State v. Redway , 2020 Ohio 3826 ( 2020 )


Menu:
  • [Cite as State v. Redway, 2020-Ohio-3826.]
    IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
    SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
    WOOD COUNTY
    State of Ohio                                    Court of Appeals No. WD-19-037
    Appellee                                 Trial Court No. 2018CR0207
    v.
    Rolando Redway                                   DECISION AND JUDGMENT
    Appellant                                Decided: July 24, 2020
    *****
    Paul A. Dobson, Wood County Prosecuting Attorney, and
    David T. Harold, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee.
    W. Alex Smith, for appellant.
    *****
    SINGER, J.
    {¶ 1} Appellant, Rolando Redway, appeals from the April 30, 2019 judgment of
    the Wood County Court of Common Pleas convicting him of possession of marijuana,
    R.C. 2925.11(A) and 2925.11(C)(3)(e), a felony of the third degree, with a specification
    for forfeiture of a cell phone in a drug case, R.C. 2941.1417(A), after acceptance of his
    no contest plea as part of a negotiated plea agreement. The remaining count for drug
    trafficking was dismissed. The trial court sentenced appellant to community control. For
    the reasons which follow, we affirm.
    {¶ 2} On appeal, appellant asserts the following single assignment of error:
    The Trial Court Erred in Denying the Motion to Suppress.
    {¶ 3} On appeal, appellant argues he entered his plea as a result of the denial of his
    motion to suppress, which he contends the trial court erroneously denied. He asserts only
    that the detention and seizure of appellant violated his constitutional rights under the
    Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution because the
    detention exceeded a reasonable time period to complete the traffic stop.
    {¶ 4} Appellate review of a trial court’s ruling on a Crim.R. 12(C)(3) motion to
    suppress involves a mixed question of law and fact. State v. Hairston, 
    156 Ohio St. 3d 363
    , 2019-Ohio-1622, 
    126 N.E.3d 1132
    , ¶ 29 (Donnelly, J., concurring), quoting State v.
    Burnside, 
    100 Ohio St. 3d 152
    , 2003-Ohio-5372, 
    797 N.E.2d 71
    , ¶ 8; State v. Hawkins,
    
    158 Ohio St. 3d 94
    , 2019-Ohio-4210, 
    140 N.E.3d 577
    , ¶ 16. The appellate court conducts
    a de novo review of application of the law to the facts but defers to the trial court’s
    evaluation of the credibility of witnesses and determination of the questions of fact which
    are supported by competent and credible evidence. Hairston, citing Burnside.
    {¶ 5} Like a Terry stop, defined in Terry v. Ohio, 
    392 U.S. 1
    , 
    88 S. Ct. 1868
    , 
    20 L. Ed. 2d 889
    (1968), the scope and duration of the traffic stop must last no longer than is
    necessary to effectuate the purpose for which the stop was made. Rodriguez v. United
    2.
    States, 
    575 U.S. 348
    , 354, 
    135 S. Ct. 1609
    , 
    191 L. Ed. 2d 492
    . A traffic stop requires a
    “reasonably diligent” check of the driver’s license, criminal record, and automobile
    registration, and proof of insurance.
    Id. at 355,
    357. However, an officer cannot make
    unrelated inquiries in order to “‘measurably extend the duration of the stop,’”
    id. at 355,
    quoting Arizona v. Johnson, 
    555 U.S. 323
    , 333, 
    129 S. Ct. 781
    , 
    72 L. Ed. 2d 694
    (2009), or
    unduly delay the stop to conduct a dog sniff. Rodriguez at 357.
    {¶ 6} In the case before us, the state highway patrol trooper testified that on
    April 18, 2018, near the exit ramp of the I-280 interchange, he observed, based on his
    past experience of observing drivers, several unusual behaviors as appellant passed by the
    trooper. The trooper began to follow appellant and observed more unusual behavior
    shortly before observing appellant move into the exit lane without signaling, a violation
    of R.C. 4511.39. The trooper then decided to initiate a traffic stop after the vehicle
    passed through the tollgate.
    {¶ 7} The patrol car dash cam admitted into evidence recorded the stop. When the
    trooper activated the overhead lights on his vehicle, appellant activated his right turn
    signal and pulled off onto the right shoulder 10-to-15 seconds later. The trooper ran the
    plate before exiting his vehicle. He approached the vehicle at 17:40:54. He explained
    the reason for the stop and asked appellant for his license. The trooper found appellant to
    be almost too polite at times. He asked appellant about his destination and appellant
    responded that he was visiting a cousin in Detroit, Michigan, on Saturday. The
    explanation was suspicious to the trooper because it was Wednesday. The trooper
    3.
    inquired how appellant was able to take time off work and appellant indicated he drove
    for Uber and was his own boss. Appellant also indicated that he had made too much
    money driving for Uber the prior year and had paid $6,000 in taxes. That comment also
    seem suspicious to the trooper because he never heard anyone say they made too much
    money. The trooper testified he carried on the conversation to ensure the violation was
    not the result of impairment or fatigue. The trooper estimated this encounter took three
    minutes, ending at 17:43.07. The trooper returned to his vehicle to confirm the
    registration and license, and checked for outstanding warrants. Because of the unusual
    behaviors and comments, the trooper, at 17:44:08, requested a K-9 handler to respond to
    the stop. At 17:45:12, the trooper gave appellant’s information to the dispatcher.
    Meanwhile, the border patrol agent working with the trooper checked the information
    through his data bases and received information that appellant was involved in an
    international drug smuggling ring out of the Philadelphia airport. The first K-9 handler
    was unable to respond, so the trooper contacted a second handler at 17:45:59. It took the
    K-9 officer six minutes to respond (17:52:12). The dispatch had not yet responded with
    the information needed to finalize the traffic stop and the trooper assumed it was because
    the criminal history check takes more time. After the K-9 handler arrived, he approached
    appellant’s vehicle to speak with appellant at 17:52:44 and walked the dog around the
    car, following which the dog alerted to the vehicle. The handler was finished at 17:54:02.
    The trooper decided to search the vehicle and the search began at 17:58:17. At that point
    in time, the trooper had not yet received the information from dispatch he needed to issue
    4.
    a traffic ticket or a warning, so the mission of the traffic stop was not yet complete. Upon
    opening the trunk, the trooper found approximately fourteen pounds of marijuana.
    {¶ 8} On appeal, appellant does not challenge the stop itself. He asserts only that
    the traffic stop was unconstitutional because it should have been completed in five
    minutes or less, but the trooper extended it to 13 minutes in order to allow time for a K-9
    unit to arrive. We find this argument unfounded. Clear and convincing evidence in the
    record supports the trial court’s finding that the trooper acted in a diligent manner in
    processing the traffic stop. Although the trooper called in a canine unit, he continued to
    process the traffic ticket in his normal manner and any delay was due to the processing of
    the request by the dispatch. Therefore, we find the traffic stop and seizure of appellant
    did not violate the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
    We find appellant’s sole assignment of error is not well-taken.
    {¶ 9} Having found that the trial court did not commit error prejudicial to
    appellant and that substantial justice has been done, the judgment of the Wood County
    Court of Common Pleas is affirmed. Appellant is ordered to pay the costs of this appeal
    pursuant to App.R. 24.
    Judgment affirmed.
    5.
    State v. Redway
    C.A. No. WD-19-037
    A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to App.R. 27.
    See also 6th Dist.Loc.App.R. 4.
    Mark L. Pietrykowski, J.                       _______________________________
    JUDGE
    Arlene Singer, J.
    _______________________________
    Christine E. Mayle, J.                                     JUDGE
    CONCUR.
    _______________________________
    JUDGE
    This decision is subject to further editing by the Supreme Court of
    Ohio’s Reporter of Decisions. Parties interested in viewing the final reported
    version are advised to visit the Ohio Supreme Court’s web site at:
    http://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/ROD/docs/.
    6.
    

Document Info

Docket Number: WD-19-037

Citation Numbers: 2020 Ohio 3826

Judges: Singer

Filed Date: 7/24/2020

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 7/24/2020