Burch v. Ohio Farmers Ins. Co. ( 2023 )

[Cite as Burch v. Ohio Farmers Ins. Co., 2023-Ohio-912.]
COURT OF APPEALS
DELAWARE COUNTY, OHIO
FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
LAGRETA BURCH : JUDGES:
:
: Hon. W. Scott Gwin, P.J.
Plaintiff-Appellant : Hon. William B. Hoffman, J.
: Hon. Patricia A. Delaney, J.
-vs- :
: Case No. 22 CAE 04 0029
:
OHIO FARMERS INSURANCE CO., :
ET AL. :
:
:
Defendants-Appellees : OPINION
CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING: Appeal from the Delaware County Court
of Common Pleas, Case No. 21 CV 12
0580
JUDGMENT: Reversed and Remanded
DATE OF JUDGMENT ENTRY: March 21, 2023
APPEARANCES:
For Plaintiff-Appellant: For Defendant-Appellee:
CARYN M. GROEDEL JOHN J. HAGGERTY
31000 Woodall Dr. 2800 Kelly Rd., Suite 200
Cleveland, OH 44139 Warrington, PA 18976
For Amicus Curiae For Amicus Curiae
The Ohio Employment Lawyers Assoc.: Ohio Chamber of Commerce:
JASON E. STARLING KEVIN D. SHIMP
4635 Trueman Blvd., Suite 200 34 S. 3rd St., Suite 100
Hilliard, OH 43026 Columbus, OH 43215
Delaware County, Case No. 22 CAE 04 0029 2
Delaney, J.
{¶1} Plaintiff-Appellant LaGreta Burch appeals the March 28, 2022 judgment
entry of the Delaware County Court of Common Pleas. Defendants-Appellees are Ohio
Farmers Insurance Company, Westfield Insurance Company, and Betsy Jones. The Ohio
Employment Lawyers Association filed a brief of amicus curiae urging reversal. The Ohio
Chamber of Commerce filed a brief of amicus curiae urging affirmance.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Original Complaint
{¶2} On July 29, 2020, Plaintiff-Appellant LaGreta Burch filed a complaint in the
Delaware County Court of Common Pleas against Defendant-Appellee Westfield
Insurance Company and Defendant-Appellee Betsy Jones (hereinafter “Original
Complaint”). In the Original Complaint, Burch asserted claims for pregnancy
discrimination, hostile environment pregnancy harassment, and retaliation for reporting
Jones to the Human Resources Department.
Employment Law Uniformity Act
{¶3} Effective April 15, 2021, Ohio Revised Code Chapter 4112 was amended
by the passage of the Employment Law Uniformity Act (hereinafter “ELUA”) under H.B.
352. The ELUA amended certain portions of Chapter 4112, including imposing a two-year
statute of limitations for employment discrimination claims, a requirement to exhaust
administrative remedies existing under Ohio law if a claim is brought under R.C. 4112.02,
and declaring that an employee was not permitted to sue a “supervisor, manager, or other
employee of the employer unless that supervisor, manager, or other employee is the
employer.”
Delaware County, Case No. 22 CAE 04 0029 3
Motion to Amend then a Voluntary Dismissal of Original Complaint
{¶4} On April 9, 2021, Burch filed a motion to amend her pleading to substitute
Defendant-Appellant Ohio Farmers Insurance Company in place of Westfield. On May
19, 2021, Burch filed a motion to amend her complaint to add an additional claim of
retaliation against Westfield. The trial court granted both motions for leave to file an
amended complaint on July 1, 2021 and stated that, “Burch may file the amended
complaint attached as Exhibit 7 to Plaintiff’s 5/19/21 Amended Motion for Leave to File
Revised Amended Complaint.” Burch did not file the amended complaint as ordered by
the trial court.
{¶5} On October 5, 2021, Burch voluntarily dismissed the Original Complaint
without prejudice under Civ.R. 41(A).
Refiled Complaint
{¶6} On December 21, 2021, Burch refiled her Original Complaint with the
Delaware County Court of Common Pleas (hereinafter “Refiled Complaint”). In the Refiled
Complaint, Burch named the following parties as defendants: Ohio Farmers Insurance
Company, Westfield Insurance Company, and Betsy Jones (hereinafter “Ohio Farmers”).
In addition to the three claims brought in the Original Complaint, Burch raised a fourth
claim of retaliation based on the alleged actions of Westfield and/or Ohio Farmers during
the discovery proceedings of the Original Complaint.
{¶7} The allegations in her Refiled Complaint were based on her employment
with Ohio Farmers Insurance Company doing business as Westfield Insurance Company.
In October 2006, Westfield hired Burch as a bodily injury specialist. In January 2014,
Burch was promoted to litigation specialist. In November 2014, Burch informed her
Delaware County, Case No. 22 CAE 04 0029 4
manager, Betsy Jones, that she was pregnant and due in May 2015. Burch alleged that
during her pregnancy, Jones engaged in pregnancy-based disparate treatment. When
Burch returned to work from parental leave in August 2015, she alleged that Jones
resumed harassing her. Burch reported Jones’ behavior to the claims litigation leader and
on August 31, 2015, filed a complaint about Jones’ behavior with Westfield’s human
resources department. The human resources department informed Burch that Jones’
conduct towards her did not rise to the level of harassment, but Burch was transferred to
a different team.
{¶8} Burch alleged in her complaint that after she reported Jones’ pregnancy-
related discrimination, Jones and the claims litigation leader retaliated against Burch by
increasing her workload without a proportional salary increase from 2014 to 2018. In
January and February 2020, however, Burch noticed that she was being assigned 50%
less cases than she received in January and February 2019.
{¶9} In 2020, Burch was interested in applying for a position as a bodily injury
leader and shadowed in the department to learn about the position. The claims litigation
leader encouraged her to apply for the position, but in February 2020, the claims litigation
leader told her she would not be interviewed because Burch had offended the casualty
litigation leader for having a meeting with a department head without permission from her
manager. A less-qualified male employee was placed in the bodily injury leader position.
{¶10} Burch alleged in her complaint that due to the persistent discriminatory,
harassing, and retaliatory treatment she suffered, the working conditions forced her to
resign in a constructive discharge on May 12, 2020.
Delaware County, Case No. 22 CAE 04 0029 5
{¶11} Burch found employment with Wayne Mutual Insurance Company after her
constructive discharge. During the discovery phase of the Original Complaint
proceedings, on March 18, 2021, Westfield issued subpoenas to Burch’s current
employer and an attorney Burch worked with while she was employed by Westfield. Burch
alleged Westfield’s intent in serving the subpoenas was to embarrass her and retaliate
against her for filing the complaint for discrimination.
Motion to Dismiss
{¶12} In lieu of an answer, Ohio Farmers filed a motion to dismiss Burch’s Refiled
Complaint. Ohio Farmers raised three separate arguments as to why the Refiled
Complaint should be dismissed: (1) Ohio’s savings statute did not apply to the Refiled
Complaint because it was not substantially the same as the Original Complaint; (2)
because the savings statute did not apply, the claims in the Refiled Complaint were barred
by the ELUA; and (3) even if the savings statute applied to the Refiled Complaint, the
Refiled Complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief should be granted.
{¶13} Burch filed a response to the motion to dismiss on February 8, 2022. Burch
first argued that under notice pleading, the Refiled Complaint was sufficiently plead to
survive a motion to dismiss. Burch next argued that if the savings statute applied to this
matter, the Refiled Complaint was substantially the same as the Original Complaint;
however, she contended the savings statute had no application in this matter because
the statute of limitations on her employment discrimination claims had not passed.
Specifically, the ELUA two-year statute of limitations for employment discrimination
claims had no application to her claims because the ELUA made no mention of
retroactivity and her claims accrued before the H.B. 352’s enactment.
Delaware County, Case No. 22 CAE 04 0029 6
{¶14} Ohio Farmers filed a reply, refuting Burch’s argument that ELUA was not
retroactive.
Judgment Entry Granting Dismissal of Refiled Complaint
{¶15} On March 28, 2022, the trial court issued its judgment entry granting Ohio
Farmers’ motion to dismiss the Refiled Complaint. The trial court agreed with Ohio
Farmers’ argument that Ohio’s savings statute did not apply to the Refiled Complaint
because the complaint was not substantially the same as the Original Complaint. The
Refiled Complaint was not substantially similar because (1) the parties in the original
action and the new action were different, and (2) the Refiled Complaint brought a new
claim that was absent from the prior action. Because the savings statute did not apply to
the Refiled Complaint, the trial court considered the Refiled Complaint a new action
subject to the ELUA and its two-year statute of limitations.1 The trial court examined
Burch’s four employment discrimination causes of action and found that pursuant to the
statute of limitations and administrative requirements of the ELUA, she failed to state a
claim upon which relief could be granted and dismissed the Refiled Complaint.
{¶16} It is from the March 28, 2022 judgment entry that Burch now appeals.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
{¶17} Burch raises one Assignment of Error:
{¶18} “THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING APPELLEES’ MOTION TO
DISMISS BECAUSE THE AMENDED EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION STATUTE IS
NOT RETROACTIVE AND THUS DOES NOT APPLY TO CLAIMS THAT ACCRUED
PRIOR TO APRIL 15, 2021.”
1 The trial court did not make a specific determination that the Ohio General Assembly intended the ELUA
to be applied retroactively to claims accruing before April 15, 2021.
Delaware County, Case No. 22 CAE 04 0029 7
ANALYSIS
{¶19} In her sole Assignment of Error, Burch contends the trial court erred in
granting Ohio Farmers’ motion to dismiss the Refiled Complaint. We agree.
Standard of Review for Civ.R. 12(B)(6)
{¶20} Our standard of review on a Civil Rule 12(B) motion to dismiss is de novo.
Dover Chemical Corp. v. Dover, 2022-Ohio-2307, 192 N.E.3d 559, ¶ 32 (5th Dist.) citing
Huntsman v. State, 5th Dist. Stark No. 2016CA00206, 2017-Ohio-2622, 2017 WL
1710432, ¶ 20, citing Greeley v. Miami Valley Maintenance Contractors Inc., 49 Ohio
St.3d 228, 551 N.E.2d 981 (1990). A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted is procedural and tests the sufficiency of the complaint. State
ex rel. Hanson v. Guernsey County Bd. of Commissioners, 65 Ohio St.3d 545, 605 N.E.2d
378 (1992). Under a de novo analysis, we must accept all factual allegations of the
complaint as true, and all reasonable inferences must be drawn in favor of the nonmoving
party. Byrd v. Faber, 57 Ohio St.3d 56, 565 N.E.2d 584 (1991). In order to dismiss a
complaint pursuant to Civil Rule 12(B)(6), it must appear beyond doubt that the plaintiff
can prove no set of facts in support of the claim that would entitle plaintiff to relief. York
v. Ohio State Highway Patrol, 60 Ohio St.3d 143, 573 N.E.2d 1063 (1991).
De Novo Consideration of Whether the ELUA Is Retroactive
Savings Statute
{¶21} Based on its analysis of Ohio’s savings statute, the trial court determined
that Burch’s Refiled Complaint failed to state a claim for relief because her causes of
action were time and administratively barred under the ELUA. The savings statute reads:
Delaware County, Case No. 22 CAE 04 0029 8
(A) In any action that is commenced or attempted to be commenced, if in
due time a judgment for the plaintiff is reversed or if the plaintiff fails
otherwise than upon the merits, the plaintiff or, if the plaintiff dies and the
cause of action survives, the plaintiff's representative may commence a new
action within one year after the date of the reversal of the judgment or the
plaintiff's failure otherwise than upon the merits or within the period of the
original applicable statute of limitations, whichever occurs later. This
division applies to any claim asserted in any pleading by a defendant.
R.C. 2305.19(A). In Wilson v. Durrani, 164 Ohio St.3d 419, 2020-Ohio-6827, 173 N.E.3d
448, ¶ 28, the Ohio Supreme Court explained the application of the savings statute to a
refiled complaint:
“Savings statutes operate to give a plaintiff a limited period of time in which
to refile a dismissed claim that would otherwise be time-barred.” That
characterization is also consistent with our precedent that an action that has
been dismissed without prejudice is deemed to never have existed. Antoon
[v. Cleveland Clinic Found.], 148 Ohio St.3d 483, 2016-Ohio-7432, 71
N.E.3d 974, at ¶ 24. The saving statute anticipates the commencement of
a new action, not the reactivation of the prior action, and it says nothing
about the new action relating back to the filing date of the prior action. See
id. In fact, because the saving statute specifically permits the refiling of an
action beyond the expiration of the statute of limitations, so long as the
refiling occurs within one year of a failure of the prior action otherwise than
on the merits, there is no need for the refiled complaint to relate back.
Delaware County, Case No. 22 CAE 04 0029 9
{¶22} The savings statute applies, however, only when the original suit and the
new action are substantially the same. If the actions are not substantially the same, such
as when the parties in the original action and those in the refiled action are different, the
savings statute does not apply. McGraw v. Jarvis, 10th Dist. No. 19AP-538, 2021-Ohio-
522, 168 N.E.3d 163, 2021 WL 753557, ¶ 28 citing Children's Hosp. v. Ohio Dept. of Pub.
Welfare, 69 Ohio St.2d 523, 525, 433 N.E.2d 187 (1982). The trial court found the Original
Complaint and the Refiled Complaint were not substantially the same, therefore Burch
could not find protection within the savings statute from the ELUA two-year statute of
limitations and administrative requirements.
{¶23} Interestingly, all parties in this appeal agree that the savings statute has no
application to the Refiled Complaint, albeit for different reasons. Ohio Farmers argues
that Burch cannot utilize the savings statute to refile her dismissed complaint because it
was not substantially the same; therefore, it is a new complaint filed after the enactment
of the ELUA, and the ELUA applies to bar her Refiled Complaint. Burch agues application
of the savings statute is irrelevant to her Refiled Complaint because her claims accrued
prior to the effective date of the ELUA, the ELUA is not retroactive, and therefore her
Refiled Complaint is not barred by the ELUA. Wading through the muddy analytical waters
of the savings statute, dates of complaints, different but the same parties, new claims,
dates of claims accrual, dates of statutes of limitations, we find the heart of this appeal
asks one question – is the ELUA retroactive so that the Refiled Complaint survives or
fails?
Delaware County, Case No. 22 CAE 04 0029 10
Retroactive or Prospective
{¶24} R.C. Chapter 4112 was amended by the passage of the ELUA, H.B. 352,
which went into effect on April 15, 2021. There is no dispute that the ELUA makes no
mention of retroactivity.
{¶25} Section 28, Article II of the Ohio Constitution, prohibits the General
Assembly from passing retroactive laws. “A statute is presumed to be prospective in its
operation unless expressly made retrospective.” R.C. § 1.48. See Van Fossen v. Babcock
Wilcox Co., 36 Ohio St.3d 100, 105, 522 N.E.2d 489 (1988); State v. Brooks, 2022-Ohio-
2478, -- N.E.3d --, ¶ 9. A statute may not be applied retroactively unless the General
Assembly expressly makes it retroactive. State v. Brooks, 2022-Ohio-2478, ¶ 10 citing
Hyle v. Porter, 117 Ohio St.3d 165, 2008-Ohio-542, 882 N.E.2d 899, ¶ 9.
{¶26} Three federal court decisions have addressed the question of whether the
ELUA has retroactive application; to wit: Williams v. Barton Malow Co., 581 F. Supp.3d
923 (2022); Erwin v. Honda North America Inc., S.D. Ohio No. 2:20-cv-4350, 2022 WL
3716561 (Aug. 29, 2022); and Hensley v. West Chester Township, S.D. Ohio No.
1:21cv373, 2022 WL 4621432 (Sept. 30, 2022). The Northern District and Southern
District courts agreed there was no language in the ELUA indicating that the General
Assembly intended for it to apply retroactively and therefore the ELUA could not be
applied retroactively. Accord Truex v. State Automobile Mut. Ins. Co., Franklin C.P. No.
21CV004747 (Feb. 10, 2022).
{¶27} Consistent with the Ohio Supreme Court’s binding precedent as to the
statutory interpretation of retroactive application and the persuasive authority of our
Delaware County, Case No. 22 CAE 04 0029 11
federal colleagues, we find the ELUA is not retroactive and has only prospective
application.
Statute of Limitations
{¶28} A statute of limitations establishes “a time limit for suing in a civil case,
based on the date when the claim accrued (as when the injury occurred or was
discovered).” Black's Law Dictionary 1707 (11th Ed.2019). Wilson v. Durrani, 164 Ohio
St.3d 419, 2020-Ohio-6827, 173 N.E.3d 448, ¶ 9. Burch alleges in her complaint that her
claims for employment discrimination and retaliation accrued on May 12, 2020 and her
second claim for retaliation accrued on March 18, 2021. Ohio Farmers argues against
those dates; however, we cannot say that those dates are not correct under our limited
standard of review where we must only consider the four corners of the Refiled Complaint
and the allegations therein in a light most favorable to Burch. See Dover Chem. Corp. v.
Dover, 2022-Ohio-2307, 192 N.E.3d 559, ¶ 32 (5th Dist.) citing Byrd v. Faber, 57 Ohio
St.3d 56, 565 N.E.2d 584 (1991).
{¶29} Prior to the April 15, 2021 enactment of the ELUA, R.C. Chapter 4112
required an employee claiming workplace discrimination to bring his or her civil action
within six years of the accrual of the claim. “R.C. 4112.99 is a remedial statute, and is
thus subject to R.C. 2305.07's six-year statute of limitations.” Cosgrove v. Williamsburg
of Cincinnati Mgt. Co., 70 Ohio St.3d 281, 638 N.E.2d 991, 991 (1994). R.C. 2305.07(B)
states, in relevant part, that “an action upon * * * a liability created by statute other than a
forfeiture or penalty * * * shall be brought within six years after the cause of action
accrued.” Id. at 992. The ELUA amended R.C. Chapter 4112 to codify a two-year statute
of limitations to file a civil action for employment discrimination claims.
Delaware County, Case No. 22 CAE 04 0029 12
{¶30} The calculation of the statute of limitations is based on the date the claims
of the plaintiff accrued. Reviewing the complaint in a light most favorably to Burch, her
claims of workplace discrimination accrued before April 15, 2021. The ELUA has no
retroactive application; therefore, Burch’s claims must be considered under the six-year
statute of limitations of R.C. Chapter 4112, in effect prior to the enactment of the ELUA.
Upon our de novo review, we find her causes of action for workplace discrimination were
timely filed within the six-year statute of limitations and the trial court erred in dismissing
her claims as barred by the ELUA’s two-year statute of limitations.
Administrative Remedies
{¶31} In its motion to dismiss, Ohio Farmers argued that Burch failed to state her
retaliation claims upon which relief could be granted because she did not first exhaust her
administrative remedies as required by the ELUA. Under the new amendments to R.C.
Chapter 4112, a plaintiff alleging a violation of R.C. 4112.02 must first file a charge with
the Ohio Civil Rights Commission. See R.C. 4112.052(a). The trial court dismissed her
retaliation claims as being barred by the ELUA.
{¶32} In this case, we find that the amendments to R.C. Chapter 4112 do not block
Burch’s retaliation claims based on our determination that the ELUA is not retroactive and
does not apply to claims arising before the amendments’ effective date of April 15, 2021.
Burch’s failure to exhaust her administrative remedies with the OCRC before filing the
Refiled Complaint is not a bar to her claims for retaliation under R.C. Chapter 4112. See
Hensley v. West Chester Township, S.D. Ohio No. 1:21cv373, 2022 WL 4621432 (Sept.
30, 2022), *6.
Delaware County, Case No. 22 CAE 04 0029 13
Supervisor Liability
{¶33} In her Refiled Complaint, Burch named her former manager, Betsy Jones
as a party-defendant to her claims for workplace discrimination, which accrued before
April 15, 2021. The trial court granted Ohio Farmers’ motion to dismiss Jones as a
defendant because the ELUA prohibits individual supervisory liability where the
supervisor is acting in the interests of the employer. See R.C. 4112.08(A). Under the
ELUA, an individual supervisor will only face individual liability if (1) the supervisor is an
employer, or (2) the claim involves retaliation for opposing discrimination, aiding a
discriminatory practice, or obstructing a person from complying with the Ohio Civil Rights
law. See R.C. 4112.01(A)(24)(a); R.C. 4112.08(A).
{¶34} Prior to the enactment of the ELUA, R.C. 4112.08 contained no provision
prohibiting individual liability for supervisors under R.C. Chapter 4112. See Genaro v.
Central Transp., Inc., 84 Ohio St.3d 293, 300, 703 N.E.2d 782 (1999). In accord with our
determination that the ELUA has no retroactive effect, we find the trial court erred in
dismissing Jones as a party-defendant pursuant to the ELUA.
The ELUA Is Not Retroactive and the Refiled Complaint Survives
{¶35} At this stage of the proceedings, our analysis is limited to the facts alleged
in the Refiled Complaint. Construing all material allegations in the Refiled Complaint
(along with all reasonable inferences that could be drawn therefrom) in favor of Burch, we
cannot state that Burch is barred by the ELUA from proceeding with her causes of action
raised in the Refiled Complaint.
{¶36} Burch’s sole Assignment of Error is sustained.
Delaware County, Case No. 22 CAE 04 0029 14
CONCLUSION
{¶37} The judgment of the Delaware County Court of Common Pleas is reversed,
and the matter is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this
Opinion and law.
By: Delaney, J.,
Gwin, P.J. and
Hoffman, J., concur.