State v. Jones , 2021 Ohio 370 ( 2021 )

[Cite as State v. Jones, 2021-Ohio-370.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO
HAMILTON COUNTY, OHIO
STATE OF OHIO, : APPEAL NO. C-190429
TRIAL NO. B-1900683
Plaintiff-Appellee, :
vs. :
O P I N I O N.
ROGER JONES, :
Defendant-Appellant. :
Criminal Appeal From: Hamilton County Court of Common Pleas
Judgment Appealed From Is: Affirmed
Date of Judgment Entry on Appeal: February 10, 2021
Joseph T. Deters, Hamilton County Prosecuting Attorney, and Paula E. Adams,
Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for Plaintiff-Appellee,
John D. Hill, Jr., for Defendant-Appellant.
OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
BERGERON, Judge.
{¶1} Defendant-Appellant Roger Jones concedes that the record reveals no
error in the trial court’s acceptance of his guilty plea, but he entreats us to venture
beyond the record in order to reverse his conviction. We decline the invitation to do
so, and we accordingly affirm the judgment of the trial court.
I.
{¶2} In January 2019, Mr. Jones and another individual became involved
in a physical altercation with Franklin Thompson, which defense counsel described
as a “drug deal gone bad.” As a result of the melee, Mr. Thompson suffered a broken
jaw, orbital, and hand, which resulted in charges of aggravated robbery and felonious
assault against Mr. Jones. Before Mr. Jones’s trial date, the court ordered a
competency evaluation, and Mr. Jones was found competent to stand trial. The state
then broached a plea deal: Mr. Jones could plead guilty to the felonious assault
charge in exchange for dismissal of the aggravated robbery charge.
{¶3} At the beginning of his plea hearing, Mr. Jones rejected the state’s
overture and asked the court—for the second time—to appoint him new counsel. The
court refused, expressing its belief that defense counsel had “worked very, very hard
on [Mr. Jones’s] behalf,” and that the matter would go to trial or a plea that day. The
court explained that if Mr. Jones was convicted of both charges, he could face up to
19 years in prison: “That’s not a guarantee. I am not saying that I would do that. But I
want to take it off your attorney. He is not the bad guy.” Mr. Jones professed not to
understand, asking the court if it would “mind” telling him “what’s in the
agreement?” The court walked through the contents of the state’s plea offer and
recessed so that Mr. Jones could caucus further with his attorney.
2
OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
{¶4} When the hearing resumed, Mr. Jones agreed to plead guilty to
felonious assault. The trial court then engaged in an extensive colloquy to ensure
that he understood the charges against him, the rights that he waived by pleading
guilty, and the maximum penalty he faced for felonious assault. Notably, Mr. Jones
informed the trial court that he could not read or write. The trial court responded by
asking whether defense counsel had read the “Entering Plea of Guilty” form to Mr.
Jones, and whether he understood it. Mr. Jones assured the judge that his attorney
read him the form and that he understood its contents. When the trial court
inquired whether Mr. Jones was taking any substances that might affect his thinking,
he revealed that he consumed “medicine for bipolar and sleep and paranoia.” The
trial court probed further: “Do you feel that it helps you?” Mr. Jones responded that
the medication helped him “a lot,” and confirmed that he was making his plea with a
“clear mind.” The trial court eventually accepted Mr. Jones’s plea and sentenced him
to three years of incarceration.
{¶5} Mr. Jones concedes in his appellate brief that “the trial court
technically complied with the strictures of Crim.R. 11(C) in accepting [his] plea, and
no doubt under the circumstances it went to great lengths to ensure that his plea was
tendered knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently.” Nonetheless, Mr. Jones raises
one assignment of error on appeal, featuring evidence from outside the record for the
proposition that his plea was not actually knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently
tendered. For the reasons explained below, we find no merit in this assignment of
error and affirm the judgment of the trial court.
II.
{¶6} To bolster his appeal, Mr. Jones urges us to consider several matters
from outside the record. He claims that he felt “coerced” into tendering his guilty
3
OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
plea because of a deteriorating relationship with his trial attorney, and was
“pressured” by the trial court’s “veiled threat” that it might impose a 19-year
sentence if he rolled the dice at trial. He further maintains that his medication
clouded his judgment, precluding him from truly grasping what transpired at the
plea hearing (his assurances to the trial court notwithstanding).
{¶7} Coercion by counsel and medication-induced incompetence are
serious allegations, certainly relevant to the validity of Mr. Jones’s guilty plea. But
claims that “depend on evidence outside the record [] are not appropriate for review
on direct appeal * * * .” State v. Winters, 5th Dist. Muskingum No. CT2015-0029,
2016-Ohio-622, ¶ 16. Our review of Mr. Jones’s direct appeal is strictly limited to
matters in the record: “A reviewing court cannot add matter to the record before it,
which was not a part of the trial court's proceedings, and then decide the appeal on
the basis of the new matter.” State v. Ishmail, 54 Ohio St.2d 402, 377 N.E.2d 500(1978), paragraph one of the syllabus.
{¶8} Our review of the record confirms what Mr. Jones already admits: that
it reveals no error in the trial court’s acceptance of his guilty plea. His “isolated
remarks to the effect that [he] did not understand the plea or proceedings” do not
warrant reversal; instead, we must consider “an overall reading of the transcript.”
State v. Wisler, 2019-Ohio-2363, 138 N.E.3d 576, ¶ 13 (1st Dist.). A holistic review of
Mr. Jones’s plea and sentencing hearings demonstrates that the trial court complied
with all aspects of Crim.R. 11(C). We agree with Mr. Jones that the trial court went to
“great lengths” to ensure that he understood his rights and the consequences of his
plea, and the transcripts belie his claim of a “veiled threat” by the trial court to
impose the maximum sentence. Mr. Jones stated on the record that his medication
assisted him in keeping his mind clear. We have to take those words at face value.
4
OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
“Defendants often face difficult, if not gut-wrenching, decisions regarding whether to
accept a plea deal.” State v. Jacobs, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-190154, 2020-Ohio-
895, ¶ 9. But the mere fact that a defendant does not like his options (or the counsel
who presents them) does not automatically render the defendant’s choice a “product
of coercion.” Id.{¶9} We note that Mr. Jones’s arguments concerning his rocky relationship
with counsel and potential side-effects of his medication could be properly raised in
an R.C. 2953.21 petition for post-conviction relief. See State v. Redavide, 2016-
Ohio-7804, 73 N.E.3d 1171, ¶ 11 (2d Dist.) (“ ‘Matters outside the record that
allegedly corrupted the defendant’s choice to enter a plea of guilty or no contest so as
to render the plea less than knowing and voluntary are proper grounds for an R.C.
2953.21 petition for post-conviction relief.’ ”), quoting State v. Wheeler, 2d Dist.
Montgomery No. 18717, 2002 WL 91304, *2 (Jan. 25, 2002). But our precedent is
clear: Mr. Jones’s attempt to inject evidence from outside the record into this appeal
must fail. We accordingly overrule his sole assignment of error and affirm the
judgment of the trial court.
Judgment affirmed.
ZAYAS, P.J., and MYERS, J., concur.
Please note:
The court has recorded its entry on the date of the release of this opinion.
5