State v. Jones ( 2021 )

[Cite as State v. Jones, 2021-Ohio-1050.]
STATE OF OHIO ) IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
)ss: NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
COUNTY OF SUMMIT )
STATE OF OHIO C.A. No. 29706
Appellee
v. APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT
ENTERED IN THE
DANIEL LEE JONES COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
COUNTY OF SUMMIT, OHIO
Appellant CASE No. CR 19 01 0111
DECISION AND JOURNAL ENTRY
Dated: March 31, 2021
CALLAHAN, Judge.
{¶1} Defendant-Appellant, Daniel Jones, appeals from his convictions in the Summit
County Court of Common Pleas. This Court affirms.
I.
{¶2} One evening in September 2018, a concerned citizen reported seeing a roadside
mattress fire on South Van Buren Road in New Franklin. The firefighters who responded to the
scene discovered a woman’s body lying on top of the burning mattress and carefully extinguished
the flames. Several items were found alongside the victim, including a cell phone, a tablet, and a
Garmin GPS device. Additionally, officers learned that a passing motorist had seen a solitary male
pulling a mattress from the back of a vehicle shortly before the fire started. An autopsy was
performed, and it was determined that the victim had died from blunt force trauma to the head and
neck with mixed asphyxial mechanisms (i.e., choking and smothering). Authorities were quickly
able to identify the victim as K.B.
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{¶3} About twelve hours after K.B.’s body was discovered, the Akron Police
Department recovered an abandoned vehicle from an Akron school parking lot. The vehicle did
not appear to have been broken into or hotwired, but its front passenger’s seat had fire damage and
its interior was sooty. The vehicle was towed to an impound lot because it was not immediately
connected with the New Franklin fire. Later that same day, Mr. Jones’ girlfriend contacted the
Akron Police Department and reported that her vehicle had been stolen sometime during the night.
An officer spoke with her and Mr. Jones at their apartment and informed them that the vehicle had
been found at a nearby school. Both Mr. Jones and his girlfriend maintained that the car had been
stolen. Both indicated that they had parked it outside their apartment the previous evening and
had not seen it since.
{¶4} Forensic scientists tested vaginal swabs taken from K.B. during her autopsy. They
also tested cuttings taken from paper towels that were found wrapped around her head at the scene.
Both tests uncovered male DNA and that DNA profile led the New Franklin Police Department to
Mr. Jones, as his profile was consistent with the profile scientists had uncovered. New Franklin
detectives began investigating Mr. Jones and learned that he shared an apartment with his
girlfriend. They also learned that the girlfriend had reported her vehicle stolen, that the alleged
theft had occurred the night of the murder, that the vehicle had been located, and that it had
sustained fire damage.
{¶5} By the time New Franklin detectives discovered the possible connection between
the girlfriend’s vehicle and K.B.’s murder, the girlfriend had turned the vehicle over to her
insurance company. Detectives were able to recover the vehicle from the insurance company’s lot
and have it transferred to their station for processing. Upon inspection, blood was found on the
front passenger’s seat. Subsequent testing confirmed that the blood belonged to K.B.
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{¶6} A warrant was issued for Mr. Jones’ arrest, and the police obtained his and his
girlfriend’s cell phone records. The records showed that Mr. Jones had called his girlfriend on the
evening of the murder at a time when both claimed to have been at home for the evening. The
records also showed that, during that call, their phones had relied on two different cell towers. The
girlfriend’s phone had connected with a cell tower that serviced the area encompassing their
apartment. Meanwhile, Mr. Jones’ phone had connected with a tower that serviced the area where
police found the girlfriend’s vehicle the next morning. The school parking lot where the vehicle
was found was located less than a mile from their apartment.
{¶7} A grand jury indicted Mr. Jones on one count of murder, one count of felony
murder, two counts of tampering with evidence, and one count of gross abuse of a corpse.
Following the State’s presentation of its case-in-chief at trial, Mr. Jones took the stand and
admitted for the first time that he had killed K.B. He indicated that they had taken drugs together,
they had gotten into an argument, they began hitting one another, and she died after he placed her
in a chokehold. The trial court agreed to instruct the jury on the lesser-included offenses of
voluntary and involuntary manslaughter, but the jury found Mr. Jones guilty on each of his original
charges. The court determined that his murder, felony murder, and felonious assault counts were
allied offenses of similar import, and the State elected to have him sentenced on the murder count.
The court sentenced Mr. Jones to a total of nineteen years to life in prison.
{¶8} Mr. Jones now appeals from his convictions and raises four assignments of error
for review. For ease of analysis, this Court reorders two of his assignments of error.
II.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. 2
DANIEL JONES WAS DENIED HIS RIGHTS TO DUE PROCESS AND
CONFRONTATION GUARANTEED BY AMENDMENTS V, VI, AND XIV TO
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THE U.S. CONSTITUTION AND ART. 1, SECTIONS 1, 10, AND 16 OF THE
OHIO CONSTITUTION THROUGH THE PLAIN ERROR INTRODUCTION
OF UNQUALIFIED EXPERT TESTIMONY.
{¶9} In his second assignment of error, Mr. Jones argues that the trial court committed
plain error when it allowed the medical examiner to testify as to K.B.’s cause of death in the
absence of a proper foundation. He argues that the admission of her testimony violated his rights
under the Due Process Clause and the Confrontation Clause. For the following reasons, this Court
rejects his argument.
{¶10} Crim.R. 52(B) permits this Court to notice plain errors or defects that affected a
substantial right in the absence of an objection in the trial court. Plain error exists only where there
is a deviation from a legal rule, that is obvious, and that affected the appellant’s substantial rights
to the extent that it affected the outcome of the trial. State v. Barnes, 94 Ohio St.3d 21, 27 (2002).
“Notice of plain error under Crim.R. 52(B) is to be taken with the utmost caution, under
exceptional circumstances and only to prevent a manifest miscarriage of justice.” State v. Long,
53 Ohio St.2d 91 (1978), paragraph three of the syllabus.
{¶11} Dr. Lisa Kohler, the Chief Medical Examiner for Summit County, testified about
the results of K.B.’s autopsy and the cause and manner of her death. Dr. Kohler did not personally
perform K.B.’s autopsy. One of her colleagues was assigned K.B.’s case, conducted the autopsy,
and generated an autopsy report. Dr. Kohler testified that she reviewed and co-signed the autopsy
report in her role as Chief Medical Examiner. She also testified that the autopsy report was one of
the business records routinely kept at her office. Dr. Kohler testified that she had performed over
3,500 autopsies and described the process of an autopsy in detail. She then testified about the
specifics of K.B.’s autopsy, as documented in the autopsy report, and offered several opinions
about the cause of K.B.’s death.
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{¶12} Mr. Jones argues that Dr. Kohler should not have been permitted to read opinions
from the autopsy report or validate its conclusions. He notes that the State never moved to qualify
her as an expert witness. While she described her qualifications in general, Mr. Jones argues, she
failed to explain the specifics of her supervisory role or what authority she had, if any, to oversee
the examiner who conducted K.B.’s autopsy. According to Mr. Jones, Dr. Kohler did not testify
that K.B.’s autopsy followed necessary protocols or that she conducted an independent review of
the pictures, slides, and specimens collected during the autopsy. He argues that it was error for
the court to admit her testimony absent any showing that she was qualified to speak to the results
of K.B.’s autopsy. Additionally, he argues that the admission of her testimony violated his rights
under the Confrontation Clause because it deprived him of the ability to question the examiner
who completed the autopsy. Because Dr. Kohler’s testimony was the only evidence the State
presented to establish cause of death, Mr. Jones argues, he sustained prejudice as a result of its
admission.
{¶13} Initially, this Court notes that Mr. Jones’ brief contains two references to a
stipulation having been made at trial. The procedural history portion of his brief includes a
statement that “[t]rial counsel stipulated to the [autopsy] report * * *.” Meanwhile, the argument
portion of his first assignment of error includes a statement that “[t]rial counsel stipulated to the
autopsy report and [Dr.] Kohler’s testimony.” This Court is mindful that a defendant, by
stipulation, may waive both his ability to contest the admission of evidence and the right of
confrontation. State v. Gibbs, 9th Dist. Lorain No. 17CA011116, 2019-Ohio-4215, ¶ 11. Even
so, no stipulation appears in this Court’s record. Mr. Jones has neither provided a record citation
for a stipulation, nor outlined the exact nature of that stipulation. Moreover, the State has refrained
from commenting on the existence of any stipulation in its responsive brief. Under these particular
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facts and circumstances, this Court declines to apply the doctrine of waiver. Instead, out of an
abundance of caution, this Court will consider Mr. Jones’ argument on its merits.
{¶14} “The Confrontation Clause guarantees a criminal defendant the right ‘to be
confronted with the witnesses against him[]’ * * * [and] bars the admission of ‘testimonial’ hearsay
statements.” State v. Myers, 9th Dist. Wayne No. 19AP0045, 2020-Ohio-6792, ¶ 13, quoting the
Sixth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 68 (2004).
The Ohio Supreme Court has held that
an autopsy report that is neither prepared for the primary purpose of accusing a
targeted individual nor prepared for the primary purpose of providing evidence in
a criminal trial is nontestimonial, and its admission into evidence at trial under
Evid.R. 803(6) as a business record does not violate a defendant’s Sixth
Amendment confrontation rights.
State v. Maxwell, 139 Ohio St.3d 12, 2014-Ohio-1019, ¶ 63. The Supreme Court also has held
that “the availability of the original [medical examiner] is irrelevant.” State v. Adams, 146 Ohio
St.3d 232, 2016-Ohio-3043, ¶ 5. That is because evidence that falls “within the scope of the
[business-records exception] is admissible ‘even though the declarant is available as a witness.’”
Id., quoting Evid.R. 803.
{¶15} Dr. Kohler specifically testified that K.B.’s autopsy report was a business record
kept by her office, and Mr. Jones has made no attempt to argue that the report was inadmissible
under Evid.R. 803(6). See App.R. 16(A)(7). Even assuming the trial court erred when it admitted
Dr. Kohler’s personal opinions about K.B.’s cause of death, the autopsy report itself was
admissible through Dr. Kohler. See Maxwell at ¶ 63; Adams at ¶ 5. The autopsy report set forth
K.B.’s cause of death. Moreover, Mr. Jones took the stand and admitted that he killed K.B. Given
the admissibility of the autopsy report and Mr. Jones’ own testimony, this Court cannot conclude
that the admission of Dr. Kohler’s testimony affected his substantial rights to the extent that it
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affected the outcome of his trial. See Barnes, 94 Ohio St.3d at 27. Because Mr. Jones has not
shown that the trial court committed plain error when it allowed Dr. Kohler’s testimony, his second
assignment of error is overruled.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. 1
DANIEL JONES WAS DENIED HIS RIGHT TO EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF
COUNSEL GUARANTEED BY THE SIXTH AMENDMENT TO THE U.S.
CONSTITUTION AND ARTICLE I, SECTIONS 1, 10, & 16 OF THE OHIO
CONSTITUTION WHEN COUNSEL DID NOT OBJECT TO UNQUALIFIED
EXPERT TESTIMONY AND PRESENTED JONES’ TESTIMONY TO
ESTABLISH A MITIGATION CLAIM THAT COULD NOT BE REASONABLY
DEMONSTRATED.
{¶16} In his first assignment of error, Mr. Jones argues that he received ineffective
assistance of counsel. He argues that his attorneys engaged in ineffective assistance when they
failed to object to Dr. Kohler’s testimony. He further argues that his attorneys engaged in
ineffective assistance when they had him (Mr. Jones) testify to support their theory of voluntary
or involuntary manslaughter. For the following reasons, this Court rejects his arguments.
{¶17} To demonstrate ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must show (1)
deficiency in the performance of counsel “so serious that counsel was not functioning as the
‘counsel’ guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment” and (2) that the errors made by
counsel were “so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial[.]” Strickland v. Washington,
466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). A defendant must demonstrate prejudice by showing that, but for
counsel’s errors, there is a reasonable possibility that the outcome of the trial would have been
different. Id. at 694. “A defendant’s failure to satisfy one prong of the Strickland test negates a
court’s need to consider the other.” State v. Madrigal, 87 Ohio St.3d 378, 389 (2000), citing
Strickland at 697.
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{¶18} To the extent Mr. Jones argues that his attorneys were ineffective for failing to
object to Dr. Kohler’s testimony, this Court has already determined that the admission of her
testimony did not affect the outcome of his trial. See Discussion, supra. The autopsy report was
admissible and evidenced the cause and manner of K.B.’s death. Moreover, Mr. Jones admitted
that he killed K.B. when he testified in his own defense. Mr. Jones has not shown that, had his
attorneys objected to Dr. Kohler’s testimony, the outcome of his trial would have been different.
See Strickland at 694. Accordingly, this Court rejects his argument insofar as it pertains to his
attorney’s failure to object to Dr. Kohler’s testimony. See State v. Tyus, 9th Dist. Summit No.
29520, 2020-Ohio-4455, ¶ 31.
{¶19} Next, Mr. Jones argues that his attorneys engaged in ineffective assistance of
counsel when they called him to testify in his own defense. Mr. Jones testified that K.B. was an
acquaintance he sometimes met for the purpose of sharing drugs and engaging in sexual activity.
He testified that he had already been awake for several days on the day he caused K.B.’s death
because he had been ingesting crack cocaine and methamphetamine. It was his testimony that he
brought K.B. to his apartment and the two got high together. Mr. Jones testified that they began
to argue when he discovered that K.B. had taken the Garmin GPS from his girlfriend’s car. He
testified that, as their argument intensified, he hit K.B. and the two began “smack[ing] each other
around for a little bit * * *.” Mr. Jones then began choking K.B. Because K.B. kept hitting him
in the face, Mr. Jones testified, he spun her around and put her in a chokehold. Mr. Jones testified
that K.B. eventually went limp and he realized that he had killed her.
{¶20} Mr. Jones argues that his attorneys should not have allowed him to testify because,
as a matter of law, his testimony did not support a claim of manslaughter. He notes that voluntary
intoxication is not a defense. He further notes that no reasonable juror hearing his testimony could
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have concluded that he was subjected to serious provocation, justifying a sudden fit of rage on his
part. According to Mr. Jones, his testimony only served to prove the State’s case and foreclosed
any chance of the jury concluding that reasonable doubt existed.
{¶21} This Court has routinely recognized that “debatable trial strategies do not constitute
ineffective assistance of counsel.” State v. Shirley, 9th Dist. Summit No. 20569, 2002 WL 5177,
*7 (Jan. 2, 2002). “It is difficult to imagine a better example of trial strategy than a decision of
whether a defendant should testify on his own behalf.” State v. Mabry, 9th Dist. Medina No. 2514-
M, 1996 WL 577701, *3 (Oct. 9, 1996). “‘The advice provided by a criminal defense lawyer to
his or her client regarding the decision to testify is ‘‘a paradigm of the type of tactical decision that
cannot be challenged as evidence of ineffective assistance.’’” State v. Nesbit, 9th Dist. Wayne No.
05CA0021, 2006-Ohio-921, ¶ 9, quoting State v. Essinger, 3d Dist. Hancock No. 5-03-15, 2003-
Ohio-6000, ¶ 41, quoting State v. Winchester, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 79739, 2002-Ohio-2130, ¶
12.
{¶22} The record reflects that Mr. Jones waited until mid-trial to tell his attorneys that he
had killed K.B. At the start of trial, his attorneys moved the court to delay their opening statement
until after the State presented its case-in-chief. His attorneys informed the court that they had
discussed voluntary and involuntary manslaughter with Mr. Jones, but he had consistently taken
the position that he was not involved in K.B.’s death. His attorneys explained that their defense
strategy might change once Mr. Jones heard the State present all of the evidence against him. Sure
enough, Mr. Jones admitted his involvement after the State presented its case. At that point, his
attorneys argued the theories of voluntary and involuntary manslaughter.
{¶23} The record reflects that the State presented a strong case against Mr. Jones. His
DNA was found inside K.B.’s vagina and on a cutting of the paper towels found wrapped around
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her head. Her blood was found on the front passenger’s seat of his girlfriend’s car, and there was
evidence that he had possession of the car on the evening of the murder. His cell phone was used
in the area where the car was found, the car had not been broken into, and someone saw a lone
male taking a mattress from the back of a car at the location where K.B.’s body was found.
{¶24} Even though the jury ultimately rejected any claim of voluntary or involuntary
manslaughter, Mr. Jones’ attorneys were successful in obtaining jury instructions on those lesser-
included offenses. Given the strength of the State’s case and, specifically, the DNA evidence
against Mr. Jones, his attorneys reasonably could have decided the better strategy was to have him
explain his actions rather than continue to deny any involvement. Because the record supports the
conclusion that the decision to have him testify was a tactical one, this Court cannot conclude that
the decision amounted to ineffective assistance of counsel. See Nesbit, 2006-Ohio-921, at ¶ 9. Mr.
Jones’ argument to the contrary lacks merit.
{¶25} Lastly, Mr. Jones argues that the alleged errors his attorneys committed by not
objecting to Dr. Kohler’s testimony and by calling him to testify, when combined, deprived him
of a competent defense. Yet, Mr. Jones has not shown that his attorneys engaged in a deficient
performance when they called him to testify in his own defense. Nor has he shown that he
sustained prejudice as a result of any alleged failure on their part to object to Dr. Kohler’s
testimony. “Under these circumstances, we cannot find that cumulative error exists.” State v.
Hanford, 9th Dist. Summit No. 29204, 2019-Ohio-2987, ¶ 38. His first assignment of error is
overruled.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. 3
DANIEL JONES’ CONVICTIONS FOR MURDER AND FELONIOUS
ASSAULT WERE NOT SUPPORTED BY SUFFICIENT ADMISSIBLE
EVIDENCE, IN VIOLATION OF THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE OF THE 5TH
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AND 14TH AMENDMENTS TO THE U.S. CONSTITUTION AND ARTICLE I,
SECTIONS 1, 10 & 16 OF THE OHIO CONSTITUTION.
{¶26} In his third assignment of error, Mr. Jones argues that his convictions for murder
and felonious assault are based on insufficient evidence. For the following reasons, this Court
rejects his argument.
{¶27} “Whether a conviction is supported by sufficient evidence is a question of law that
this Court reviews de novo.” State v. Williams, 9th Dist. Summit No. 24731, 2009-Ohio-6955, ¶
18, citing State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 386 (1997). The relevant inquiry is whether the
prosecution has met its burden of production by presenting sufficient evidence to sustain a
conviction. Thompkins at 390 (Cook, J., concurring). For purposes of a sufficiency analysis, this
Court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the State. Jackson v. Virginia, 443
U.S. 307, 319 (1979). We do not evaluate credibility, and we make all reasonable inferences in
favor of the State. State v. Jenks, 61 Ohio St.3d 259, 273 (1991). The evidence is sufficient if it
allows the trier of fact to reasonably conclude that the essential elements of the crime were proven
beyond a reasonable doubt. Id.{¶28} Mr. Jones’ sufficiency argument is extremely limited. He argues that the State
failed to present any “competent evidence” that he caused K.B.’s death. That is because the State
relied on Dr. Kohler’s testimony to prove causation and, according to Mr. Jones, her testimony
and opinions were improperly admitted. He essentially asks this Court to disregard her testimony
in conducting its review. Yet, an appellate court must “review the issue of sufficiency in
consideration of all evidence presented by the State in its case in chief, whether such evidence was
properly admitted or not.” (Emphasis added.) State v. Dixon, 9th Dist. Medina Nos. 11CA0065-
M, 11CA0087-M, 2012-Ohio-4428, ¶ 18. Mr. Jones concedes that Dr. Kohler’s testimony, if
considered, “would be sufficient to present prima facie causation.” Moreover, he has not set forth
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any additional argument that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to sustain his
convictions. See App.R. 16(A)(7).
{¶29} Because Mr. Jones has conceded that Dr. Kohler’s testimony provides sufficient
support for his convictions and because this Court cannot ignore that testimony, see Dixon at ¶ 18,
this Court rejects Mr. Jones’ argument that his murder and felonious assault convictions are based
on insufficient evidence. See State v. Edwards, 9th Dist. Summit No. 28164, 2017-Ohio-7231, ¶
49-51. This Court also declines to conduct any additional review of the sufficiency of the evidence,
as Mr. Jones has limited his argument to Dr. Kohler’s testimony and has not set forth any additional
argument in that regard. See id. at ¶ 50. Upon review, Mr. Jones’ third assignment of error is
overruled.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. 4
DANIEL JONES’ CONVICTIONS FOR MURDER AND FELONIOUS
ASSAULT WERE AGAINST THE MANIFEST WEIGHT OF THE
ADMISSIBLE EVIDENCE IN VIOLATION OF THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE
OF THE 5TH AND 14TH AMENDMENTS TO THE U.S. CONSTITUTION
AND ARTICLE I, SECTIONS 1, 10 & 16 OF THE OHIO CONSTITUTION.
{¶30} In his fourth assignment of error, Mr. Jones argues that his murder and felonious
assault convictions are against the manifest weight of the evidence. This Court rejects his
argument.
{¶31} When considering whether a conviction is against the manifest weight of the
evidence, this Court must:
review the entire record, weigh the evidence and all reasonable inferences, consider
the credibility of witnesses and determine whether, in resolving conflicts in the
evidence, the trier of fact clearly lost its way and created such a manifest
miscarriage of justice that the conviction must be reversed and a new trial ordered.
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State v. Otten, 33 Ohio App.3d 339, 340 (9th Dist.1986). A reversal on this basis is reserved for
the exceptional case in which the evidence weighs heavily against the conviction. Id., citing State
v. Martin, 20 Ohio App.3d 172, 175 (1st Dist.1983).
{¶32} This Court has repeatedly recognized that “sufficiency and manifest weight are two
separate, legally distinct arguments.” State v. Vicente-Colon, 9th Dist. Lorain No. 09CA009705,
2010-Ohio-6242, ¶ 20. While sufficiency tests the State’s burden of production, manifest weight
tests its burden of persuasion. State v. Taylor, 9th Dist. Summit No. 28746, 2018-Ohio-2921, ¶
26. The concepts are not interchangeable, and it is inappropriate to combine them. See State v.
Mukha, 9th Dist. Wayne No. 18AP0019, 2018-Ohio-4918, ¶ 11.
{¶33} Though Mr. Jones cites the manifest weight standard in his brief, his argument
sounds strictly in sufficiency. He once again argues that his murder and felonious assault
convictions must be reversed because they are premised upon improper testimony (i.e., Dr.
Kohler’s testimony). He asserts that, without that testimony, the jury could not have concluded
beyond a reasonable doubt that he caused K.B.’s death.
{¶34} Mr. Jones “has not challenged any of the State’s evidence as ‘unreliable or lacking
credibility.’” State v. Webb, 9th Dist. Summit No. 28437, 2018-Ohio-4199, ¶ 6, quoting State v.
Smith, 9th Dist. Summit No. 27877, 2016-Ohio-7278, ¶ 16. He also has not addressed the
persuasiveness of the evidence or any alleged conflicts in the evidence. See State v. Vanest, 9th
Dist. Summit No. 28339, 2017-Ohio-5561, ¶ 34. This Court will not develop a manifest weight
argument on an appellant’s behalf. See Mukha at ¶ 11. “Because Mr. [Jones] has not developed
an argument to support his manifest weight challenge, we decline to conduct a manifest weight
analysis.” State v. Auerswald, 9th Dist. Medina No. 11CA0053-M, 2013-Ohio-742, ¶ 50. His
fourth assignment of error is overruled.
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III.
{¶35} Mr. Jones’ assignments of error are overruled. The judgment of the Summit County
Court of Common Pleas is affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.
There were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
We order that a special mandate issue out of this Court, directing the Court of Common
Pleas, County of Summit, State of Ohio, to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy
of this journal entry shall constitute the mandate, pursuant to App.R. 27.
Immediately upon the filing hereof, this document shall constitute the journal entry of
judgment, and it shall be file stamped by the Clerk of the Court of Appeals at which time the period
for review shall begin to run. App.R. 22(C). The Clerk of the Court of Appeals is instructed to
mail a notice of entry of this judgment to the parties and to make a notation of the mailing in the
docket, pursuant to App.R. 30.
Costs taxed to Appellant.
LYNNE S. CALLAHAN
FOR THE COURT
HENSAL, P. J.
CARR, J.
CONCUR.
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APPEARANCES:
JEREMY A. VEILLETTE, Attorney at Law, for Appellant.
SHERRI BEVAN WALSH, Prosecuting Attorney, and JACQUENETTE S. CORGAN, Assistant
Prosecuting Attorney, for Appellee.