State v. Baker , 2023 Ohio 241 ( 2023 )

[Cite as State v. Baker, 2023-Ohio-241.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
LUCAS COUNTY
State of Ohio Court of Appeals No. L-21-1258
Appellee Trial Court No. CR0202002036
v.
Angela Baker DECISION AND JUDGMENT
Appellant Decided: January 27, 2023
*****
Julia R. Bates, Lucas County Prosecuting Attorney, and
Brenda J. Majdalani, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee.
Thomas P. Kurt, for appellant.
*****
I. Introduction
OSOWIK, J.
{¶ 1} Following a jury trial, the defendant-appellant, Angela Baker, was convicted
on two counts of ethnic intimidation and two counts of aggravated menacing by the
Lucas County Court of Common Pleas. Baker was accused of directing racial epithets
and threatening to “kill” two teenaged boys with her car during an altercation in a Meijer
parking lot. On appeal, Baker argues that the trial court erred in denying her motion to
dismiss on selective prosecution grounds and further erred in failing to provide a self-
defense instruction to the jury. As set forth below, we affirm.
II. Background
{¶ 2} The incident in this case occurred in the parking lot of a Meijer Store in
Oregon, Ohio, around 5 p.m. on July 7, 2020. Baker was living out of her car at the time
and specifically in the Meijer lot. Baker’s blue Dodge Charger was parked in an empty
section, near a light post. While seated inside her car, two teenaged boys, and brothers,
D.V., aged 15, and A.H. aged 17 (“the victims”), walked by Baker’s car. The victims
traversed the lot, from a nearby hotel to Meijer for some “snacks.” Baker is Caucasian;
the victims are African-American.
{¶ 3} The record in this case includes footage from D.V.’s cell phone that captured
part of the altercation as well as three “body cam” videos, taken by the two arresting
officers from the Oregon Police Department. The officers interviewed Baker, the
victims, and an eyewitness. A description of the video evidence is set forth below.
{¶ 4} By all accounts, the incident began when Baker “flipped off” the victims,
with her middle finger, as they walked by her car. In the first police video, when asked
why she made that gesture, Baker said that she was “tired of these fucking [N-words]
harassing me. Always walking past my car and all this bullshit and harassing me. So, I
flip them off and then [A.H.] starts coming towards me * * * running his mouth.”
2.
{¶ 5} Footage from D.V.’s cell phone captured what happened next. As the cell
phone video begins, D.V. can be heard yelling, “this bitch is racist as fuck,” and A.H. is
seen walking toward the car. Baker is heard, muttering something that includes the word
“die,” and the victims demand to know “how we going to die” and “what we going to die
for” and “it’s because I’m black, isn’t it * * * yeah, it’s because I’m black, huh?” After
that exchange, Baker begins to maneuver her car slowly, in reverse, away from the
victims and slowly enunciates “worthless [inaudible] nigger.” To this, the victims
unleash a torrent of their own profanity-laced insults, telling Baker to “step out of the
car” so they can “beat [her] ass,” and calling her a “honkey” and a “stupid-cracker bitch”
and a “racist.” The final images from D.V.’s cell phone are mostly of the pavement, but
the sound of squealing tires can be heard, along with D.V. yelling “watch out; watch out;
watch out.”
{¶ 6} During A.H.’s interview, he told police that, after he and his brother walked
by Baker’s car on their way to the store, she honked at them. In response, A.H. and D.V.
“looked back” in the direction of the car, and Baker said, “Y’all about to die, niggers.”
A.H. admits that he began walking back toward the car, and demanded to know “what are
we doing [wrong]?” and to know what her “problem” was. A.H. told police that he
“didn’t even know” Baker, and he admitted that he was “mad.” According to A.H.,
Baker then began “chasing” him in her car and “driving around [in circles], trying to hit
[him] with the car.” D.V. was interviewed next. He told police that he and his brother
sought refuge in the grocery cart corral area to prevent Baker from hitting them.
3.
Although Baker did not hit either victim, “she kept following” them and was still “trying
to hit” them.
{¶ 7} Next, the police interviewed eyewitness and store employee, C.R., who was
“on break” and watched the altercation from inside his car that was parked nearby. The
eyewitness could see, but not hear what was said between the parties, because his car
windows were up. According to him, the victims were “teasing” Baker, when she
“gunned” her car at them. He told police that, “[Baker] was trying to hit them for sure.”
And, when the victims “got closer to her,” then she “really tr[ied] to hit them.” The
eyewitness told police that Baker “could have left the parking lot” but instead she “tried
[to hit them] multiple times.”
{¶ 8} During a second conversation between the police and Baker, Baker repeated
that she gave the victims the middle finger because she “was sick and tired of their shit,
of [N-words] taunting me everywhere I fucking go, even walking past me when I’m
sitting here parking.” Baker told police that, after making that gesture, the victims began
yelling “c’mon, c’mon” and “taking off their shirts” and “walking at me * * * so I start
charging my car at them.” (Emphasis added.) When A.H., i.e. the “one in the black
shirt,” got a grocery cart and started “walking” toward Baker again, with the cart, she
“charged at them again * * * but * * * swerved” out of the way and did not hit them.
After this description of the incident, police arrested Baker on two counts of aggravated
menacing.
4.
{¶ 9} After her arrest, the police talked to Baker one last time, specifically to ask
why she had “approached” the victims. Baker explained that she was “fucking fed up of
getting taunted by these stupid [N-words].” Baker added that she had “had enough” and
was “sick of” being taunted “everywhere I go.” Baker claimed that police had not
“listen[ed]” to her previous complaints, and she decided to “fight back.” The police
pressed Baker on this point, asking if she had been harassed and taunted by the victims,
in particular, or “all black people.” Baker responded, “I don’t remember if they [i.e. the
victims] were here before. * * * I don’t even know these fuckers.”
{¶ 10} On August 31, 2020, Baker was indicted on two counts of ethnic
intimidation, in violation of R.C. 2927.12(A) and (B), a felony of the fifth degree, one
count for each victim (Counts 1 and 2) and two counts of aggravated menacing, in
violation of R.C. 2903.21(A) and (B), a misdemeanor of the first degree, again one count
for each victim (Counts 3 and 4).
{¶ 11} On September 27, 2021, Baker filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that the
state had engaged in selective prosecution on the basis of race when it charged her for
“using racial slurs” and “threatening the alleged victims” but failed to charge the victims,
who had engaged in the same conduct. The state opposed the motion, and a hearing was
held on October 26, 2021. At the hearing, the parties stipulated to a composite exhibit,
identified Joint Ex. 1, consisting of the four videos previously described. Based upon its
review of the videos and the arguments at hearing, the trial court denied Baker’s motion.
5.
{¶ 12} A three-day jury trial was held, beginning on November 8, 2021. At trial,
the state called both victims, the eye-witness, and the arresting officers. The defense
moved for an acquittal and renewed its motion to dismiss, both of which were denied.
The trial court also denied a defense request for a self-defense jury instruction.
Following deliberations, the jury returned a guilty verdict as to all four counts, and the
court ordered a presentence investigation in preparation for sentencing.
{¶ 13} At sentencing, the trial court found that the aggravated menacing counts,
set forth in Counts 3 and 4, merged with the ethnic intimidation counts, set forth in
Counts 1 and 2, and the state elected to proceed with sentencing as to the ethic
intimidation counts. The trial court then sentenced Baker to serve six months in jail and
to serve five years of community control. The imposition of community control included
conditions that, among others, required Baker to have no direct or indirect contact with
the victims and to submit to mental health treatment. The trial court also imposed two
years of discretionary post-release control. Baker appealed and assigns two errors for
review:
I. The trial court erred in overruling defendant’s motion to dismiss,
in violation of defendant’s right to due process and equal protection, as
guaranteed by the Fifth and Fifth [sic] Amendments to the United States
Constitution and Article I, Section 2, of the Constitution of the State of
Ohio.
6.
II. The trial court erred in denying defendant’s request for an
instruction of self-defense pursuant to Ohio Revised Code § 2901.05, in
violation of defendant’s rights to equal protection and due process, as
guaranteed under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United
States Constitution and Article I, Section 10, of the Constitution of the State
of Ohio.
III. Baker presented no evidence to support her claim of selective prosecution.
{¶ 14} In her first assignment of error, Baker alleges that the trial court erred when
it denied her motion to dismiss. Baker complains that, while both she and the victims
violated the ethnic intimidation statute, only she was charged. She claims that the state’s
charging decision was based upon her race.1
{¶ 15} “[A] trial court’s determination regarding a motion to dismiss on selective-
prosecution grounds presents a mixed question of law and fact.” State v. Michel, 181
Ohio App.3d 124, 2009-Ohio-450, 908 N.E.2d 456, ¶ 9 (9th Dist.); see also, Cleveland v.
Oko, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 103278, 2016-Ohio-7774, ¶ 15. Appellate review of the
trial court’s determination “is analogous to our review of a motion to suppress.” Id.When considering a motion to [dismiss on the grounds of selective
prosecution], the trial court assumes the role of trier of fact and is therefore
in the best position to resolve factual questions and evaluate the credibility
1
Baker does not allege that the state engaged in selective prosecution as to the
aggravated menacing counts.
7.
of witnesses. Consequently, an appellate court must accept the trial court’s
findings of fact if they are supported by competent, credible evidence.
Accepting these facts as true, the appellate court must then independently
determine, without deference to the conclusion of the trial court, whether
the facts satisfy the applicable legal standard.
(Internal citations omitted.) State v. Burnside, 100 Ohio St.3d 152, 2003-Ohio-5372, 797
N.E.2d 71, ¶ 8. Accord Michel at ¶ 9.
{¶ 16} “A selective-prosecution claim is not a defense on the merits to the
criminal charge itself, but an independent assertion that the prosecutor has brought the
charge for reasons forbidden by the Constitution.” State v. Getsy, 84 Ohio St.3d 180,
203, 702 N.E.2d 866 (1998). Selective prosecution claims sound in equal protection and
protect against prosecutions “based on ‘an unjustifiable standard such as race, religion, or
other arbitrary classification.’” State v. LaMar, 95 Ohio St.3d 181, 2002-Ohio-2128, 767
N.E.2d 166, ¶ 43, quoting United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 464, 116 S.Ct. 1480,
134 L.Ed.2d 687 (1996), quoting Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448, 456, 82 S.Ct. 501, 7
L.Ed.2d 446 (1962).
{¶ 17} In State v. Flynt, 63 Ohio St.2d 132, 134, 407 N.E.2d 15 (1980), the Ohio
Supreme Court adopted the following test with regard to selective-prosecution claims:
To support a defense of selective or discriminatory prosecution, a
defendant bears the heavy burden of establishing, at least prima facie, (1)
that, while others similarly situated have not generally been proceeded
8.
against because of conduct of the type forming the basis of the charge
against him, he has been singled out for prosecution, and (2) that the
government’s discriminatory selection of him for prosecution has been
invidious or in bad faith, i.e., based upon such impermissible considerations
as race, religion, or the desire to prevent his exercise of constitutional
rights.
“A mere showing that another person similarly situated was not prosecuted is not enough;
a defendant must demonstrate actual discrimination due to invidious motives or bad faith.
Intentional or purposeful discrimination will not be presumed from a showing of differing
treatment.” State v. Freeman, 20 Ohio St.3d 55, 58, 485 N.E.2d 1043 (1985). See also
Flynt at 134 (“The conscious exercise of some selectivity in enforcement is not in itself *
* * a violation of the United States Constitution.”).
{¶ 18} In this case, the court found that Baker failed to satisfy either prima facie
element required under Flynt. As to the court’s conclusion that Baker failed to show that
the parties were similarly situated, the court made the following findings:
· Baker instigated the altercation by being the “first” to use a
“derogatory comment” and to threaten “to do bodily harm,” specifically by
threatening “to kill [the victims].”
· The victims used derogatory language [i.e. cracker and honkie]
“only * * * after” Baker told them that “they were going to die,” and using
the “N” word.
9.
· The victims “turned on their phone to start videotaping” because
they “felt” that they had been the subject of a crime.
· Baker posed a threat to the victims because “she was inside her
car.”
· The victims did not pose a threat to Baker, because they were “on
foot” and never got “close enough” to harm her.
· Baker’s actions were motivated by race. In the court’s own words,
“you can’t change what you said, Ms. Baker, [from] that video, [which is]
that you did this because they were African American.”
· Race was not a motivating factor for the victims. The court found
that their words and conduct were “clearly in reaction” to Baker, who
instigated the conflict.
{¶ 19} The court concluded that Baker failed to show any discriminatory animus
by the state in its decision to prosecute Baker. It commented that that the police officers
“[did]their job” in that “they made a fairly immediate charging decision after
interviewing everybody at the scene.”
{¶ 20} Baker raises the same arguments on appeal as she did before the trial court.
That is, she claims that the parties were, in fact, similarly situated because both used
racial slurs—Baker by calling the victims the “N” word and the victims by calling her a
“honkie” and a “cracker”—and both made threats of violence—Baker by driving her car
at them and the victims by threatening to “beat [Baker’s] ass.”
10.
{¶ 21} It was Baker’s burden to show that the state treated her differently than
other persons “who [were] in all relevant aspects alike to [her].” State v. Williamson, 9th
Dist. Summit No. 29935, 2022-Ohio-185, ¶ 41 quoting Harsco Corp. v. Tracy, 86 Ohio
St.3d 189, 192, 712 N.E.2d 1249 (1999) (Defendant failed to establish that he was
similarly situated with four Caucasian deputies who were subjected to administrative,
rather than criminal investigations). For purposes of a selective enforcement claim, a
“similarly situated” individual is someone of another race or ethnicity who could have
been arrested for the same offense as the defendant but was not. Armstrong, 517 U.S. at
469, 116 S.Ct. 1480, 134 L.E.2d 687 (Noting that “[t]he vast majority of the [Circuit]
Courts of Appeals require the defendant to produce some evidence that similarly situated
defendants of other races could have been prosecuted, but were not, and this requirement
is consistent with our equal protection case law.”).
{¶ 22} Ethnic intimidation, as defined by R.C. 2927.12, can be committed by
violating, with the requisite racial or ethnic animus, R.C. 2903.21 (aggravated menacing),
2903.22 (menacing), 2909.06 (criminal damaging or endangering), 2909.07 (criminal
mischief), or 2917.21(A)(3), (4), or (5) (telecommunications harassment). State v.
Mutter, 150 Ohio St. 3d 429, 2017-Ohio-2928, 82 N.E.3d 1141, ¶ 20. Here, the state
indicted Baker alleging one predicate offense—aggravated menacing in violation of R.C.
2903.21—in the ethnic-intimidation charge. Therefore, the offense of ethnic
intimidation, contains two elements: first, that Baker committed the predicate offense of
aggravated menacing, in violation of R.C. 2903.21 and second, that she committed that
11.
offense because of the race, color, religion, or national origin of another person or group
of persons. Accord Mutter. Again, the trial court found that Baker admitted to, and did,
commit the predicate offense “because they were African American,” whereas it found
no evidence of racial animus by the victims,
{¶ 23} We agree. There is simply no evidence in this case that the victims
“selected” Baker because she is Caucasian, nor is there any evidence that their actions
were motivated by Baker’s race. Rather, the evidence fully supports the trial court’s
conclusion that the victims’ actions were taken in response to a confrontation instigated
by Baker, who called them the “N word” and told them that they were going to “die.” “It
would not be unreasonable for anyone to react in anger to such confrontational conduct.”
State v. Chopak, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 96947, 2012-Ohio-1537, ¶ 24. And, although
the victims’ use of the terms “honkey,” and “stupid-cracker bitch” was offensive,
“repugnant or obnoxious language does not, in itself, demonstrate than an action was
undertaken “’by reason of the [another’s] race.’” Chopak quotiing State v. Kingery, 2d
Dist. Montgomery No. 24063, 2012–Ohio–505, ¶ 20. This is especially true in this case,
where it was Baker who, unprovoked, instigated the altercation by accosting the victims
with hateful and threatening language. Therefore, we agree with the trial court that the
victims could not have been prosecuted for ethnic intimidation in this case because there
is no evidence that they committed the predicate offense of aggravated menacing “by
reason of the race, color, religion, or national origin of another person” as is required to
12.
prosecute a case under R.C. 2927.12. For these reasons, we find that Baker failed to
satisfy the first prong of the Flynt test.
{¶ 24} The second element of the Flynt test required Baker to produce evidence
that the state’s decision to charge her was based upon “impermissible considerations as
race, religion, or the desire to prevent [her] from exercising a constitutional right.” Flynt.
The mere fact that Baker was prosecuted and the victims were not is insufficient, as a
matter of law, to establish a defense of selective prosecution. State v. Freemam, 20 Ohio
St.3d 55, 485 N.E.2d 1043 (1985). Despite her claim, Baker has failed to produce any
evidence that the state’s prosecution of her was “because she is Caucasian.” Moreover, it
bears repeating that, initially, the charges against Baker were limited to two counts of
aggravated menacing. It was not until she admitted to police that she drove at the victims
as a way to “fight back,”—not at the victims, in particular, because she did not “even
know” them—but against all black people, that the state, with good reason, added the
ethnic intimidation charges.
{¶ 25} We find that the trial court’s findings are supported by competent, credible
evidence, and accepting these facts as true, Baker has failed to satisfy either prong of the
Flynt test to establish a prima facie claim of selective prosecution. Accordingly, the trial
court did not commit error in denying Baker’s motion to dismiss on selective prosecution
grounds, and her first assignment of error is overruled.
IV. Baker was not entitled to self-defense jury instruction.
13.
{¶ 26} In her second assignment of error, Baker alleges that the trial court erred in
denying her request for a self-defense jury instruction.
{¶ 27} “The elements of self-defense differ depending upon whether the
defendant, in defending [herself], used deadly or non-deadly force.” In re N.K., 6th Dist.
Sandusky No. S-21-001, 2021-Ohio-3858, ¶ 12. “Deadly force” is defined as “any force
that carries a substantial risk that it will proximately result in the death of any person.”
R.C. 2901.01(A)(2). A “substantial risk” is “a strong possibility, as contrasted with a
remote or significant possibility, that a certain result may occur or that certain
circumstances may exist.” R.C. 2901.01(A)(8). In this case, Baker concedes that the act
of driving her automobile “at” the victims constituted deadly force. See, e.g., State v.
Sepeda, 6th Dist. Lucas No. L-21-1123, 2022-Ohio-1889, ¶ 40 (A vehicle can be a deadly
weapon “when used in a manner likely to produce death or bodily harm.”).
The elements of a valid claim of self-defense [involving the use of
deadly force] are as follows: (1) the defendant was not at fault in creating
the situation giving rise to the affray; (2) the defendant had a bona fide
belief that he or she was in imminent danger of death or great bodily harm
and that his or her only means of escape from such danger was in the use of
such force; and (3) the defendant did not violate any duty to retreat or avoid
the danger.
14.
Sepeda at ¶ 47, citing State v. Petway, 2020-Ohio-3848, 156 N.E.3d 467, ¶ 41 (11th
Dist.), citing State v. Barnes, 94 Ohio St.3d 21, 24, 759 N.E.2d 1240 (2002). (Additional
citations omitted.)
{¶ 28} Self-defense is an affirmative defense—not an element of a crime. State v.
Messenger, Slip Opinion No. 2022-Ohio-4562. Recently, in Messenger, the Ohio
Supreme Court “clarified the burden of proof where a defendant asserts a claim of self-
defense under the version of the statute that became effective March 28, 2019.” State v.
Greer, 6th Dist. Lucas No. L-22-1082, 2023-Ohio-103, ¶ 34, citing Messenger. It
recognized that “R.C. 2901.05(B)(1) triggers the state’s duty to disprove self-defense so
long as ‘there is evidence presented that tends to support that the accused person used the
force in self-defense’”—a burden that is not all that heavy. Id. at ¶ 20, 22 (“The
reference in R.C. 2901.05(B)(1) to ‘evidence presented that tends to support’ self-defense
indicates that the defendant’s burden of production is not a heavy one and that it might
even be satisfied through the state’s own evidence.”). As such, “a defendant charged with
an offense involving the use of force has the burden of producing legally sufficient
evidence that the defendant’s use of force was in self-defense.” Id. at ¶ 25. “[I]f the
defendant’s evidence and any reasonable inferences about that evidence would allow a
rational trier of fact to find all the elements of a self-defense claim when viewed in the
light most favorable to the defendant, then the defendant has satisfied the burden,” and
the state must then disprove self-defense. Id. at ¶ 25. In that case, “the sufficiency-of-
the-evidence standard of review applies to [the defendant’s] burden of production and a
15.
manifest-weight-of-the-evidence standard of review applies to the state’s burden of
persuasion.” Id. at ¶ 26.
{¶ 29} “[A] determination as to whether the trial court applied the correct legal
standard in reviewing and weighing the evidence presents a question of law requiring de
novo review.” Greer at ¶ 33 quoting Dublin v. Starr, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 21AP-173,
2022-Ohio-2298, ¶ 50.
{¶ 30} Here, Baker argues that she satisfied her burden of production to warrant a
jury instruction on the issue of whether she acted in self-defense when she drove her
vehicle at the victims because the record contains evidence that the victims “threatened”
Baker by “asking her to exit her vehicle so [that] they could fight her * * * and ‘beat her
ass.’” Baker maintains that such evidence “tends to support” her claim that her use of
deadly force was “only * * * because she felt she was being threatened.” Baker urges, at
a minimum, that it was a “debatable issue,” that should have been decided by the jury,
not the court.
{¶ 31} While discussing defense counsel’s request—that the trial court instruct the
jury on the issue of whether Baker acted in self-defense—the trial court reviewed the
evidence on that issue. First, it noted that, according to A.H.’s testimony, he told Baker
to “get out of your car; I’m going to beat your ass,” from a distance of about ten feet from
Baker’s car. Although Baker did not testify, the “video of her at the scene” established
that, in response to A.H.’s statements, Baker “stayed in her car” and then “did go after
[the victims]” in her car. In finding that Baker was not entitled to a self-defense
16.
instruction, the court concluded that there was no evidence to support Baker’s claim that,
when she “did what she did,” she acted out of a bona fide belief that she was in imminent
danger of death or great bodily harm. Instead, Baker’s “mindset” was “not because she
was fearful” but rather “because [the victims] were African American.”
{¶ 32} Our review of the record convinces us that the trial court complied with its
obligation not to weigh the credibility of the evidence when determining whether Baker
had satisfied her burden of production. See, e.g., State v. Estelle, 2021-Ohio-2636, 176
N.E.3d 380, ¶ 19 (3d Dist.) (“In deciding whether to give a self-defense instruction, the
trial court must view the evidence in favor of the defendant, and the question of
credibility is not to be considered.”); State v. Gambino, 11th Dist. Trumbull No. 2021-T-
0018, 2022-Ohio-1554, ¶ 24, appeal not allowed, 167 Ohio St.3d 1499, 2022-Ohio-2953,
193 N.E.3d 585 (“In determining whether the self-defense instruction is appropriate the
‘court must view the evidence in a light most favorable to the defendant’ without
consideration of credibility.”). Indeed, the trial court specified that its legal conclusion—
that Baker failed to satisfy the second “element of self-defense”—was not predicated on
the “credibility” of the evidence. That is, the court could not find “even a little bit of
evidence” tending to show that Baker believed herself to be in imminent danger of death
or great bodily harm. Other record evidence supports that conclusion, including
testimony from the eyewitness who told police that Baker “could have left the parking
lot” but instead “tried [to hit them] multiple times.”
17.
{¶ 33} Because we find that Baker failed to produce any evidence tending to show
that her use of deadly force was predicated upon a bona fide belief that she was in
imminent danger of death or great bodily harm or that her only means of escape from
such danger was in the use of such force, the trial court did not err in refusing to provide
a self-defense instruction to the jury. Accordingly, we find Baker’s second assignment of
error not well-taken.
V. Conclusion
{¶ 34} It was Baker’s “heavy burden” to establish a claim of selective prosecution,
and the record supports the conclusion that she produced no evidence of others being
similarly situated to her and not prosecuted or that the state was motivated by
discriminatory animus toward Baker on the basis of her race. Accordingly, we must
conclude that the trial court did not err when it denied Baker’s motion to dismiss, and her
first assignment of error is found not well-taken.
{¶ 35} Likewise, Baker failed to present any evidence that, at the time she used
deadly force, she had a bona fide belief that she was in imminent danger of death or great
bodily harm and that her only means of escape from such danger was in the use of such
force. Therefore, the trial court did not err in refusing her request to instruct the jury on
the issue of self-defense, and Baker’s second assignment of error is also not well-taken.
{¶ 36} Having found Baker’s assignments of error not well-taken, the December
8, 2021 judgment by the Lucas County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed. Pursuant to
App.R. 24, Baker is ordered to pay the costs of this appeal.
18.
Judgment affirmed.
State of Ohio v.
Angela Baker
C.A. No. L-21-1258
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to App.R. 27.
See also 6th Dist.Loc.App.R. 4.
Mark L. Pietrykowski, J. ____________________________
JUDGE
Thomas J. Osowik, J.
____________________________
Gene A. Zmuda, J. JUDGE
CONCUR.
____________________________
JUDGE
This decision is subject to further editing by the Supreme Court of
Ohio’s Reporter of Decisions. Parties interested in viewing the final reported
version are advised to visit the Ohio Supreme Court’s web site at:
http://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/ROD/docs/.
19.