Little Aquanauts, L.L.C. v. Makovich & Pusti Architects, Inc. , 2021 Ohio 942 ( 2021 )


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  • [Cite as Little Aquanauts, L.L.C. v. Makovich & Pusti Architects, Inc., 
    2021-Ohio-942
    .]
    COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
    EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
    COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA
    LITTLE AQUANAUTS, L.L.C.,                               :
    Plaintiff-Appellee,                    :
    No. 109594
    v.                                     :
    MAKOVICH & PUSTI ARCHITECTS,
    INC., ET AL.,                                           :
    Defendants-Appellants.                 :
    JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION
    JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED
    RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: March 25, 2021
    Civil Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas
    Case No. CV-19-926299
    Appearances:
    Harvey + Abens, Co., L.P.A., David L. Harvey III, and
    Matthew B. Abens, for appellee.
    Shumaker, Loop & Kendrick, L.L.P., Nicholas T. Stack,
    and Nicholas A. Huckaby, for appellant.
    FRANK D. CELEBREZZE, JR., J.:
    Appellant Endless Pools, Inc. (“Endless Pools”) challenges the trial
    court’s judgment entry denying its motion to compel arbitration or, alternatively,
    motion to dismiss with memorandum in support. After a thorough review of the law
    and facts, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
    I. Factual and Procedural History
    Appellee Little Aquanauts, L.L.C. (“Aquanauts”) is in the business of
    teaching water self-rescue training to children. Aquanauts leased space for its
    business, but the premises did not have a pool, so Aquanauts looked into installing
    an endless pool. In fall 2016, Aquanauts initiated conversations with Endless Pools
    regarding purchasing and installing one of their pools. Aquanauts alleged that it
    relied on representations made by Endless Pools in selecting a pool design that
    would be appropriate for and work in Aquanauts’ premises.
    Aquanauts ultimately purchased the pool on Endless Pools’ website. As
    part of the finalization process, Aquanauts was given an opportunity to view the
    Terms and Conditions of Sale (“Terms and Conditions”) that would apply to the
    purchase. The pertinent sections of the Terms and Conditions state as follows:
    1. Terms and Conditions:
    Any terms and conditions are limited to those contained in these Terms
    and Conditions of Sale. By finalizing your order and choosing the I
    Accept option, you are agreeing to the terms contained herein. * * *
    These Terms and Conditions of Sale constitute the full and entire
    agreement between the customer and Endless Pools pertaining to this
    sale.
    2. Governing Law:
    The Laws of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania will govern this sale
    and these Terms and Conditions of Sale between Endless Pools and the
    customer without regard to conflicts of laws or rules. Any arbitration or
    litigation will be conducted in Delaware County, Pennsylvania. The
    customer consents to the jurisdiction of the Federal and State courts
    located in Pennsylvania, and submits to the jurisdiction thereof and
    dismisses the right to change venue. The customer also consents to the
    application of personal jurisdiction by any such court with respect to
    such proceeding.
    3. Limitation of Liability:
    * * * Endless Pools shall not be responsible for any permits, fees,
    licenses, and authorizations necessary to comply with local or state
    codes or requirements. Endless Pools takes no responsibility for any
    site preparation, including, but not limited to, preparing any slab or
    foundation. Any Endless Pools product installed above grade must be
    placed on a properly engineered structure.
    ***
    6. Disputes:
    Any disputes arising under these Terms and Conditions of Sale must be
    submitted to binding arbitration before a JAMS arbitrator in
    Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. The party in whose favor a judgment is
    rendered in arbitration shall be reimbursed for its legal fees and costs
    by the other party, in addition to any other damages awarded by the
    arbitrator.
    Construction and installation of the pool commenced, and, as it was
    nearing completion, Aquanauts learned that the Cuyahoga County Board of Health
    was required to inspect the pool and corresponding systems. Upon contacting the
    Board of Health, Aquanauts was informed that it should have sought the approval
    of the Board of Health prior to the pool’s construction and installation. Aquanauts
    attempted to submit the paperwork belatedly, but it was rejected. Aquanauts was
    informed that its pool was not compliant with the state of Ohio’s regulations.
    Aquanauts was never able to use the pool and therefore was never able
    to open for business; Aquanauts was forced to vacate its leased space.
    Aquanauts filed suit against Endless Pools, along with the architect of
    the project and the contractor who installed the endless pool. Pertinent to this
    appeal,   Aquanauts    alleged   claims   against   Endless    Pools   for   negligent
    misrepresentation and violation of Ohio’s Deceptive Trade Practices Act.
    Endless Pools moved to compel arbitration or, in the alternative, to
    dismiss the case, arguing that Aquanauts had agreed to arbitrate any claims.
    Aquanauts opposed the motion, asserting that its claims fell outside of the scope of
    the arbitration provision in the Terms and Conditions. The trial court denied
    Endless Pools’ motion without analysis. Endless Pools then filed the instant appeal,
    raising one assignment of error for our review:
    The trial court erred in denying Endless Pools’ motion to dismiss
    [Aquanauts’] claims against Endless Pools or, alternatively, to stay the
    action and compel [Aquanauts] to re-assert its claims in arbitration.
    II. Law and Discussion
    This court applies a de novo standard of review when evaluating the
    scope of an arbitration agreement, that is, whether a party has agreed to submit a
    certain issue to arbitration. Seyfried v. O’Brien, 
    2017-Ohio-286
    , 
    81 N.E.3d 961
    , ¶ 18
    (8th Dist.), citing McCaskey v. Sanford-Brown College, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No.
    97261, 
    2012-Ohio-1543
    , ¶ 7. Any doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable issues
    should be resolved in favor of arbitration. Moses H. Cone Mem. Hosp. v. Mercury
    Constr. Corp., 
    460 U.S. 1
    , 24-25, 
    103 S.Ct. 927
    , 
    74 L.Ed.2d 765
     (1983).
    Aquanauts does not dispute that it agreed to the Terms and Conditions,
    which contained the arbitration provision. Endless Pools argues that the arbitration
    provision is broad and covers any dispute “arising from” the Terms and Conditions.
    Further, Endless Pools asserts that, even if the arbitration provision were not so all-
    encompassing, Aquanauts’ claims would still be covered because Endless Pools
    argues that Aquanauts’ claims are for breach of contract, but are creatively pled as
    negligent misrepresentation and violation of Ohio’s Deceptive Trade Practices Act.
    In addition, Endless Pools contends that Aquanauts’ claims directly
    involve a provision from the Terms and Conditions, to wit: “Endless Pools shall not
    be responsible for any permits, fees, licenses, and authorizations necessary to
    comply with local or state codes or requirements.” Consequently, Endless Pools
    maintains that arbitration of Aquanauts’ claims is mandatory.
    In opposition, Aquanauts argues that its claims are not subject to the
    arbitration provision because, by the very language of the Terms and Conditions, the
    arbitration clause is quite narrow. Aquanauts maintains that its claims do not arise
    from the Terms and Conditions, but instead are premised upon representations by
    Endless Pools that occurred prior to entering the purchase. Aquanauts is not
    alleging any issues with the subjects included in the Terms and Conditions. Rather,
    its allegations stem from the duty of Endless Pools to communicate, prior to the sale,
    correct and relevant information to guide or assist Aquanauts in its business
    decision. Aquanauts asserts that Endless Pools’ duty to convey accurate information
    about its pools existed independently of the Terms and Conditions.
    Ohio recognizes a “strong public policy” in favor of arbitration and the
    enforcement of arbitration provisions. Hayes v. Oakridge Home, 
    122 Ohio St.3d 63
    , 
    2009-Ohio-2054
    , 
    908 N.E.2d 408
    , ¶ 15; Taylor Bldg. Corp. of Am. v. Benfield,
    
    117 Ohio St.3d 352
    , 
    2008-Ohio-938
    , 
    884 N.E.2d 12
    , ¶ 24; R.C. 2711.01(A). When
    ruling on a motion to compel arbitration, however, the “proper focus” is on whether
    the parties actually agreed to arbitrate the matter at issue, i.e., the language and
    scope of the arbitration provision, not the general policies of the arbitration statutes.
    Taylor v. Ernst & Young, L.L.P., 
    130 Ohio St.3d 411
    , 
    2011-Ohio-5262
    , 
    958 N.E.2d 1203
    , ¶ 20.
    A “presumption favoring arbitration” arises when a claim in dispute
    “falls within the scope of the arbitration provision.” Williams v. Aetna Fin. Co., 
    83 Ohio St.3d 464
    , 471, 
    700 N.E.2d 859
     (1998); Taylor Bldg. at ¶ 27; Natale v. Frantz
    Ward, L.L.P., 
    2018-Ohio-1412
    , 
    110 N.E.3d 829
    , ¶ 9 (8th Dist.). Although a party
    cannot be compelled to arbitrate a dispute the party has not agreed to submit to
    arbitration, Council of Smaller Ents. v. Gates, McDonald & Co., 
    80 Ohio St.3d 661
    ,
    665, 
    687 N.E.2d 1352
     (1998), “[a]ny doubts regarding arbitrability should be
    resolved in favor of arbitration,” Natale at ¶ 9, citing Academy of Medicine of
    Cincinnati v. Aetna Health, Inc., 
    108 Ohio St.3d 185
    , 
    2006-Ohio-657
    , 
    842 N.E.2d 488
    , ¶ 14.
    The threshold question is whether the parties agreed to arbitrate the
    issues. In Aetna Health, Inc., the Supreme Court of Ohio reiterated that the test for
    determining the arbitrability of a given dispute involves four rules:
    (1) that “‘arbitration is a matter of contract and a party cannot be
    required to so submit to arbitration any dispute which he has not
    agreed to so submit’”; (2) that the question whether a particular claim
    is arbitrable is one of law for the court to decide; (3) that when deciding
    whether the parties have agreed to submit a particular claim to
    arbitration, a court may not rule on the potential merits of the
    underlying claim; and (4) that when a “‘contract contains an arbitration
    provision, there is a presumption of arbitrability in the sense that “[a]n
    order to arbitrate the particular grievance should not be denied unless
    it may be said with positive assurance that the arbitration clause is not
    susceptible of an interpretation that covers the asserted dispute.”’”
    Id. at ¶ 5, quoting Cohen v. PaineWebber, Inc., 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-010312,
    
    2002-Ohio-196
    , ¶ 9, quoting Council of Smaller Ents. at 665-666, citing AT&T
    Technologies, Inc. v. Communications Workers of Am., 
    475 U.S. 643
    , 650, 
    106 S.Ct. 1415
    , 
    89 L.Ed.2d 648
     (1986). ‘“[A] proper method of analysis * * * is to ask if an
    action could be maintained without reference to the contract or relationship at issue.
    If it could, it is likely outside the scope of the arbitration agreement.”’ Aetna Health,
    Inc. at ¶ 6, quoting Fazio v. Lehman Bros., Inc., 
    340 F.3d 386
    , 395 (6th Cir.2003).
    “[W]hile torts may sometimes be covered by arbitration clauses where
    the allegations underlying the claims touch matters covered by the arbitration
    agreement, tort claims that may be asserted independently, without reference to the
    contract, fall outside of the scope of an arbitration provision.” Arnold v. Burger
    King, 
    2015-Ohio-4485
    , 
    48 N.E.3d 69
    , ¶ 32 (8th Dist.), citing Fazio at ¶ 6; see also
    Complete Personnel Logistics, Inc. v. Patton, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 86857, 2006-
    Ohio-3356, ¶ 15 (“[T]ort claims that may be asserted independently, without
    reference to the contract, fall outside the scope of the arbitration provision.”).
    We agree with Aquanauts that the arbitration provision in this matter
    is narrow in scope and covers solely disputes “arising under these Terms and
    Conditions of Sale.” The document containing the Terms and Conditions is brief
    and only addresses the following areas: Aquanauts’ acceptance and the extent of the
    terms and conditions contained therein, the governing law, limitation of liability,
    payments, international shipments, and disputes.
    Aquanauts’ claims allege that Endless Pools represented that the
    selected pool would comply with all applicable codes and laws, that Endless Pools
    supplied false information regarding the suitability and appropriateness of its
    product for Aquanauts’ space, and that the pool was of a particular standard and
    quality necessary for approval which it, in fact, was not. The Terms and Conditions
    do not contain any information relating to the sale or specifics regarding the pool,
    and as such, do not pertain to the claims alleged by Aquanauts. Accordingly,
    Aquanauts’ claims can be asserted without any reference to the Terms and
    Conditions.
    Endless Pools argues that Aquanauts’ claim that Endless Pools
    represented that the pool would be installed according to all applicable codes and
    laws directly implicates Section 3 of the Terms and Conditions, “Limitation of
    Liability” (“Endless Pools shall not be responsible for any permits, fees, licenses, and
    authorizations necessary to comply with local or state codes or requirements.”).
    However, Endless Pools’ argument is misplaced. Aquanauts’ claims are not alleging
    that Endless Pools failed to obtain a permit, fee, license, or authorization, and thus
    do not fall under the asserted provision.
    Finally, Endless Pools’ argument that the parties agreed to submit any
    issue of arbitrability to the arbitrator is without merit. “‘Unless the parties clearly
    and unmistakably provide otherwise, the question of whether the parties agreed to
    arbitrate is to be decided by the court, not the arbitrator.’” Pappas v. Richmond
    Towers L.L.C., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 94558, 
    2011-Ohio-5249
    , ¶ 14, quoting
    Belmont County Sheriff v. FOP, Ohio Labor Council, Inc., 
    104 Ohio St.3d 568
    ,
    
    2004-Ohio-7106
    , 
    820 N.E.2d 918
    , ¶ 13, citing Council of Smaller Ents., 80 Ohio
    St.3d at 666, 
    687 N.E.2d 1352
    .
    Endless Pools argues that Aquanauts agreed to have the arbitrator
    determine the issue of arbitrability because the arbitration clause provides that
    dispute will be submitted to a JAMS arbitrator, and JAMS’ rules state that such
    questions shall be determined by the arbitrator, but this is insufficient.       Any
    agreement for arbitrability to be decided by the arbitrator rather than the court must
    be spelled out in the arbitration clause itself. See Pappas at ¶ 16. The arbitration
    clause in the Terms and Conditions is silent as to jurisdiction; accordingly, the
    parties did not unmistakably provide that the issue of arbitrability was to be
    determined by the arbitrator. The issue was therefore properly determined by the
    court.
    The trial court properly denied the motion to compel arbitration, and
    Endless Pools’ assignment of error is overruled.
    III. Conclusion
    Aquanauts’ claims do not fall within the scope of the arbitration
    clause. Thus, the trial court did not err in denying Endless Pools’ motion to compel
    arbitration or, alternatively, motion to dismiss. Endless Pools’ sole assignment of
    error is overruled, and the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
    Judgment affirmed.
    It is ordered that appellee recover from appellant costs herein taxed.
    The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
    It is ordered that a special mandate be sent to said court to carry this judgment
    into execution.
    A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27
    of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
    FRANK D. CELEBREZZE, JR., JUDGE
    ANITA LASTER MAYS, P.J., and
    KATHLEEN ANN KEOUGH, J., CONCUR