State ex rel. Lofton v. Clancy , 2020 Ohio 4570 ( 2020 )


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  • [Cite as State ex rel. Lofton v. Clancy, 
    2020-Ohio-4570
    .]
    COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
    EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
    COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA
    STATE EX REL., JAQUISE LOFTON,                              :
    Relator,                                   :
    No. 109830
    v.                                         :
    JUDGE MAUREEN CLANCY,                                       :
    Respondent.                                :
    JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION
    JUDGMENT: WRIT DISMISSED
    DATED: September 18, 2020
    Writ of Mandamus
    Motion No. 540272
    Order No. 540906
    Appearances:
    Jaquise Lofton, pro se.
    Michael C. O’Malley, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting
    Attorney, and James E. Moss, Assistant Prosecuting
    Attorney, for respondent.
    FRANK D. CELEBREZZE, JR., J.:
    Relator, Jaquise Lofton, requests a writ of mandamus directing
    respondent, Judge Maureen Clancy,1 to resentence him to properly advise him of his
    Relator named Judge Timothy E. McMonagle as respondent in his complaint.
    1
    Pursuant to App.R. 29(C)(1), Judge Maureen Clancy, who currently holds the seat on the
    appellate rights. Relator has an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
    Therefore, respondent’s motion to dismiss is granted, and relator’s complaint for
    writ of mandamus is dismissed.
    I. Factual and Procedural History
    According to the complaint filed July 15, 2020, relator was a criminal
    defendant in three cases, Cuyahoga C.P. No. CR-09-521349-A, CR-09-523781-A,
    and CR-09-525202-B. In 2010, he entered guilty pleas in these cases and was
    sentenced. Relator asserts that respondent failed to advise him of his appellate
    rights pursuant to Crim.R. 32(B)(2)-(B)(3). As a result, relator did not timely appeal
    from these convictions. Relator asserts that on January 4, 2016, he filed a motion
    for delayed appeal with this court, which was denied on January 21, 2016. The next
    action he took to redress this claimed grievance was to file the instant action on
    July 15, 2020. Relator seeks an order from this court requiring respondent to
    resentence him to properly inform him of his appellate rights. Respondent filed a
    motion to dismiss on August 3, 2020. There, she argued that relator was not entitled
    to relief in mandamus based on the allegations made in the complaint. Relator did
    not timely oppose the motion to dismiss.
    II. Law and Analysis
    The case is before us on respondent’s motion to dismiss. As such, this
    court must take as admitted all material factual allegations in the complaint, and
    common pleas court previously held by Judge McMonagle, was previously substituted as a
    party pursuant to Civ.R. 25(D).
    construe all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmovant. State ex rel. Hanson
    v. Guernsey Cty. Bd. of Commrs., 
    65 Ohio St.3d 545
    , 548, 
    605 N.E.2d 378
     (1992).
    In order to grant the motion and dismiss the complaint, “‘it must appear beyond
    doubt from the complaint that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts entitling him to
    recovery.’” 
    Id.,
     quoting O’Brien v. Univ. Community Tenants Union, 
    42 Ohio St.2d 242
    , 242, 
    327 N.E.2d 753
     (1975).
    Mandamus is appropriate when relators show by clear and
    convincing evidence that (1) that they have a clear legal right to the requested relief,
    (2) that respondents have a clear legal duty to provide the requested relief, and (3)
    that they have no plain and adequate legal remedy. State ex rel. Kerns v. Simmers,
    
    153 Ohio St.3d 103
    , 
    2018-Ohio-256
    , 
    101 N.E.3d 430
    , ¶ 5.
    Lofton claims that he was entitled to an explanation of his appellate
    rights when he was sentenced in his three criminal cases and that obligation has yet
    to be fulfilled.
    Crim.R. 32(B)(2) states in part, “After imposing sentence in a serious
    offense, the court shall advise the defendant of the defendant’s right, where
    applicable, to appeal or to seek leave to appeal the sentence imposed.” Crim.R.
    32(B)(3) goes on to state,
    If a right to appeal or a right to seek leave to appeal applies under
    division (B)(1) or (B)(2) of this rule, the court also shall advise the
    defendant of all of the following:
    (a) That if the defendant is unable to pay the cost of an appeal, the
    defendant has the right to appeal without payment;
    (b) That if the defendant is unable to obtain counsel for an appeal,
    counsel will be appointed without cost;
    (c) That if the defendant is unable to pay the costs of documents
    necessary to an appeal, the documents will be provided without cost;
    (d) That the defendant has a right to have a notice of appeal timely filed
    on his or her behalf.
    Relator has alleged that these provisions apply to him. According to
    this rule of criminal procedure, relator has a clear legal right to an explanation of his
    appellate rights during sentencing.
    Relator claims he never received such an advisement, but he did not
    attach portions of the transcript from his sentencing hearing to demonstrate that
    the trial court failed to inform him of his appellate rights during his sentencing.
    Relator did attach copies of the sentencing entries from his cases, which did not
    include any mention of his appellate rights. He claims that an explanation of his
    appellate rights must appear in the journal entries of sentence, and such a
    notification was not incorporated into his sentencing entries. He concludes that, as
    a result, he is required to be resentenced by respondent so that he may be properly
    informed of his appellate rights. Construing this evidence in relator’s favor as we
    must, this court will assume that relator was not informed of his appellate rights.
    However, relator’s claim that he is entitled to a writ of mandamus
    does not immediately follow. Relator must have no adequate remedy in the ordinary
    course of law to be entitled to relief in mandamus. State ex rel Kerns v. Simmers,
    
    153 Ohio St.3d 103
    , 
    2018-Ohio-256
    , 
    101 N.E.3d 430
    , ¶ 5. Relator claims that he has
    no adequate remedy because he filed a motion for delayed appeal, and that was
    denied. Setting aside the fact that a motion for delayed appeal constitutes a remedy
    that was available to relator, his claims that mandamus is available relies on State v.
    Hunter, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 92626, 
    2010-Ohio-657
    .
    In Hunter, after finding that a sentence that was imposed on an
    appellant was void, this court went on to find that the appellant was not properly
    informed of his appellate rights. Id. at ¶ 18. The Hunter court stated that the trial
    court failed to inform Hunter of his appellate rights “under Crim.R. 32, including
    the right to counsel. Therefore, the appropriate avenue of relief is for the trial court
    to resentence Hunter advising him of these rights, thus reinstating the time within
    which he may file a timely notice of appeal on the resentencing.” Id. at ¶ 22.
    Hunter actually demonstrates that relator has an adequate remedy at
    law. State ex rel. Wright v. Cuyahoga Cty. Court, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 96397,
    
    2011-Ohio-2159
    , ¶ 3 (rejecting a claim premised on Hunter similar to the one
    advanced by relator in the present action).
    Further, the Supreme Court of Ohio has recognized that a motion for
    resentencing filed with the trial court is a proper means to address the failure of a
    judge to advise criminal defendants of their appellate rights after the imposition of
    sentence. State ex rel. Hill v. Navarre, Slip Opinion No. 
    2020-Ohio-4274
    , ¶ 8.
    There, the court upheld the decision of the Sixth District Court of Appeals denying
    a writ of mandamus, stating the relator “could have appealed [the judge’s] order
    [denying a motion for resentencing] and obtained appellate review of whether he
    had been properly informed of his appeal rights and of postrelease control * * *.” 
    Id.
    These other avenues of relief establish that relator has or had an
    adequate remedy at law. Accord Wright at ¶ 3. Whether or not used, an adequate
    remedy in the ordinary course of law precludes relief in mandamus. State ex rel.
    Phelps v. McClelland, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 108021, 
    2019-Ohio-2448
    , ¶ 13, citing
    State ex rel. Tran v. McGrath, 
    78 Ohio St.3d 45
    , 
    676 N.E.2d 108
     (1997).
    Accordingly, respondent’s motion to dismiss is granted because
    relator possesses an adequate remedy at law.          Relator’s request for writ of
    mandamus is dismissed. Costs to relator. The clerk is directed to serve upon the
    parties notice of this judgment and its date of entry upon the journal. Civ.R. 58(B).
    Writ dismissed.
    _____________________________________
    FRANK D. CELEBREZZE, JR., JUDGE
    ANITA LASTER MAYS, P.J., and
    RAYMOND C. HEADEN, J., CONCUR
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 109830

Citation Numbers: 2020 Ohio 4570

Judges: Celebrezze

Filed Date: 9/18/2020

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 9/24/2020