Homestead Interiors, Inc. v. Hines , 2021 Ohio 1014 ( 2021 )

[Cite as Homestead Interiors, Inc. v. Hines, 2021-Ohio-1014.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
ELEVENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
GEAUGA COUNTY, OHIO
HOMESTEAD INTERIORS, INC., : OPINION
Plaintiff-Appellee, :
CASE NO. 2020-G-0257
- vs - :
PHILLIP HINES, :
Defendant-Appellant. :
Civil Appeal from the Chardon Municipal Court, Case No. 2018 CVF 00577.
Judgment: Reversed and remanded.
George L. Badovick, 13033 Ravenna Road, Chardon, OH 44024 (For Plaintiff-Appellee).
Glenn E. Forbes, Forbes Law, LLC, 166 Main Street, Painesville, OH 44077 (For
Defendant-Appellant).
CYNTHIA WESTCOTT RICE, J.
{¶1} This matter is before us on the appeal of Phillip Hines from a June 15, 2020
judgment entry of the Chardon Municipal Court, overruling Mr. Hines’ objections to a
magistrate’s decision and rendering judgment in favor of Homestead Interiors, Inc. on its
motion for attorney fees in the amount of $7,850.00. The judgment is reversed.
{¶2} The litigation began on June 18, 2018, as a small claims complaint filed by
Appellee Homestead Interiors, Inc. (“Homestead”) against Appellant Phillip Hines (“Mr.
Hines”) for $600.00 on an account pertaining to carpet installation. Mr. Hines answered
and counterclaimed, alleging Homestead violated the Consumer Sales Practices Act and
the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, damaged his personal property, and breached
express warranties and implied warranties of merchantability. Mr. Hines sought damages
in the amount of $14,000.00 plus costs, attorney fees, and punitive damages. Homestead
answered, and the case was transferred to the civil docket of the Chardon Municipal
Court.
{¶3} On July 22, 2019, Homestead filed a joint “Motion in Limine to Strike
Defendant’s Expert Testimony and Motion for Sanctions.” The magistrate issued an order
on July 31, 2019, granting Homestead’s motion to strike and ordering Homestead to
submit a fee bill for attorney fees incurred in the matter. Mr. Hines filed a “Motion to Set
Aside Magistrate’s Order,” which the magistrate denied on August 19, 2019.
{¶4} Mr. Hines noticed an appeal from the magistrate’s August 19, 2019 order
denying his motion to set aside the order of July 31, 2019. The issues on appeal were
ultimately resolved between the parties, and the appeal was dismissed upon request.
Thereafter, the parties filed a joint motion in the municipal court to vacate the sanctions
order of July 31, 2019. The motion was granted.
{¶5} Meanwhile, a bench trial was held before a magistrate on August 1, 2019,
on the merits of the claim and counterclaim. In a September 4, 2019 decision, the
magistrate found in favor of Homestead and against Mr. Hines for $600.00 on the
account, plus interest and costs. The magistrate also awarded attorney fees to
Homestead and ordered Homestead to submit a bill for fees incurred in the matter.
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{¶6} Mr. Hines filed objections to the magistrate’s decision on September 17,
2019. The municipal court never ruled on these objections nor did it issue a judgment
on the claim or counterclaim.
{¶7} Homestead submitted its statement of attorney fees, to which Mr. Hines
responded. The magistrate held an evidentiary hearing on February 27, 2020. In an April
17, 2020 decision, the magistrate recommended that Homestead should be awarded
attorney fees in the amount of $7,850.00 as requested. Mr. Hines filed objections to the
magistrate’s decision. On June 15, 2020, the municipal court overruled the objections
and rendered judgment to Homestead against Mr. Hines in the amount of $7,850.00 for
attorney fees.
{¶8} This appeal ensued. Appellant raises three assignments of error for our
review, the first of which asserts:
{¶9} The Trial Court erred to the prejudice of the Defendant by
granting a Judgment for attorney fees when entitlement to
attorney fees had not yet been established.
{¶10} Mr. Hines argues that the municipal court did not have authority to award
attorney fees to Homestead without first overruling his objections to the magistrate’s
September 4, 2019 decision on the underlying claim and counterclaim and entering an
independent final judgment. We agree with Mr. Hines.
{¶11} Very simply, “[a] magistrate’s decision is not effective unless adopted by the
court.” Civ.R. 53(D)(4)(a). Additionally, the trial court is required to rule on objections to
a magistrate’s decision: “If one or more objections to a magistrate’s decision are timely
filed, the court shall rule on those objections. In ruling on objections, the court shall
undertake an independent review as to the objected matters to ascertain that the
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magistrate has properly determined the factual issues and appropriately applied the law.”
Civ.R. 53(D)(4)(d). E.g., City of Kent v. CDC-Kent, LLC, 11th Dist. Portage No. 2017-P-
0081, 2018-Ohio-3743, ¶13, fn. 2 (“Magistrates have limited authority, which does not
extend to issuing judgment entries; entering judgments is solely the function of the
judge.”); accord Wheeler v. Tubbs, 11th Dist. Lake No. 2008-L-159, 2008-Ohio-6411, ¶7.
{¶12} A trial court’s judgment that fails to rule on properly filed objections to a
magistrate’s decision is not a final appealable order. See, e.g., McCown v. McCown, 145
Ohio App.3d 170, 172 (12th Dist.2001). Thus, given the municipal court’s failure to rule
on the objections to the magistrate’s underlying decision, a question is raised as to
whether this court has jurisdiction to decide the appeal.
{¶13} The subject of this appeal, however, is the municipal court’s subsequent
overruling of objections and independent judgment as to attorney fees. If we were now
to dismiss the appeal for lack of a final appealable order, the objections to the underlying
decision may never be properly ruled on by the municipal court, and final judgment may
never be entered. Further, Mr. Hines would be prevented from requesting Civ.R. 60(B)
relief and would be unable to appeal from the denial of a Civ.R. 54(B) motion to
reconsider. See, e.g., Beyke v. Beyke, 3d Dist. Union Nos. 14-05-13 & 14-05-15, 2005-
Ohio-5465, ¶16 (Civ.R. 60(B) may only be used to obtain relief from final judgments, and
the refusal to reconsider an interlocutory order is itself an interlocutory order, not subject
to appeal).
{¶14} Mr. Hines did attempt to remedy this situation by requesting the municipal
court vacate the June 15, 2020 judgment for the reasons outlined above, but the court
denied the request. It appears the municipal court may be laboring under the
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misconception that the September 4, 2019 magistrate’s decision was rendered final by
Mr. Hines’ first appeal in this matter. In the court’s June 15, 2020 judgment entry, it stated
that “the Defendant appealed the September 4, 2019 Magistrate’s Decision, but it was
settled and dismissed in the Eleventh District Court of Appeals.” Mr. Hines’ first appeal,
however, was from the magistrate’s August 19, 2019 order denying his motion to set aside
the magistrate’s order of July 31, 2019. The issues raised and settled in that appeal,
related to sanctions, were wholly separate from the magistrate’s recommendation on
September 4, 2019, to render judgment on the underlying claim and counterclaim.
{¶15} In these particular circumstances, we conclude the municipal court’s
attorney fees order is final and appealable under R.C. 2505.02(B)(1) (“An order is a final
order that may be reviewed, affirmed, modified, or reversed, with or without retrial, when
it is * * * An order that affects a substantial right in an action that in effect determines the
action and prevents a judgment.”). Accordingly, we have jurisdiction to review and
determine this appeal.
{¶16} We further find instructive the decision in Murphy v. Murphy, 5th Dist. Stark
No. 2007CA00069, 2008-Ohio-1971. In Murphy, the magistrate filed a decision finding
the defendant guilty of contempt on plaintiff’s motions for contempt. The magistrate
recommended a 30-day jail sentence with an opportunity to purge the contempt. The
defendant filed objections. The trial court never ruled on the objections, adopted the
magistrate’s decision, or entered an independent judgment. Thus, there was no final
judgment finding the defendant in contempt and ordering a jail sentence. Even so, the
plaintiff filed a motion to impose sentence, the trial court held a hearing on the motion,
and the trial court sustained the motion and ordered the defendant to report to jail. The
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Fifth District concluded that the trial court clearly imposed sentence prior to ruling on the
objections to the contempt finding that formed the basis for the suspended jail sentence,
which was an error of law (and also a violation of the defendant’s due process rights).
The trial court’s decision was reversed on that basis. Id. at ¶56-64.
{¶17} Similarly, here, the magistrate issued a decision finding in favor of
Homestead on the $600.00 claim and request for attorney fees. Mr. Hines filed
objections. The municipal court never ruled on those objections, adopted the magistrate’s
decision, or entered an independent final judgment on the underlying matters. Even so,
Homestead submitted a bill for fees incurred, the magistrate held an evidentiary hearing,
and the magistrate recommended an attorney fee award in the amount of $7,850.00. The
municipal court overruled the objections to that decision and ordered Hines to pay
attorney fees as recommended by the magistrate. This was clearly an error of law, as
there was no final judgment of the trial court that formed the basis for the award of attorney
fees.
{¶18} For these reasons, we conclude the municipal court erred to the prejudice
of Mr. Hines by granting an order for attorney fees when entitlement to those fees had not
yet been finally established by the court.
{¶19} Mr. Hines’ first assignment of error has merit.
{¶20} Mr. Hines raises two additional assignments of error:
{¶21} The Trial Court erred to the prejudice of the Defendant by
granting a Judgment for attorney fees when there was no
testimony as to the reasonableness of those fees by a person
other than the proponent.
{¶22} The Trial Court erred to the prejudice of the Defendant by
granting a Judgment for attorney fees when neither
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reasonableness of the fees, nor the Swanson factors, were
demonstrated.
{¶23} Pursuant to our holding under the first assignment of error, these arguments
have been rendered moot.
{¶24} The judgment of the Chardon Municipal Court is reversed, and this matter
is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
MARY JANE TRAPP, P.J.,
MATT LYNCH, J.,
concur.
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