Nordonia Landscape Supplies, L.L.C. v. Akron ( 2020 )

[Cite as Nordonia Landscape Supplies, L.L.C. v. Akron, 2020-Ohio-2809.]
STATE OF OHIO ) IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
)ss: NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
COUNTY OF SUMMIT )
NORDONIA LANDSCAPE SUPPLIES, C.A. No. 29618
LLC
Appellant
APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT
v. ENTERED IN THE
COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
CITY OF AKRON COUNTY OF SUMMIT, OHIO
CASE No. CV-2019-01-0254
Appellee
DECISION AND JOURNAL ENTRY
Dated: May 6, 2020
HENSAL, Judge.
{¶1} Nordonia Landscape Supplies, LLC (“NLS”) has appealed a judgment of the
Summit County Court of Common Pleas that granted judgment on the pleadings to the City of
Akron. For the following reasons, this Court affirms.
I.
{¶2} According to NLS, the City of Akron’s purchasing department requested a quote
for road salt in September 2018. NLS did not have enough salt on hand for the entire order, so it
sent the City two quotes, one for the salt it already had and another for salt that it would have to
purchase and have shipped from Egypt. After not hearing back from the City for several days,
NLS told the purchasing agent that it would have to sell the salt to other entities. The purchasing
agent, however, replied that the City would take the salt. The purchasing agent later sent back a
signed copy of the quote for the salt NLS had on hand. In reliance on the purchasing agent’s
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statements, NLS also had salt shipped from Egypt and purchased a couple of dump trucks to deliver
that salt.
{¶3} Over the course of the next month, the City did not pay NLS. At the end of the
month, it told NLS that it did not want the salt. According to NLS, because the winter ended up
being mild, it eventually had to sell the salt for less than its arrangement with the City. NLS
subsequently sued the City for breach of contract and promissory estoppel. The trial court granted
judgment on the pleadings to the City on NLS’s promissory estoppel claim because it determined
that the City was engaged in a governmental function when it inquired about the salt and the
doctrine of promissory estoppel is inapplicable against a political subdivision that is engaged in a
governmental function. NLS later dismissed its breach of contract claim. It has appealed the trial
court’s judgment on its promissory estoppel claim, assigning as error that the court incorrectly
determined that procurement of road salt is a governmental function.
II.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE PROCUREMENT OF
ROAD SALT IS A GOVERNMENTAL FUNCTION.
{¶4} NLS acknowledges that the Ohio Supreme Court has held that the doctrine of
promissory estoppel is inapplicable against a political subdivision if the political subdivision was
engaged in a governmental function. Hortman v. Miamisburg, 110 Ohio St. 3d 194, 2006-Ohio-
4251, syllabus. It argues that rule does not apply in this case because the City was engaged in a
proprietary function instead of a governmental function. See State ex rel. Upper Scioto Drainage
& Conservancy Dist. v. Tracy, 125 Ohio St. 399, 405 (1932) (holding that State could be estopped
because it was engaging in a proprietary function). According to NLS, because a city is not liable
if it fails to remove snow and ice from a road, the procurement of road salt is not a governmental
function. The parties agree that this Court should apply the definitions of governmental function
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and proprietary function set forth in Revised Code Section 2744.01 to resolve this issue.1 We
review a trial court’s ruling on a motion for judgment on the pleadings de novo. State ex rel.
Maher v. City of Akron, 9th Dist. Summit No. 28761, 2018-Ohio-4310, ¶ 8.
{¶5} Under Section 2744.01(C)(1), a “[g]overnmental function” includes the functions
specified in Section 2744.01(C)(2) or a function that meets one of three criteria. Those criteria are
a function that (1) “is imposed upon the state as an obligation of sovereignty and that is performed
by a political subdivision voluntarily or pursuant to legislative requirement;” (2) “is for the
common good of all citizens of the state;” or (3) “promotes or preserves the public peace, health,
safety, or welfare; that involves activities that are not engaged in or not customarily engaged in by
nongovernmental persons; and that is not specified in division (G)(2) of this section as a
proprietary function.” R.C. 2744.01(C)(1)(a-c). A “[p]roprietary function” includes certain
functions specified in Section 2744.01(G)(2) and functions that are both not described or specified
under the definition of a governmental function and “that promotes or preserves the public peace,
health, safety, or welfare and that involves activities that are customarily engaged in by
nongovernmental persons.” R.C. 2744.01(G)(1)(b).
{¶6} The trial court determined that the procurement of road salt is a governmental
function because Section 2744.01(C)(2)(e) specifies that “[t]he regulation of the use of, and the
maintenance and repair of, roads, highways, streets, avenues, alleys, sidewalks, bridges, aqueducts,
viaducts, and public grounds” is a governmental function. The court reasoned that, because the
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The parties both contend that whether the City was engaged in a governmental or
proprietary function should be resolved by applying the definitions in Section 2744.01. Although
applying those definitions requires some review of Chapter 2744, this case does not involve the
political subdivision immunity analysis set forth in that chapter. Instead, it involves a common
law rule that the Ohio Supreme Court has continued to apply even after the enactment of Chapter
2744. Hortman at ¶ 13, 25.
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maintenance of roads is a governmental function, and salt is needed to maintain the roads,
procurement of road salt is also a governmental function.
{¶7} NLS argues that the word “maintenance” in Section 2744.01(C)(2)(e) means only
to engage in general repair and upkeep of the roads, which is the definition of “maintain[.]” It
notes that courts have held that a political subdivision cannot be held liable for failing to remove
snow and ice from a road under Section 2744.02(B)(3). See Howard v. Miami Twp. Fire Div., 119
Ohio St. 3d 1, 2008-Ohio-2792, ¶ 11, 30; Greslick v. Sudano, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 73353, 1998
WL 896294, *3 (Dec. 24, 1998). According to NLS, if a political subdivision is not liable for
failing to clear snow and ice from the roads, snow and ice removal must not be one of its sovereign
obligations. Thus, a political subdivision must not be performing a governmental function when
it removes snow and ice from a road. Purchasing salt to assist with the removal of snow and ice,
therefore, also does not fall within a political subdivision’s governmental functions.
{¶8} NLS also argues that the removal of snow and ice fits squarely within the definition
of a proprietary function under Section 2744.01(G)(1)(b) because it is an activity “customarily
engaged in by nongovernmental persons.” It argues that, like private property owners, a political
subdivision may voluntarily choose to remove naturally accumulating snow and ice from public
roads to make its property safer and more accessible, but it has no legal duty to do so.
{¶9} We do not agree that, because a city is not liable for failing to remove ice and snow
from a road, it is not engaging in a governmental function when it performs that task. Section
2744.02(A)(1) provides that political subdivisions are immune from liability when they are
engaged in either governmental or proprietary functions. Section 2744.02(B) provides certain
exceptions to that general rule, one of which is that a political subdivision is liable for its “negligent
failure to keep public roads in repair and other negligent failure to remove obstructions from public
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roads[.]” R.C. 2744.03(B)(3). The reason that courts have concluded that political subdivisions
are not liable for failing to remove snow and ice under that language is because snow and ice do
not constitute “obstructions[.]” Howard at ¶ 30; Greslick at *3. Those cases do not suggest that
the removal of snow and ice from a road is not a governmental function.
{¶10} Upon review of Section 2744.01(C), we conclude that the removal of snow and ice
from public roads is a governmental function for multiple reasons. See Thomas v. Wooster, 9th
Dist. Wayne No. 07CA0059, 2008-Ohio-1464, ¶ 14 (stating that removing ice from a bridge would
be within a city’s governmental function of maintaining the roadways). First, using NLS’s
definition of “maintenance[,]” a political subdivision is engaged in the “upkeep” of a road when it
removes snow and ice from the road. R.C. 2744.01(C)(2)(e). Second, the removal of snow and
ice from public roads “is for the common good of all citizens of the state” in that it makes travelling
by motor vehicle more convenient and safer. R.C. 2744.01(C)(1)(b). Third, the removal of snow
and ice from roads promotes or preserves public safety, it is an activity that is not customarily
engaged in by nongovernmental persons, and it is not specified as a proprietary function in Section
2744.01(G)(2). R.C. 2744.01(C)(1)(c). Although NLS correctly notes that private property
owners customarily engage in the removal of snow and ice from their properties, they do not
customarily engage in the removal of snow and ice from public roads, which is the specific
function at issue in this case.
{¶11} Because the removal of snow and ice from public roads is a governmental function,
we conclude that the acquisition of salt as a supply to aid in that activity is also a governmental
function. We, therefore, conclude that the trial court correctly determined that NLS’s promissory
estoppel claim against the City is precluded under Hortman v. Hortman, 110 Ohio St. 3d 194, at
syllabus. NLS’s assignment of error is overruled.
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III.
{¶12} NLS’s assignment of error is overruled. The judgment of the Summit County Court
of Common Pleas is affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.
There were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
We order that a special mandate issue out of this Court, directing the Court of Common
Pleas, County of Summit, State of Ohio, to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy
of this journal entry shall constitute the mandate, pursuant to App.R. 27.
Immediately upon the filing hereof, this document shall constitute the journal entry of
judgment, and it shall be file stamped by the Clerk of the Court of Appeals at which time the period
for review shall begin to run. App.R. 22(C). The Clerk of the Court of Appeals is instructed to
mail a notice of entry of this judgment to the parties and to make a notation of the mailing in the
docket, pursuant to App.R. 30.
Costs taxed to Appellant.
JENNIFER HENSAL
FOR THE COURT
CALLAHAN, P. J.
TEODOSIO, J.
CONCUR.
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APPEARANCES:
WARNER MENDENHALL and LOGAN TROMBLEY, Attorneys at Law, for Appellant.
EVE V. BELFANCE, Director of Law, and DAVID HONIG, BRIAN D. BREMER, and
KIRSTEN L. SMITH, Assistant Directors of Law, for Appellee.