In re E.H. , 2020 Ohio 2835 ( 2020 )


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  • [Cite as In re E.H., 
    2020-Ohio-2835
    .]
    COURT OF APPEALS
    LICKING COUNTY, OHIO
    FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
    IN THE MATTER OF:                           :       JUDGES:
    :       Hon. Patricia A. Delaney, P.J.
    E.H., W.H., J.N.                            :       Hon. Craig R. Baldwin, J.
    :       Hon. Earle E. Wise, Jr., J.
    :
    :
    :       Case Nos. 2019 CA 00108
    :                 2019 CA 00109
    :                 2019 CA 00110
    :
    :       OPINION
    CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING:                            Appeal from the Court of Common
    Pleas, Juvenile Division, Case Nos.
    F2017-0351, F2017-0352, F2017-
    0353
    JUDGMENT:                                           Affirmed
    DATE OF JUDGMENT:                                   May 6, 2020
    APPEARANCES:
    For Appellant-Father                                For Appellee-LCJFS
    JERMAINE COLQUITT                                   PAULA M. SAWYERS
    33 West Main Street                                 20 South Second Street
    Suite 109                                           Fourth Floor
    Newark, OH 43055                                    Newark, OH 43055
    For Mother                                          Guardian ad Litem
    Carolynn E. Fittro                                  SCOTT SIDNER
    1335 Dublin Road                                    39 Northview Drive
    Suite 115F                                          Johnstown, OH 43031
    Columbus, OH 43215
    Licking County, Case Nos. 2019 CA 00108, 2019 CA 00109, 2019 CA 00110                  2
    Wise, Earle, J.
    {¶ 1} Appellant-Father, C.H., appeals the October 1, 2019 judgment entries of the
    Court of Common Pleas of Licking County, Ohio, Juvenile Division, denying motions for
    legal custody and terminating his parental rights and granting permanent custody of his
    children to appellee, the Licking County Department of Job and Family Services.
    FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
    {¶ 2} On May 22, 2017, appellee filed complaints for temporary legal custody of
    E.H. born in March 2015 (Case No. F2017-0351), W.H. born in March 2017 (Case No.
    F2017-0352), and J.N. born in November 2012 (Case No. F2017-0353), claiming the
    children to be dependent children. Father of E.H. and W.H. is appellant herein; father of
    J.N. is J.A., presumed deceased; mother of all three children is N.H. Appellee had been
    granted emergency shelter care of the children three days earlier.
    {¶ 3} An adjudicatory hearing was held before a magistrate on July 12, 2017. By
    decisions filed same date, the magistrate found the children to be dependent and ordered
    temporary custody of the children to remain with appellee. The trial court approved and
    adopted the magistrate's decisions via judgment entries filed July 13, 2017. Case plans
    were immediately filed thereafter.
    {¶ 4} On November 8, 2017, mother filed motions to grant temporary custody of
    the children to either the children's maternal grandparents or their maternal great aunt
    and uncle.
    {¶ 5} On April 18, 2018, appellee filed motions for permanent custody due to the
    parents being unable to make any significant progress on the case plans and the children
    should not or could not be placed with either parent within a reasonable amount of time.
    Licking County, Case Nos. 2019 CA 00108, 2019 CA 00109, 2019 CA 00110                     3
    Mother's motions for temporary custody were to be heard at the permanent custody
    hearing. Hearings were held before a magistrate on February 15, and 22, 2019. Prior to
    the hearings, mother orally moved to amend her motions for temporary custody to
    motions for legal custody to either of the aforementioned relatives. By decisions filed July
    22, 2019, the magistrate denied the motions for legal custody and granted appellee's
    motions for permanent custody.
    {¶ 6} Each parent filed objections. By judgment entries filed October 1, 2019, the
    trial court denied the objections, approved and adopted the magistrate's decisions, and
    granted permanent custody of the children to appellee.
    {¶ 7} Appellant-Father filed an appeal in each case and this matter is now before
    this court for consideration.1 The assignments of error in each of the three appeals are
    identical and are as follows:
    I
    {¶ 8} "THE MAGISTRATE ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT DENIED
    MOTHER'S MOTION TO GRANT LEGAL CUSTODY OF ALL THREE MINOR
    CHILDREN TO EITHER MATERNAL GRANDPARENTS OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE TO
    MATERNAL GREAT AUNT AND UNCLE [C. AND T. A.] AND ERRED IN GRANTING
    THE LICKING COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF JOB AND FAMILY SERVICES
    PERMANENT CUSTODY OF THE MINOR CHILDREN."
    II
    1Mother also filed appeals (Case Nos. 2019 CA 00111, 2019 CA 00112, and 2019 CA
    00113), and her arguments will be reviewed therein.
    Licking County, Case Nos. 2019 CA 00108, 2019 CA 00109, 2019 CA 00110                    4
    {¶ 9} "THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE BEST INTERESTS
    OF THE MINOR CHILDREN WOULD BE SERVED BY THE GRANTING OF
    PERMANENT CUSTODY."
    I
    {¶ 10} In his first assignment of error, father claims the trial court abused its
    discretion in denying mother's motions for legal custody to relatives. We disagree.
    {¶ 11} R.C. 2151.353(A)(3) states the following in pertinent part:
    (A) If a child is adjudicated an abused, neglected, or dependent child,
    the court may make any of the following orders of disposition:
    (3) Award legal custody of the child to either parent or to any other
    person who, prior to the dispositional hearing, files a motion requesting legal
    custody of the child or is identified as a proposed legal custodian in a
    complaint or motion filed prior to the dispositional hearing by any party to
    the proceedings.
    {¶ 12} We agree with the following analysis set forth by our colleagues from the
    Eighth District in In re D.T., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga Nos. 100970 and 100971, 2014-Ohio-
    4818, ¶ 19-22:
    Legal custody is significantly different than the termination of
    parental rights in that, despite losing legal custody of a child, the parent of
    the child retains residual parental rights, privileges, and responsibilities. In
    Licking County, Case Nos. 2019 CA 00108, 2019 CA 00109, 2019 CA 00110                    5
    re G.M., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 95410, 
    2011-Ohio-4090
    , ¶ 14, citing R.C.
    2151.353(A)(3)(c). In such a case, a parent's right to regain custody is not
    permanently foreclosed. In re M.J.M. [8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 94130, 2010-
    Ohio-1674] at ¶ 12. For this reason, the standard the trial court uses in
    making its determination is the less restrictive "preponderance of the
    evidence." Id. at ¶ 9, citing In re Nice, 
    141 Ohio App.3d 445
    , 455, 
    751 N.E.2d 552
     (7th Dist.2001).       "Preponderance of the evidence" means
    evidence that is more probable, more persuasive, or of greater probative
    value. In re C.V.M., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 98340, 
    2012-Ohio-5514
    , ¶ 7.
    Unlike permanent custody cases in which the trial court is guided by
    the factors outlined in R.C. 2151.414(D) before terminating parental rights
    and granting permanent custody, R.C. 2151.353(A)(3) does not provide
    factors the court should consider in determining the child's best interest in
    a motion for legal custody. In re G.M. at ¶ 15. We must presume that, in
    the absence of best interest factors in a legal custody case, "the legislature
    did not intend to require the consideration of certain factors as a predicate
    for granting legal custody."     Id. at ¶ 16.    Such factors, however, are
    instructive when making a determination as to the child's best interest. In
    re E.A. [8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 99065, 
    2013-Ohio-1193
    ] at ¶ 13.
    The best interest factors include, for example, the interaction of the
    child with the child's parents, relatives, and caregivers; the custodial history
    of the child; the child's need for a legally secure permanent placement; and
    whether a parent has continuously and repeatedly failed to substantially
    Licking County, Case Nos. 2019 CA 00108, 2019 CA 00109, 2019 CA 00110                    6
    remedy the conditions causing the child to be placed outside the child's
    home. R.C. 2151.414(D).
    Because custody determinations " 'are some of the most difficult and
    agonizing decisions a trial judge must make,' " a trial judge must have broad
    discretion in considering all of the evidence. In re E.A. at ¶ 10, quoting
    Davis v. Flickinger, 
    77 Ohio St.3d 415
    , 418, 
    674 N.E.2d 1159
     (1997). We
    therefore review a trial court's determination of legal custody for an abuse
    of discretion. Miller v. Miller, 
    37 Ohio St.3d 71
    , 74, 
    523 N.E.2d 846
     (1988).
    An abuse of discretion implies that the court's attitude is unreasonable,
    arbitrary, or unconscionable. Blakemore v. Blakemore, 
    5 Ohio St.3d 217
    ,
    219, 
    450 N.E.2d 1140
     (1983).
    Accord, In re L.D., 10th Dist. Franklin No. 12AP-985, 
    2013-Ohio-3214
    ; Stull v. Richland
    County Children Services, 5th Dist. Richland Nos. 11CA47 and 11CA48, 
    2012-Ohio-738
    .
    {¶ 13} Final hearings were held on February 15, and 22, 2019. On the morning of
    the first hearing date, mother orally moved to amend her motions for temporary custody
    to motions for legal custody to either the children's maternal grandparents (F.M. and E.M.)
    or their maternal great aunt and uncle (C.A. and T.A.). T. at 7-8. The magistrate
    acknowledged that the grandparents and the great aunt signed a statement of
    understanding form as required under R.C. 2151.353(A)(3). T. at 8.
    {¶ 14} The children's maternal grandmother, F.M., testified she and her husband
    live in a three bedroom mobile home. T. at 12. They have enough income to meet all of
    Licking County, Case Nos. 2019 CA 00108, 2019 CA 00109, 2019 CA 00110                       7
    their financial needs as well as the children's. T. at 14. She was aware of the oldest child
    having special needs, but the child was getting help and that would continue. T. at 15.
    She could not testify to the child's special needs "because I don't know." T. at 27. She
    was not aware of any issues with the younger two children. T. at 15. She had sisters
    and sisters-in-law as a support system to help out. 
    Id.
     She did not know the children's
    birthdates. T. at 31. She has visited with the children and they are bonded. T. at 16.
    She never filled out paperwork seeking placement because "it happened so fast" and the
    original caseworker told her not to bother because they would not get the children. T. at
    19-20. F.M. stated she had convictions for a DWI in 2009 and one in 2012, and a drug
    related charge, "but I went to rehab, I finished that, and I've been clean for five years." T.
    at 20-21. She no longer consumes alcohol. T. at 21-22. Her drug related charge was
    abusing harmful intoxicants in 2013. T. at 22. She denied having a substantiated physical
    abuse case with Children's Services when mother was a child, stating, "[t]hat went
    nowhere," "I never went to court for none of that." T. at 23, 43. She stated she has always
    wanted the children. T. at 27.
    {¶ 15} F.M.'s husband, E.M., testified he understood the oldest child had special
    needs as the child was autistic. T. at 47. He has visited with the children and they are
    bonded. T. at 49-50. He testified he was prepared to have the children in his home. T.
    at 50. However, in October 2018 and again just prior to the hearing, E.M. told the
    guardian ad litem he did not think it was feasible for him and his wife to care for the
    children. T. at 55. Overnight he changed his mind. 
    Id.
     He explained "there were doubts
    whether we would be able to handle them and everything, and she has guaranteed me
    Licking County, Case Nos. 2019 CA 00108, 2019 CA 00109, 2019 CA 00110                   8
    or promised me that she's had a change of heart and that she really wants to do it so I
    agreed with her." T. at 56. He did not know the children's birthdates. T. at 66.
    {¶ 16} The children's maternal great aunt, C.A., testified she was aware that the
    oldest child had autism, and she would be able to meet the child's special needs. T. at
    77. She lives in a three bedroom home with her husband and her seventeen year old
    child. T. at 78. She and her husband have enough income to meet all of their financial
    needs as well as the children's. T. at 79-80. She has a close bond with the oldest child
    because at one time, her older daughter was taking care of the child. T. at 81. She really
    did not know much about the youngest child. 
    Id.
     The oldest child was removed because
    C.A.'s daughter failed to complete the required paperwork.       T. at 85.   The original
    caseworker asked C.A. to take a drug screen, but she refused. T. at 83. C.A. tried to
    visit with the children once a week until the oldest child was removed from her daughter's
    care. T. at 86-87. C.A. wanted the children, but did nothing to follow up because she
    was "waiting to hear what everything was going on because I'd been kinda of in the loop.
    I don't really know where the children are, what's going on with them." T. at 88. The
    guardian ad litem called C.A. and left two voice messages that she acknowledged
    receiving, but never returned his calls. T. at 92-93, 347-348. C.A. never had all three of
    the children over at the same time. T. at 95. She did not know the children's birthdates.
    T. at 101.
    {¶ 17} The foster mother of the oldest child testified the child's been diagnosed
    with autism and cognitive delays. T. at 125, 129-130. She explained the child's behaviors
    and the in home treatment she provides for the child. T. at 126-127. She opined the child
    Licking County, Case Nos. 2019 CA 00108, 2019 CA 00109, 2019 CA 00110                      9
    "takes a lot of care, a lot of constant care and [the child's] always going to take a lot of
    constant care for the rest of [the child's] life." T. at 128.
    {¶ 18} Rebecca Inboden is the family's ongoing caseworker. She testified the
    maternal grandmother would not be able to pass a home study because of her criminal
    history.   T. at 268.     Plus she had "demonstrated some fairly inappropriate and
    uncooperative behavior towards agency staff." 
    Id.
     Maternal grandfather stated he could
    not care for the children by himself. T. at 269. Maternal great aunt "acknowledged that
    she had a history of substance abuse and that she had sought treatment for that." T. at
    269-270. Appellee asked her to do a random drug screen, but she refused. T. at 297.
    There was also a concern that her husband had a domestic violence conviction in the
    past; therefore, C.A. and her husband would have been excluded as potential relative
    options for the children. T. at 270. C.A. was told she could visit with the children. She
    visited in February of 2018, and did not return for any more visits. T. at 300-301. Ms.
    Inboden opined the relatives "would be probably very overwhelmed very quickly with the
    children's needs, and how young the children are, and how extensive the needs are, and
    the level of care that's involved." T. at 300.
    {¶ 19} In his decisions filed July 22, 2019, the magistrate noted several concerns
    with the maternal grandparents, the most notable was his concern with F.M.'s "apparent
    lack of knowledge about these children." F.M. was not able to testify to the oldest child's
    special needs because she just did not know. Given the foster mother's testimony as to
    this child's significant needs, it is apparent F.M. "has no real idea" as to what the child's
    needs are. The magistrate noted this is especially important given the fact that the
    maternal grandparents "are on the fence about becoming permanent custodians for these
    Licking County, Case Nos. 2019 CA 00108, 2019 CA 00109, 2019 CA 00110                    10
    children." They admitted to telling the guardian ad litem on more than one occasion that
    they could not care for the children, but changed their minds the night before the hearing.
    This was a concern as they "don't seem fully committed to taking on responsibility for
    these three children." The magistrate concluded the following: "Given the hesitance of
    the two to take on this task, the scale of the task presented by three young [children] and
    the exceptional needs of [J.], the undersigned simply cannot see how this would work
    long-term. For these reasons, the motion of Mr. and Mrs. [M.] for custody should be
    denied."
    {¶ 20} The magistrate had the same concerns with C.A. It was unclear whether
    she understood all that was involved in caring for the oldest child's special needs and add
    to that "the needs of caring for two other young children and it seems that Ms. [A.], though
    acting with good intentions, has not demonstrated that she is able and willing to take on
    these three children and meet their needs permanently." The magistrate concluded her
    request for legal custody should be denied.
    {¶ 21} Upon review, based upon a preponderance of the evidence presented as
    outlined above, we cannot say the trial court abused its discretion in denying the motions
    for legal custody.
    {¶ 22} Assignment of Error I is denied.
    II
    {¶ 23} In his second assignment of error, father claims the trial court erred in
    finding clear and convincing evidence that the children's best interests would be best
    served by granting permanent custody to appellee. We disagree.
    Licking County, Case Nos. 2019 CA 00108, 2019 CA 00109, 2019 CA 00110                         11
    {¶ 24} R.C.2151.414(B)(1) states permanent custody may be granted if the trial
    court determines, by clear and convincing evidence, that it is in the best interest of the
    child and:
    (a) The child is not abandoned or orphaned * * * and the child cannot
    be placed with either of the child's parents within a reasonable time or
    should not be placed with the child's parents.
    (b) The child is abandoned.
    (c) The child is orphaned, and there are no relatives of the child who
    are able to take permanent custody.
    (d) The child has been in the temporary custody of one or more public
    children services agencies or private child placing agencies for twelve or
    more months of a consecutive twenty-two-month period * * *.
    (e) The child or another child in the custody of the parent or parents
    from whose custody the child has been removed has been adjudicated an
    abused, neglected, or dependent child on three separate occasions by any
    court in this state or another state.
    {¶ 25} Clear and convincing evidence is that evidence "which will provide in the
    mind of the trier of facts a firm belief or conviction as to the facts sought to be established."
    Cross v. Ledford, 
    161 Ohio St. 469
    , 
    120 N.E.2d 118
     (1954), paragraph three of the
    syllabus. See In re Adoption of Holcomb, 
    18 Ohio St.3d 361
    , 
    481 N.E.2d 613
     (1985).
    "Where the degree of proof required to sustain an issue must be clear and convincing, a
    Licking County, Case Nos. 2019 CA 00108, 2019 CA 00109, 2019 CA 00110                    12
    reviewing court will examine the record to determine whether the trier of facts had
    sufficient evidence before it to satisfy the requisite degree of proof." Cross at 477.
    {¶ 26} R.C. 2151.414(E) sets out the factors relevant to determining whether a
    child cannot be placed with either parent within a reasonable period of time or should not
    be placed with the parents. Said section states in pertinent part the following:
    (E) In determining at a hearing held pursuant to division (A) of this
    section or for the purposes of division (A)(4) of section 2151.353 of the
    Revised Code whether a child cannot be placed with either parent within a
    reasonable period of time or should not be placed with the parents, the court
    shall consider all relevant evidence. If the court determines, by clear and
    convincing evidence, at a hearing held pursuant to division (A) of this
    section or for the purposes of division (A)(4) of section 2151.353 of the
    Revised Code that one or more of the following exist as to each of the child's
    parents, the court shall enter a finding that the child cannot be placed with
    either parent within a reasonable time or should not be placed with either
    parent:
    (1) Following the placement of the child outside the child's home and
    notwithstanding reasonable case planning and diligent efforts by the agency
    to assist the parents to remedy the problems that initially caused the child
    to be placed outside the home, the parent has failed continuously and
    repeatedly to substantially remedy the conditions causing the child to be
    placed outside the child's home. In determining whether the parents have
    Licking County, Case Nos. 2019 CA 00108, 2019 CA 00109, 2019 CA 00110                     13
    substantially remedied those conditions, the court shall consider parental
    utilization of medical, psychiatric, psychological, and other social and
    rehabilitative services and material resources that were made available to
    the parents for the purpose of changing parental conduct to allow them to
    resume and maintain parental duties.
    (16) Any other factor the court considers relevant.
    {¶ 27} R.C. 2151.414(D)(1) sets forth the factors a trial court shall consider in
    determining the best interest of a child:
    (D)(1) In determining the best interest of a child at a hearing held
    pursuant to division (A) of this section or for the purposes of division (A)(4)
    or (5) of section 2151.353 or division (C) of section 2151.415 of the Revised
    Code, the court shall consider all relevant factors, including, but not limited
    to, the following:
    (a) The interaction and interrelationship of the child with the child's
    parents, siblings, relatives, foster caregivers and out-of-home providers,
    and any other person who may significantly affect the child;
    (b) The wishes of the child, as expressed directly by the child or
    through the child's guardian ad litem, with due regard for the maturity of the
    child;
    (c) The custodial history of the child, including whether the child has
    been in the temporary custody of one or more public children services
    Licking County, Case Nos. 2019 CA 00108, 2019 CA 00109, 2019 CA 00110                      14
    agencies or private child placing agencies for twelve or more months of a
    consecutive twenty-two-month period, or the child has been in the
    temporary custody of one or more public children services agencies or
    private child placing agencies for twelve or more months of a consecutive
    twenty-two-month period and, as described in division (D)(1) of section
    2151.413 of the Revised Code, the child was previously in the temporary
    custody of an equivalent agency in another state;
    (d) The child's need for a legally secure permanent placement and
    whether that type of placement can be achieved without a grant of
    permanent custody to the agency;
    (e) Whether any of the factors in divisions (E)(7) to (11) of this section
    apply in relation to the parents and child.
    {¶ 28} Father does not contest the fact that the children were placed in appellee's
    temporary custody on May 19, 2017, adjudicated on July 12, 2017, and the permanent
    custody hearings were held on February 15, and 22, 2019. As found by the trial court,
    the children have been in appellee's custody for over twelve months of a consecutive
    twenty-two-month period. R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(d).
    {¶ 29} Ms. Inboden testified the initial concerns with the family were domestic
    violence between mother and father, mental health concerns for mother, and substance
    abuse concerns for both parents. T. at 236-237. Father's case plan addressed mental
    health and substance abuse issues, and medical neglect of the children. T. at 237-238,
    257.   At the initial intake in May 2017, father tested positive for amphetamines,
    Licking County, Case Nos. 2019 CA 00108, 2019 CA 00109, 2019 CA 00110                      15
    methamphetamine, and THC.         T. at 258.    Father self-referred for substance abuse
    services at LAPP, but did not complete the program and his case was "closed non
    successful, uncompliant." T. at 260-261. Father's substance abuse continued to be an
    ongoing problem. He tested positive for drugs on multiple random drug screens, and
    refused drug screens on at least two occasions. T. at 244-245, 259-260, 281-282, 313-
    314. Father's substance abuse remains a concern. T. at 261.
    {¶ 30} As for mental health, father had a past diagnosis of PSTD which he felt was
    no longer relevant. T. at 262. Also, there was a concern of domestic violence. 
    Id.
     Father
    never produced verification of undergoing any mental health evaluation. T. at 263, 311.
    Father's mental health remains a concern. 
    Id.
    {¶ 31} Father's parenting skills were an issue as the two older children had
    developmental delays i.e., difficulties with speech, articulation, communicating. T. at 250,
    263. Father attended one or two classes at Heartbeats, a pregnancy and parenting
    support facility, but did not follow through. T. at 263-264. Father's parenting skills remain
    a concern. T. at 264.
    {¶ 32} Father's employment and housing were not an issue until he and mother
    separated and he moved to North Carolina to live with his brother. T. at 264-265. Father
    provided verification of employment in North Carolina. T. at 265.
    {¶ 33} Father regularly visited with the children and the visits went "[v]ery well," he
    was "very attentive and engaged with the kids." T. at 266. He even traveled from North
    Carolina for visitations. T. at 199, 303.
    Licking County, Case Nos. 2019 CA 00108, 2019 CA 00109, 2019 CA 00110                    16
    {¶ 34} The children were in foster care and were making remarkable progress. T.
    at 266-268. Their basic and special needs were being met, and their respective foster
    parents wanted to adopt them. T. at 114, 128-129, 266, 268, 309.
    {¶ 35} Ms. Inboden stated the case plan services have not been completed and
    "what has been attempted, doesn't appear to be sufficient to alleviate the concerns or
    provide any reassurance that the children's needs will be met and they'll be safe." T. at
    274.
    {¶ 36} Scott Sidner is the guardian ad litem.      He testified he observed visits
    between father and the children and they went "[r]eally well." T. at 338-339. He could
    tell father "loved the kids and vice versa." T. at 340-341. Father responded appropriately
    to the children's behaviors and redirected the children when necessary. T. at 340. He
    "was doing really well in the last part of the visits, not just his section but coming there
    and interacting with the kids and everything." T. at 341. However, he did not believe
    father was capable of meeting the basic and special needs of the children. T. at 357. It
    was his opinion that granting permanent custody to the agency would be in the children's
    best interests. T. at 358.
    {¶ 37} Father testified at the time of the hearing, he and mother had been
    separated for eight months. T. at 197-198. He lived in North Carolina with his brother
    and his family in a rented home. T. at 197. He travels to Ohio every two weeks to visit
    with the children. T. at 199. He acknowledged that he was given a copy of the case plan,
    and understood what was required: maintain employment/income, substance abuse
    assessment and treatment, and mental health counseling. T. at 200-201. He was
    currently employed and received disability income. T. at 199-200, 206. He completed
    Licking County, Case Nos. 2019 CA 00108, 2019 CA 00109, 2019 CA 00110                  17
    LAPP education, but did not follow up on recommended services because "I wanted to
    get something that showed a completion, a certificate." T. at 201-202. Instead he
    completed an online program through Open Path. T. at 202; Father's Exhibit B. However,
    he admitted to testing positive for illegal substances after completing the program and
    using marijuana in the past few months prior to the hearing. T. at 202-203. He did not
    refuse one of the drug screens, he just wanted to wait "to allow the time to actually have
    to urinate." T. at 320, 330-331. He received a mental health discharge from the VA in
    2015. T. at 326-327; Father's Exhibit C. He did not seek any additional mental health
    evaluation other than ongoing reevaluation with a VA therapist "just to see if there's any
    need for any further concern. They deemed nothing at that point. That there was no
    further concern for any continuous evaluation." T. at 203-204, 327-328. He felt his
    continuous involvement with the VA was satisfactory. T. at 328. He stated he took an
    online parenting class. T. at 209, 324-326; Father's Exhibit A. Although the oldest child
    was not his child, he consider the child to be his, and was aware of the child's special
    needs. T. at 204. Father stated Ms. Inboden had told him that he would never get his
    children back as long as he stayed with mother. 
    Id.
    {¶ 38} On the issue of permanent custody regarding father, the magistrate found
    the children had been in the agency's temporary custody for twenty months of a
    consecutive twenty-two month period, and father "has also made minimal progress" on
    his case plan objectives. See Magistrate's Decisions filed July 22, 2019. While he did
    engage in mental health services through the VA, participated in an online program for
    substance abuse, and took an online parenting class, he admitted to continued
    "substance abuse through much of the case." He did not have independent housing and
    Licking County, Case Nos. 2019 CA 00108, 2019 CA 00109, 2019 CA 00110                      18
    lived out of state. The magistrate found father "may be worse off than when the case
    started as well." The magistrate further noted because father now lives in North Carolina,
    the Interstate Compact for the Placement of Children (hereinafter "ICPC") applied in this
    case. As quoted by the magistrate, Article VI(A) of the ICPC states, " 'no child subject to
    this compact shall be placed into a receiving state until approval for such placement is
    obtained.' " Article VI(B) states if " 'the public child placing agency in the receiving state
    does not approve the proposed placement then the child shall not be placed.' " The trial
    court did not receive any such approval from North Carolina; therefore, the magistrate
    could not recommend an order of placement with father. The magistrate recommended
    the termination of parental rights, and determined "the best way for these children to
    achieve stability and permanency is through adoption." The magistrate recommended
    permanent custody of the children to the agency. By judgment entries filed October 1,
    2019, the trial court denied father's objections and approved and adopted the magistrate's
    decisions.
    {¶ 39} As explained by our brethren from the Second District in In re A.J.S. & R.S.,
    2d Dist. Miami No. 2007CA2, 
    2007-Ohio-3433
    , ¶ 22:
    Accordingly, issues relating to the credibility of witnesses and the
    weight to be given the evidence are primarily for the trier of fact. In this
    regard, "[t]he underlying rationale of giving deference to the findings of the
    trial court rests with the knowledge that the trial judge is best able to view
    the witnesses and observe their demeanor, gestures and voice inflections,
    and use these observations in weighing the credibility of the proffered
    Licking County, Case Nos. 2019 CA 00108, 2019 CA 00109, 2019 CA 00110                        19
    testimony." Seasons Coal Co., Inc. v. Cleveland (1984), 
    10 Ohio St.3d 77
    ,
    80, 
    461 N.E.2d 1273
    . Finally, an appellate court must adhere to every
    reasonable presumption in favor of the trial court's judgment and findings of
    fact. In re Brodbeck, 
    97 Ohio App.3d 652
    , 659, 
    647 N.E.2d 240
    , citing
    Gerijo, Inc. v. Fairfield (1994), 
    70 Ohio St.3d 223
    , 226, 
    1994-Ohio-432
    , 
    638 N.E.2d 533
    .
    {¶ 40} Further, " 'the discretion which the juvenile court enjoys in determining
    whether an order of permanent custody is in the best interest of a child should be
    accorded the utmost respect, given the nature of the proceeding and the impact the
    court's determination will have on the lives of the parties concerned.' " In re Mauzy
    Children, 5th Dist. Stark No. 2000CA00244, 
    2000 WL 1700073
    , *2 (Nov. 13, 2000),
    quoting In re Awkal, 
    95 Ohio App.3d 309
    , 316, 
    642 N.E.2d 424
     (8th Dist.1994).
    {¶ 41} From the testimony, it is clear that father loves his children and wishes to
    parent them.      However, the evidence is also clear that despite the services and
    caseworkers available to him for some twenty-one months, he has not been able to
    maintain the services and/or successfully complete them. The children are thriving in
    their respective foster homes and appear to be healthy and happy. Given the evidence
    presented, it is impossible for this court to second guess the trial court. As stated above,
    credibility, reliability, and forthrightness are within the province of the trier of fact.
    {¶ 42} Upon review, we find sufficient clear and convincing evidence to support the
    trial court's decisions to terminate father's parental rights and grant permanent custody of
    the children to the agency.
    Licking County, Case Nos. 2019 CA 00108, 2019 CA 00109, 2019 CA 00110           20
    {¶ 43} Assignment of Error II is denied.
    {¶ 44} The judgments of the Court of Common Pleas of Licking County, Ohio are
    hereby affirmed.
    By Wise, Earle, J.
    Delaney, P.J. and
    Baldwin, J. concur.
    EEW/db