State v. Ocanas , 2023 Ohio 951 ( 2023 )


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  • [Cite as State v. Ocanas, 
    2023-Ohio-951
    .]
    COURT OF APPEALS
    LICKING COUNTY, OHIO
    FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
    STATE OF OHIO                                      JUDGES:
    Hon. John W. Wise, P.J.
    Plaintiff-Appellee                         Hon. Craig R. Baldwin, J.
    Hon. Andrew J. King, J.
    -vs-
    Case No. 2022 CA 00047
    JASON A. OCANAS, JR.
    Defendant-Appellant                        OPINION
    CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING:                        Criminal Appeal from the Court of Common
    Pleas, Case No. 21CR525
    JUDGMENT:                                       Affirmed
    DATE OF JUDGMENT ENTRY:                         March 22, 2023
    APPEARANCES:
    For Plaintiff-Appellee                          For Defendant-Appellant
    WILLIAM C. HAYES                                WILLIAM T. CRAMER
    PROSECUTING ATTORNEY                            470 Olde Worthington Road
    ROBERT N. ABDALLA                               Suite 200
    ASSISTANT PROSECTOR                             Westerville, Ohio 43082
    20 South Second Street
    Newark, Ohio 43055
    Licking County, Case No. 2022 CA 00047                                                   2
    Wise, P. J.
    {¶1}   Defendant-Appellant Jason A. Ocanas, Jr. appeals his convictions and
    sentences on one count of Failure to Comply with Order or Signal of Police and one count
    of Obstructing Official Business entered in the Licking County Court of Common Pleas
    following a jury trial.
    {¶2}   Appellee is the state of Ohio.
    STATEMENT OF THE FACTS AND CASE
    {¶3}   On July 2, 2021, the Licking County Grand Jury returned an indictment
    against Defendant-Appellant Jason A. Ocanas, Jr. charging him with one count of Failure
    to Comply with Order or Signal of Police, in violation of R.C. §2921.331(B), a third-degree
    felony; and one count of Obstructing Official Business, in violation of R.C. §2921.31(A),
    a fifth-degree felony.
    {¶4}   On April 26, 2022, after two continuances, the matter proceeded to a jury
    trial
    {¶5}   Prior to the start of the trial, Appellant moved to exclude the State's
    introduction of a 9-1-1 call made by Allen Scarberry on the basis that introduction of the
    9-1-1 call was inadmissible hearsay and violated the Confrontation Clauses of the U.S.
    and Ohio Constitutions. (T. at 99-101). Although the prosecution had subpoenaed
    Scarberry to appear and testify, it had been unable to obtain service for the most recently
    scheduled trial, and Scarberry did not appear. The trial court overruled Appellant's motion
    to exclude ruling that the 9-1-1 call was not testimonial, and that it qualified as an
    exception to hearsay as a present-sense impression and excited utterance. (T. at 102-
    104).
    Licking County, Case No. 2022 CA 00047                                                      3
    {¶6}   At trial, the State presented testimony from Officer Jonathan Bell, 9-1-1
    Dispatcher Shannon Taylor, Officer Taylor Vogelmeier, Deputy Christopher Hamacher,
    Sgt. Deputy Tyler Markus, Deputy Brian Stetson, and Deputy Doug Moore.
    {¶7}    Officer Jonathan Bell of the Utica Police Department testified that he was
    on duty the morning of September 28, 2021. (T. at 122). Officer Bell testified that he was
    parked, facing eastbound observing traffic on State Route 13 in the Village of Utica when
    he observed a silver F-150 pick-up truck traveling at fifty miles per hour in a thirty-five
    mile-per-hour zone. (T. at 126-128). Officer Bell pulled out behind the vehicle and
    accelerated to catch the vehicle in order to initiate a traffic stop for a speeding violation.
    Id. He testified that he first activated his overhead emergency lights but when the truck
    failed to stop and began speeding up, he activated his siren. (T. at 132-133). The truck
    continued southbound on S.R. 13 at speeds in excess of eighty (80) miles-per-hour with
    Officer Bell in pursuit. (T. at 136). The chase continued for approximately twenty-three
    miles, winding through rural and residential areas in and around Utica and Granville. The
    truck reached speeds of over a hundred miles an hour at times. The truck ran stop signs
    and crossed railroad tracks at high speeds, going airborne on at least one occasion. They
    passed multiple vehicles during the chase. At one point the truck almost lost control while
    trying to make a high-speed turn and went off the side of the road, but regained control
    and continued fleeing. The truck finally came to a stop on a cul-de-sac, dead-end street.
    (T. at 136-152).
    {¶8}   Officer Bell testified that as the truck neared the end of the cul-de-sac it
    slowed, both the driver and passenger side doors opened, and while the vehicle was still
    moving, the driver jumped out of the vehicle and ran east, and a passenger jumped out
    Licking County, Case No. 2022 CA 00047                                                     4
    of the vehicle and ran west. (T. at 152-153). The vehicle continued to roll until it ran over
    a curb and crashed into a tree. (T. at 153).
    {¶9}   Officer Bell exited his cruiser and observed an additional occupant in the
    vehicle, later identified as Allen Scarberry, screaming and trying to climb over the driver's
    seat in order to exit the vehicle. (T. at 157). Officer Bell ordered Scarberry out of the
    vehicle at gunpoint. (T. at 158). Officer Bell testified he then assisted other officers in
    searching on the west side of the vehicle for the front seat passenger. (T. at 159). Officer
    Bell testified that they apprehended the front seat passenger, whom they identified as
    Isaiah Gillum, with the assistance of an Ohio State Patrol helicopter pilot. Id.
    {¶10} Officer Bell testified that his cruiser had a dash camera and he was wearing
    a body camera, and the State played Officer's Bell's dash camera footage linked with
    audio from Officer Bell's body camera for the jury. (T. at 166; Ex. 4).
    {¶11} Officer Bell testified he interviewed Appellant following Appellant's arrest,
    which was also captured on his body camera. (T. at 171). The State played Officer Bell's
    body camera footage for the jury. (Id; Ex. 5). Appellant told Officer Bell that he was not
    driving the car, and he did not know who was driving the car, it was just "some random-
    ass dude I just met." (Exhibit 5, time-stamp 1:30:01). After Officer Bell asked Appellant
    why his DNA was found on the steering wheel, Appellant first stated he had never seen
    the vehicle before, but then stated that he was messing with the steering wheel and radio.
    (T. at 176; Ex. 5). When Officer Bell asked Appellant why he was jumping out of the
    driver's side door, Appellant responded that he was trying to stop the vehicle and put it in
    park. (Ex. 5, time-stamp 1 :30:01).
    Licking County, Case No. 2022 CA 00047                                                        5
    {¶12} 9-1-1 Dispatcher Shannon Taylor testified regarding the call she received
    between midnight and 2:00 a.m. on September 28, 2021, which the prosecution played
    for the jury. (T. at 190; Exhibit 6). In the 9-1-1 call, a frantic individual can be heard first
    talking to Taylor and then talking to other individuals:
    Guys, let me out now … I’m gonna fuck you guys up…
    … Please, let me out
    Guys, fucking please, let me out …
    Guys, let me out … I gotta
    You guys are gonna fucking get us killed, please!
    … Jay, please bro, stop the fucking truck before I start breaking windows. Bro I'm
    not trying to die, nigga. Fucking stop it now. Dude I can't fucking do this I have a
    fucking anxiety anxiety attack … I’m not doing this
    No! No! No! No! Stop the fucking truck!"
    …
    Guys are you still on the phone I was in the … I didn't want to get hurt but these
    mother fuckers was just running from cops for a hot minute ... I'm not ... (Officer
    Bell shouting orders) It's not me, Sir ... I've been trying ... (Officer Bell shouting
    orders) I’ve been on the phone trying to get out of the car. I've been trying to get
    out, this is not me man ... I've been trying to call you guys.
    (Ex. 6).
    {¶13} Taylor Vogelmeier, a tactical flight officer with the Ohio State Highway Patrol
    next testified for the State. Officer Vogelmeier testified that he was on duty the early
    morning of September 28, 2021, and assisted in locating the two individuals that fled from
    Licking County, Case No. 2022 CA 00047                                                    6
    the truck by using thermal imaging from his helicopter and directing law enforcement
    officers to their location. (T. at 197-198). Footage from Officer Vogelmeier's thermal
    recording camera was played for the jury. (T. at 198, Ex. 7). Officer Vogelmeier testified
    that he directed law enforcement to one individual to the east of the truck who was sitting
    on the back porch of a nearby house smoking a cigarette, and one individual to the west
    that was lying face down. (T. at 202). Officer Vogelmeier saw no other individuals in the
    area besides law enforcement officers. Id.
    {¶14} Deputy Christopher Hamacher of the Licking County Sheriff’s Office also
    testified regarding September 28, 2022. Deputy Hamacher testified that he assisted
    Officer Bell and Deputy Brown in arresting Isaiah Gillum, and that he saw no other
    persons in the area. (T. at 209). Deputy Brown testified that when they found Gillum, he
    was laying prone under a tree. (T. at 210).
    {¶15} Sergeant Deputy Tyler Markus of the Licking County Sheriff’s Office was on
    duty the morning of September 28, and testified regarding his participation in the search
    for the two subjects that fled the truck, during which time he did not see any other
    individuals besides the suspects and did not participate in making any arrests. (T. at 213-
    215).
    {¶16} Deputy Brian Stetson of the Licking County Sheriff's Office was on duty
    September 28, 2022, and testified regarding his participation in the search for the
    suspects. Deputy Stetson testified that he and Deputy Moore arrested Appellant after
    being directed to Appellant's location by OSP Aviation. (T. at 218). Deputy Stetson
    testified he first saw Appellant sitting on the porch smoking a cigarette. (T. at 219).
    Licking County, Case No. 2022 CA 00047                                                   7
    {¶17} Deputy Doug Moore of the Licking County Sheriff’s Office testified regarding
    his participation in the search for the suspects. Deputy Moore arrested Appellant. (T. at
    223). Upon encountering Appellant, Deputy Moore observed that "he had stuff all over his
    pants, like burrs or whatever all over his pants." (T. at 224). The State played Deputy
    Moore's body camera footage for the jury. (T. at 225; Ex. 8). In the footage, the following
    exchange between Deputy Moore and Appellant was captured:
    Moore: Where's your shoes?
    Appellant: I honestly have no idea where they went.
    Moore: Were you the driver?
    Appellant: No.
    Moore: What were you, the passenger?
    Appellant: Uh, back seat I believe, er passenger? No back seat."
    Moore: Who's the driver, what's his name?
    Appellant: No idea.
    Moore: You don't know what his name is?
    Appellant: No.
    Moore: You're in a car with somebody you don't know what their
    name is?
    Appellant: Yeah.
    Moore: You know anybody else in the car, know what their name is?
    Appellant: No, just met them.
    Moore: Just met them tonight, huh?
    Appellant: Yeah, I was walking and they ...
    Licking County, Case No. 2022 CA 00047                                                       8
    (Ex. 8, time stamp 1:08:27)
    {¶18} Following Deputy Moore's testimony, the State rested. (T. at 234). The
    State informed the trial court that Scarberry had failed to show for trial, so they would be
    unable to call him as a witness. (T. at 233). Appellant then moved for dismissal pursuant
    to Criminal Rule 29, which the trial court overruled. (T. at 239).
    {¶19} Appellant did not present any evidence and rested. Id.
    {¶20} After hearing all the evidence, the jury returned a verdict of guilty as to all
    charges. (Judgment Entry, April 27, 2022).
    {¶21} The trial court deferred sentencing pending receipt of a presentence
    investigation report.
    {¶22} On June 22, 2022, the trial court sentenced Appellant to a prison term of
    twenty-four (24) months on Count One and six (6) months on Count Two, to be served
    consecutively, for a total aggregate prison term of thirty (30) months. The trial court further
    imposed a one (1) to three (3) year term of post-release control. (Judgment Entry, June
    22, 2022).
    {¶23} Appellant now appeals, raising the following assignments of error:
    ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
    {¶24} “I. APPELLANT'S RIGHT TO CONFRONT THE WITNESSES AGAINST
    HIM UNDER THE FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS WAS VIOLATED BY THE
    ADMISSION OF HEARSAY IN A 911 CALL FROM A WITNESS WHO DID NOT TESTIFY
    {¶25} “II. THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY ADMITTING A
    HEARSAY STATEMENT IN A 911 CALL.
    Licking County, Case No. 2022 CA 00047                                                   9
    {¶26} “III. THE WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE DOES NOT SUPPORT
    APPELLANT'S CONVICTION FOR FAILURE TO COMPLY.”
    I., II.
    {¶27} In his first and second Assignments of Error, Appellant argues the trial court
    erred in allowing the admission of a 9-1-1 call into evidence. We disagree.
    {¶28} Appellant argues that the admission of hearsay evidence violated the Rules
    of Evidence and the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment to the United States
    Constitution.
    {¶29} We will not reverse a trial court's ruling on evidentiary issues absent an
    abuse of discretion and proof of material prejudice. See State v. Belton, 
    149 Ohio St.3d 165
    , 
    2016-Ohio-1581
    , 
    74 N.E.3d 319
    , ¶ 116.
    9-1-1 Call
    {¶30} Statements a caller makes during a 9-1-1 call are often found to be non-
    testimonial and are admissible if the statements satisfy a hearsay exception. State v.
    Jacinto, 
    2020-Ohio-3722
    , 
    155 N.E.3d 1056
    , ¶ 61 (8th Dist.) This is because a 9-1-1 caller
    is typically “speaking about events as they [are] actually happening” and “[a]lthough one
    might call 911 to provide a narrative report of a crime absent any imminent danger,” 911
    callers are usually facing ongoing emergencies. (Emphasis deleted.) Davis v.
    Washington, 547 U.S. at 827, 
    126 S.Ct. 2266
    , 
    165 L.Ed.2d 224
     (“A 911 call * * * and at
    least the initial interrogation conducted in connection with a 911 call, is ordinarily not
    designed primarily to ‘establis[h] or prov[e]’ some past fact, but to describe current
    circumstances requiring police assistance.”). Under such circumstances, the 9-1-1 caller
    Licking County, Case No. 2022 CA 00047                                                     10
    is not testifying, the 9-1-1 caller is not acting as a witness and the statements of the 9-1-1
    caller are not testimonial in nature. Id. at 827-828, 
    126 S.Ct. 2266
    .
    Confrontation Clause
    {¶31} The Sixth Amendment's Confrontation Clause provides: “In all criminal
    prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right * * * to be confronted with the witnesses
    against him.” Only testimonial hearsay implicates the Confrontation Clause. A statement
    is “testimonial” if it is made for “ ‘a primary purpose of creating an out-of-court substitute
    for trial testimony.’ ” State v. Montgomery, 
    148 Ohio St.3d 347
    , 
    2016-Ohio-5487
    , 
    71 N.E.3d 180
    , ¶ 87, quoting Michigan v. Bryant, 
    562 U.S. 344
    , 358, 
    131 S.Ct. 1143
    , 
    179 L.Ed.2d 93
     (2011); see also State v. Knox, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 107414, 2019-Ohio-
    1246, 
    2019 WL 1501549
    , ¶ 67 (“[T]he core class of statements implicated by the
    Confrontation Clause” includes those “ ‘made under circumstances which would lead an
    objective witness to reasonably believe that the statement would be available for use at
    a later trial.’ ”), quoting Crawford v. Washington, 
    541 U.S. 36
    , 52, 
    124 S.Ct. 1354
    , 
    158 L.Ed.2d 177
     (2004).
    {¶32} The admission of a testimonial, out-of-court statement by a declarant who
    does not testify at trial violates the Confrontation Clause unless the declarant is
    unavailable and the defendant had a prior opportunity to cross-examine the declarant.
    Crawford at 53-54, 68, 
    124 S.Ct. 1354
    . We review evidentiary rulings that implicate the
    Confrontation Clause de novo. State v. McKelton, 
    148 Ohio St.3d 261
    , 
    2016-Ohio-5735
    ,
    
    70 N.E.3d 508
    , ¶ 97.
    Licking County, Case No. 2022 CA 00047                                                   11
    {¶33} 911 calls are generally nontestimonial and are admissible if the statements
    contained therein satisfy a hearsay exception.
    {¶34} As the United States Supreme Court observed in Davis v. Washington, 
    547 U.S. 813
    , 
    126 S.Ct. 2266
    , 
    165 L.Ed.2d 224
     (2006), in the case of 911 calls, the declarants
    are generally “speaking about events as they [are] actually happening” and that
    “[a]lthough one might call 911 to provide a narrative report of a crime absent any imminent
    danger,” 911 callers are typically facing ongoing emergencies. (Emphasis deleted.) Id. at
    827, 
    126 S.Ct. 2266
    . Under such circumstances, the 911 caller is not testifying; the 911
    caller is not acting as a witness, and the statements of a 911 caller are not testimonial in
    nature. Id. at 827-828, 
    126 S.Ct. 2266
    . See also State v. Jacinto, 8th Dist. No. 108944,
    
    2020-Ohio-3722
    , 
    155 N.E.3d 1056
    , ¶ 61.
    {¶35} Here, the statements made by Scarborough to Appellant, while they were
    in the car and recorded by the 9-1-1 dispatcher, were nontestimonial, and therefore no
    Sixth Amendment violation occurred. Appellant therefor cannot establish a confrontation-
    clause violation.
    Hearsay
    {¶36} Even when the Confrontation Clause does not operate to prohibit the
    admission of a hearsay statement, the statement may nonetheless be inadmissible under
    the Rules of Evidence. See State v. Nevins, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 21379, 2007-Ohio-
    1511, ¶ 36, (“[T]estimony may be admissible under the Confrontation Clause yet
    inadmissible under the rules of evidence, and vice versa * * *.”). Thus, having addressed
    that the 9-1-1 emergency call was not barred by the Confrontation Clause, we now turn
    Licking County, Case No. 2022 CA 00047                                                      12
    to address whether it was admissible under the Rules of Evidence, wherein we will apply
    an abuse of discretion standard of review.
    {¶37} Hearsay is defined to mean “a statement, other than one made by the
    declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered into evidence to prove the truth of
    the matter asserted in the statement.” Evid.R. 801(C).
    {¶38} Under the Rules of Evidence, hearsay is generally inadmissible unless an
    exception to the hearsay rule applies. Evid.R. 802.
    {¶39} “Evid.R. 803 is one such rule which permits the admission of certain
    hearsay statements even though the declarant is available as a witness.” Dayton v.
    Combs, 
    94 Ohio App.3d 291
    , 300 (2d Dist.1993).
    {¶40} Evid.R. 803 is titled Hearsay Exceptions; Availability of Declarant
    Immaterial. Evid.R. 803 provides in its pertinent parts:
    The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule, even though the
    declarant is available as a witness:
    (1) Present Sense Impression. A statement describing or
    explaining an event or condition made while the declarant was perceiving
    the event or condition, or immediately thereafter unless circumstances
    indicate lack of trustworthiness.
    (2) Excited utterance. A statement relating to a startling event or
    condition made while the declarant was under the stress of excitement
    caused by the event or condition.
    ***
    (Emphasis added.) Evid.R. 803(2).
    Licking County, Case No. 2022 CA 00047                                                  13
    {¶41} 9-1-1 calls are generally admissible as excited utterances or under the
    present sense impression exception to the hearsay rule.” State v. Martin, 5th Dist. Tusc.
    No. 2015AP0010, 
    2016-Ohio-225
    , ¶ 59 (5th Dist.). Navarette v. California, 
    134 S.Ct. 1683
    , 1689, 
    188 L.Ed.2d 680
     (2014); State v. Smith, 
    80 Ohio St.3d 89
    , 107–108, 
    684 N.E.2d 668
     (1997); State v. Johnson, 10th Dist. No. 08AP–652, 
    2009-Ohio-3383
    , 
    2009 WL 2003398
    , ¶ 22; State v. Williams, 6th Dist., 
    2013-Ohio-726
    , 
    987 N.E.2d 322
    , ¶ 24;
    State v. Combs, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C–120756, 
    2013-Ohio-3159
    , 
    2013 WL 3816613
    ,
    ¶ 32
    {¶42} Regarding a present sense impression under Evid.R. 803(1), “[t]he key to
    the statement's trustworthiness is the spontaneity of the statement; it must be either
    contemporaneous with the event or be made immediately thereafter.” State v. Essa, 
    194 Ohio App.3d 208
    , 
    2011-Ohio-2513
    , 
    955 N.E.2d 429
     (8th Dist.), ¶ 126. “ ‘The principle
    underlying this hearsay exception is the assumption that statements or perceptions,
    describing the event and uttered in close temporal proximity to the event, bear a high
    degree of trustworthiness.’ ” State v. Dixon, 
    152 Ohio App.3d 760
    , 
    2003-Ohio-2550
    , 
    790 N.E.2d 349
    , ¶ 12 (3d Dist.), quoting Cox v. Oliver Machinery Co., 
    41 Ohio App.3d 28
    , 35,
    
    534 N.E.2d 855
     (12th Dist.1987). Accordingly, “Ohio courts have routinely held that 911
    calls are admissible as present sense impressions.” Ohio v. Scott, 1st Dist. Hamilton Nos.
    C-200385 and C-200403, 
    2021-Ohio-3427
    , ¶ 17. See also State v. Smith, 2017-Ohio-
    8558, 
    99 N.E.3d 1230
    , ¶ 37 (1st Dist.) (“911 calls are usually admissible under the excited
    utterance or the present sense impression exception to the hearsay rule”).
    {¶43} For a statement to be admissible as an excited utterance, four prerequisites
    must be satisfied: (1) there must be a startling event that produces a nervous excitement
    Licking County, Case No. 2022 CA 00047                                                     14
    in the declarant, (2) the statement must have been made while the declarant was still
    under the stress of excitement caused by the event, (3) the statement must relate to the
    startling event, and (4) the declarant must have personally observed the startling event.
    See, e.g., State v. Renode, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 109171, 
    2020-Ohio-5430
    , 
    2020 WL 6948175
    , ¶ 27, citing State v. Taylor, 
    66 Ohio St.3d 295
    , 300-301, 
    612 N.E.2d 316
     (1993),
    and Jones, 
    135 Ohio St.3d 10
    , 
    2012-Ohio-5677
    , 
    984 N.E.2d 948
    , at ¶ 166.
    {¶44} “There is no per se amount of time after which a statement can no longer
    be considered to be an excited utterance.” Taylor at 303, 
    612 N.E.2d 316
    . “The central
    requirements are that the statement must be made while the declarant is still under the
    stress of the event and the statement may not be the result of reflective thought.”
    (Emphasis deleted.) 
    Id.
    {¶45} In this case, the prosecutor played a recording of the 9-1-1 call placed by
    Allen Scarberry. On the recording, Scarberry can be heard screaming and begging the
    driver of the vehicle to stop the truck. At one point he can be heard addressing the driver
    of the truck as “Jay”. He can also be heard screaming that he is “not trying to die”, that he
    is having an “anxiety attack” and that he “didn’t want to get hurt.”
    {¶46} We find each of the requirements as to a present sense impression or an
    excited utterance were met as to Scarberry’s statements as heard on the 9-1-1 call and
    were admissible as exceptions to the hearsay rule.
    {¶47} Accordingly, the trial court did not err or abuse its discretion in admitting the
    9-1-1 call. Scarberry’s statements on the call were non-testimonial and were admissible
    under the excited utterance exception to the hearsay rule.
    Licking County, Case No. 2022 CA 00047                                                   15
    {¶48} Based on the foregoing, we find Appellant’s first and second Assignments
    of Error not well-taken and hereby overrule same.
    III.
    {¶49} In his third Assignment of Error, Appellant argues his conviction for Failure
    to Comply was against the weight of the evidence.
    {¶50} In determining whether a conviction is against the manifest weight of the
    evidence, the court of appeals functions as the “thirteenth juror,” and after “reviewing the
    entire record, weighs the evidence and all reasonable inferences, considers the credibility
    of witnesses and determines whether in resolving conflicts in the evidence, the jury clearly
    lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the conviction must
    be overturned and a new trial ordered.” State v. Thompkins, supra, 78 Ohio St.3d at 387.
    Reversing a conviction as being against the manifest weight of the evidence and ordering
    a new trial should be reserved for only the “exceptional case in which the evidence weighs
    heavily against the conviction.” Id.
    {¶51} Appellant herein is challenging his conviction on one count of Failure to
    Comply with Order or Signal of Police Officer, in violation of R.C. §2921.331(B), which
    provides, in relevant part:
    (B) No person shall operate a motor vehicle so as willfully to elude or
    flee a police officer after receiving a visible or audible signal from a police
    officer to bring the person's motor vehicle to a stop.
    {¶52} The sole issue is whether Appellant was the non-compliant driver of the
    silver Ford F-150 pick-up truck.
    Licking County, Case No. 2022 CA 00047                                                       16
    {¶53} After reviewing the evidence, we find that Appellant's conviction was not
    against the manifest weight of the evidence. The jury heard testimony from Officer Bell,
    as well as all of the other officers involved in the search, and the 9-1-1 call which support
    a finding that Appellant was the driver of the silver F-150 pick-up truck in this case. The
    jury also watched the dashcam footage from Officer Bell's police cruiser and his body
    cam footage showing his conversation with Appellant. The jury also had Officer Moore’s
    body cam footage which showed the conversation between the him and Appellant when
    he arrested Appellant. Additionally, the jury had the video footage from the helicopter
    showing the search for Appellant and the other passenger.
    {¶54} Here, the jury clearly believed the evidence presented in support of
    Appellant being the driver of the vehicle. “The jury was in the best position to judge the
    credibility of the [witnesses], and we will not disturb its credibility determination.” State v.
    Bostick, 12th Dist. Warren Nos. CA2022-03-013 and Warren Nos. CA2022-04-015, 
    2022 WL 17245135
    , 
    2022-Ohio-4228
    , ¶ 17. Moreover, “[i]t is well-established that when
    conflicting evidence is presented at trial, a conviction is not against the manifest weight
    of the evidence simply because the trier of fact believed the prosecution testimony.” State
    v. Lunsford, 12th Dist. Brown No. CA2010-10-021, 
    2011 WL 6382534
    , 
    2011-Ohio-6529
    ,
    ¶ 17.
    {¶55} In light of the consistent testimony of Officer Bell and the 9-1-1 call which
    identified Appellant as the driver of the silver F-150 pick-up truck, as well as the dashcam
    and body cam footage from the officers supporting that testimony, we find that the
    evidence presented at trial does not weigh heavily in favor of acquittal. The evidence
    Licking County, Case No. 2022 CA 00047                                                   17
    provided allowed the jury to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that Appellant was the
    driver of the vehicle in this case.
    {¶56} “The jury did not clearly lose its way and create a manifest miscarriage of
    justice in finding Appellant guilty of failing to comply with an order or signal of a police
    officer.” Bostick at ¶ 18.
    {¶57} Accordingly, we find Appellant's conviction is not against the manifest
    weight of the evidence.
    {¶58} Appellant’s third Assignment of Error is overruled.
    {¶59} The judgment of the Court of Common Pleas of Licking County, Ohio, is
    affirmed.
    By: Wise, P. J.
    Baldwin, J., and
    King, J., concur.
    JWW/kw 0320