State v. Miller ( 2020 )

[Cite as State v. Miller, 2020-Ohio-3329.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
ELEVENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
LAKE COUNTY, OHIO
STATE OF OHIO, : OPINION
Plaintiff-Appellee, :
CASE NO. 2019-L-084
- vs - :
GINA B. MILLER, :
Defendant-Appellant. :
Civil Appeal from the Lake County Court of Common Pleas, Case No. 2015 CR 000776.
Judgment: Affirmed.
Charles E. Coulson, Lake County Prosecutor, and Jennifer A. McGee, Assistant
Prosecutor, Lake County Administration Building, 105 Main Street, P.O. Box 490,
Painesville, OH 44077 (For Plaintiff-Appellee).
Albert L. Purola, 38298 Ridge Road, Willoughby, OH 44094 (For Defendant-Appellant).
TIMOTHY P. CANNON, P.J.
{¶1} Appellant, Gina B. Miller, appeals from the July 29, 2019 judgment of the
Lake County Court of Common Pleas, denying her petition for postconviction relief
without a hearing. We affirm the trial court’s judgment.
{¶2} The facts in this matter have been stated through the previous appeal in
State v. Miller, 11th Dist. Lake No. 2018-L-055, 2018-Ohio-5192 (“Miller II”), ¶2-7, and
are as follows:
On September 6, 2016, after a police investigation uncovered
impropriety in connection with appellant’s fortune-telling business,
appellant was charged in a 28-count indictment, which included
felonies for engaging in a pattern of corrupt activity, aggravated
theft, telecommunications fraud, identity fraud, securing writings by
deception, grand theft, and theft. Several of the charges included a
forfeiture specification. Appellant initially entered a plea of not guilty
to the indictment.
A plea hearing was held on March 10, 2017. Appellant withdrew her
plea of not guilty and entered a plea of guilty to an amended count
of aggravated theft, a second-degree felony in violation of R.C.
2913.02(A)(3). The remaining counts were dismissed. The matter
was referred to the Lake County Adult Probation Department for a
pre-sentence investigation report (“PSI”).
A sentencing hearing was held on April 27, 2017. Appellant was
sentenced to serve eight years in prison. Appellant stipulated to an
order requiring her to pay her victims $1.4 million in restitution. All
items seized by police from appellant’s home and business were to
be forfeited and items distributed to the victims. The trial court filed
its judgment entry of sentence on April 28, 2017.
Appellant noticed a direct appeal, arguing her sentence was
contrary to law. This court affirmed the trial court’s judgment. See
State v. Miller, 11th Dist. Lake No. 2017-L-074, 2017-Ohio-8809
[Miller I].
On October 12, 2017, appellant filed a petition for postconviction
relief pursuant to R.C. 2953.21. * * * Attached to the petition was
the appellant’s affidavit, in which she averred that prior to her plea
hearing she had instructed trial counsel she did not want to enter a
guilty plea and wanted to go to trial; that trial counsel told her she
would “not be locked up, and at the sentencing hearing, Affiant
would probably get probation or at most two (2) years”; that she is
poorly educated and was overpowered by the situation; “that at the
trial, she wrote on a legal pad belonging to [trial counsel], that may
still be in existence, that she did not want to go to trial”1; and that
she never deceived anyone and instead, “[s]he just talked to them,
and they liked her.” * * *
In a judgment entry filed April 4, 2018, the trial court denied
appellant’s petition for postconviction relief [without a hearing]. * * *
1. We again note that this statement is inconsistent with the other statements in appellant’s affidavit and
with her assertion that she wanted to go to trial.
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{¶3} On appeal, we held that the trial court erred when it failed to address the
credibility of appellant’s affidavit or determine whether it presented substantive grounds
for postconviction relief that would warrant a hearing. Miller II, supra, at ¶24. We
remanded the matter for the limited purpose of allowing the trial court to exercise its
discretion and determine whether the affidavit is credible and presents substantive
grounds for postconviction relief. Id.
{¶4} Upon remand from this court, the trial court entered judgment on the issue
of conducting a hearing on the petition for postconviction relief on July 29, 2019. The
trial court concluded, after a thorough analysis, that appellant’s affidavit was not
credible. As a result, the trial court dismissed the petition without conducting a hearing.
{¶5} Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal and raises the following
assignment of error for our review:
{¶6} “The trial court abused its discretion in refusing to grant a hearing.”
{¶7} Appellant also presents the following question for this court to consider: “Is
the abuse of discretion standard so amorphous and subjective to be no standard at all,
in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment?”
Standard of Review
{¶8} As we stated in the previous appeal, “‘in reviewing a petition for
postconviction relief filed pursuant to R.C. 2953.21, a trial court should give due
deference to affidavits sworn to under oath and filed in support of the petition, but may,
in the sound exercise of discretion, judge the credibility of the affidavits in determining
whether to accept the affidavits as true statements of fact.’” Id., quoting State v.
Calhoun, 86 Ohio St. 3d 279 (1999), paragraph one of the syllabus. The Ohio Supreme
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Court outlined this standard of review in State v. Gondor, 112 Ohio St. 3d 377, 2006-
Ohio-6679, ¶51-52:
In postconviction cases, a trial court has a gatekeeping role as to
whether a defendant will even receive a hearing. * * * [T]he trial
court’s gatekeeping function in the postconviction relief process is
entitled to deference, including the court’s decision regarding the
sufficiency of the facts set forth by the petitioner and the credibility
of the affidavits submitted. We established in Calhoun that a court
reviewing the trial court’s decision in regard to its gatekeeping
function should apply an abuse-of-discretion standard. The
consistent approach is to grant that same level of deference to the
trial court in regard to its posthearing decision.
{¶9} Appellant initially takes issue with the “abuse of discretion” standard of
review itself. Appellant identifies various standards attributed to the “abuse of
discretion” standard, including the definition in Blakemore v. Blakemore, 5 Ohio St. 3d
217 (1983). It should be noted that this court has previously disavowed the standard in
Blakemore and has consistently applied the following standard from State v. Ferranto,
112 Ohio St. 667 (1925), as discussed in Bayus v. Bayus, 11th Dist. Trumbull No. 2011-
T-0062, 2012-Ohio-1462, ¶16 (per curiam):
As this court recently stated, the term “abuse of discretion” is one of
art, “connoting judgment exercised by a court, which does not
comport with reason or the record.” State v. Underwood, 11th Dist.
No. 2008-L-113, 2009-Ohio-2089, ¶30, citing State v. Ferranto, 112
Ohio St. 667, 676-678 (1925). The Second Appellate District also
recently adopted a similar definition of the abuse-of-discretion
standard: an abuse of discretion is the trial court’s “failure to
exercise sound, reasonable, and legal decision-making.” State v.
Beechler, 2d Dist. No. 09-CA-54, 2010-Ohio-1900, ¶62, quoting
Black’s Law Dictionary (8 Ed.Rev.2004) 11. As Judge Fain
explained, when an appellate court is reviewing a pure issue of law,
“the mere fact that the reviewing court would decide the issue
differently is enough to find error (of course, not all errors are
reversible. Some are harmless; others are not preserved for
appellate review). By contrast, where the issue on review has been
confined to the discretion of the trial court, the mere fact that the
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reviewing court would have reached a different result is not enough,
without more, to find error.” Id. [at] ¶67.
Accord Dague v. Dague, 11th Dist. Lake No. 2011-L-076, 2012-Ohio-1582, ¶33; In re
A.L.W., 11th Dist. Portage Nos. 2011-P-0050, et seq., 2012-Ohio-1458, ¶50; Marble
Builder Direct Internatl., Inc. v. Hauxhurst, 11th Dist. Lake No. 2011-L-040, 2012-Ohio-
1674, ¶16; Cobb v. Shipman, 11th Dist. Trumbull No. 2011-T-0049, 2012-Ohio-1676,
¶17.
{¶10} As discussed above—and pursuant to Gondor and Calhoun—abuse of
discretion is the appropriate standard of review for the trial court’s denial of a hearing on
a petition for postconviction relief, and we apply it as discussed accordingly.
Analysis of the Credibility of Miller’s Affidavit
{¶11} In the matter sub judice, appellant argues that the denial of a hearing,
regardless of the trial court’s discretion, amounts to a violation of her due process rights.
The trial court denied appellant a hearing because it found that the affidavit submitted
with the petition for postconviction relief lacked credibility.
{¶12} [I]n assessing the credibility of affidavit testimony in so-called paper
hearings, [the trial court] should consider all relevant factors.
Among those factors are (1) whether the judge reviewing the
postconviction relief petition also presided at the trial, (2) whether
multiple affidavits contain nearly identical language, or otherwise
appear to have been drafted by the same person, (3) whether the
affidavits contain or rely on hearsay, (4) whether the affiants are
relatives of the petitioner, or otherwise interested in the success of
the petitioner's efforts, and (5) whether the affidavits contradict
evidence proffered by the defense at trial. Moreover, a trial court
may find sworn testimony in an affidavit to be contradicted by
evidence in the record by the same witness, or to be internally
inconsistent, thereby weakening the credibility of that testimony.
Calhoun, supra, at 285 (internal citations omitted). Further, “‘[f]or purposes of
determining whether there are substantive grounds for postconviction relief that would
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warrant a hearing, it is generally accepted that affidavits presented in support of the
petition should be accepted as true. * * * However, conclusory or self-serving affidavits
presented by the petitioner in support of his claims, without more, will not satisfy the
petitioner’s evidentiary burden.’” State v. Ramos, 11th Dist. Geauga No. 2007-G-2794,
2008-Ohio-3738, ¶25, quoting State v. Pierce, 127 Ohio App. 3d 578, 586 (11th
Dist.1998) (emphasis added).
{¶13} In the matter sub judice, the trial court reviewed the affidavit submitted by
appellant with her petition for postconviction relief and determined that it lacked
sufficient credibility to warrant granting a hearing on the matter. The trial court applied
the factors and concluded (1) the judge ruling on the petition also presided over the
change of plea hearing, and is familiar with the proceedings; (2) the only affidavit
submitted was that of appellant; (3) multiple averments in the affidavit rely on hearsay;
(4) the affidavit is self-serving and produced by a person, the appellant, with a clear
interest in the efforts; and (5) the statements made in the affidavit are both internally
inconsistent and contradictory with the plea colloquy the court engaged in with appellant
on the record before accepting her guilty plea. All of these findings are supported by
the record, reflected in appellant’s contradicting affidavit, and duly stated in the trial
court’s judgment entry.
{¶14} Appellant challenges the persuasiveness of the plea colloquy; however,
the trial court, in exercising its discretion, directly addressed this challenge in the
judgment entry:
As for the plea colloquy, defense counsel has argued that it should
be disregarded. That every criminal lawyer, as well as most judges,
know that plea hearings are scripted, with everyone saying just
enough to get through the hearing, with likely little or no
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understanding of the depth of the proceeding. Essentially, he
contends that plea hearings are a farce and that the words spoken
at these hearings should not be given any weight.
First, the Defendant does not even allege in her affidavit that she
did not understand what she was being told by the Court, the
questions that were being asked of her, or what the proceeding was
about. In addition, she also never states that her answers to the
questions she was being asked are not true and that she was just
responding to the questions how her lawyer told her to respond, i.e.
scripted, or how she thinks the Court wanted her to respond.
Second, if defense counsel’s position is to be adopted, then every
plea hearing that takes place daily across the country is an exercise
in futility and a complete waste of time. Courts would be in a no-
win situation. On the one hand, judges can advise criminal
defendants of all of their constitutional rights and the penalties they
face, and strictly adhere to the mandates of Crim.R. 11, but should
give no weight or consideration to the responses given by the
defendants because it should be presumed they really do not
understand and are just saying what we want to hear. Under this
scenario, if a defendant comes back later and makes self-serving
statements that contradict statements made during the hearing, the
self-serving statements should be believed, the statements made
during the plea should not be considered, and the plea would
ultimately have to be vacated. On the other hand, judges can
choose not to follow the requirements of Crim.R. 11 and not inquire
of the defendants and just let them plead guilty. Obviously, we all
know what would happen with this scenario.
This Court refuses to adopt this argument of the defendant’s
counsel. It goes without saying that the plea colloquy mandated by
Crim.R. 11 is an imperative part of the criminal justice system, and
courts that strictly comply with the requirements of Crim.R. 11 must
be permitted to rely on the responses provided. Defendant’s
argument regarding the futility of this procedure has no merit.
{¶15} Further, appellant takes issue with the determination that her affidavit
lacked credibility by criticizing the trial court for quashing a subpoena of her trial
counsel. Appellant argues that by not allowing her to subpoena her previous counsel—
who is alleged to have given her ineffective assistance and incorrect legal advice
regarding her potential sentence—her affidavit is the only way to credibly introduce
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evidence of misconduct. The record reflects the trial court issued a judgment entry
quashing the subpoena of appellant’s previous counsel on June 3, 2019. However,
there is no assignment of error with regard to this entry. This entry was not included in
the notice of appeal filed by Miller and is not properly before this court for consideration.
Therefore, we decline to consider the relevance of the ruling on appellant’s subpoena in
determining whether the trial court abused its discretion in evaluating the credibility of
her affidavit.
{¶16} The trial court applied the Calhoun factors in making its determination that
the affidavit submitted with the petition for postconviction relief lacked credibility and
properly journalized it in the judgment entry from which appellant now appeals. This
determination was within the discretion of the trial court, and the decision to deny
appellant a hearing on her petition for postconviction relief was not a violation of her
right to due process.
{¶17} Finally, appellant filed a supplemental memorandum in which she argues,
for the first time, that she was not advised as to the elements of the crime to which she
pled guilty before sentencing. Her argument is that because she was not fully advised,
her plea was not made intelligently and voluntarily. We note that this has not been
assigned as error in the present appeal; however, even if it were, this issue was ripe at
the time she filed her notice of direct appeal in Miller I. Appellant could have posed the
challenge at that time, but she did not.
{¶18} “Under the doctrine of res judicata, a final judgment of conviction bars a
convicted defendant who was represented by counsel from raising and litigating in any
proceeding except an appeal from that judgment, any defense or any claimed lack of
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due process that was raised or could have been raised by the defendant at the trial,
which resulted in that judgment of conviction, or on an appeal from that judgment.”
State v. Perry, 10 Ohio St. 2d 175 (1967), paragraph nine of the syllabus. “[A]ny issues
that * * * could have been raised by a defendant * * * on direct appeal are res judicata
and not subject to review in subsequent proceedings.” State v. Lintz, 11th Dist. Lake
No. 2010-L-067, 2011-Ohio-6511, ¶36 (citations omitted).
{¶19} With regard to appellant’s supplemental memorandum challenging the
voluntariness of her plea, the doctrine of res judicata operates to bar that challenge.
{¶20} Appellant’s sole assignment of error has no merit.
{¶21} The judgment of the Lake County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed.
THOMAS R. WRIGHT, J.,
MATT LYNCH, J.,
concur.
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