State v. Williamson ( 2020 )

[Cite as State v. Williamson, 2020-Ohio-3300.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
MONTGOMERY COUNTY
STATE OF OHIO :
:
Plaintiff-Appellee : Appellate Case Nos. 28352 & 28641
:
v. : Trial Court Case No. 2018-CR-3775
:
HARRISON D. WILLIAMSON, JR. : (Criminal Appeal from
: Common Pleas Court)
Defendant-Appellant :
:
...........
OPINION
Rendered on the 12th day of June, 2020.
...........
MATHIAS H. HECK JR. by JAMIE J. RIZZO, Atty. Reg. No. 0099218, Assistant
Prosecuting Attorney, Montgomery County Prosecutor’s Office, Appellate Division,
Montgomery County Courts Building, 301 West Third Street, 5th Floor, Dayton, Ohio
45422
Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellee
CHRISTOPHER C. GREEN, Atty. Reg. No. 0077072, 130 West Second Street, Suite
830, Dayton, Ohio 45402
Attorney for Defendant-Appellant
.............
HALL, J.
-2-
{¶ 1} Harrison D. Williamson, Jr., appeals from the trial court’s judgment denying
of his post-sentence motion to withdraw his guilty plea, which was submitted without
evidentiary support. He contends that the court should have held a hearing before
denying his motion. We disagree. A hearing was unnecessary, because Williamson’s
factual statements, together with the record, failed to establish a reasonable likelihood
that withdrawal of his plea was necessary to correct a manifest injustice. We affirm the
judgment of the trial court.
I. Factual and Procedural History
{¶ 2} Williamson was indicted in November 2018 for possession of less than
five grams of cocaine in violation of R.C. 2925.11(A), a fifth-degree felony. He pleaded
guilty in February 2019 without a plea agreement, and on March 20, 2019, he was
sentenced to 11 months in prison. At the end of the sentencing hearing, after the court
announced the sentence and ordered Williamson to be remanded to the custody of the
sheriff to serve the sentence, his counsel stated, “Mr. Williamson is telling me he intends
to withdraw his plea.” (Tr. 10). The trial court indicated that he could file a motion to that
effect.
{¶ 3} On April 8, 2019 Williamson filed, pro se, a one-page document titled “Notice
of Appeal,” which initiated this appeal and also contained a caption as a “Motion to
Withdraw Guilty Plea.” In the body of this unsigned filing, he asked “to withdraw a guilty
plea only made under the presumptions that Community Control would be granted.” He
also contended that his sentence was the product of racial bias. On April 16, his attorney
filed a motion to withdraw his plea. That filing stated that the reason to withdraw the plea
-3-
was that “it was not knowingly and voluntarily entered,” without further elaboration and
also without any evidentiary support. The motion did request a hearing on the matter, but
counsel also requested the court to appoint other counsel because “present counsel
would have a conflict of interest.”
{¶ 4} We docketed Williamson’s appeal based on the April 8 notice of appeal. In
July 2019, his appointed appellate attorney filed a motion to dismiss the appeal and to
remand the case back to the trial court to allow the trial court to consider the April 16 plea-
withdrawal motion. We overruled the motion to dismiss but sustained the motion to
remand for the limited purpose of the trial court’s ruling on the pending motion.
{¶ 5} On October 9, 2019, the trial court overruled Williamson’s motion to withdraw
his guilty plea without a hearing. The court explained in its written decision that Williamson
had not alleged any facts that, if true, would require the withdrawal of his plea and that he
had not established a manifest injustice. The court noted that at the plea hearing, it
advised Williamson that if he pleaded guilty, he could be sentenced to prison, and that
Williamson said he understood this. The Court stated: “In sum, it appears to the Court
that Defendant assumed he would be given probation and, when that did not happen, he
had a change of heart, which is an insufficient basis for withdrawal of his plea.”
{¶ 6} On October 22, 2019, we restored Williamson’s first appeal to our active
docket. On December 18, Williamson, with leave, filed a second, delayed appeal from
the trial court’s order overruling his motion to withdraw. We consolidated Williamson’s two
-4-
appeals, and they are now before us.1
II. Analysis
{¶ 7} Williamson assigns one error to the trial court:
The Trial Court abused its discretion when it did not hold an evidentiary
hearing on the Motion to Withdraw plea.
{¶ 8} A post-sentence motion to withdraw a guilty plea is “subject to the standards
of Crim.R. 32.1, which requires that after sentencing has occurred, a defendant must
demonstrate ‘manifest injustice’ before a trial court should permit withdrawal of the plea.”
State v. Francis, 104 Ohio St.3d 490, 2004-Ohio-6894, 820 N.E.2d 355, ¶ 26. Accordingly,
“the withdrawal of a guilty plea after sentencing is permitted only in the most extraordinary
cases.” State v. Hall, 2d Dist. Greene No. 2011-CA-32, 2012-Ohio-2539, ¶ 11, citing
State v. Smith, 49 Ohio St.2d 261, 264, 361 N.E.2d 1324 (1977). Consideration of “[t]he
motion is ‘addressed to the sound discretion’ of the trial court.” State v. Harris, 2d Dist.
Montgomery No. 19013, 2002-Ohio-2278, ¶ 7, citing Smith at paragraph two of the
syllabus. An appellate court reviews the trial court’s decision only for abuse of discretion.
Id., citing State v. Adams, 62 Ohio St.2d 151, 157, 404 N.E.2d 144 (1980).
{¶ 9} “An evidentiary hearing is not required on every post-sentence motion to
withdraw a plea. The movant must establish a reasonable likelihood that withdrawal of
his plea is necessary to correct a manifest injustice before a trial court must hold a hearing
on his motion.” (Citation omitted.) State v. Current, 2d Dist. Champaign No. 2010-CA-31,
1 We note that Williamson has completed his prison sentence but the Ohio Department
of Rehabilitation and Correction website indicates he is presently on three years of post-
release control. Accordingly we conclude his appeal is not moot. State v. Scott, 2d Dist.
Montgomery No. 28039, 2019-Ohio-400, ¶ 14.
-5-
2012-Ohio-1851, ¶ 8; see also Hall at ¶ 12 (“The trial court is not required to hold an
evidentiary hearing on every post-sentence motion to withdraw a plea.”). “A hearing is
required only if the facts alleged by the defendant, if accepted as true, would require the
plea to be withdrawn.” State v. McComb, 2d Dist. Montgomery Nos. 22570, 22571, 2009-
Ohio-295, ¶ 19.
{¶ 10} The trial court acknowledged that Williamson had requested an evidentiary
hearing but concluded that it was not required to hold one. The court said that Williamson
had not alleged any facts that, if true, would require the withdrawal of his plea. Rather, he
merely alleged that “his plea was not knowingly or voluntarily given and admits that he
had a change of heart after learning what his sentence would be.” Citing the plea hearing,
the court stated, “[I]t is clear to the Court that, irrespective of the promises Defendant
claims his attorney and the prosecutor made to him regarding his sentence, the Court
advised Defendant that he could be sentenced to a term of six to twelve months of
incarceration if he entered a guilty plea.” Williamson indicated that he understood. The
court noted that Williamson also said he understood that entering a guilty plea would
waive his right to a jury trial and that he was making this decision voluntarily. Further,
Williamson said that he had been able to speak with his attorney about the plea. The trial
court noted that Williamson did not allege that the outcome of the case would have been
different if his attorney had taken different action. “In sum,” concluded the court, “it
appears to the Court that Defendant assumed he would be given probation and, when
that did not happen, he had a change of heart, which is an insufficient basis for withdrawal
of his plea.”
{¶ 11} Williamson argues that the trial court abused its discretion in two ways. First,
-6-
he contends that the court should have held a hearing to determine if promises had been
made to induce his plea. Williamson says that the trial court's statement that he was
advised on the possible sentence “irrespective of the promises Defendant claims his
attorney and the prosecutor made to him regarding his sentence” suggests the possibility
that he may have been promised that he would receive only community control. Second,
citing the same statement, Williamson contends that the court was wrong to say that even
if a hearing showed that promises were made, it would not have been enough to show
that he did not enter his guilty plea knowingly and voluntarily.
{¶ 12} Williamson made several factual statements in three separate pro se filings,
all filed on April 8, 2019, none of which were supported by affidavit or other evidentiary
material. In the “Notice of Appeal” / “Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea,” he stated that he
pleaded guilty under the presumption that he would be sentenced to community control.
He further alleged that the trial judge racially discriminated against him. (Williamson is
black.) He said that the judge sentenced him based solely on his criminal history and
claimed that, in other cases, white defendants who had more felonies were given
probation or a shorter sentence. He also claimed that, on the same day he was
sentenced, a white female was sentenced on several possession charges to only six
months in prison. Finally, Williamson alleged that the judge incorrectly stated that he was
not eligible for community control. In his “Docketing Statement” filing, Williamson wrote
that his attorney had told him the prosecutor “made a plea offer of (1-5) years on
Community Control.” Williamson said that he agreed to this and pleaded guilty, but the
trial court imposed a prison term. Lastly, in his “Motion for Appointment of Counsel,” he
stated that he only pled guilty “due to false plea agreements by prosecutor, and his
-7-
lawyer.” He also said “[t]he record will reflect that the defendant made it known at the
sentencing date that a probation promise was given by his attorney.” It does not reflect
that Williamson made such an assertion.
{¶ 13} When it comes to withdrawing a plea, “ ‘[a] change of heart is not enough,’
and a trial court’s finding regarding a defendant’s true motivation is entitled to deference.”
State v. Simpson, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 24266, 2011-Ohio-6181, ¶ 10, quoting State
v. Williamson, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 21965, 2008-Ohio-4727, ¶ 13. “Defendant’s self-
serving declarations or affidavits are insufficient to rebut the record on review which
shows that his plea was voluntary. The good faith, credibility and weight of the movant’s
assertions in support of the motion are matters to be resolved by the trial court.” (Citations
omitted.) Current, 2d Dist. Champaign No. 2010-CA-31, 2012-Ohio-1851, at ¶ 9. The
record here supports the trial court's findings that Williamson’s guilty plea was voluntary
and as to his true motivation for wanting to withdraw his plea. Williamson pleaded guilty
in open court with no plea agreement appearing in the record. From the plea form, which
Williamson signed, and the trial court’s statements during the plea colloquy, which
Williamson said he understood, it was clear that he faced the possibility of a prison
sentence. We further note that Williamson was not a novice at criminal procedure. The
presentence investigation report that the trial court considered at sentencing revealed
eight felony convictions and four previous prison sentences. This is a classic situation
where Williamson must have either been lying at the time of his trial court
acknowledgement or in the motion to withdraw his plea, or both.
{¶ 14} Moreover, in this record there was no evidence that supported any of
Williamson’s factual allegations. There was no evidence that Williamson’s plea was
-8-
induced improperly—no evidence of an agreement between Williamson and the state and
no evidence of a promise between Williamson and his attorney. The trial court’s statement
that Williamson cites—“irrespective of the promises Defendant claims his attorney and
the prosecutor made to him regarding his sentence”—was not evidence of a promise;
rather it implied that the court found no evidence of any promise. And although Williamson
stated after sentencing that he wanted “to take [his] guilty plea back,” there is nothing in
the transcript to support his claim that he made it known at that time that his attorney had
promised him probation. Furthermore, we understand the court’s point to be that even if
such a promise had been made, the court subsequently told Williamson explicitly that
prison was a possibility—a possibility that Williamson said he understood. There is no
evidence that the trial judge had a racial bias generally or a bias against Williamson
specifically. No information about the other cases to which Williamson refers is in the
record. Lastly, contrary to Williamson’s assertion, the trial judge never stated that he was
ineligible for community control; the judge said he did not believe that Williamson was
“amenable” to community control. (Tr. 9).2
III. Conclusion
{¶ 15} Williamson’s attempt to withdraw his plea was based on nothing more than
his own self-serving, unsworn statements, which were either unsupported or directly
contradicted by the record. His contentions were insufficient to rebut the voluntariness of
Williamson’s plea as shown by the record and did not require a hearing. The court did
not abuse its discretion by choosing not to hold a hearing.
2
Parenthetically, we note that if Williamson has any evidence supporting these
allegations, it could be more properly presented in a petition for post-conviction relief.
-9-
{¶ 16} The sole assignment of error is overruled, and the trial court’s judgment is
affirmed.
.............
DONOVAN, J. and FROELICH, J., concur.
Copies sent to:
Mathias H. Heck, Jr.
Jamie J. Rizzo
Christopher C. Green
Hon. Dennis J. Adkins