.C. 2953.23(A) exceptions applies. State
    v. Martin, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 17AP-6, 
    2017-Ohio-5657
    , ¶ 9; R.C. 2953.23(A).
    {¶10} A trial court may not entertain an untimely or successive post-
    conviction petition unless the petitioner initially demonstrates either (1) he was
    unavoidably prevented from discovering the facts necessary for the claim for relief,
    or (2) the United States Supreme Court recognized a new federal or state right that
    applies retroactively to persons in the petitioner’s situation. R.C. 2953.23(A)(1)(a).
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    Case No. 13-21-05
    If the petitioner can satisfy one of those two conditions, he must also demonstrate
    that but for the constitutional error at trial, no reasonable finder of fact would have
    found him guilty. R.C. 2953.23(A)(1)(b). R.C. 2953.23(A)(2) allows a trial court
    to consider an untimely petition in certain cases involving DNA testing.
    {¶11} “Absent jurisdiction to consider a petition for post-conviction relief, a
    trial court is not required to hold an evidentiary hearing.” State v. Wesson, 9th Dist.
    Summit No. 28412, 
    2018-Ohio-834
    , ¶ 23, citing State v. Price, 9th Dist. Wayne No.
    03CA0046, 
    2004-Ohio-961
    , ¶ 10.
    {¶12} “‘[T]he question whether a court of common pleas possesses subject-
    matter jurisdiction to entertain an untimely petition for postconviction relief is a
    question of law, which appellate courts review de novo.” State v. Apanovitch, 
    155 Ohio St.3d 358
    , 
    2018-Ohio-4744
    , ¶ 24, quoting State v. Kane, 10th Dist. Franklin
    No. 16AP-781, 
    2017-Ohio-7838
    , ¶ 9.
    {¶13} Here, Stewart does not allege an issue which would render his
    conviction void. See State v. Jones, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 20AP-300, 2020-Ohio-
    5525, ¶ 14. Specifically, Stewart alleges that the State neglected to provide him
    with a second search warrant, search-warrant affidavit, and itemization of the
    property seized as a result of that search warrant, which was executed at 112½ East
    North Street in Fostoria, Ohio in 2006. Nevertheless, Stewart’s argument regarding
    that search warrant did not deprive the trial court of subject matter jurisdiction to
    issue the conviction and sentence in his case. In other words, arguments challenging
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    Case No. 13-21-05
    discovery matters, and relating to a search warrant, cannot surmount the doctrine of
    res judicata. See State v. King, 5th Dist. Muskingum No. CT2006-0021, 2007-Ohio-
    2810, ¶ 21; State v. Holder, 11th Dist. Geauga No. 2002-G-2469, 
    2003-Ohio-5860
    ,
    ¶ 18.
    {¶14} Because Stewart does not allege any error that would render his
    conviction void, the trial court properly denied Stewart’s motion to vacate without
    an evidentiary hearing as untimely and as barred by the doctrine of res judicata.
    Indeed, Stewart’s petition was filed well beyond the statutory window set forth in
    R.C. 2953.21(A)(2). Accordingly, Stewart was required to establish that his petition
    falls within one of the exceptions specified in R.C. 2953.23(A), which he failed to
    do. Indeed, Stewart was not unavoidably prevented from discovering any of the
    issues related to the search warrant. See State v. West, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No.
    100226, 
    2014-Ohio-1626
    , ¶ 7. Moreover, Stewart did not allege that the United
    States Supreme Court recognized a new federal or state right which would
    retroactively apply to his situation or that he is challenging DNA testing. Thus, the
    trial court was without jurisdiction to consider Stewart’s untimely and successive
    petition for postconviction relief. Apanovitch at ¶ 41; Wesson, 
    2018-Ohio-834
    , at ¶
    23.
    {¶15} Consequently, Stewart’s argument is barred by the doctrine of res
    judicata. “Under the doctrine of res judicata, a final judgment of conviction bars a
    convicted defendant who was represented by counsel from raising and litigating in
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    Case No. 13-21-05
    any proceeding except an appeal from that judgment, any defense or any claimed
    lack of due process that was raised or could have been raised by the defendant * *
    * on an appeal from that judgment.” State v. Perry, 
    10 Ohio St.2d 175
     (1967),
    paragraph nine of the syllabus. See also State v. James, 3d Dist. Hancock No. 5-19-
    30, 
    2020-Ohio-720
    , ¶ 17. Stewart could have and should have presented his
    argument regarding the search warrant before the trial court or on direct appeal;
    however, he failed to do so. See Stewart, 
    2009-Ohio-3411
    . Thus, Stewart is barred
    by the doctrine of res judicata from raising this issue in a subsequent proceeding.
    See James at ¶ 17.
    {¶16} Stewart’s assignment of error is overruled.
    {¶17} Having found no error prejudicial to the appellant herein in the
    particulars assigned and argued, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
    Judgment Affirmed
    SHAW, J., concurs.
    MILLER, J., concurs in Judgment Only.
    /jlr
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