State v. Sparks , 2020 Ohio 4930 ( 2020 )

[Cite as State v. Sparks, 2020-Ohio-4930.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
GREENE COUNTY
:
STATE OF OHIO :
: Appellate Case No. 2019-CA-78
Plaintiff-Appellee :
: Trial Court Case No. 2019-CR-389
v. :
: (Criminal Appeal from
DAVID C. SPARKS : Common Pleas Court)
:
Defendant-Appellant :
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OPINION
Rendered on the 16th day of October, 2020.
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MARCY A. VONDERWELL, Atty. Reg. No. 0078311, Greene County Prosecutor’s Office,
Appellate Division, 61 Greene Street, Suite 200, Xenia, Ohio 45385
Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellee
JOHN A. FISCHER, Atty. Reg. No. 0068346, 70 Birch Alley, Suite 240, Dayton, Ohio
45440
Attorney for Defendant-Appellant
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FROELICH, J.
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{¶ 1} After a jury found David C. Sparks guilty of aggravated possession of drugs,
the trial court sentenced him to a 12-month prison term, with optional post-release control
for up to three years. Sparks appeals from that judgment, arguing that the jury verdict was
supported by insufficient evidence and was against the manifest weight of the evidence.
The judgment of the trial court will be affirmed.
Factual and Procedural Background
{¶ 2} At about 4:45 a.m. on March 24, 2019, Officer Joe Walton of the Fairborn
Police Department responded with his patrol partner to a dispatch about “a suspicious
person * * * yelling and screaming” in the street in the vicinity of Top Dog Saloon. (Trial
Tr., p. 140.) Upon arriving at that location, Officer Walton noticed a man standing in the
bar’s parking lot who matched the description given in the dispatch. According to Officer
Walton, the man “kind of had a dazed look on his face” (id., p. 142), and “it was
immediately apparent that he was under the influence due to his lack of balance [and]
slurred speech.” (Id., p. 143.) Officer Walton stated that the man, whom he identified as
Sparks, was “aggressive” and directed “[v]ulgar language” toward the officers from the
time they first approached him. (Id.)
{¶ 3} Officer Walton testified that Sparks first told him that he (Sparks) “was
walking home,” and that he lived in Fairborn Apartments, about a mile to a mile and a half
away. (Id., p. 143-144.) Subsequently, however, Sparks told the officers that he “was on
his way to the bus stop at Wright State, and he was going to ride his bike there.” (Id., p.
145.) Officer Walton said that Sparks continued to shout profanities at the officers
throughout the encounter, despite multiple warnings to stop doing so. Because the
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officers were concerned about Sparks’s safety in his apparently intoxicated condition,
Officer Walton placed Sparks under arrest for disorderly conduct.
{¶ 4} Officer Walton handcuffed Sparks, performed a pat down over the multiple
layers Sparks was wearing, placed Sparks in the police cruiser, and transported him to
the Fairborn City Jail. Once at the jail, Officer Walton performed a more thorough search
of Sparks’s person, during which he found “a glass tube * * * [with] white residue on the
inside of it” in Sparks’s outer right coat pocket. (Id., p. 150-151.) Based on his training
and experience, Officer Walton believed the glass tube to be a “meth pipe.” (Id.) Initial
field testing for the presence of methamphetamine yielded a positive result; later
laboratory testing confirmed that the pipe contained trace amounts of methamphetamine.
As a result, Sparks was indicted on a single count of aggravated possession of drugs in
violation of R.C. 2925.11(A), a fifth-degree felony, with a forfeiture specification.
{¶ 5} Officer Walton was the only witness to appear at Sparks’s trial. He identified
a video-recording of his interaction with Sparks, which was played for the jury. In closing
argument, the State remarked on what it characterized as Sparks’s lack of reaction when
the pipe was discovered inside his coat pocket. The jury returned a verdict of guilty on the
aggravated possession of drugs offense, and the trial court subsequently sentenced
Sparks to a 12-month prison term, with post-release control for up to three years.
{¶ 6} Sparks appeals from that judgment, setting forth two assignments of error:
1) The Jury Verdict Was Based on Insufficient Evidence
2) The Jury Verdict Was Against the Manifest Weight of the Evidence.
Assignment of Error #1 – Insufficient Evidence
{¶ 7} Sparks’s first assignment of error contends that the jury verdict was based
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on insufficient evidence. More specifically, he challenges the sufficiency of the evidence
to support a finding that he “knowingly” possessed the methamphetamine found in the
pocket of his coat.
{¶ 8} A sufficiency of the evidence argument disputes whether the State has
presented adequate evidence on each element of the offense to sustain the verdict as a
matter of law. State v. Wilson, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 22581, 2009-Ohio-525, ¶ 10,
citing State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 386, 678 N.E.2d 541 (1997). “The relevant
inquiry is whether, after viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution,
any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime proven
beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. Jenks, 61 Ohio St.3d 259, 574 N.E.2d 492 (1991),
paragraph two of the syllabus.
{¶ 9} The statute that Sparks was convicted of violating provides that “[n]o person
shall knowingly obtain, possess, or use a controlled substance or a controlled substance
analog.” R.C. 2925.11(A). Methamphetamine is a controlled substance. See R.C.
2925.11(II). For purposes of drug offenses, “ ‘[p]ossess’ or ‘possession’ means having
control over a thing or substance, but may not be inferred solely from mere access to the
thing or substance through ownership or occupation of the premises upon which the thing
or substance is found.” R.C. 2925.01(K). “A person acts knowingly, regardless of purpose,
when the person is aware that the person’s conduct will probably cause a certain result
or will probably be of a certain nature. A person has knowledge of circumstances when
the person is aware that such circumstances probably exist.” R.C. 2901.22(B).
{¶ 10} Officer Walton’s uncontroverted testimony established that a pipe with trace
amounts of methamphetamine was located inside the pocket of the coat that Sparks was
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wearing at the time of his arrest. Sparks nonetheless argues that Officer Walton’s
testimony was insufficient to support a finding that Sparks was aware of the pipe’s
presence. We disagree.
{¶ 11} Although Sparks attempts to analogize his case to State v. Moss, 8th Dist.
Cuyahoga No. 56889, unreported (May 10, 1990), that decision is inapposite. In Moss,
the defendant was convicted of possession of cocaine found on the windowsill of a motel
bathroom where the defendant just had taken a shower. The evidence showed that the
motel room was registered to a different man (Thomas) who was absent when the police
arrived, that Thomas had the only key to the room, and that Moss had brought no personal
items to the room other than the clothes he was wearing. Under those circumstances, the
appellate court found the evidence insufficient to prove that Moss knowingly possessed
the cocaine discovered in the motel room. That result is consistent with R.C. 2925.01(K),
which provides on its face that possession of a substance “may not be inferred solely
from mere access * * * through * * * occupation of the premises upon which the * * *
substance is found.”1
{¶ 12} R.C. 2925.01 contains no such limitation on the inferences that may be
drawn when a controlled substance is present on the defendant’s person or in his or her
clothing. In comparable situations, other appellate courts have deemed the evidence
sufficient to support an inference that the defendant knowingly possessed drugs found in
his or her coat pocket. See, e.g., State v. Bennett, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 57149, 1990
1Another decision on which Sparks heavily relies – State v. Flores-Lopez, 2017-Ohio-
690, 85 N.E.3d 534, ¶ 52 (2d Dist.) – also involved drugs found not on the defendant’s
person, but in his proximity (in that case, inside a suitcase in the backseat of a vehicle in
which the defendant was a passenger), and likewise is distinguishable on that basis.
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WL 88725 (June 28, 1990); State v. Woods, 9th Dist. Summit No. 22267, 2005-Ohio-
2681.
{¶ 13} In Bennett, the defendant denied knowledge of two plastic bags of cocaine
found by a parole officer in the pocket of the jacket the defendant was wearing; at trial,
another witness testified that he, not the defendant, had placed the bags there.
Nevertheless, the court of appeals determined “there was enough evidence for the jury
to reasonably infer knowledge on the part of defendant.” Bennett at *2. Similarly, in
Woods, the appellate court sustained the defendant’s conviction for possession of crack
cocaine found inside a coat hanging in the defendant’s bedroom closet, despite the trial
testimony of the defendant’s nephew that he, not the defendant, had placed the crack in
that coat. We likewise conclude that the presence of the meth pipe in Sparks’s coat pocket
was sufficient to support an inference that he knowingly possessed that pipe.
{¶ 14} Our conclusion is not altered by Sparks’s challenge to the significance of
his alleged lack of reaction to the pipe’s discovery. Although Sparks maintains that Officer
Walton’s own testimony shows that Sparks was too intoxicated for his alleged lack of
reaction to be interpreted as indicative of prior knowledge, the jurors were free to draw
their own conclusions regarding the significance of the video, if any. As the above-cited
cases underscore, the mere presence of the pipe in Sparks’s pocket was sufficient to
support an inference that he was aware it was there, irrespective of his response (or lack
thereof) to Officer Walton’s discovery of the pipe. We are not persuaded by Sparks’s
additional argument that the evidence of knowledge was insufficient because Officer
Walton failed to discover the pipe during his initial pat down of Sparks, meaning that
Sparks, too, could have been oblivious to the pipe’s presence in the pocket of his heavy
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coat.
{¶ 15} Sparks also faults Officer Walton for not inquiring about the pipe and
possible explanations for its presence, but that argument is no more availing. While
Officer Walton admitted on cross-examination that he did not ask Sparks whether the coat
was his, whether others may have had access to the coat, or whether the pipe was his,
even a denial or an alternative explanation from Sparks would not have rendered the
evidence insufficient. See Bennett; Woods.. Officer Walton’s testimony that a pipe
containing traces of methamphetamine was found inside the pocket of the coat Sparks
was wearing was sufficient to permit a rational trier of fact to find that the essential
elements of the offense of aggravated possession of drugs had been proven beyond a
reasonable doubt.
{¶ 16} Sparks’s first assignment of error is overruled.
Assignment of Error #2 – Manifest Weight of the Evidence
{¶ 17} Sparks’s second assignment of error contends that the jury’s guilty verdict
was against the manifest weight of the evidence. His arguments largely echo those
offered in support of his challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence.
{¶ 18} In contrast to an insufficient evidence challenge, “a weight of the evidence
argument challenges the believability of the evidence and asks which of the competing
inferences suggested by the evidence is more believable or persuasive.” Wilson, 2d Dist.
Montgomery No. 22581, 2009-Ohio-525, at ¶ 12; see Eastley v. Volkman, 132 Ohio St.3d
328, 2012-Ohio-2179, 972 N.E.2d 517, ¶ 19. When evaluating whether a conviction is
against the manifest weight of the evidence, the appellate court must review the entire
record, weigh the evidence and all reasonable inferences, consider witness credibility,
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and determine whether, in resolving conflicts in the evidence, the trier of fact “clearly lost
its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the conviction must be
reversed and a new trial ordered.” Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d at 387, 678 N.E.2d 541,
citing State v. Martin, 20 Ohio App.3d 172, 175, 485 N.E.2d 717 (1st Dist.1983).
{¶ 19} Because the trier of fact sees and hears the witnesses at trial, we must defer
to the factfinder’s decisions whether, and to what extent, to credit the testimony of
particular witnesses. State v. White, 2018-Ohio-3076, 118 N.E.3d 410, ¶ 38 (2d Dist.),
citing State v. Lawson, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 16288, 1997 WL 476684 (Aug. 22,
1997). The fact that the evidence is subject to different interpretations does not render
the conviction against the manifest weight of the evidence. Wilson at ¶ 14. A judgment of
conviction should be reversed as being against the manifest weight of the evidence only
in exceptional circumstances. Martin at 175.
{¶ 20} Sparks did not testify and also offered no other witnesses or evidence at
trial, instead basing his defense on his attorney’s argument that the State had failed to
prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Sparks knowingly possessed methamphetamine.
Having determined that the evidence was sufficient to sustain Sparks’s conviction, we
also determine that the guilty verdict was not against the manifest weight of the evidence.
We must defer to the jury’s apparent assessment of Officer Walton’s testimony as
credible, as well as its assessment of the significance of the video-recording of Sparks’s
arrest. The State’s evidence sufficed to support an inference that Sparks was aware of
the pipe in his coat pocket, and no contrary evidence was presented to the jury. The
record reveals no basis for concluding that the jury lost its way in finding that Sparks
knowingly possessed methamphetamine.
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{¶ 21} Sparks’s second assignment of error is overruled.
Conclusion
{¶ 22} For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the trial court will be affirmed.
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HALL, J. and WELBAUM, J., concur.
Copies sent to:
Marcy A. Vonderwell
John A. Fischer
Hon. Stephen Wolaver